PLATO

MENO

STOCK
THE

MENO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.
PEMBROKE COLLEGE

PART I.—INTRODUCTION AND TEXT

Oxford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1887

[All rights reserved]
PREFACE.

All books are written to satisfy a want, if not on the part of the public, at all events on that of the author. But this book needs less apology than some others; for the Meno is prescribed for the Oxford course, and there is no English edition of it.

The text that has been followed is that of K. F. Hermann. It has not formed part of the scope of this work to discuss differences of reading. My object has been, in the first place, to clear away any difficulties that might present themselves to a novice, except such as merely required a reference to the dictionary, and, in the next place, to supply whatever aids seemed necessary for the full appreciation of the substance and style of the dialogue.

My debt to Stallbaum is immense—far greater than appears from the acknowledgments: but what has been borrowed has become so mixed up with what has been supplied as to render discrimination impossible. A general acknowledgment is therefore the more necessary. Next to Stallbaum most help has been derived from Riddell's admirable Digest of Platonic Idioms, appended to his edition of the Apology, to which a reference has in every case been given.
My thanks are due to my friend, the Rev. R. L. Clarke, of Queen’s College, who kindly spared time from more important work to look over the notes. As an examination made under such circumstances was necessarily hasty, any mistakes that may have escaped his vigilance must be credited to me alone. Since writing the above I have found myself laid under deep obligation to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow of Balliol, for his careful supervision of the whole work during its passage through the press, in the course of which many corrections and improvements have been suggested.

ST. G. STOCK.

8, Museum Villas, Oxford,
April, 1887.
INTRODUCTION.

1. Plato is valuable for his method, rather than for any positive dogmatic truth which he teaches.

'Out of Plato,' says Emerson, 'come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought'—a sentiment which I remember to have heard expressed in more homely language by one of our own professors—'There's no sort of rubbish or nonsense that you won't find in Plato.'

Plato's merit is that he taught the world to think—at least the western portion of it: he did not think for it, as Aristotle did after him. Neither scientific terminology nor dogmatic system are to be found in Plato, save in a most rudimentary form. To say that a man is a 'Platonist' does not really give us any definite idea of his philosophical tenets. We infer that he has an enthusiastic belief in the immortality of the soul, grounded on somewhat shaky arguments, and thinks that ignorance lies at the root of evil. There perhaps the matter ends. We should hardly go on to suspect him of being in favour of a community of women among the upper classes of society.

It was a question among the Ancients whether Plato dogmatized at all. Those who thought that he did found his own opinions expressed through four characters in the dialogues—Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian stranger in the Laws, and the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist. But even the opinions ascribed to Socrates are detached and tentative rather than final and systematic; they are so many isolated and independent efforts to follow out the train of thought of

\[1\] We might credit him also with a belief in the power of the mind to acquire knowledge by the royal road of ideas, independently of experience.
the moment—mere random ventures on the sea of thought of
a mind that was ready to sail wherever the wind of the argu-
ment might blow. It is quite true to say with Voltaire—‘Un
homme qui saurait tout Platon, et qui ne saurait que Platon,
saurait peu, et saurait mal,’ only it is slightly off the point.
One does not go to Plato for facts of science or ready-made
doctrines; but for a spirit and a method, that we may learn
to question all things, while at the same time we become
kindled with his enthusiasm for truth and virtue.

2. Dramatic form of Plato’s writings—perhaps
borrowed from Sicily.

One of the main reasons for this combination of infinite
suggestiveness with such meagreness of positive results is the
form which Plato adopted for his writings. Plato dramatised
the world of thought as completely as Shakespeare drama-
tised the world of action. The mind of the Greeks, at the
time when Plato wrote, was dominated by the drama, as it
had been dominated, in an earlier age, by the forms of epic
poetry. Add to this that philosophy—at least moral philo-
sophy—began in conversation amid the gymnasia and por-
ticoes of Athens, and we see that nothing could be more
natural than that the first mould into which it ran should be
that of the dramatic dialogue. Zeno, the Eleatic, is credited
with having been the first to employ the dialogue, or shares
the honour with one Alexamenus, otherwise unknown. But
before him, we find an anticipation of Plato in a quarter
where it might least have been expected, namely, in the great
comic poet of Sicily, Epicharmus, whose plays seem to have
abounded in philosophical discussions, conducted in due form
of dialectic, though in broad Doric verse. Epicharmus pre-
dicted that somebody would come after him, who would strip
his words of their metre, in place of which he would invest
them with stately robes of diction, and prove himself invin-
cible in the arena of thought, while giving a fall to all his
antagonists. Whether this prophecy was fulfilled by Plato
or not, in the shape of a debt to Epicharmus, it is with his
name alone that the philosophical dialogue is indissolubly associated.  

It has been often noticed that in Aristotle the influence of the dialogue is not yet extinct. Though his works assume the shape of formal treatises, yet we are everywhere conscious of the presence of a suppressed antagonist—a kind of Devil's Advocate, whose business it was to test the claims of every proposition before it was admitted to the canonisation of truth.

3. Tendency of the Greeks to dramatise philosophy.  
Partition of Philosophy.

The connection, on which we have been dwelling above, between philosophy in its earliest form and the drama was recognised by the Greeks themselves. The dialogue was defined as being 'composed of question and answer, on some philosophical or political subject, with appropriate character-drawing of the persons who take part in it, and in an ornate style.' This definition was a common-place of antiquity, for we find it not only in Diogenes Laertius, but in identically the same words in the 'Introduction to Plato's Dialogues' by Albinus. Further, it was pointed out how the progress of philosophy presented an analogy to the progress of the drama. As Thespis first added a single actor to the original song of the chorus, then Aeschylus a second, and Sophocles a third: so philosophy had at first only a single department, namely, physical speculation, to which Socrates added moral science, while Plato perfected its structure with the third division of dialectic. Ever after this the form of philosophy was as rigidly fixed as the form of a tragedy; and every systematic exponent or critic started with the assumption of a tripartite division into φυσική, ηθική, and διαλεκτική, or, as it was called later, λογική. Nor is the division without ground of reason. For philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or man, and if it studies man, it must

1 The celebrated mime-writers of Sicily, Sophron and Xenarchus, are said to have been great favourites with Plato.
regard him either from the side of the emotions or of the intellect.

4. *Trilogies and tetralogies among the dialogues of Plato.*

The desire to trace an analogy between Plato's philosophy and the drama was pushed to an extreme by those commentators who variously distributed his works into trilogies or tetralogies. The latter form was adopted by Aristophanes the grammarian, whose arrangement starts with the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias, but the cogency of the connection is in no case very apparent, and, after five trilogies have been established, the attempt at further classification is abandoned. The other distribution into tetralogies, which has been followed in Hermann's edition of Plato, from which our text is drawn, is resolutely carried out from beginning to end. There are just thirty-six works, including the Letters as one, which were acknowledged in antiquity to be Plato's own, so that they fit conveniently into nine tetralogies. Here we start with a very plausible combination in the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. In the Euthyphro, we become aware of the indictment of Socrates by Meletus; in the Apology we listen to the philosopher's defence of himself before his judges; in the Crito we find him refusing to violate the laws of his country by escaping from jail: in the Phaedo we are admitted as auditors to the dying discourse of

> 'Him, the Master of all thought,  
> Who took the hemlock and superbly died.'

Here, however, the tie of connection is a historical one, which necessarily fails us in the bulk of the dialogues, from which the biographical element is absent. If the principle were pressed, however, our own dialogue, the Meno, would have a right to precede the four just mentioned, for it shows us the motives which induced Anytus, the real mover in the matter, to get up the indictment against Socrates. But the Meno, as a matter of fact, is ranked along with the Euthy-
demus, Protagoras, and Gorgias in a quartette which deals more especially with the views and pretentions of the Sophists.

5. Division of the dialogues into theoretical and practical, etc.

Quite apart from the division into trilogies or tetralogies, there was current also among the Ancients a subtle logical division of the works of Plato, which possesses a real philosophical value.

It is assumed, to begin with, that the works of Plato fall into two main classes, one in which there is a more or less definite conclusion present in the author’s mind, to which he wishes to guide the reader, the other in which the object is vague inquiry. This gives us the two principal ‘characters’ of the λόγος Πλατωνικός—ὑφηγητικός and ζητητικός. The foregoing conclusion may be of a merely speculative nature or one bearing upon life and practice. Thus we are led to a subdivision of the first of the two main classes into theoretical and practical; and these again are subdivided respectively into physical and logical, ethical and political. It is on the other side of the division that we must look for the Meno. The ‘inquisitory’ dialogues are all so many exhibitions of the art of mental wrestling, but may be distinguished into dialogues of practice and of combat (γυμναστικός and ἀγωνιστικός). The latter may end either in proving one’s own proposition or upsetting the adversary’s (ἐνδεικτικός or ἀνατρεπτικός); the former may assume the shape either of eliciting a conclusion from an unpractised thinker or of demolishing his successive attempts to reach one (μαθητικός or πειραστικός). Here then are the eight infimae species which we reach in our division. Plato’s works are either—physical, logical, ethical, political, elicitory, tentative, probative, or eversive. Below these

1 It is worth noticing that Albinus has ἐλεγκτικός in his list (Hermann’s Plato, vol. vi. p. 148), and makes no mention of ἐνδεικτικός. The latter therefore may be a mistake in Diogenes Laertius, iii. § 49. The Protagoras is the only dialogue referred to this head.
there is only the enumeration of the individual dialogues falling under each class, which gives scope for difference of opinion, and we find the list presented by Albinus very different from that of Diogenes Laertius. As to the tentative nature of the Meno, however, all are agreed.

6. Order of the Platonic dialogues.

Into the vexed question of the order of the Platonic writings we need not enter here. There is not sufficient internal evidence to establish a chronological order; and, if there were, it would be no clue to the logical order. Plato did not think systematically, but piecemeal, and whoever thinks in that way—and who does not?—will often have suggested to him by one train of reasoning, and supply later, another which seems necessary to lead up to it. Perhaps no more sensible enunciation has been made touching the order of Plato's writings than that of Albinus, who declared that they constituted a perfect circle, and therefore presented no one point which could rightly be considered prior to another. Only it may be said generally that in its leading idea the Meno presents a connection with the Protagoras; for in that dialogue it is ultimately maintained by Socrates that virtue is knowledge, and therefore can be taught. In the Meno this idea seems to be struggling into the light of certainty, when we are plunged back into confusion again by the admitted absence of teachers. On the subordinate, though intrinsically more important, point of the proof of the pre-existence of the soul from the doctrine of reminiscence, the Meno connects itself with the deeper discussion of the same subject in the Phaedo. In its general tone, and in the conduct of the argument, it reminds the reader of the Theaetetus, though that again is a deeper dialogue than ours.

7. Date of the composition of the Meno.

As regards the date of composition, Stallbaum and others of the German critics consider the Meno to have been written
during the lifetime of Socrates. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, with whom both Grote and Professor Jowett agree, finds a clear reference to the trial and death of Socrates in the concluding words of the Meno; and indeed it is difficult to understand how any other opinion could be arrived at, unless the critic were throttled by a theory. Professor Jowett goes so far as to say—"There is no reason to suppose that any of the dialogues of Plato were written before the death of Socrates," setting aside, apparently, as unworthy of credence, the anecdote told by Diogenes Laertius of how Socrates exclaimed, on hearing Plato read the Lysis—"Good heavens! How many lies the young man has been telling about me!" This is really too good not to be true. And it leads us on to another point. For if Plato thus began to make Socrates his mouth-piece even during the lifetime of the latter, with how much more freedom is the process likely to have been carried on after his death! We can well believe therefore that Plato was so penetrated with the habit of uttering his own thoughts through the medium of Socrates, that he became quite indifferent to chronological accuracy. Any thought which was in Plato's mind was liable to be put into Socrates' mouth. Granting this, we can recognise in the Meno an allusion to the bribing of Ismenias the Theban by the Persians, which would fix the approximate date of the dialogue to a period shortly after B.C. 394.

THE TETRALOGIES,
commonly ascribed to Thrasyllus.

Εὐθυφρων, ἦ περὶ ὀσίου .................. πειραστικός.
'Απολογία Σωκράτους .................. ἡθικός.
Κρῖτων, ἦ περὶ πρακτέον .................. ἡθικός.
Φαίδων, ἦ περὶ ψυχῆς .................. ἡθικός.

Κρατίλος, ἦ περὶ ὀρθότητος ὄνομάτων .................. λογικός.
Θεάτητος, ἦ περὶ ἐπιστήμης .................. πειραστικός.
Σοφιστής, ἦ περὶ τοῦ ὑπνος .................. λογικός.
Πολιτικός, ἦ περὶ βασιλείας .................. λογικός.
Παρμενίδης, ἡ περὶ ἱδεών...
Φιλήθος, ἡ περὶ ἡδονῆς...
Συμπόσιον, ἡ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ...
Φαίδρος, ἡ περὶ ἑρωτοῦ...

'Αλκιβιάδης, ἡ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως...
'Αλκιβιάδης δεύτερος, ἡ περὶ προσευχῆς...
"Ιππαρχος, ἡ φιλοκερδῆς...
'Ἀντερασταῖ, ἡ περὶ φιλοσοφίας...

Θεάγης, ἡ περὶ σοφίας...
Χαριμίδης, ἡ περὶ σωφροσύνης...
Λάχης, ἡ περὶ ἀνδρείας...
Λύσις, ἡ περὶ φιλίας...

Εὐθύδημος, ἡ ἐριστικὸς...
Πρωταγόρας, ἡ Σοφισταῖ...
Γοργίας, ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς...
Μένων, ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς...

'Ιππίας πρῶτος, ἡ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ...
'Ιππίας δεύτερος, ἡ περὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦ...
"Ιων, ἡ περὶ 'Ιλιάδος...
Μενέζενος, ἡ ἐπιτάφιος...

Κλεισοφόν, ἡ προτρεπτικὸς...
Πολιτεία, ἡ περὶ δικαίου...
Τίμαιος, ἡ περὶ φύσεως...
Κριτίας, ἡ 'Ατλαντικὸς...

Μίνως, ἡ περὶ νόμου...
Νόμοι, ἡ περὶ νομοθεσία...
'Ἐπινομίς, ἡ νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος, ἡ φιλόσοφος...
'Ἐπιστολαῖ...

logikós.
θεικός.
θεικός.
θεικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
ανατρεπτικός.
μειραστικός.
ανατρεπτικός.
μαευτικός.
μειραστικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
μαευτικός.
DIVISION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO.

Δόγμα Πλατωνικός (expository)

στροφικός (theoretical)

γνώμωνικός (controversial)

διαγωνικὸς (inquisitorial)

εὐδοκητικός (persuasive)

περαιητικός (tentative)

εὐδοκητικός (persuasive)

μετρητικός (understanding)

ἀθηνητικός (ethical)

πολιτικός (political)

φυσικός (natural)

λογικός (logical)

θεωρητικός (theoretical)

πρακτικός (practical)

γυμναστικός (exercitatory)

υφήγητικός (expository)
** COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE. **

*How is virtue to be attained?*

Meno, a somewhat sophisticated youth, who has studied under Gorgias, propounds to Socrates an inquiry as to how virtue is to be attained. Does it come (1) by teaching, (2) by training, or (3) by nature? (70 A).

*What is virtue?*

Socrates objects to this question on the ground that he does not know what virtue is, and, what is more, has never met with anybody who did (70 B–71 B). Meno is of opinion that Gorgias knew all about it, and undertakes to answer the question himself (71 C, D).

*Meno's account of virtue; he enumerates many virtues.*

The virtue of a man, he says, is to be competent to manage affairs of state, and, in managing them, to help his friends and hurt his foes, and avoid being hurt himself. The virtue of a woman is to manage her household well, taking care of the things, and obeying her husband. Again, there is the virtue of a child, whether girl or boy, and of an elder person, of a freeman, and of a slave. In fact, every age, sex, and condition has its different virtue (71 E–72 A).

*What is the common element in these?*

This first attempt to define virtue is really an enumeration, and not a definition. Accordingly Socrates asks for the essential attributes which cause these various virtues to be called by the same name, illustrating his question by the example of the word 'bee' (72 B).

*Explanation of what is meant by a common element or general idea.*

Meno only dimly grasps the conception of a general idea (72 C), and Socrates proceeds to enforce his meaning by the
parallel examples of health, strength, and size. Does Meno think that the health of a man is different from the health of a woman? Or that health has one and the same form (είδος), wheresoever existent? (72 D, E). Meno is willing to grant the essential unity of these ideas, but thinks that the case of virtue is somehow different from the rest (73 A). Socrates, however, gets him to admit that man and woman, child and elder will alike require the same things, namely, justice and temperance, if they are to be virtuous (73 A, B).

Virtue is the capacity of ruling over men.

It being agreed then that virtue is one and the same thing, wherever found, Meno is again called upon to define it. He does so offhand, declaring virtue to be 'the capacity of ruling over men' (73 C).

Faults of the definition.

This first attempt at a formal definition falls an easy prey to the dialectic of Socrates. For (1) it cannot possibly apply to the virtue of a child or a slave, whereas it is essential to a logical definition that it should be co-extensive with the thing defined; and (2) the mere capacity to rule is not virtue, but only the capacity to rule justly. Meno admits the force of both these objections, saying as to the latter—'For justice, Socrates, is virtue' (73 D).

What is wanted is definition, not enumeration.

Hereupon Socrates asks him whether justice is virtue or a virtue, and sets him floundering once more amid the difficulties of a general idea. Socrates illustrates his own question by the case of figure. He would not call roundness 'figure,' but 'a figure,' because there are other figures. 'Yes,' says Meno, 'and so I say that there are other virtues as well as justice' (73 E). When asked what these are he specifies temperance, wisdom, and magnificence, showing incidentally how wide was the Greek conception of virtue, including, as
it did, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic elements. Socrates again reminds him that what he wants to arrive at is the one idea which underlies these different phases of virtue (74 A).

The definition of figure.

Meno confesses his inability to arrive at this, and Socrates helps him to understand the question by the parallel instances of 'figure' and 'colour' (74 B, C). To say that the round and the straight are both figures is not to say that the round is straight or the straight round, but it is to say that there is something called 'figure' which is common to both (74 D, E). Let Meno then say what this something is (75 A).

Meno throws the task on Socrates, under promise that he, in his turn, will attempt to define virtue; and Socrates accordingly defines figure as 'the only thing which invariably accompanies colour' (75 B). Meno jeers at this definition on the ground that it assumes a knowledge of colour, and thus involves what is known in logic as the fault of ignotum per ignotius, or, as in this case, per aequae ignotum (75 C). Accordingly Socrates, admitting the principle that a definition should be clearer than the thing defined (75 D), propounds another definition of figure as 'the termination of a solid' (75 E-76 A).

Colour defined in the style of Gorgias.

Meno now calls for a definition of colour; and Socrates, after bantering him on his imperiousness (76 A, B), asks him whether he would like a definition in the style of Gorgias. To this Meno eagerly assents; whereupon Socrates, assuming the Empedoclean doctrine of sense-perception being due to emanations from bodies, defines colour as 'an emanation from bodies commensurate with and perceptible by sight'—a definition which is hailed with enthusiasm by Meno (76 C, D). Socrates hints that Meno likes this definition on account of its pomposity, and expresses his own preference for the definition of figure (76 E).
Meno once more defines virtue.

It is now Meno’s turn to define virtue, for which the other definitions were meant by way of practice (77 A).

Adopting the sentiments of some poet, Meno defines virtue as ‘the desire for honourable things combined with the power of procuring them’ (77 B).

To this it is objected by Socrates that to desire things honourable is to desire good, and all men desire good, so that the definition is wider than the thing defined (77 C–78 A). It follows from this that the difference between one man and another must lie in the power of procuring good, so that Meno’s definition now assumes this shape—‘Virtue is the power of procuring good things’ (78 B).

But in vain.

This third attempt of Meno’s at a formal definition of virtue is upset on the ground that good things must be provided justly, if there is to be any virtue in the matter; so that we are in fact defining the genus, virtue, by its species, justice, and are involved in our old vicious circle. It will be necessary to begin the whole thing over again (78 C–79 E).

Socrates confesses his own ignorance, but he is willing to help Meno in finding out what virtue is.

On hearing this, Meno’s patience gives way, and he compares Socrates to a torpedo which paralyses everything which comes near to it (80 A, B).

Socrates playfully rejoins that he suspects Meno is fishing for compliments, and wants to hear a simile about himself in return. He pleads guilty to filling others with doubt, but declares that it is because he is full of doubt himself. But though he does not know what virtue is, he is quite ready to join Meno in searching into the matter (80 C, D).

Is such discovery possible? How can we acquire knowledge?

At this point the dialogue takes an unexpected turn, for
Meno suddenly produces a weapon from the armoury of the Sophists, in the shape of a dilemma against the possibility of mental search—

If one knows a thing, search is superfluous; and if one does not know it, search is useless.

Either one knows a thing or one does not.

\[ \therefore \text{Search is either superfluous or useless (80 D, E).} \]

Knowledge is reminiscence.

Socrates bodily accepts one horn of this dilemma, declaring that, as a matter of fact, we do know all things. For the soul is immortal, and, though subject to what we call birth and death, is in its essence indestructible. Having therefore existed from all time, it has seen and learnt all things (81 A–C). Now inasmuch as nature is all of a piece, and its truths all connected one with another, there is nothing to prevent the soul which has forgotten anything from tracking it out within itself, by following up any clue, if only it has the energy and perseverance to do so. This is how men can evoke knowledge from their own minds on subjects of which they seemed at starting to be blankly ignorant (81 D).

Meno does not appear at all surprised at the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and metempsychosis, for which we may suppose him to have been prepared by the philosophy of Empedocles; but he is not quite so ready to accept the corollary of reminiscence (81 E).

Socrates accordingly proceeds to illustrate this latter doctrine by a practical example.

Practical illustration of the doctrine. Examination of the slave.

He asks Meno to call one of his numerous pages, a perfectly uneducated lad. Showing this boy a square, Socrates elicits from him that if the side of such a figure were two feet, the figure itself would be four square feet; likewise that a square twice as big as this would consist of eight square feet (82 A–D). Then Socrates asks how big the line would be on which the double square would be described, and the
ΜΕΝΩΝ

[ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς· πειραστικὸς.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ,

ΑΝΤΤΟΣ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐχεις μοι εἶπεῖν, ὥς Σωκρατες, ἄρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἐρετή; ἡ οὖ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητὸν; ἡ οὗτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητῶν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἀλλή τυπι τρόπῳ;

ΣΩ. Ὡ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θεταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ ἔθανομάζοντο ἐφ' ἱππική τε καὶ πλοῦτῳ, νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφία, καὶ Β ὁ γὰρ ἠκιστα ὁ τοῦ σοῦ ἔταραρ Ἀριστίππον πολίται Λαρισαῖοι. τοῦτοι δὲ υμῖν αὔτοις ἐστὶν Γοργίας' ἀφικώμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἔραστας ἐπὶ σοφία εἰλήφειν Ἀλευνάδων τὲ τῶν πρώτων, ὅν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἔστω Ἀριστίππος, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν Θεταλῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ύμᾶς εἰδίκευ, ἀφοβόμεν τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐὰν τὸς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τὸν εἰδότας, ἃτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἔρωταν τῶν Ἕλλης· οὐκ ἄν τοῦ βουλομένῳ ὅ τι ἠν τῆς βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτι ....
οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. εὐθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον
71 περιέστηκεν· ἂσπερ αὐχμὸς τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονε, καὶ
kινδυνεύει έκ τῶν τῶν τόπων παρ' ὡμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ή
σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινὰ θέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν εὐθάδε,
οὔτες οὕτως οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἔρει· ὥς ξένε, κινδυνεύω
σοι δοκεῖν μακαρίος τις εἶναι, ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἶτε διδακτὸν
εἴθ' ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγιγνεται εἰδέναι· ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον
dέω εἶτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτό.
ὄ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαυν ἀρετή, τυνχάρω εἰδῶς.

Β Ἐγὼ οὕν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω· συμπένομαι
tοῖς πολίταις τούτων τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν κατα-
μέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαυν ὅ δέ
μὴ οἴδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖον γέ τι εἰδείην; ἦ δοκεὶ
σοι οἴον τε εἶναι, ὡστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παρά-
παυν ὡστὶς ἐστὶ, τούτων εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος
eἴτε καὶ γενναῖος ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τάναντια τούτων; δοκεὶ
σοι οἴον τ' εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς
C οὔτ' ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστιν οὐσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ
οἴκαθε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὥς ἐταϊρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὔτ' ἀλλο
πῶ εὔνετυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

ΜΕΝ. Τί δαί; Γοργία οὐκ εὔνετυχες ὅτε εὐθάδε ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε.

ΜΕΝ. Εἴται οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;

ΣΩ. Οὐ πάνω εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὅστε οὐκ ἔχω
εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ' ἵσως
D ἐκείνος τε οἴδε, καὶ σὺ ὃ ἐκείνος ἐλεγεν' ἀνάμνησουν οὖν
με, πῶς ἐλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπὲ' δοκεὶ γὰρ ὅτι
ποῦ σοι ἀπερ ἐκείνψ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Ἐκείνου μὲν τοῖνυν ἔως μὲν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστὶν σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τι φής ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἴπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχεστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὁ, ἂν φανῆς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδειν πῶστε εἰδότι ἐνυτευχηκέναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ χαλεποῦν, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἶπεῖν. πρῶ-Ε τον μὲν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ράδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ᾿ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴ τὴν οἰκίαν εὐ οἰκεῖν, σωζοῦσαν τε τὰ ἐνδοὺ καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς. καὶ ἀλλή ἐστὶ παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενους, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἄνδρος, εἰ μὲν 72 βούλει, ἔλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δοῦλου. καὶ ἀλλαὶ πάμπολλα ἅρεται εἰσίν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετής πέρι ο τι ἐστιν' καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἥλικιῶν πρὸς ἐκαστὸν ἔργουν ἐκάστῳ ἕμων ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ὁσαύτως δὲ, οὐμαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

ΣΩ. Πολλὴ γέ τινι εὐτυχία ἑοικα κεχρησθαί, ὃ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμὴν τῇ ἀνεύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοι κεμένων. ἀτάρ, ὃ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τήν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμὴν, εἰ μοι ἐρομένον μελίττης περὶ Β οὐσίας ὁ τὶ ποτ' ἐστιν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐλεγες αὐτάς εἶναι, τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνῳ μοι, εἰ σε ἡρόμην ἀρα τούτῳ φής πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφεροῦσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἡ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφε- ροῦσιν, ἄλλῳ δὲ τῷ, οἶον ἥ κάλλει ἡ μεγέθει ἡ ἄλλῳ τῷ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνῳ οὕτως ἑρωθείες;

ΜΕΝ. Τοῦτ’ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ὑ μέληται εἰσίν, ἡ ἐτέρα τῆς ἐτέρας.
ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο τοινύν μοι αὐτὸ εἶπέ, ὃς Μένων, ὃς οὖν δὲν διαφέρονσιν ἄλλα ταὐτὸν εἶσιν ἀπασαί τί τοῦτο φήσι εἶναι; εἴχες δὴ ποὺ ἄν τι μοι εἶπεῖν; MEN. Ἐγγείη.

ΣΩ. Οὐτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν καὶ εἰ πολλαί καὶ παντοδαπαῖ εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἴδος ταῦτων ἀπασαί ἔχουσίν, δὲ ὁ εἰσὶν ἄρεται, εἰς δὲ καλῶς ποὺ ἔχει ἀποβλέψεις τῶν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκείνῳ δηλώσαι,

D ὁ τυγχάνει οὕσα ἄρετή ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὁ τι λέγο; MEN. Δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν' οὐ μέντοι ὅσι θεολομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτήμενον.

ΣΩ. Πόσον δὲ περὶ ἄρετῆς μόνον σοι οὖτω δοκεῖ, ὃς Μένων, ἀλλὴ μὲν ἄνδρὸς εἶναι, ἀλλή δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἡ καὶ περὶ υγίειας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἱσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἀλλή μὲν ἄνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι υγίεια, ἀλλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς; ἡ ταῦτων πανταχοῦ εἴδος ἐστιν, εάν περ υγίεια ἡ, εάν τε ἐν ἄνδρι εάν τε ἐν ἄλλῳ

Ε ὀτρόθυν ἡ; MEN. Ἡ αὐτῆ μοι δοκεῖ υγίεια γε εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἱσχύς; εάν περ ἱσχυρὰ γυνὴ ἡ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἱσχύι ἱσχυρὰ ἐσται; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω οὖν ἀλλοι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἱσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἱσχύς, εάν τε ἐν ἄνδρι ἡ ἐάν τε ἐν γυναικί ἡ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

MEN. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε. 73 ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ἄρετή πρὸς τὸ ἄρετὴ εἶναι διολογεῖ τι, εάν τε ἐν παιδί ἡ ἐάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτη, εάν τε ἐν γυναικί ἐάν τε ἐν ἄνδρι;

MEN. Ἐμοιγε πως δοκεῖ, ὃς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὁμοίον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.
MEN. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐλεγεῖ πόλιν εὐ διοικεῖν, γυναῖκὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;
MEN. Ἕγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ὁρ’ οὖν οἶν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦτα;
MEN. Οὐ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν περ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσι, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη διοικήσουσιν;
MEN. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.
MEN. Φαίνονται.
ΣΩ. Τί δαί; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης µῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἀδικοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο;
MEN. Οὐ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σωφρόνες καὶ δίκαιοι;
MEN. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ’ ἀνθρωποὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἄγαθοί εἰσιν. τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γέγονονται.
MEN. Ἕοικεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δήτου, εἰ γε µὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄν τρόπῳ ἄγαθοι ἦσαν.
MEN. Οὐ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῦν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστὶ, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτὸ φησί Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ᾿ ἐκείνων.
MEN. Τί ἄλλο γ’ ἡ ἀρχειν οἶν τ’ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώ-πων; εἴπερ ἐν γε τι χήτεις κατὰ πάντων.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ µὴν ζητῶ γε. ἄλλ’ ἄρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὡ Μένων, καὶ δοῦλου, ἄρχειν οὐ̣ ὲ τε
εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἐτι ἀν δούλος εἶναι ὁ ἀρχων;

MEN. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὧ ἀριστε. ἐτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει: ἀρχεῖν φῆς οἶον τ’ εἶναι: οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτὸς τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;

MEN. Οἴμαι ἐγώγε’ ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἀρετή ἑστιν.

Ε ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀρετή τις;

MEN. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὄς περὶ ἀλλὸν ὄτου οὕν. οἶον, εἰ βούλει, στρογ-γυλότητος πέρι εἴπομ’ ἂν ἔγωγε, ὃτι σχῆμα τὶ ἑστιν, οὐχ οὔτως ἀπλῶς ὃτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὔτως ἂν εἴπομι, ὃτι καὶ ἄλλα ἑστι σχῆματα.

MEN. Ὅρθως γε λέγων σύ, ἔπει καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς.

74 ΣΩ. Τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ’ οἶον καὶ ἐγὼ σοι εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχῆματα, εἰ με κελεύοις καὶ συ οὖν ἐμοι εἴπε ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

MEN. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τούτων ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετή ἑστιν καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταύτων πεπόνθαμεν πολλάς αὐ εὐρήκαμεν ἀρετάς μίαν ἡτούντες, ἄλλου τρόπον ἡ νῦν ἡ’ τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἦ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἑστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρέιν.

Β MEN. Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι πω, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὡς σὺ ἡτεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε ἂλλ’ ἐγὼ προσβήσομαι, ἐὰν οἶος τ’ ᾧ, ἡμᾶς προσβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γὰρ που, ὃτι οὔτωσι ἔχει περὶ πάντως’ εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τούτο, ὦ νῦν ὅ’
ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστι σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες
(ὅτι) στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι εἶπεν ἀπέρ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα
ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἡ σχῆμα τί; εἶπες ὅπου ἃν ὦτι
σχῆμα τί.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶ σχῆματα; Ο
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἃν;
ΜΕΝ. Ἕγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὀσσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὁ τι
ἐστιν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν
ὁ ἑρωτῶν, πότερον τὸ λευκόν χρώμα ἐστὶν ἡ χρώμα τί;
εἶπες ἃν ὦτι χρώμα τί, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα;
ΜΕΝ. Ἕγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα,
ἔλεγες ἃν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἦττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα
τοῦ λευκοῦ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ὦτι ὁσσερ ἐγὼ μετήει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν
ὅτι αἰὲ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνοῦμεθα, ἄλλα μή μοι οὕτως, ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐνὶ τυπὶ προσαγορεύεις ὄνοματί,
καὶ φής οὐδέν αὐτῶν ὁ τι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ
ἐναντία ὄντα ἄλληλους, τί ἐστὶ τούτο, ὅ οὐδέν ἦττον
κατέχει τὸ στρογγυλόν ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὁ δὴ ὄνομάζεις σχῆμα
καὶ οὐδέν μᾶλλον φής τὸ στρογγυλόν σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ Ἐ
εὐθύ; ἢ οὖχ οὐτω λέγεις;
ΜΕΝ. Ἕγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγης, τότε οὐδέν μᾶλλον
φής τὸ στρογγυλόν εἶναι στρογγύλου ἢ εὐθύ, οὔτε τὸ
εὐθύ εὐθύ ἢ στρογγύλου;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήποτε, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΜΕΝ. 'Αλλά μήν σχήμα γε ουδέν μάλλον φής εἶναι τῷ στρογγύλῳ τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τῷ ἑτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο, οὐ τοῦτο ὄνομα ἔστι τῷ σχήμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἶ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ

ΣΩ. Περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὦ τι βούλει, ὥ ἀνθρώπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὦ τι λέγεις· ἢ ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πάσιν τούτοις ταυτὸν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχους ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τίς ἐρωτήφη τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις, ὅ ἡ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταυτὸν ἐπὶ πάσι; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηται σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.

ΜΕΝ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὦ Σῶκρατες, εἰπὲ.

ΣΩ. Βούλει ποι ὑπόσχομαι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. 'Εθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. 'Εγώγε.

ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοῖνυν' ἄξιον γάρ.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρώμεθα σοι εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστι σχήμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἐστώ γάρ δὴ ἢ μίν τοῦτο σχήμα, τὸ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἢ ἐποίημενον· ἰκανῶς σοι, ἡ ἀλλὶς πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γάρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῶν εἰ μοι ἀρετὴν εἰποῖς.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε εὐθῆς, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΜΕΝ. ὁτι σχήμα ποὺ ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὁ ἂν χρόνι ἐπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόνιν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ωσάυτως ἀποροῖ ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴη σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;
ΣΩ. Τάληθη ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἶη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρώμενος, εἶπομ' ἀν αὐτῷ ὃτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰρηταί· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὥρθῳς λέγω, σὸν δ' ἐργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἔλεγχευν. εἰ δὲ ὠσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλομεν ἀλλήλοις δια-
λέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότερον πώς καὶ διαλεκτικῶτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ᾿Ισως τὸ διαλεκτικῶτερον μὴ μόνον τάληθη ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἑκείνων δὲν ἀν προσιμολογηθῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτόμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ σοι οὖτωs εἰπεῖν. λέγε γὰρ μοι· τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνιδε λέγω οἶνον πέρας καὶ ἐσχατον πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτὸν τι λέγω· ᾿Ισως δ' ἂν ἡμῖν Ὀρδίκος δια-
φέρωτο· ἀλλὰ σὺ γέ πον καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικὼν.

ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὁ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἔτερον αὐτορεῦν, 76 οἶον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίαις;

ΜΕΝ. ῾Εγώγε καλῶ.

ΣΩ. ᾿Ηδὲ τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μον ἐκ τοῦτων, σχῆμα ὁ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχῆματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς τὸ στερεόν περάνει, τοῦτ’ εἶναι σχῆμα· ὁπερ ἂν συλλα-
βῶν εἴπομι στερεόν πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Τὸ δὲ χρώμα τί λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὁβριστὴς γ' εἰ, ὃ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη 
πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέ-
λεις ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπεῖν, τὸ τί ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν Ἑ 
εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. ᾿Αλλ' ἐπειδὰν μοι σὺ τοῦτ' εἴπης, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἑρῶ σοι.
ΣΩ. Καν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνώή, ὁ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἰ καὶ ἑρασταί σου ἔτι εἰσίν.
ΜΕΝ. Τί ὢν;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλη ἡ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἀτε τυραννεύοντες, ἔως ἄν C ἐν ὀρᾶ ὑσι. καὶ ἀμα ἐμοῦ ἵσωσ κατέγυνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ ἦττων τῶν καλῶν. χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρίνομαι.
ΜΕΝ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.
ΣΩ. Βούλεις οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἣ ἄν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;
ΜΕΝ. Βούλομαι πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὀντῶν κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;
ΜΕΝ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὖς καὶ δι᾽ ὃν αἰ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;
ΜΕΝ. Πάννυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν D πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάπτους ἡ μεῖξιος εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἑστὶ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἑγώγη.
ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων ὡς ξύνες ὁ τοι λέγω, ἐφη Πύνδαρος. ἤστι γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροῇ σχῆματων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητὸς.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὡ Σωκράτες, ταῦτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.
ΣΩ. Ἐσως γὰρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν ἐηρηται· καὶ ἀμα, οἷμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἄν εἰς αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνῆν, Ἐ δὲ ἤστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.
ΜΕΝ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τραγική γάρ ἦστιν, ὡς Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὡστε ἂρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ σχήματος.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦστιν, ὡς Ἀλέξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἦμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη βελτίων' οἶμαι δὲ οὖν ἄν σοι δόξαι, εἰ μὴ, ὥσπερ χθές ἐλεγες, ἀναγκαῖον σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ' εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μνηθείσις.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ' ἄν, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰ μοι 77 πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἴσος τ' ἐσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἢθι δὴ πειρώ καὶ σὺ ἐμό τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδούναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἄρετής πέρι, ὅ τι ἐστί, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβουσας τι ἐκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτουτες, ἀλλ' ἔσασας οἶλην καὶ ὑγίην ἐπὶ τί ἐστιν ἄρετήτα τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρ' ἐμὸν ἐλήφας.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ τοῖς μοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἄρετή εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητής λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖς καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἄρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατῶν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα λέγεις τῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητήν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἐτέρων δὲ οἱ τῶν ἁγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὅριστε, δοκοῦσι Σ σοι τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τινὲς τῶν κακῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.
ΜΕΝΟ, 77 C – 78 A.

ΣΩ. Οἵομενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὦμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. Ἄμφοτερα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὁ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὦμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;
Δ ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὑφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ὃ ἀν γενήται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ὃ ἀν παρῇ;
ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὑφελεῖν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γιγνώσκοντες ὧτι βλάπτει.
ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακά, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὑφελεῖν;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἀγνοοῦτες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνων, ἃ φωντο ἡ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἐστὶ δὲ ταῦτα γε κακαί· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦτες αὐτὰ καὶ οἵομενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὐ;
ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὕτοι γε.
ΣΩ. Τί δαί; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῆς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον, ὃ ἀν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσι δῆλον ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ' αὐτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

78 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὕτοι οὐκ οἴουσαν ἂθλίους εἶναι καθ' ὅσον βλάπτονται;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τὸ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τοὺς δὲ ἂθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;
MEN. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν οὖν ὁστὶς βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὡς Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἀλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι, ἡ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

MEN. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες· καὶ Β οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἐστιν ἡ ἄρετὴ βούλεσθαι τε τάγαθα καὶ δύνασθαι;

MEN. Εἴπον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτον λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἐτέρος τοῦ ἐτέρου βελτίων;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλον, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἄν εἰ ἀμείων.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' ἐστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἄρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζομαι τάγαθα.

MEN. Παντάπασι μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σοῦ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΣΩ. Ἰδομεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἵσως γὰρ ἀν εὖ λέγοις. τάγαθα φῆς οἶον τ' εἶναι πορίζομαι ἄρετήν εἶναι;

MEN. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶον υγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον, καὶ χρυσόν λέγω καὶ ἄργυρον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμᾶς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἄρχας; μὴ ἄλλᾳ ἄττα λέγεις τάγαθα ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
MEN. Οὗ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἴεν τρυσίν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετῆ ἐστὶν, ὡς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικός ξένος. πότερον προστίθης τι τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὡς Μένων, τὸ δικαίος καὶ ὁ σίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετῆν καλεῖς;

MEN. Οὐ δήποτε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ κακλαν.

ΣΩ. Πάντως δήποτε δεῖ ἁρα, ὡς εοίκε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἐν ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς εἴ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐσται ἀρετῆ, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τάγαθα.

MEN. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετῆ γένουτ' ἂν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζεσθαι τρυσίν καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δικαιοῦν, μὴτε αὐτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν ἁρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετῆ ἄν εἰη, ἀλλὰ, ὡς εοίκεν, ὁ μὲν ἄν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνεται, ἀρετῆ ἐσται, ὁ δ' ἄν ἄνευ 79 πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἐκαστὸν ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

MEN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Εἴτα, ὡς Μένων, παιδείς πρός με;

MEN. Τί δή, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. "Οτι ἄρτι ἑμὸν δειθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετῆν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθ' ὁ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἡμέλησας, λέγεις.
ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT.

The argument of the Meno seems to fall naturally into three main divisions—

I. The attempt to define virtue, arising out of the initial question—'Can virtue be taught?' 70 A-80 D.

II. The exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence, in answer to the sophistical argument against the possibility of search; 80 D-86 C.

III. Hypothetical resumption of the original question; 86 C-100 C.

These three parts may be further subdivided as follows—

I. The attempt to define virtue; 70-80 D.
   a. Introductory; 70-71 D.
   b. Enumeration of virtues in mistake for a definition; 71 E-73 C.
   c. First definition of virtue, as 'the capacity to rule over men,' refuted; 73 C-74 A.
   d. Method of definition illustrated by the case of figure, which is defined to be
      (1) the sole invariable concomitant of colour;
      (2) the termination of a solid, 74 B-76 A,
and of colour, which is defined, in accordance with the philosophy of Empedocles, to be 'an emanation from bodies commensurate with and perceptible by sight;' 76 A-E.
   e. Second definition of virtue, 'To desire noble things and be able to attain them,' refuted; 77 A-78 B.
   f. Third definition of virtue, as 'The power of providing what is good,' refuted; 78 C-79 E.
   g. Despair of Meno; 80 A-D.
ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT.

II. Exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence; 80 D-86 B.
   a. Dilemma against the possibility of search; 80 D, E.
   b. Statement of the doctrine of reminiscence; 81 A-82 B.
   c. Illustration of the doctrine in the person of Meno's page (82 B-86 B) comprising
      (1) The dissipation of fancied knowledge; 82 C-83 E.
      (2) Inculcation of the advantages of doubt; 84 A-C.
      (3) The recovery of knowledge within the soul; 84 D-86 B.

III. Hypothetical resumption of the original question; 86 C-100 C.
   a. Illustration of the meaning of hypothesis; 86 C-87 C.
   b. Proof that virtue is knowledge or prudence, and must therefore come by teaching, and not by nature; 87 D-89 B.
   c. Objection. There are no teachers (89 C, D); for
      (1) The Sophists, who profess virtue are not so; 89 E-92 D.
      (2) Neither are the statesmen who display it; 92 E-94 E.
   d. General uncertainty as to the teachability of virtue; 95 A-96 B.
   e. Resulting conclusion that virtue cannot be taught; 96 B, C.
   f. Discovery that right opinion may serve as a substitute for knowledge; 96 D-98 C.
   g. Recapitulation of the argument, culminating in the conclusion that virtue, as we know it, is not founded on knowledge, and must therefore be a kind of inspiration; 98 C-100 C.
ΜΕΝΟ, 79 B – E.

δὲ μοι, ὅτι ἄρετὴ ἔστιν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι Β
μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· τότῳ δὲ φής μόριον ἄρετῆς εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἕγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἡξ ὧν σὺ ὀμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ
μορίου ἄρετῆς πράττειν, ὃ τι ἄν πράττῃ, τούτῳ ἄρετῆν
εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φής ἄρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ
ἐκάστα τούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν ὅ;γ;

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ λέγω, ὅτι ἐμοὶ δηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν
τὴν ἄρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὃ τι ἔστι,
πᾶσαν δὲ φής πράξειν ἄρετήν εἶναι, ἐἀνπερ μετὰ μορίου
ἄρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὃ τι ἄρετὴ ἔστι τὸ C
ὅλον καὶ ᾦδη γνωσμένον ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἔαν σὺ κατακερ-
ματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἡξ
ἀρχῆς, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὃ φίλε
Μένων, τί ἐστίν ἄρετή, ἐκ μετὰ μορίου ἄρετῆς πᾶσα
πράξεις ἄρετὴ ἄν εἴη; τούτῳ γὰρ ἔστι λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ
tις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράξεις ἄρετὴ ἔστιν.
ἡ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν ἰεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ’
οὐ εἰς τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἄρετῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ
eἰδότα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἐλ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ’ ἐγώ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην D
περὶ τοῦ σχῆματος, ἀπεβάλλομεν ποὺ τὴν τοιαύτην
ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ξητουμένων καὶ μῆπω ὄμολο-
γημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὄρθως γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὡ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἐτι ξητουμένης
ἄρετῆς ὅλης ὃ τι ἔστων οἷον διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀπο-
κρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὅτως, ἡ ἄλλο ὃπλών
tοῦτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς E
δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἢ λέγεις; ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

ΜΕΝ. Ἂμοιγε δοκεῖς ὁρθῶς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἡ ἄρχης τί φῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἔταιρός σου;

ΜΕΝ. ΟΣ Σῶκρατες, ἰκουνοῦ μὲν ἐγώγε πρίν καὶ συγ-
80 γενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδέν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν' καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γογτευεῖς με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατε-
πάδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τὸ τε ἔδος καὶ τὰλλα ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ γάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησίαζοντα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκῶν ποιεῖ καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἔμε τοιοῦτον τι πεποιηκέναι,

Β ναρκᾶν. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἐγώγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι ἀποκρίνωμαι σοι. καίτοι μυρίάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, καὶ πάντως ἔτι, ὡς γέ ἐμαντῷ ἐδόκοιν' νῦν δὲ οὖν ὃ τι ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖς ἐν βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένευ οὐδὲ ἀποδημῶν ἐγὼ γὰρ ξένωος ἐν ἄλλη πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ' ἀν ὃς γόῆς ἀπαχθεῖσι. ἀμήθ

ΣΩ. Πανοῦργος εἰ, ὃ Μένων, καὶ ὅλγουν ἐξηπα-
τησάς με.

ΜΕΝ. Τι μάλιστα, ὃ Σῶκρατες;

C ΣΩ. Τίνος ὡς ὁ οἴει;

ΣΩ. Ἄνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι. λυσι-
tελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλὰς γὰρ, οἴμαι, τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαι σε. ἐγὼ δὲ, εἰ μὲν ἡ
νάρκη αὐτή ναρκῶσα οὖτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἐσικε αὐτῇ᾽ εἰ δὲ μῆ, οivec. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορείν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὖτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορείν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅ ἐστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μὲντοι ἵσως πρῶτερον μὲν Ὅ ἱδήσθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἄφασθαι, νῦν μὲντοι ὁμοίοι εἰ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὁμοίος δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὃ τι ποτε ἐστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητῆσεις, ὥς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν をしている ἐστι; ποιῶν γὰρ ἄν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητῆσεις; ἢ εἴ καὶ ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐντύχως αὐτῷ, πῶς εἰσε ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ἱδήσθα;  

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἶνον βούλει λέγειν, ὥς Μένων. ὥρᾶς ἐς τοῦτον ὃς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατὰγεις, ὃς οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὁ οἶδεν οὔτε ὁ μὴ οἶδεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γε ὁ οἶδε ζητοῖ. οἶδε γάρ, καὶ οὔδεν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητῆσεως οὔτε ὁ μὴ οἶδεν οὔδε γὰρ οἶδεν ὃ τι ζητῆσει.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σου δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὃ λόγος ὅ  

οὗτος, ὥς Σώκρατες;  

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.  

ΜΕΝ. Ἐχεις λέγειν ὅπε;  

ΣΩ. Ἐγώγε ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεία πράγματα—

ΜΕΝ. Τίνα λόγου λεγόντων;  

ΣΩ. Ἀλήθη, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλῶν.  

ΜΕΝ. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;  

ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντες εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ ἱερείων ὀσοὶ μεμέληκε περὶ ὅν μεταχειρίζονται λόγου οἴους ὃ εἶναι διδόναι λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ὃ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὃσοι θεῶι εἰσιν. ὃ δὲ λέγουσι, ταῦτα
ἐστιν· ἄλλα σκόπει, εἰ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἄληθῆ λέγειν.
φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀδάνατον, καὶ
tοτὲ μὲν τελευτῶν, ὃ ἢ ἀποθνῄσκει καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ
πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλυσθαι ὃ' οὐδεποτε· δεῖν ὃ διὰ
tαῦτα ὅς ὀσιώτατα διαβιβάζῃ τὸν βίου·
οὐσι γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιὸν πένθεος
dέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεν ἄλινον κειμῶν ἐνάτῳ ἔτει
ἀνδιδοὶ ψυχὰν πάλιν,
καὶ σθένει κρασίνοι σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι
ἀνδρεῖς αὔξουν· ἔστε δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἱήρως ἄγνω
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῖνται.

"Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδάνατος τε οὐσα καὶ πολλάκις
γεγονὼν, καὶ ἑωρακών καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδον
καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἐστιν ὃ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὡστε
οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν καὶ περὶ ἀρετής καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οὕς
τε εἶναι αὐτήν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἀ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπι-
στατο. ἀτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάτης συγγενοῦσι οὕσης,
καὶ μεμαθηκώς τῆς ψυχής ἀπαιντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν
μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἀνθρώπωι,
tάλλα πάντα αὐτῶν ἀνευρεῖν, ἕαν τις ἀνδρεῖος ἂ καὶ μὴ
ἀποκάμην ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν
ἀνάμνησις ὀλον ἐστὶν. οὐκοι δεὶ πέλθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ
ἐρωτικῷ λόγῳ· οὕτως μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἄργους ποιήσειε
καὶ ἐστὶ τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδος ἀκούσαι, οὐδὲ
δὲ ἐργαστικοὺς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ὃ ἐγὼ πιστεύων
ἀληθεὶ εἶναι ἑθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετῆ ὅ τι ἐστὶν.

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ, ὥ Σώκρατε, ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τούτῳ,
ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἂν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνά-
μνησις ἐστὶν; ἔχεις με τούτῳ διδαξαῖ ὡς οὕτως ἔχεις;

ΤΩ. Καὶ ἄρτι εἴπον, ὥ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἰ·
MENO, 82 A – C.

καὶ νῦν ἔρωτᾶς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὅσ ὦ φήμι διδαχὴν 82 εἶναι ἀλλ’ ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαῖνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τὰναντία λέγων.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τῶν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας ἐίπον, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους ἀλλ’ εἰ πῶς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὁσπερ λέγεις, ἐνδείξαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὡμως ἰθὲν ἐθέλω προ-

θυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἐνεκεν. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν

πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τούτων τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐνα, ὄντων Ὑ

βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε. δεύρῳ πρόσελθε.

ΣΩ. Εἴλαν μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐλληνίζει; 

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε σφόδρα, οἴκογενής.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τῶν νοῦν, ὅποτε ἂν σοι φαίνηται,

ἡ ἀναμμηνησκόμενος ἡ μανθάνων παρ’ ἐμοῦ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ προσέξω.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον

χωρίον ὃτι τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐγγυς.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἵσας ἔχον τὰς

γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὖσας;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἵσας ἔχον;

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ὀνκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ

ἔλαττον;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ὅν τότε ἡ ἀυτή ἡ πλευρὰ ὑποῖον ποδὸι καὶ ἀυτὴ

ὑποῖ, πόσων ἂν εἰς ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον; ὡδὲ ὅτα 

κόπτει: εἰ ἴν ταύτῃ ὑποῖον ποδοῦ, ταύτῃ ὅτα ἐνὸς ποδὸς ἑόν, 

ἀλλ’ ἴν αὐτὰς ἂν ἴν ὑποῖον ποδοῦ τὸ χωρίον:
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἕπειδη δὲ δυνών ποδών καὶ ταύτη, ἀλλο τί ἰ

dis δυνών γλυγεται;

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Δυνών ἄρα δις γλυγεται ποδῶν;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἰσίν οἱ δύο δις πόδες; λογισάμενος
eἰπέ.

ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρες, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἑτερον
dιπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δὲ, ἵσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς
gραμμὰς ὀσπερ τούτο;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν;

ΠΑΙ. Ὁκτὼ.

ΕΣΩ. Φέρε ὅδ', πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἐκεῖ-

νου ἢ γραμμὴ ἐκάστη; ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτε δυνῶν ποδῶν-
tί δὲ ἢ ἐκεῖνου τοῦ διπλάσιον;

ΠΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅδ', ὡ Σώκρατες, οτι διπλασία.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾶς, ὡ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδά-

σκώ, ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶ πάντα; καὶ νῦν οὖτος οἴεται εἰδέναι,

ὅποια ἔστιν ἄφ' ἦς τὸ ὀκτώπον χωρίου γενήσεται; ἢ οὐ
dοκεῖ σοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οἶδεν οὖν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὔ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Οἴεται δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Θεῶ δὴ αὐτῶν ἀναμμυνησκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ

ἀναμμυνησκέσθαι. οὐ δὲ μοι λέγει ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας

83 γραμμῆς φης τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίου γίγνεσθαι; τοιόνδε
λέγω, μή ταύτη μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχὺ, ἀλλὰ ἵσον πανταχῷ ἔστω ὡςπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτων, ὀκτώπον· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.

ΠΑΙ. Ἐμοιγέ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἄν ἐτέραν τοσαῦτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης ὅ, φής, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπον χωρίον, ἄν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται;

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγραψόμεθα δὴ ἄπ' αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. Β ἀλλο τι ἡ τουτί ἄν εἴη ὁ φής τὸ ὀκτώπον εἶναι;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστι ταῦτα τέτταρα, ὡς ἐκαστον ἵσον τούτω ἔστι τῷ τετράποδι;

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

ΠΑΙ. Πῶς ὁ' οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἔστι τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἁρα, ὡ παῖ, οὖ διπλάσιον ὁ ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἐκκαίδεκα, οὐχὶ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ὅκτωπον δ' ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον;

ΠΑΙ. Φημὶ.
Τετράπονυς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησι ουτὶ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Εἴειν τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπονυ οὐ τοῦτο μὲν διπλάσιὸν ἐστὶ, τοῦτον δὲ ἡμισὺ;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μεῖζονος ἐσται ἡ τοσαύτης γραμμή, ἀπὸ ἐλάττωνος δὲ ἡ τοσησθεί; ἡ οὔ;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

Καλῶς τὸ γὰρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνουν. καὶ μοι λέγει τοιχ ἢ δὲ μὲν δυοίν ποδοῖν ἢν, ἢ δὲ τεττάρων;

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Δεὶ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμήν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δύσθος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.

ΠΑΙ. Δεὶ.

Πειρώ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῆς αυτῆν εἶναι.

ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδα.

Οὐκοῦν ἀνπερ τρίπονυ ἦ, τὸ ἡμισυν ταυτῆς προσ-ληψομεθα καὶ ἐσται τρίπονυ; ὁυὸ μὲν γὰρ οἶδε, ὁ δὲ εἰς καὶ ἐνθεινδε ὁσαυτος ὥς εἰς μὲν οἶδε, ὁ δὲ εἰς καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὀ φῆς.

ΠΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Οὐκοῦν ἄν ἦ τῇδε τρὶῶν καὶ τῇδε τρὶῶν, τὸ ὁλον χωρίου τρὶῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;

ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

Τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες;

ΠΑΙ. 'Εννέα.

'Εδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;

ΠΑΙ. 'Ὀκτὼ.

Ὅδ' ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδος πώ τὸ ὀκτώπονυ χωρίου γίγνεται.
ΠΑΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀπὸ πολας; πειρὼ ἡμῖν εἴπειν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ µὴ βουλεῖι ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ πολας.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸνΔία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἴδα.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς ἀν, ὦ Μένων, οὐ ἔστιν ἡ ἃδικσον ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤδει µὲν οὖ, ἢ τις ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτὼποδος χωρίου γραμμῆ, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἴδεν, ἀλλ ’οὐν ψετό γ ἃ αὐτὴν τότε εἶδεναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὑς εἰδῶς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἡδη, καὶ ὡσπερ οὐκ οἴδεν, οὐδ’ οἴεται εἴδεναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλήθη λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πράγμα ὦ οὐκ ἤδει;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο µοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτον ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὡσπερ ἡ νάρκη, µῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐµοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Προέρχον γοῦν τι πεποιηκαµεν, ὥς ἐοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὁπτ’ ἔχει· νῦν µὲν γάρ καὶ ζητήσεις ἃν ἢδεως οὐκ εἰδῶς, τότε δὲ ἀδίκως ἃν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις φετ’ ἃν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίων χωρίου, ὡς Ο δεὶ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμήν ἔχειν µήκει.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οἰεί οὖν ἃν αὐτῶν πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσαι ζητεῖν ἡ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὦ φετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος µὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόδησε τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ µοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὡμητὸ ἀρα ναρκῆσας;
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὁ τι καὶ ἀνευρήσεις ἐκτῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος φύλαττε δὲ ἂν που εὔρης με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιώτα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τοῦτον δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.

Λέγε γὰρ μοι σύ' ὦ τὸ μὲν τετράπον τούτο ἡμῖν ἐστὶ χωρίων; μανθάνεις;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθείμεν ἂν τούτι ἵσον;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἵσον ἐκατέρφο τούτων;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσάμεθ ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὐν γένοιτ' ἂν τέτταρα ἵσα χωρία τάδε;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τούτῳ γίγνεται;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἐδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι ἢ οὐ μέμυησαί;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμή ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεῖνουσα, τείνουσα δίχα ἐκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὕται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἵσαι, περιέχουσαι τούτι τὸ χωρίον;

ΠΑΙ. Γίγνονται.

ΣΩ. Σκόπηε δὴ πηλίκον τί ἐστι τούτο τὸ χωρίον;
ΠΑΙ. Όυ μανθάνω.
ΣΩ. Όψι τεττάρων οντων τουτων ήμισυ εκαστου
έκαστη ή γραμμη ἀποτεμηκεν έντος ; ή οὐ ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικαῖα εὖ τουτῳ ἐνεστιν ;
ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρα.
ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ ;
ΠΑΙ. Δύο.
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοίν τί ἔστιν ;
ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.
ΣΩ. Τὸδε οὖν ποσάπονυ γίγνεται ;
ΠΑΙ. Ἄκτωπον.
ΣΩ. Ἄπο ποίας γραμμῆς ;
ΠΑΙ. Ἄπο ταύτης.
ΣΩ. Ἄπο τῆς ἑκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ
tetrapodos ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καλοῦσι δὲ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταῖ·
ὡστ' εἰ ταύτη διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν,
ὡς ὑπο φής, ὁ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ' ἄν τὸ διπλάσιον
χωρίον.
ΠΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Μένων ; ἐστιν ήμινα δόξαν οὐχ
αὐτοῦ οὕτος ἀπεκρίνατο ;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἐναυτοῦ.
ΣΩ. Καλ ἡμιν οὐκ ἦδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὁλίγον πρότερον.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεισ.
ΣΩ. Ἐνήσαν δὲ γε αὐτῷ αὐταί αἱ δόξαι· ἡ οὐ ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Τῷ οὖν εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ δὲν ἄν μὴ εἰδῆ ἐνεις
ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τουτων δὲν οὐκ οἴδεν ;
MENO, 85 C – 86 A.

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὁσπερ ὄναρ ἀρτι ἀνακ-κινήται αἱ δόξαι αὐταί· εἰ δὲ αὐτῶν τίς ἀνεφήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οὐσθ' ὅτι τελευ- Δ τῶν οὐδενός ἦττον ἀκρίβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.

MEN. Ἑκουεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενός διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτός ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

MEN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμμηνησκεσθαι ἐστὶν;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' ὦν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἢν νῦν οὕτως ἔχει, ηταὶ ἔλαβε ποτε ἢ ἄει εἴχει;

MEN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἂεὶ εἴχει, ἂεὶ καὶ ἢν ἐπιστήμων' εἰ δὲ ἔλαβε ποτε, οὐκ ἀν ἐν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἐλληφὼς Ε εἰη. ἡ δεδίδαξε τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὕτως γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταῦτα ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὡστε τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαξε; δίκαιος γὰρ ποὺ ἐξ εἶδεναί, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονε καὶ τέθραπται.

MEN. ἈΛΛ' οὕτα ἔγγυε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε δεδίδαξεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεί δὲ ταῦτα τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχὶ;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σῶκρατες, φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβῶν, οὐκ ἢδη τοῦτο 86 δήλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅτ' οὐκ ἢν ἀνθρωπος;

MEN. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Εἶ ὦν ὅν ἂν ἦν χρόνον καὶ ὅν ἂν μὴ ἦν ἀνθρώπος, ἐνεσσοῦται αὐτῷ ἀληθεὶς δόξα, αἰ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστήμην γίγνονται, ἄρ' ὅν τοῦ ἂν χρόνον μεμαθηκὼς ἐσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐστὶν ἡ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπος.

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἂν ἡ ἀλήθεια ἦμιν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἂθάνατος ἄν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶχ, ὡστε ἔστερον ὁ χρόνι, ὃ μὴ τυχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν, τότε δ’ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμυχμένος, ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὡ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὡ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἀλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διασχυρισάμην· ὅτι δ’ οἴομενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν, ἂ μὴ τις οἴδε, βελτίων ἂν εἴμεν καὶ ἀνθρικότεροι καὶ ἓπτον ἁργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα, ἂ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι εὑρέων μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, Σ περὶ τοῦτον πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοῦμαι, εἰ οἶός τε εἰην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Βούλεις οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμοουοῆμεν, ὅτι ζητετέον περὶ οὐ μὴ τις οἴδε, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κωπή ζητεῖν τί ποτ’ ἐστιν ἄρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ ἂν ἦδομα, ὅπερ ἡρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεφαλῆμη καὶ ἀκούσαμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὅτι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἡ ὡς φύσει ἡ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ ὑπαργιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὡ Μένων, μὴ μόνον
ΜΕΝΟ, 86 Δ – 87 Β.

έμαντον ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρῶτον εἰτε διδακτόν εἰτε οὗ διδακτῶν ἡ ἁρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἐξητήσαμεν αὐτό. ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτὸν μὲν οὐδ’ ἐπιχειρεῖσι ἄρχεις, ἵνα ἡ ἐπεύθεσος ἂς, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖσι τέ ἄρχεις καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαι σοι· τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν;

Ε ἐξοίκευσον οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι, ποιῶν τί ἐστιν ὁ μὴ πο οὐσεν ὁ τί ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἄλλα σμικρόν γἐ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχωρήσων εἰς ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἰτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἰτε ὀπωσοῦν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὡδὲ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδὰν τις ἔρθηται αὐτοῦς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷον τε ἐσ.

87 τόν δὲ τὸν κύκλου τόδε τὸ χωρίου τρίγωνον ἐντάθημαι, εἴποι ἂν τις ὧτι οὐπω οἶδα εἰ ἐστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ μὲν των ὑπόθεσιν προύργον οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸ τὸ πράγμα τοιάνδε εἰ μὲν ἐστιν τοῦτο ὁ χωρίο τοιοῦτον, οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιοῦτο χωρίῳ, οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ἐπορεύεσθαι ὑποθέμενοι οὖν ἐθέλω εἰτεῖν σοι.

Β τὸ συμβαίνου περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλου, εἰτε ἀδύνατον εἰτε μὴ.

Οὔτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρετῆς ἁμείς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἵσμεν οὐδ’ ὁ τί ἐστιν οὐδ’ ὁποῖον τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτῷ σκοπῶμεν εἰτε διδακτόν εἰτε οὗ διδακτῶν ἐστιν, ὡδὲ λέγοντες εἰ ποιῶν τί ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐτῶν ἁρετῆ, διδακτῶν ἂν εἰή ἢ οὗ διδακτῶν; πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοίον ἡ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἄρα διδακτῶν ἡ οὖ, ἡ δ’ νῦν ὡθ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνήστων; διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν.

C ὁποτέρως ᾧ τῷ οὐνόματι χρώμεθα· ἀλλ’ ἄρα διδακτῶν; ἡ τοῦτο γε παντὶ ὄνθα, ὡτι οὗθεν ἀλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἡ ἐπιστήμη.
MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἶ δὲ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετῆ, οὕτως ὅτι διδακτὸν ἄν εἶη.
MEN. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;
ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὅντος διδακτὸν, τοιοῦδε δ' οὗ.
MEN. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι, πότερον ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετῆ ἡ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.
MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τούτο σκεπτέον εἶναι. Ὡ
ΣΩ. Τί δαί δὴ; ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ φαμέν εἶναι τῇ ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;
MEN. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωρίζομεν ἐπιστήμης. τάχ' ἄν εἶη ἡ ἀρετῆ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν των αὐτῶ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύομεν.
MEN. Ἐστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀρετῆ γ' ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοὶ;
MEN. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοῖ, ὥφελιμοι πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ ὥφε- ἐ
λίμα. οὖχι;
MEN. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἀρετῆ δὴ ὥφελιμον ἐστὶν;
MEN. ὔ Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων.
ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντες, πολὺ ἐστιν ἡ ἡμᾶς ὥφελει. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ὑσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥφελιμα. οὖχι;
MEN. Ναί.

88 ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν ὑσ σὺ ἀλλως φῦσ ὑσ οὕτως ;

MEN. Οὐκ, ἀλλ’ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ, ὅταν τι ἐκάστου τοῦτων ἡγήται, ὥφελεί ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τι, βλάπτει ; ἀρ’ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὥφελεί, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, βλάπτει ;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμάθειαν καὶ μυήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ;

B MEN. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ, τοῦτων ἄττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ἀλλ’ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμην, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὥφελεῖ ; οἶδον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρονήσεις ἢ ἀν- δρεία ἀλλ’ οἶδον θάρρος τι. οὐχὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀνευ νοῦ θαρρὴ ἀνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὥφελεῖται ;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθεία καὶ πεπληρωμέθα μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μαθηματομενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὥφελ- λιμα, ἀνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά ;

C MEN. Πάνω σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καταρτήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτα, ἀφροσύνης δ’ εἰς τούναυτιον ;

MEN. 'Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἁρετή τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστί καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὥφελιμῶ εἶναι, φρονήσειν αὐτῷ δὲ ἐϊναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὕτε ὥφελιμα οὕτε βλαβερά ἐστί, προσγενομένης δὲ φρο-
MEMO, 88 D — 89 B.

νήσεως ἡ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὦφέλιμα γίγνεται. Ὁ κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὦφέλιμόν γε οὕσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν' εἶναι.

MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτον τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἀρ' οὐχ ὡσπερ τῇ ἀλλῇ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἤγοιμεν ὦφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπολεῖ, ἢ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερὰ, οὕτως αὐτὶ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθὸς μὲν χρω—Ε μένῃ καὶ ἡγομένη ὦφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθὸς δὲ βλαβερὰ;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς δὲ γε ἡ ἐμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δ' ἡ ἀφρων;

MEN. Ἐστιν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνυπηρτήθεσαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ 89 εἶναι· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἃν εἰη τὸ ὦφέλιμον· φαμέν δὲ τῆν ἀρετὴν ὦφέλιμον εἶναι;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Φρόνησιν ἃρα φαμέν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἦτοι ξύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι;

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὡς Σῶκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἴην φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ.

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν ποι καὶ τὸδ' ἣν' εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ Β ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσαν ποι ἂν ἢμῖν οἱ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὐς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες
ἐκείνων ἀποφημάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατα-
σήμηναμένοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ίνα μηδεὶς αὐ-
tοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν,
χρῆσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.
ΜΕΝ. Εἰκός γέ τοι, ὥ Σῶκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγ-
cνονται, ἀρα μαθήσει ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς ἐπιτιμήθη ἡ ἡ ἀρετή,
ὅτι διδάκτων ἐστίν.
ΣΩ. Ἰσως νῦν Δία: ἀλλὰ μὴ τούτο οὐ-καλῶς ὀμο-
λογήσαμεν;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἀρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν
καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπειτα, εἰ
μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγίες εἶναι.

D ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν οὐ; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ
kαὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἡ ἀρετή;
ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρω, ὥ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτῶν
αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ
καλῶς λέγεσθαι: ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψασθαι ἐὰν
σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τὸ δὲ γὰρ μοι εἴπετ’ εἰ ἐστὶ
διδακτῶν ὅτιον πράγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Ε ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦνατιν αὖ, οὐ μὴτε διδάσκαλοι μὴτε
μαθηταὶ εἰεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζομεν μὴ
διδακτῶν εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐστι ταῦτα: ἀλλ’ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δο-
kοῦσθι σοι εἶναι;
ΣΩ. Πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν, εἰ τινὲς εἰεν αὐτῆς δικά-
σκαλοί, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα, οὐς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ ἐκεῖ καὶ νῦν, ὁ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῶν Ἀνυτος ὄδε παρεκαθέζετο, ἐφαινόμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδόθην ἂν Ἀνυτος γὰρ ὄδε πρῶτον μὲν ἔστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ ΣΟΦΟΣ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὅτι ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντων τινός, ὥσπερ δ' νῦν νεωστὶ εἰλη-φῶς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἐπείτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὗ ὕπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ ὁγκώδης τε καὶ ἑπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλῆς ἀνὴρ' ἐπείτα Β' τούτου εὐ ἔθρεψε καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τᾶς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τουτὼν ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἰτ' εἰσίν εἴπε μή, καὶ οὕτως.

Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὁ 'Ἀνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ σαυτῷ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷ, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῖνες ἂν εἶξεν διδάσκαλοι. οἶδε δὲ σκέφται εἰ βουλο-μεθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ΑΝ ἂν αὐτῶν πέμπομεν διδασκάλους; ἄρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατροὺς;

AN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ σκυτότομον ἀγαθὸν βουλομέθα γενέσθαι, ἄρ' οὖ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτότομους;

AN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τάλλα οὕτως;

AN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπε. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατροὺς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμ-πομεν, βουλομένου ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι: ἄρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-
Δ γωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμπουτες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν ἂν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μῆ, καὶ τοὺς μυσθῶν πραττομένους ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήγαντας αὐτοὺς διδασκαλοὺς τοῦ βουλομένου λέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἢρ’ οὖ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν;

AN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ 

Ε αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πωλλὴ ἀνοιά ἐστι βουλομένους αὐλητὴν 
tina ποιήσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχυουμένους διδάξεις τὴν 
tέχνην καὶ μυσθὸν πραττομένους μῆ-ἔθελεν πέμπειν, 
ἄλλους δὲ τοις πράγματα παρέχειν, ξητοῦντα μανθάνειν 
παρὰ τούτων, ὃ μὴτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι 
μὴτ’ ἐστιν αὐτῶν μαθητής μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, 
ὡς ἡμεῖς ἄξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ἄν πέμπωμεν. 
οὐ πολλὴ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι;

AN. Ναί μὰ Δία ἐμοίγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρόσ.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ὥν τοινυν ἐξεστί σε μετ’ ἐμοῦ

91 κων ἀν αὐλοῦμεθαί περὶ τοῦ ἔξουν τοινυν Μένωνος. 

οὕτως γὰρ, ὃ Ἀνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρόσ με, ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ 
ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ἢ τι νὰ άνθρωποι τάς 
tε ῥίκιας καὶ τᾶς πόλεις καλῶς διουκοῦσι, καὶ τοῦς γονέας 
tῶν αὐτῶν θεραπεύοντι, καὶ πολῖται καὶ ἔξουν ὑποδέ-

ξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἔπλοστανται ἂξιοὶ ἀνδρός

Β ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην ὥν τὴν ἀρετήν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἄν 

πέμπουτες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιμεν. ἡ δῆλον ὡς κατὰ 

τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχυουμένους 

ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήγαντας αὐτοὺς κοι-

νούς τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μυσθῶν 

τοῦτον ταξιμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους ;

AN. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὃ Σώκρατες ;
ΣΩ. Οίσθα δήπον καὶ σὺ, ὅτι οὔτοι εἶσιν οἶνος οἱ ἀνθρώποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

ΑΝ. Ἡράκλεις, εὑρήμει, ὡς Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν Συγγενῶν μηδὲ οἰκεῖοι μηδὲ φίλων, μήτε ἄστον μήτε ξένου, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λαβηθῆμαι, ἐπεὶ οὔτοι γε φανερά ἐστί λάβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγενομένων.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὡς Ἀντω; οὔτοι ἂρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιομένων τι ὑπόστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἀλλών διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, οί τι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσι; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα Δ ἄξιοισι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἴδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἑνα Πρωταγόραν πλεῖος χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὅσ οὔτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν καὶ τοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐγγαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἰμάτια ἐξαιτοῦμεν οὐκ ἂν δύναμτο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας Ε μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἰμάτια τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἂλλ' εἴ τοιαύτα ποιοῦειν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λυμῷ ἀποθάνουειν. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανε διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγενομένους καὶ μοχθηρότερος ἀποτέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανε πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἐτῆς ὁμοίᾳ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἔγγυς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῆ γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχυῃ ὅντας καὶ ἐν ἄπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἐτὶ εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτην εὑδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπανται καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι γεγονότες ἑκείνου, 92 οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὅντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατῶν καὶ λαβῆσθαι τοὺς
νέοις, ἡ λεληθέναι καὶ ἕαυτοὺς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσωμεν τούτοις, οὕς ἐνιοί φασὶ σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

AN. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων τούτων δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκ

B koutes. πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἔδωσαν αὐτούς εἰσαφικνείσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τὸς ἔξος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτον τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δέ, ὁ Ἀνυτε, ήδικηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τὶ οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἰ;

AN. Οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἐγώγε συγγέγονα πῶποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλουν ἐάσαμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Ἀπειρος ἄρ' εἴ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

C AN. Καὶ εἴην γε.

ΣΩ. Πώς οὖν ἂν, ὁ δαμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτον τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τῷ ἁγαθῶν ἡξει ἐν ἕαυτῷ εἴτε φλαὐρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἀπειρος εἴης;

AN. 'Ραδίως τούτοις γοῦν οἴδα οἷοί εἴσιν, εἴτ' οὖν ἀπειρος αὐτῶν εἴμη εἴτε μή.

ΣΩ. Μάντις εἰ ὅσως, ὁ Ἀνυτε' ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἷσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὃν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζομι' ἂν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἔξητομεν τίνες εἰσὶ, παρ' οὕς ἂν

D Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο' οὕτως μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἐστωσαν οἱ σοφισταί· ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἴπε ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν πατρικῶν τόνδε ἐταῖρον εὐρηγέτησον, φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ διηλθόν γένοιτ' ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.

AN. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὖν σὺ ἔφρασας;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐς μὲν ἐγὼ ὁμιῇ διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἴποι, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδέν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φήσῃ· καὶ
ΜΕΝΟ, 92 Ε – 93 Σ.

εἰσώς τί λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ Ε ἔτινας ἐλθῆ Ἀθηναίων εἰπὲ ὅνομα ὅτου βούλει.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὅνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι;  ὥστε γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν ὅσ ὁ βελτίων αὐτῶν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταὶ, ἐὰν περ ἐθέλη πεῖθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ' οὕδενος μαθώντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἴοι τε ὄντες τάντα, δ' αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον;

ΑΝ. Καὶ τούτους ἐγώγη ἄξιω παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κάγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσ᾽ σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἁγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇ δε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;

ΣΩ. Ἐμοιγε, ὡ Ἀνυτε, καὶ εἰναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἁγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἐτί οὐχ ἢττον ἡ εἰναι; ἀλλὰ μόνῳ καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἁγαθοὶ γεγονασί τής αὐτῶν ἀρετής; τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ οὐ δ' ὁ λόγος ἢμῖν τυχανεὶ ὅν οὐκ εἰ εἰσίν ἁγαθοὶ ἡ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ' εἰ γεγονασίν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἄλλ' εἰ διδάκτον ἐστὼν ἀρετὴ β πάλαι σκοπούμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοπούντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἄρα οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τήν ἀρετήν, ἢν αὐτοὶ ἁγαθοὶ ἦσαν, ἡπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὗ παραδοτόν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτόν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου τούτ' ἐστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητούμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων.

'Ωδὲ οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου′ Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἁγαθὸν ἃν φαίνῃς ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;

ΑΝ. Ἐγώγη, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἁγαθὸν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἢν, κάκεινον εἰναι;

ΑΝ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγη, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ’, οيء, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ που τὸν νίὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ; ἢ οيء αὐτῶν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ D παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετῆν, ἢν αὐτῶς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντος τὸν νίὸν ἰππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθὸν; ἐπέμενε γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππῶν ὀρθῶς ἑστηκός, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππῶν ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἀ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν, ὃσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἶχετο ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

AN. 'Ακήκοα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τὴν γε φύσιν τοῦ νίεος αὐτοῦ ἠτιάσατ' ἄν τις εἶναι κακὴν.

Ε AN. 'Ισως οὐκ ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ο Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἀπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἦδη τοῦ ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου;

AN. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτῶν τὸν αὐτὸν νίὸν παιδεύσαι, ἢν δὲ αὐτῶς σοφίαν ἢν σοφὸς, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτῶν βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἢν γε διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή;

AN. 'Ισως μὰ Δ’ οὐ.

ΣΩ. Οὔτως μὲν δὴ σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἄρετῆς, ὅν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀριστοῖς τῶν προτέρων εἶναι;

94 ἄλλου δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, 'Ἀριστείδην τῶν Λυσιμάχου ἡ τοῦτον οὖχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι;

AN. 'Εγνωγε, πάντως δήποτον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὔτως τὸν νἰὸν τὸν αὐτὸν Λυσιμάχου, ὃς μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο, κάλλιστα 'Αθηναίων ἔπαι-

δευσεν, ἀνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουὸν πεποιηκέναι;
τούτῳ γάρ ποι καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὅρᾶς οἷός ἐστιν. 
ed dè βουλείς. Περικλέα, οὕτω μεγαλουπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἴσοι ὅτι ὅρο νείς ἔθρεψε, Παραλοὺ καὶ Σάνθιππον;

AN. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτους λέντοι, ὡς οἴσθα καὶ σύ, ἰππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρος Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τάλλα ἐπαίδευσεν, ὥσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρος. ἀγαθὸς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβουλετὸ 

ποίησαι; δοκῶ μὲν, ἐβουλετό, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτόν. 

ίνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οὐ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἄνυματος, γεγονέναι τούτο τὸ πράγμα, ἐνθυμῆθητι ὅτι Θ 

Ὀουκυδίδης αὐτὸ νείς ἔθρεψε, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανου, 

καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσε τά τε ἄλλα εὗ καὶ ἐπάλαυσαν 

κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων τῶν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθία ἔδωκε, τῶν 

δὲ Εὐδόρφῳ οὕτω δὲ ποι ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα 

παλαίειν. ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

AN. Ἐγώγε, ἀκοῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅθῆν ὅτι οὕτως οὐκ ἂν ποτε, οὐ μὲν ἐδει 

δαπανώμενου διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτῶν, οὐ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθὸς ἄνδρας 

ποίησαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξε, εἰ διδακτόν ἤν; ἀλλὰ 

γὰρ ἵσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαύλος ἤν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ 

πλείστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οὐκ 

κίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς 

ἀλλοις Ἐλλησιω, ὡστε εἰπέρ ἢν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν 

ἀν ὦστι ἐμελλέν αὐτῶ τοὺς νείς ἅγαθους ποίησεων, 

ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἡ τῶν ἔξων, εἰ αὐτῶς μὴ ἐσχόλαξ 

οὐά τῇ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ ἔταιρε Ἐ 

Ἀνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτόν ἀρετή.

AN. Ὄ Σώκρατεσ, βαδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν
ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν ὄν ἂν σοι συμβουλεύσαμη, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὃς ἦσος μὲν καὶ ἐν ἀλλή πόλει ῥάδιον ἐστὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὐ, ἐν 95 τῇ δὲ καὶ πάνω οἴμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Ὡ Μέγων, Ἀντος μὲν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορείν τούτους τοὺς ἀνδρας, ἐπειτα ἤγειται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἰς τούτων. ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἕαν ποτε γνῷ, οἴον ἐστι τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σοὶ δὲ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶ καλὸι κἀγαθοὶ ἀνδρεῖς;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

Β ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὕτω παρέχειν αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτῶν ἀρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἄν αὐτῶν ἀκούσας ὡς διδακτῶν, τοτὲ δὲ ὃς οὐ.

ΣΩ. Ψώμεν οὔν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, ὃς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δαλ δὴ; οἱ σοφισταὶ σοι οὕτω, οἵπερ μόνοι

C ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσας ὑπισχυομένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχυομένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινοὺς.

ΣΩ. Οὔδε' ἀρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὃπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ.
ΜΕΝΟ, 95 C – 96 B.

ΣΩ. Οίσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
tois politikois touto dokei totê men einai didaktôn, toutê D
'o ou, alla kai Theoumn touto poieithn oisô th' oti taútâ
tauta legei:

MEN. 'Ev poiôs épeisw;

ΣΩ. 'Ev tois elégeîous, ou legei
kai para toisw pîne kai êstheie, kai metà toisw
îze, kai ánýpane tois, òn megálh dýnâmês.

esbßow mên gar âp' esbßa didáxeai' òn de kakôsw
syμmêsgyês, ápoleîs kai touto éunta vónou.

E
oîsth' oti en toutous mên ou didaktou ouês ths arêtês legei:

MEN. Fainetai ge.

ΣΩ. 'Ev allous dé ge olýgon metâbâs,
eî ò' òn poieithn, phêsî, kai ènûthetou ândrî vòma, legei
pws ouî

pilouûs an muôsoûs kai megálous efêron
oi óunâmênoi touto poieîn, kai

ou pot' an êz ágadóu patrâs ëxentô kakós,
peîthômenos muôthoiou saôfroswî. alla didâskwv
ou pote poîshes toû kakôn ândr' ágadón.

ënvoeis oti autôs autô pálin peri tout autôi tânavtîa
legei;

MEN. Fainetai.

ΣΩ. 'Exeis ouî eîpeîn allou òtônou prâgmatos,
oi ouî men fâskoutes didâskaloi einai ouî oups allou
didâskaloi òmologouîntai, alla ouî'de autôi épîstassthai,
alla poînîrî einai peri autô touto to prâgma ouî fasi B
didâskaloi einai, ouî de òmologouîmenoi autôi kalôi kâga-
ðoi toutê mên fasiw autô didaktôn einai, totê de ou'; toutô
ouî ouîto teataraghênos peri òtônou faihîs ân ouî kuriôs
didâskalous einai;
MEN. Μὰ Δὲ οὐκ ἔγγυε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὃντες διδάσκαλοι εἰςι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὃτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;
MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

C ΣΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταὶ;
MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταί εἴεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδάκτων εἶναι;
MEN. Ὡμολογήκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ἀρετὴς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;
MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;
MEN. Φαίνεται οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἁρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἰη διδάκτων;

D MEN. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὅρθως ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. ἔστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὡς Σῶκρατες, πότερον ποτε οὐδὲ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἃ τίς ἂν εἰη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύομεν, ὡ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαιλοὶ τινες εἰναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέουν τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἐν γε ἔτω τρόπῳ βελτίως ποιήσει—λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν ἁρτί ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἐλάθε καταγελάστως, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἱγομομένης ὅρθως τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα— ἥ ἱσως καὶ διαφεύγειν ἡμᾶς τῷ γυνώναι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

MEN. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὡ Σῶκρατες;
ΣΩ. Ὡδὲ ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐδε ὁφελίμους
εἶναι, ὅρθως ὁμολογήκαμεν τούτο γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχου· ἢ γάρ;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἐσονταί, ἀν ὅρθως ἡμῖν ἡγώνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τούτῳ που καλῶς ὁμολογοῦμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. "Οτι δ' οὐκ ἔστων ὅρθως ἡγεῖσθαι, ἦν μὴ φρόνιμος ἢ, τούτῳ ὁμοιοὶ ἐσμεν οὐκ ὅρθως ὁμολογηκόσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς δὴ ὅρθως λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. εἴ τις ἔδως τὴν ὄδον τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βουλεῖ ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλος ἡγοῖτο, ἀλλο τι ὅρθως ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἴ τις ὅρθως μὲν δοξάζων, ἤτις ἔστιν η ὄδος, Θ ἐληνυθῶς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὕτος ἂν ὅρθως ἡγοῖτο;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔως γ' ἂν ποὺ ὅρθην δόξαν ἔχη περὶ δ' ὃν τὸ ἐτερός ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν ἐσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρουῶν δὲ μῆ, τοῦ τούτῳ φρονοῦντος.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐδὲν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθῆς πρὸς ὅρθοτητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν φρονήσεως· καὶ τούτῳ ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ παρελεύπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὁποίοις τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρονήσεις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὅρθως Σ πράττειν' τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἢ μ' ἀληθῆς. ?

ΜΕΝ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἤττου ὠφέλιμον ἔστιν ὅρθη δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

ΜΕΝ. Τοσοῦτο γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὃ μὲν τὴν ἐπι-
στήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἃν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὅρθὴν δόξαν τοτε μὲν ἃν τυγχάνοι, τοτε δ' οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὅρθην δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι, ἐωσπερ ὅρθα δοξάζοι;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται: ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὁ Σώ-

οικρατεῖς, τούτου οὔτως ἔχοντος, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε πολὺ
tιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὅρθης δόξης, καὶ δἰ' ὃ τι ἔ
μὲν ἑτερον, τὸ δὲ ἑτερὸν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν δι' ὃ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

MEN. Πάνυ γ' εἶπέ.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέχηκασ
τὸν νοῦν' ἵσως δὲ οὖν' ἐστὶ παρ' ὑμῖν.

MEN. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τούτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καὶ ταύτα, εὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ἃ, ἀποδιδά-

σκεῖ καὶ δραπετεύει, εὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

Ε ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἐκείνων ποιημάτων λευκόντων μὲν ἐκτήσθαι
οὐ πολλῆς τυνὸς ἄξιον ἑστὶ τιμῆς, ὡσπερ δραπέτην
ἀνθρώπων' οὐ γὰρ παραμένεις δεδεμένων δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον
πάντα γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἑστὶ. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω:
tαύτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθείς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι
αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ
χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τάγαθα ἐργάζονται: πολὺν δὲ χρόνον
οὐκ ἔθελον παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς
ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὡστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιοι εἰσιν, ἐως
ἀν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τούτῳ δ' ἑστὶν,
Μένων ἔταιρε, ἀνάμμησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν
ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθώσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι
γίνονται, ἐπείτα μόνυμοι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιωτερον
ἐπιστήμην ὅρθης δόξης ἑστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη
ὁρθῆς δόξης.
MEN. Νὴ τὸν Δια, Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐοικε τοιοῦτῳ τινί. Ἡ

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰκάζων ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶ τι ἄλλοιον ὅρθη δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάντως μοι δοκῶ τούτῳ εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίνην ἄν εἰδέναι, ὃλίγα δ' ἀν φαίνυν]ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνων θείην ἀν ὡν οίδα.

MEN. Καὶ ὅρθως γε, Ὡ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δαί; τόδε οὐκ ὅρθως, ὅτι ἀλήθης δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἐκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἡ ἐπιστήμη;

MEN. Καὶ τούτῳ δοκεῖς μοι ἀλήθη λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἀρα ὅρθη δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἢττον ὑφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνήρ ὁ ἔχων ὅρθην δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμης.

MEN. "Εστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ ωφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὦμολόγηται εἶναι.

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρες ἀν εἰεν καὶ ὑφελίμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἰεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ὅρθην δόξαν, τούτου δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε δόξα ἀλήθης, D οὗτο ἐπίκτητα—ἡ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;

MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἴ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἰεν ἄν.

MEN. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοπούμεν τὸ μετὰ τούτο, εἰ ἐιδακτόν ἔστιν.

MEN. Ναί.
ΜΕΝΟ, 98 Δ – 99 Β.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτών ἐδοξεῖ εἰναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἢ ἀρετή;
ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

Α. 1078 ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε διδακτῶν εἰη, φρόνησις ἀν εἰναι;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε διδάσκαλοι εἰεν, διδακτῶν ἀν εἰναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔτως.
ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἰναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐστι ταύτα.
ΣΩ. 'Ὡμολογήκαμεν ἀρα μήτε διδακτῶν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἰναι;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθον γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἰναι;
ΜΕΝ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. 'Ὅφελιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἰναι τὸ ὀρθὸς ἡγοῦμενον;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

99 ΣΩ. 'Ὀρθῶς δὲ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταύτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἀνθρωπὸς ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπιόν ἡγεμονία γίγνεται; ὡ δὲ ἀνθρωπὸς ἡγεμῶν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν, δύο ταύτα, δόξα ἀληθῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι οὔτως.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείδη οὐ διδακτῶν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη ὡ ἐπιγίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

Β ΣΩ. Δυνῶν ἄρα ὄντων ἁγαθῶν καὶ ὁφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἐτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἐν πολιτικῆ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμῶν.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρὰ σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὁντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὐς ἀρτὶ Ἀντωνὸς ὅδε ἔλεγε· διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἶοι τε ἀλλοὺς ποιεῖν τοιοῦτος οἶοι αὐτοὶ εἰσίν, ἀτε οὐ δι’ ἐπιστήμην ὁντες τοιοῦτοι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἑοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται; ἢ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις οὐροθοῦν, οὐδὲν διαφεράντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῷδοι τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν ἄληθῆ καὶ πολλὰ, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὕτως νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πρᾶττον τι καὶ λέγουσιν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἁρθώς ἀρ’ ἂν καλοὶμεν θείους τε, οὐς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῷδοι καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐκέπεται· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἢκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπρους οὕτως καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥστε κατορθώσι λέγουτες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἶδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες δὴποῦ, ὁ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φαινή, οὕτως.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονται γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὁρθῶς λέγειν. Ἐ καίτοι ἵσως Ἀντωνὸς ὅδε σοι ἄχρηται λέγοντι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν μὲλει ἐμοιγε. τούτω μὲν, ὁ Μένων, καὶ
αὕθις διαλεξόμεθα: εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἔξητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετή ἂν εἰ ὡς ὑπειράσης ὑπείρασθον, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἀνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνυται, εἰ μή τις εἰ ὑποίκος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷς καὶ ἄλλον ποιήσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἰ, σχέδον ἂν τὶ ὑπότοι λέγωστο τοι- ούτος ἔν τοῖς ζῴων, οἷον ἔφη Ὁμήρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τῶν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἷος πέπυνται τῶν ἐν Ἀιδίῳ, αἳ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσθουσι. ταῦτα ἂν καὶ εὑθὺς τοιοῦτος ὅσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθεῖς ἂν πράγμα εἰ ὑπὸ ἀρετήν.

Β ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὁ Μένων, θεία μοῖρα ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετή οἷς παραγίγνυται: τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν φτινυ τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνυται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ξήτειν τί ποτ' ἔστω ἄρετή. νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὡρα ποι λέναι, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἀπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πείθε καὶ τὸν ἔχουν τόνδε

C Ἀντων, ὥστε πραότερος ἡ ὡς ἐάν πείσῃς τούτου, ἔστω δ' τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὅ νήσεις.
Clarendon Press Series

THE

MENO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE

PART II.—NOTES

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1887

[All rights reserved]
NOTES.

MENON] Of the person who gives his name to this dialogue we know from the text itself that he was a Thessalian (70 A), the son of Alexidemus (76 E), that relations of hospitality existed between his family and that of Anytus (90 B, 92 D), that he was a favourite of Aristippus of Larissa, one of the noble family of the Aleuadae (70 B), that he was a disciple of Gorgias, and familiar with the philosophy of Empedocles (76 C), and that his family stood well with the court of Persia (98 D); we are led to infer also that he was handsome, rich, and noble (71 B), and was, still in the bloom of youth (76 A-C).

From the connection with Aristippus the Thessalian and the court of Persia, there is good reason for identifying the Meno of Plato with the Meno of Xenophon's Anabasis. For in the Anabasis we meet with an Aristippus, the Thessalian, who was a guest-friend of Cyrus the Younger; and Xenophon relates how, being hard pressed by the opposite faction at home, he came to Cyrus and procured means for maintaining a mercenary force, which was not to be disbanded till Cyrus could avail himself of its aid against his brother Artaxerxes (Anab. I. 1. § 10). Now we find 1500 men from this force joining Cyrus at Colossae under the command of Meno the Thessalian (Anab. I. 2. § 6), whose youth and good looks had won him the favour of Aristippus (II. 6. § 28).

At first Meno appears to have enjoyed the chief place in Cyrus' favour. He commanded the right wing at the review held at Tyriaeum, while Clearchus commanded the left (Anab. I. 2. § 15); and it was he who was chosen to escort the Phoenician queen, Epyaxa, back into her own country (I. 2. § 20). On this expedition he sacked the town and palace of Tarsus, in revenge for the loss of 100 hoplites on the mountains, who, it was supposed, might have been cut off by the Cilicians (I. 2. § 25).

When the army was halting at Thapsacus, on the banks of the Euphrates, and it was doubtful whether the soldiers would consent to march against the King, Meno persuaded his men to be the first to cross the river, and was magnificently rewarded by Cyrus in con-
sequence (I. 4. § 17). This seems to have been the culminating point of Meno's fortunes.

Shortly after this a feud arose between him and Clearchus, originating in a soldier's quarrel, and they were only prevented from engaging their forces by the intervention of Proxenus the Boeotian (who, like Meno himself, had been a disciple of Gorgias II. 6. § 16), reinforced by the energetic interference of Cyrus himself (I. 5. §§ 11-17). From this time forward Clearchus seems to have gained in favour both with the army and with Cyrus. In the review held in the plains of Babylonia, as in the battle of Cunaxa itself, the right wing was commanded by Clearchus and the left by Meno (I. 7. § 1; I. 8. § 4).

Subsequently to the death of Cyrus, Meno, who was the guest-friend of Ariaeus (II. 1. § 5), was suspected of treason by Clearchus (II. 5. § 28), a belief which was shared by Xenophon himself (II. 4. § 15). After the treacherous seizure of the generals by the Persians, Ariaeus told the Greeks that Clearchus was dead, but that Proxenus and Meno were held in high honour, because they had revealed his plots (II. 5. § 38). This appears to have been a mere lie. Proxenus, according to Xenophon, was a man of stainless honour, and shared the fate of the other generals (II. 6. §§ 19, 20), and although Meno was spared at first, it was only to linger out for a year an ignominious life crowned by a wretched death (II. 6. § 29). His character is drawn in the blackest colours by Xenophon (II. 6. §§ 21-28).

η περί ἀρετῆς] It is important to bear in mind that intellectual as well as moral excellence is conveyed under the Greek term ἀρετή, and that the former rather overshadowed the latter in the popular use of the term. This is why Anytus so unhesitatingly answers that Themistocles was 'a good man,' using the word as an equivalent for a clever or able man, as in the slang sense which it carries among ourselves. By 'virtue' in fact was meant, in popular parlance, that assemblage of qualities which makes a man a capable statesman.

The aim of every ambitious young Greek at this period was to become δυνατός λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά. The scions of wealthy houses did not mind spending money, if only they could acquire the art whereby men manage houses and cities well, and become capable of ruling, and of doing good to themselves and others (Xen. Mem. IV. 2. § 11). The demand created the supply (Prot. 31 S E), and the class of Sophists arose, professing to be able to teach men 'virtue.' It was this claim of the Sophists which led Socrates to raise the previous question, whether virtue could be taught.

πειραστικός] i.e. tentative. This term belongs to an elaborate
philosophical division of the works of Plato, which has been preserved to us by Diogenes Laertius (III. §§ 49–51), but which was certainly not devised by himself. Grote (Plato, vol. I. p. 160 note) thinks it 'certain' that he borrowed it from Thrasylus, to whom the division into tetralogies is ascribed. But the division into tetralogies itself may not have been the work of Thrasylus. Albinus, the author of an 'Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato' (printed in Hermann's Appendix Platonica), and a contemporary of Galen (born about A. D. 130), after speaking of the division into tetralogies, adds 'of this opinion are Dercyllides and Thrasylus.' Thrasylus, then, is not necessarily the author of the division into tetralogies with which his name has been coupled by Diogenes (III. 56).

For the philosophical division, into which the term πειραστικός enters as one of the dividing members, see the scheme prefixed. It embraces several works which modern critics regard as spurious. ἔξεσ μοι εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] Contrary to his general habit, Plato, in this dialogue, plunges straight into the discussion. But the omission of an introduction, in which the Meno resembles the Cratylus, Philebus, Hipparchus, and Minos, is more apparent than real, since the first two pages (70–71 D) effectively set before us the personality of Meno.

The same question which is here propounded is touched on in the Nicomachaean Ethics in connection with happiness, in which virtue is infinitely the most important ingredient. The ninth chapter of the first book of that treatise commences thus: 'Οθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητῶν ἢ ἔθοστών ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀκριτῶν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοίραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. The drift of Aristotle's discussion is to show that happiness is the outcome of human effort, and not in any special sense the gift of Heaven—least of all the result of chance. The precise question which forms the subject of the Meno is alluded to as an unsettled one by Aristotle in the tenth book (ch. (9), § 6), where, speaking on the question of how virtue is to be acquired, he says, Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθόν οἰοντι, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ δίδασκῃ. So far as moral virtue is concerned, Aristotle, while allowing some weight both to nature and teaching, ascribes by far the most important part to training.

dιδακτόν] The employment of the neuter adjective with a substantive not of the neuter gender imparts a more abstract air to the question. Translate, 'Whether virtue is a thing to be taught.' Cp. Eur. Hipp. 443 (Dindorf)

Κύριες γάρ οὐ φορητόν, ἤν πολλῆ ῥυή.

ἐφ' ἵππηκή] On the reputation of the Thessalians for horsemanship see Laws 625 D; Hipp. Maj. 284 A. Thessaly is a great plain
enclosed by mountains, which adapts it for horses. When Anchimolius invaded Attica, the Peisistratidae cleared the plain of Phalerus, and let loose upon him a body of Thessalian horse, who effected the destruction of himself and the main part of his army (Herod. V. 63).

B καὶ ἐπὶ σοφία] θαυμάζονται or θαυμασθήσονται has to be supplied from ἑθαυμάζοντο.

'Αριστόππου] For Aristippus see the note on Meno prefixed. He is not to be confounded with Aristippus of Cyrene, the disciple of Socrates, and the founder of what is called the Cyrenaic philosophy.

Λαρισαίοι] The regular construction would require the repetition of the article. For its suppression cp. Apol. 32 B, ἡ φυλὴ Ἀρτιοχής and Phaedo 57 A, τῶν πολιτῶν Φλωσίων. Stallbaum.

Γοργίας] A celebrated rhetorician, a native of Leontium in Sicily. He was himself a disciple of Empedocles, to whom the invention of the art of rhetoric is ascribed (Quint. III. i. §§ 8, 9, Diog. Laert. VIII. §§ 57, 58), and among his pupils were Aeschines (the philosopher, not the orator) and Antisthenes, who left him for Socrates (Diog. Laert. II. § 64, VI. § 1). He composed an Art of Rhetoric, which has not come down to us, though two orations, alleged to be his, are extant. He was deputed as ambassador from his native city to Athens, to implore aid against Syracuse, and produced a fatal effect there on the public mind by his eloquence (Diod. XII. ch. 53. p. 514): at the same time he won for himself disciples in private, from whom he received handsome fees (Hipp. Maj. 282 B, C). He is said to have lived to the age of 107 or more (Cic. De Sen. ch. v; Quint. III. i. § 9; Diog. Laert. VIII. § 58; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, p. 494).

τῆν πόλιν] i.e. Larissa, the city of the Aleuadai, a powerful family of nobles among the Thessalians. They are called Θεσσαλίς βασιλές by Herodotus (VII. 6).

ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἰθικεν] The first of these is a cognate accusative, which falls under the more general head of accusative of the internal object. To append ἔθος to εἰθικεν does not add any new idea, but merely sets out what was already contained in the action of the verb. In ὑμᾶς, on the other hand, we have an accusative of the external object.

C παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν] Cp. Apol. 33 B, ὀμολογεῖ καὶ πλοῦσι, καὶ πενήτι παρέχω ἐμαυτῶν ἐρωτᾶν. On Gorgias' undertaking to answer everybody see Gorg. 447 C, D, and for some comments of Cicero on the practice see De Fin. II. ch. 1.

οὐδενὶ ὅτι ὁὐκ] The way in which this expression comes about is perhaps this: οὐδεὶς ὅτις οὐ first becomes stereotyped as an equiva-
lent of πᾶς τίς (as below 71 A, οὐδὲις ὡστὶς οὗ γελᾶσεται = πᾶς τίς γελᾶσεται), and then the new expression is declined throughout. Here we have it in the dative, where the original expression would have been so. Similarly we have the gen. masc. in Prot. 317 C, the gen. neut. in Theaet. 178 B, the acc. masc. in Phaedo 117 D, οὐδένα δύναται οὗ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, and the acc. neut. below 74 D, καὶ φής οὐδέν αὐτῶν ὅ τι οὗ σχῆμα εἶναι.

[perieusthekev] Cp. Thuc. VI. 24 τοῦναντίον περίεστη αὐτῷ, ‘it turned out quite the opposite to what he expected.’

[κινδυνεύει] On the force of κινδυνεύω see L. and S. sub voce, 71 A.

μακάριος τίς] Cp. Theag. 128 B; Menex. 249 D.

tοσούτων δέω ... εἰδέναι] Stallbaum quotes Axiochus 372 B for the full construction with the article, and a passage of Lucan (Icaromenippus 5) for its omission. With a genitive of the pronoun the omission of the article is the rule. See note on 92 A.

ός] = ὡστε.

tυγχάνω εἰδώς] Verbs which express being in a state or condition, such as ἔχω, and, as here, τυγχάνω, are constructed with a participle.

ός οὐκ εἰδώς. Here the natural construction would be ὡς οὐκ Β εἰδότα, but it is the well-known tendency of Greek to put into the nominative whatever relates to the subject of the principal verb. It is one of the many forms of the figure called Attraction.

δ δὲ μὴ οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.] A similar difficulty occurs in the Laches, where Socrates declares that, before we can discuss the training of the soul, we must know what virtue is. (See especially 190 B.) Cp. also Rep. I. 354 C, ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστι, σχολῆ εἰσομαι εἰτε ἄρετῇ τὶς οὖσα τυγχάνει εἰτε καὶ οὐ.

τί ἐστι] The phrase τί ἐστι is the technical expression for what is called in Logic the ‘genus’ of a thing; ποῖον τι signifies the ‘species,’ which consists of ‘genus’ (τι) and ‘differentia’ (ποῖον). We have ὅποιον τι here because the question is indirect.

τί δαί] A mere formula of transition. Cp. 73 A, B; 77 E; 87 C D; 98 B.

ἐγώγει] Notice how in Greek dialogue ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are implied rather than expressed. This is one of the most marked differences between the modern and the classical languages. Modern Greek uses μάλιστα or ναί for ‘yes,’ and ὧχι for ‘no.’

ὡστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν] ‘So that, in point of fact, I am not able.’ The infinitive here after ὡστε would denote merely the logical consequence.

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνί που, κ.τ.λ.] This is a sly intimation that Socrates D does not expect originality from Meno.
MENO, NOTES.  71 D–72 B.

ω πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων]  Cpr. Apol. 25 C, εἰπέ, ω πρὸς Διός, Μέλητε; 26 E, ἀλλ', ω πρὸς Διός.  See Riddell’s Apology, Digest of Idioms § 288.

εἰπὸν]  Imperative from εἰπα.  Cpr. ἤνεγκα, Attic, and ἡλθαμεν, Alexandrian.  This form is noticeable as having the stem of a second aorist and the terminations of a first.  Though so rare in classical Greek, it is the prevalent mode of formation in the modern language.  εἰπα is not to be confounded with what is sometimes called 'the Homeric Aorist,' έζε, έξον (imper.), βήσετο, δύσετο, etc., which have the terminations of a second aorist appended to the stem of a first.

φανήσ ... εἰδώς]  'Be found to know.'  With an infinitive the meaning would be 'seem to know.'

Ε αὐτῇ ἐστίν ἀνδρὸς ἄρετή]  The article is omitted with ἄρετή in accordance with the rule that the subject takes the article and the predicate not.  Stallbaum.

tοὺς μὲν φίλους, κ.τ.λ.]  This is the definition of justice which Polemarchus endeavours to uphold in the first book of the Republic (332 D).  Socrates maintains against it that it cannot be just to harm anybody (333 B–D).


καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἀρρενῶν]  We have here an unusual, but at the same time perfectly natural grammatical phenomenon—namely, adjectives of different genders agreeing with the same substantive.

72 A  καθ' ἐκάστην γάρ, κ.τ.λ.]  The whole answer is given from the point of view of Gorgias.  Aristotle, evidently with an eye to this passage, says that his enumeration of different virtues is preferable to the vague generality of a definition of virtue in the abstract.  See Pol. I. ch. 13 καθόλου γάρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἐαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἐκεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρετή, ἣ τὸ ὅρθοπραγεῖν, ἥ τι τῶν τοιούτων.  πολὺ γάρ ἀμείνοιν λέγοντιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἄρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὔτως ὀριζομένων.

B  οὐσίας ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστι]  Riddell (Digest § 229) classes this as a case of what he calls 'binary structure,' as though the words ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστι simply repeated οὐσίας in another form.  But plainly we have here the same construction as above 71 E, ὡστε οὐκ ἀπορία ἐιπεῖν ἄρετής περὶ ὃ τι ἐστι, both of them being in accordance with the common Greek idiom by which the subject of the dependent clause is attracted into the principal one.

The word οὐσία denotes the being or essence of a thing, that is, the collection of attributes without which it would not be what it is.  The Romans cared so little for the subtleties of thought that they had no word to express this idea until 'essentia' and 'entia' were coined.
by Plautus (see Quint. II. 14. § 2; III. 6. § 23 ed. Bonnell; there is some doubt as to the reading of the name). ‘Essentia’ was used by Cicero, and after him by Fabianus, an elegant writer contemporary with Seneca; but it was always regarded as a monstrosity by the Romans (Sen. Epist. 58 ad in.). Seneca complains of the inadequacy of the Roman language to deal with the conceptions of Plato.

καὶ eι[ In this compound, however originated, the ἄν has lost its force. The meaning of the expression is ‘even though.’ It may be followed by the indicative, as here, or by the optative, as in Rep. III. 408 B. Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. V. (9), § 13; Pol. I. 3. § 3.

ἀλλὰ μὲν ἄνθρωπος εἶναι] In order to account for the nominative, a personal δοκεῖ has to be supplied here from the impersonal δοκεῖ preceding. Cp. Apol. 25 A, B, where the ellipse is more manifest owing to the change of number.

τὸ γὰρ τῇ ἀντὶ τοῦτο λέγω. We have here the construction ἐλέγειν τινὰ τι only with a neuter object. Any word, or collection of words, when cited merely as such, is neuter in Greek. This is called in Logic the ‘suppositio materialis’ of a word or phrase. Thus τὸ ἀνθρώπως, the word ‘man,’ and here τὸ τῇ ἀντὶ, the expression ‘the same.’ Translate, ‘By the expression “the same,” I mean this.’

πρὸς τὸ ἵσχὺς εἶναι] In the nominative, because referring to the subject of the verb διαφέρει. Cp. note on ὡς οὐκ εἶδῶς, 71 B.

δικαίοσύνη, κ.τ.λ.] The modern reader is often inclined to feel surprise and impatience at the platitudes of Plato. He should bear in mind that Dialectic was a game of which the laws were exactly enforced. One of the interlocutors was not allowed at his own discretion to assume the identity of one form of expression with another. Thus, if the point to be proved were some proposition relating to λάπις, and the questioner had already extracted from his opponent a confession of the point at issue with respect to ἒμάτιον, it required an additional question and answer to effect the transition, though the one was admittedly a mere synonym of the other (Arist. Sophist. Elench. 6. § 3; Top. I. 7. § 1).

ἐπείν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι] This seems at first sight a case of ὡστορον πρότερον: but the καὶ is probably corrective—‘or rather.’ Socrates is sure that Meno’s telling would be equivalent to his recollecting what Gorgias had said.

τῇ αὐτῷ φησί] αὐτό is put vaguely for ‘the thing in question.’ This usage is common enough both in Plato and Aristotle. Cp. below 86 C ad fin. πρότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὑπτι αὐτῷ δεὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν; where αὐτῷ stands for ἀρετῆ. Shortly after we have τὴν ἀρετὴν appended
in apposition to αὐτό, § 7 D ad in. Cp. Rep. IV. 430 C; Apol. 21 B, ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ: Ar. Eth. Nic. X. (9), § 14, also X. (9), § 9, where the plural αὐτά is used in the same loose way.

ἄρχειν οἴκον τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] This was the specious prospect with which the Sophists dazzled the imagination of ambitious youths. See note on ἦ περὶ ἀρετῆς in the title of the dialogue.

D ἄρχειν οὐκ οὖν τε εἶναι] The construction is slightly irregular, as the dative presupposes παιδὶ καὶ δοῦλῳ.

ἐτι γάρ] The γάρ here introduces a new point, instead of supporting the former one.

Ε πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις] If there is anything calculated to make us believe in a real growth of the human faculties within historical times, it is the extreme difficulty under which Socrates always labours in instilling into the minds of his hearers the meaning of a general idea. Even the intelligent Theaetetus makes the same false start as Meno, and begins with an enumeration of various branches of knowledge, when he is asked for a definition of knowledge in general (Theaet. 146 C, D).

74 A μεγαλοπρέπεια] We have now had mentioned the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice—a division which plays an important part in the Republic, and underlies Cicero's treatise De Officiis. It is remarkable that the one virtue named in addition to these should be μεγαλοπρέπεια. There is a certain dramatic propriety, as Stallbaum points out, about the mention of this quality in the mouth of a disciple of Gorgias, who taught his pupils to answer ἄφοβος τε καὶ μεγαλοπρέπως. But it occupies pretty nearly the same post of honour where there is no such dramatic motive discernible (below 88 A; Rep. III. 402 C). μεγαλοπρέπεια is a conception peculiar to the honour-loving Greek, for which we have no real equivalent in English. As defined and specialised by Aristotle, it means 'expenditure on a large scale with propriety' (Eth. Nic. IV. (2), § 1); but this is no clue to the vaguer use of the term by Plato (see Rep. VI. 486 A). Socrates in Xenophon speaks of the attribute of magnificence (τὸ μεγαλοπρέπες, Mem. III. 10. § 5) revealing itself in the features. For a sketch of a μεγαλοπρέπης see Herodotus VI. 121, 122.

διὰ πάντων] 'Running through all.' See L. and S. and for Riddell's view Digest of Idioms § 112.

B προσβιβάσατε] Light is thrown on the meaning of this word by its use in Xenophon, Mem. I. 2. § 17 τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβᾶζοντας, 'winning them over to their theory.' προσβιβάζειν would mean 'to advance.' See Xen. Mem. I. § 5, § 1.

εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο] Notice that the indefinite τίς takes the opta-
tive, whereas when greater definiteness is imparted by the substitution of αὐτῇ, lower down, the mood is changed into the indicative. The superposition of three conditional clauses, εἰ ... εἰ ... εἰ, before we reach the apodosis at εἰπες, is very remarkable. Stallbaum. For two such clauses cp. Rep. 331 C and Theaet. 147 A.

Acharn. 345 άλλα μή μοι πρόφασιν. Stallbaum.

οὕδεν οὕτων οὐ τι οὐ] See note on οὐδενὶ ὅτω οὐκ, 70 C.

ἐναντία οντα] This is in agreement with τά πολλά ταῦτα above, the intervening clause, καὶ φής, κ.τ.λ. being parenthetical.

εἰπες οτι άλλ οὐδε μανθάνω] οτι, unlike the English conjunction, 75 A 'that,' may be used with the direct as well as with the oblique narration. † Cp. below C, εἶπομεν ἀν αὐτῷ οτι έμοι μὲν εὐρηται.

τά επι πάσι τούτοις ταῦταν. 'That which is the same thing in all of them.' The article is already contained in ταῦταν: but the product of crasis has become so much an independent word that it is again prefixed. Stallbaum.

μελέτη] This is equivalent in meaning, if not in etymology, to the Latin word 'meditatio.' Both words are used of an actor or orator 'getting up what he has to say, and may sometimes be rendered by the English word 'rehearsal.'


βούλει οὖν χαρισώμαι] Cp. Phaedo 79 A, Θώμεν οὖν βούλει; ίκανώς σοι] So also Phaedo 71 D, ίκανώς σοι, ἐφη, ἣ οὐ; ἀγαπᾶν] This Attic form of the optative is preferred in vowel verbs to the ordinary ending in -ομη, κ.τ.λ. It is somewhat remarkable that though the verb ἀγαπᾶν was common in classical Greek it was left to Jewish writers (Philo and St. Paul) to give circulation to ἀγάπη.

εύθες] Because involving the logical fault known as 'ignotum per ignotius' or 'pér aequae ignorantia,' i. e. defining a thing by something less known, or no better known than itself. Socrates tacitly accepts Meno's correction. See 79 D, ἀπεβάλλομεν που τῇ τοιαῦτῃ ἀπόκρισιν.

ἐριστικῶν] The ἐριστικός is defined by Aristotle to be one who argues with a view to victory rather than to truth (Sophist. Elench. XI. §§ 5, 6). The ἀγωνιστικός is much the same (see Theaet. 146 C ad fin.).

δει] The indicative marks a transition from a mere supposition to the actual case in hand, for which the way is paved by the introduction of the words ὄσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σοῦ.

διαλεκτικώτερον] That is, in a way more conducive to the attainment of truth, the proper end of διαλεκτική. Cp. Arist. Top. VIII.
II. § 2 Δυσκολαίνοντες οὖν ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιοῦνται τὰς διατριβάς.

δι έκείνων, κ.τ.λ.] We have here in effect the logical rule that a definition should be clearer than the thing defined. The object of a definition is to explain the meaning of one term by the use of others; but this object will be defeated, if the others selected are no more intelligible or less intelligible, than the original one. See Aldrich, ch. I. § 8 ad fin. 'Ut per se clarior sit et notior definito: alias non explicat omnino.'

δ ἐρωτώμενος] 'The person interrogated.' But the same person is indicated as by the term δ ἐρόμενος, 'the questioner,' above. For the objector's doubts would be satisfied by a series of questions to which he would be expected to respond.


It shows the wariness with which the dialectical wrestlers were wont to grapple with one another, that the one should demand of the other his formal assent to the existence of ever so common a notion before he proceeded to argue about it. We should say bluntly, 'Do you admit the existence of so and so?' But the Greeks, with a finer logical faculty, were content with the recognition of an idea in men's minds as indicated by language.

Ε Πρέδικος διαφέρωντο] For a somewhat burlesque specimen of Prodicus' skill in distinguishing shades of meaning in words see Prot. 337 A–C.

Prodicus was a native of the island of Ceos, a fellow-countryman of the Poet Simonides (Prot. 339 E). Socrates at one time derived instruction from him (see below 96 D, with which cp. Crat. 384 B; Char. 163 D; Prot. 341 A, and Xen. Mem. II. 1. § 21). He is said to have amassed a great fortune by his lectures (Hipp. Maj. 282 C). He is best known as the author of 'The Choice of Hercules,' related in Xenophon's Memorabilia.


76 A ταύτα τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίαις] οὗτος is sometimes used to indicate that a thing is well-known. Cp. below 80 A, ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ.

ἀποκρίνεσθαι] Epexegetical of πράγματα, explaining the nature of the trouble.

B ἐρασταί σοι] What Socrates is made to say in joke, with
questionable taste on the part of Plato, is stated in earnest by Xenophon (Anab. II. 6. § 28).

κατέγνοκας] καταγεγρυσκειν τινος means to form an unfavourable judgment of somebody.

ἐίμι ἣττων τῶν καλῶν] In the Theages (128 B) Socrates is made to declare that the one art of which he was really master, was the art of love (τὰ ἐρωτικά), with allusion to the magnetic influence which he exercised over his disciples. That this way of speaking was characteristic of the real Socrates is evident from the similar language put into his mouth by Xenophon (Mem. II. 6. § 28).

λέγετε] The plural shows that the opinion is ascribed to the school of Gorgias in general.

κατὰ Ἑμπεδοκλέα] Gorgias was himself a disciple of Empedocles (Quint. III. i. § 8; Diog. Laert. VIII. § 58). Empedocles was famous as a philosopher, poet, orator, physician, and magician. He was a native of Acragas in Sicily, and a member of a wealthy family. Romantic legends have collected round his name, and little is known with certainty of his life. His father's name is usually given as Meton, though some say Exaenetus, and some Archinomus. He is variously stated to have been a disciple of Pythagoras, of Parmenides, of Xenophanes. The invention of rhetoric is ascribed to him by Aristotle, as that of dialectic to Zeno. His philosophy was embodied in hexameter verses, of which some fragments have been preserved to us. His style was lofty and full of metaphors. He flourished in Olympiad 84 (B.C. 444–0). See his life by Diogenes Laertius, book VIII. §§ 51–77. Empedocles' theory of vision assimilates sight to smell. Just as in smell there is an actual contact of particles with the organ of sense, so Empedocles supposed it to be in the case of sight.


σώνες ὅ του λέγω, ζαθέων ἵερῶν ὀμάνυμε πάτερ, κτίστορ Λίτνας.

ἐστι γάρ χρόνα] For the same theory see Timaeus 67 C, where colours are compared to flames radiating from the object.

τραγική] 'High-flown,' 'pompous.' There is perhaps an allusion to the style of Empedocles. Diogenes Laertius speaks of a 'tragic inflation' as characteristic of the whole man (VIII. § 70). For the expression cp. Rep. III. 413 B ad in.

'Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστιν] We certainly seem to require αἰτή here in contrast with the ἐκείνη following. Without it, we must understand Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστιν to mean 'But it is not better,' as opposed to the 'It seems better,' which is implied in ὑπόσκει σοι. For the phrase ὃς
\(\varepsilon\mu\alpha\nu\tau\nu\varepsilon\pi\epsilon\beta\omega\) cp. Gorg. 453 B. \(\varepsilon\kappa\varepsilon\iota\nu\nu\) refers to the amended definition of figure as 'the termination of a solid.'

\(\alpha\lambda\lambda\; \varepsilon\iota\; \pi\varepsilon\rphi\mu\varepsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota\nu\) The \(\varepsilon\iota\) merely repeats the former one. Render \(\varepsilon\iota\; \mu\iota\) above 'if you had not.'

77 A \(\varphi\rho\sigma\theta\u0395\iota\iota\sigma\iota\eta\; \alpha\omicron\rho\omicron\lambda\epsilon\iota\psi\nu\) Cp. Symp. 210 A; Rep. VII. 533 A.

\(\alpha\lambda\lambda\; \sigma\omicron\pi\omega\sigma\; \mu\iota\; \omicron\nu\chi\; \omicron\iota\omicron\sigma\varsigma\; \tau\iota\; \varepsilon\sigma\omicron\omicron\alpha\iota\nu\) 'But I am afraid I shall not be able to tell you many things of the sort.' The whole phrase recurs in Rep. VI. 506 D. For \(\sigma\omicron\pi\omega\sigma\; \mu\iota\) followed by the indicative cp. Phaedo 77 B and Soph. Oed. T. 1074, 5, where we have the verb of fearing expressed—

\[\delta\omicron\omicron\iota\chi\; \sigma\omicron\pi\omega\sigma\]

\(\mu\iota\; \kappa\iota\; \tau\iota\sigma\varsigma\; \sigma\iota\nu\sigma\varsigma\; \tau\iota\sigma\varsigma\; \alpha\nu\alpha\rho\beta\rho\chi\varepsilon\; \kappa\kappa\alpha\).

Similarly Aristoph. Knights 112. See also Riddell, Digest § 59.

\(\alpha\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma\iota\nu\alpha\iota\nu\) A metaphor from paying a debt. Cp. Symp. 194 D. \(\alpha\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\; \omicron\nu\; \varepsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\omicron\rho\omicron\sigma\varsigma\; \tau\iota\; \theta\iota\psi\; \sigma\omicron\pi\omega\sigma\; \omicron\nu\dot{\iota}\nu\; \hat{\eta}\dot{\eta}\; \delta\iota\alpha\iota\gamma\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\omega\).

\(\omicron\lambda\gamma\nu\) That is, a logical whole, not divided into its component species—courage, temperance, etc. Elsewhere Plato aptly compares a bad logical division to hacking a quarter of meat instead of jointing it (Phaedrus 265 E).

B \(\delta\omicron\nu\alpha\sigma\theta\omicron\alpha\iota\nu\) It has been conjectured that the poet meant this absolutely, in the sense of 'power.' But as we know nothing of the passage except from Plato, we had better accept his interpretation. We have a similar construction below 78 A, \(\epsilon\pi\theta\iota\mu\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\; \tau\epsilon\; \tau\iota\nu\; \kappa\alpha\kappa\nu\) \(\kappa\alpha\iota\nu\kappa\tau\alpha\sigma\beta\alpha\nu\), where two verbs requiring different cases are coupled with the same noun. For the construction \(\delta\omicron\nu\alpha\sigma\theta\omicron\alpha\iota\nu\) \(\tau\iota\; \alpha\omicron\rho\iota\iota\sigma\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\nu\) supply \(\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\). Cp. last note.

C \(\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\) It is more usual to find \(\phi\gamma\varsigma\) used thus parenthetically. See Phaedo 59 C; Theact. 151 E.

\(\iota\; \gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota\nu\; \alpha\nu\tau\omega\) Cp. Symp. 204 E, \(\delta\; \epsilon\rho\omega\nu\; \tau\iota\nu\; \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omega\nu\; \tau\iota\; \epsilon\rho\alpha\); \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota\nu\), \(\hat{\eta}\; \delta\; \epsilon\gamma\omega\), \(\alpha\nu\tau\omega\).

78 A \(\kappa\alpha\kappa\alpha\delta\alpha\iota\mu\nu\alpha\varsigma\) \(\kappa\alpha\kappa\alpha\delta\alpha\iota\mu\nu\alpha\) means a man who is attended with an evil genius; hence 'unfortunate.' The word is used also for the evil genius itself. See the appalling story of Cassius of Parma in Valerius Maximus, bk. I. ch. 7, De Somniis § 7. A belief in spirits attendant upon human beings was common to the Jews, Greeks, and Romans. There are two passages in the New Testament, which seem to imply it, Matt. xviii. 10; Acts xii. 15. Among the Romans the guardian-spirit of a man was called his Genius, that of a woman her Juno (Tibullus IV. 6. 1; 13. 15). The conception was turned to a religious use in the later Paganism. Epictetus finely says: 'So that when ye have shut to the doors, and made it dark
within, remember never to say that ye are alone; for neither are ye. For God is within, and your Genius is within; and what need have they of light to behold what ye are doing?’ (Arrian, Epict. bk. I. ch. 14 ad fin.).

κτάσθαι] See note on δύνασθαι, 77 B.
βουλεσθαι] Supply κινδυνεύει.

It might be remarked on this that all men desire the apparent good, but differ in the degree in which their view of it approximates to, or recedes from, the real good.

'Aγαθᾶ δὲ καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Notice the hyperbaton in this sentence, C i.e. the displacement of the natural order of words, the emphatic part being brought in last for the sake of giving it a greater prominence. Riddell, Digest § 309.

καὶ χρυσίων . . . κτάσθαι] κτάσθαι might be coordinate with ἵγειάν τε καὶ πλούτον, and λέγω parenthetical. See note on λέγεισ, 77 B. But it is perhaps simpler to take λέγειν as directly governing κτάσθαι, ‘And the getting of gold and silver too I mean.’

ἀττα] Attic neut. pl. of the indefinite pronoun τις, for τίνα; to be distinguished from ἀττα, neut. pl. of ὀστὶς, 88 B.

τι] If τι is substantival, we must regard τὸ δικαίως καὶ δόσις as in D apposition to it; but probably it should be taken adverbially—‘at all.’

αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς] Meno had made out virtue to lie in the procuring of worldly goods; but Plato imparts still greater invidiousness to his position by representing him as confounding virtue with these lower goods themselves.

ἐκκοριζοῦσα] The participle is attracted into the gender of ἀρετῆ, which stands nearest to it in the sentence. In sense it belongs to πόρῳ preceding.

ἀπορία] This word generally signifies physical incapacity. Here it means the moral incapacity of the virtuous man to degrade himself.

μόριον] Logically a part, as being one of the constituent species of a genus.


τοῦτο δὲ φῆς μόριον] τοῦτο refers really to δικαίωσύνη, but is attracted into the gender of μόριον. See note on ἐκκοριζοῦσα, above 79 A.

For a somewhat different instance cp. Cic. Phil. II. 22 ‘Pompeium, quod imperii Populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit.’

ὁ τι ἄν πράττει] Supply τίς. For its omission cp. 97 A; also Char. 167 B; Euthyd. 284 A. Similarly τίνα is omitted below, 81 D; Apol. 29 A, δοκεῖν σοφῶν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.
The rare impersonal passive construction is perhaps employed, consciously or unconsciously, to escape the monosyllabic δέης.

To attempt to define a thing by means of its own species is a kind of 'circulus in definiendo,' since to define a thing by its species is to define it by itself. The procedure, however, more directly offends against the principle laid down by Aristotle in the Organon—that no definition can state the essence of a thing, if its elements are not prior and better known (Top. VI. 4. § 2). Now the species of a genus, though they may be better known to us, are not better known universally; they are, in fact, intelligible only through the genus, so that we are involved in an 'ignotum per ignotius.'

The question—τί ἔστιν ἀρετή;—is here latent, to the predicate of which, τί, the participle, is accommodated. Cp. below 87 C, ὅτι τοιούτῳ μὲν ὄντος διδακτών, where the thing spoken of is ἡ ἀρετή. Similarly Prot. 354 C, Οὐκών τήν μὲν ἡδονήν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθόν ὤν; 80 A καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν] Cp. Theaet. 149 A, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώστατος εἰμὶ καὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.

ὑπεράνως] 'Quite,' 'absolutely.' Cp. Apol. 17 D and passim. The word is of specially frequent occurrence in the slightly colloquial language of the Apology.

ὅμοιότατος] This striking metaphor deserves to be compared with that of the magnet in the Ion (533 D, E), by which Plato illustrates the secondary inspiration of students of poetry.

tό τε εἴδος] Similarly Alcibiades, in the Symposium, rallies Socrates on his personal appearance (215 A, B), and Theodorus tells him that the youthful Theaetetus is not handsome, but like himself (Theaet. 143 E), οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέωικε δὲ σοι τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τό ἐξω τῶν ὁμότατων. It was a permitted subject of jesting. When a man is very ugly he becomes proud of the distinction!


πετουηκέαναι, ναρκάν] ναρκάν is intransitive, as in the line preceding. It is epexegetical of τοιούτων τί only, not of τοιούτων τί πε-πουηκέαναι.

On the fondness of Socrates for Athens see Crito 52 B; Phaedrus 230 D. On the treatment that he might have met in another state see Apol. 37 C, D.

οὔκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ' ἀποδημῶν] On the fondness of Socrates for Athens see Crito 52 B; Phaedrus 230 D. On the treatment that he might have met in another state see Apol. 37 C, D.

αὐτὴ ναρκάωσα] Pliny testifies to the opposite: ‘Novit torpedo C vim suam, ipsa non torpescens.’ Stallbaum.

τοὺς ἄλλους] Masc., because, though speaking of the torpedo, he is thinking of himself.

ἐντύχοις] On the optative subjoined to an indicative sentence see D Riddell, Digest § 74.

ἐρυστικὸν λόγον] Grote says in a note (Plato, vol. II. p. 16), E ‘If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by so doing they rendered service to the interests of philosophy;’ and in the text, ‘Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for the subsequent three centuries—What is the criterion of truth?’

κατάγεις] It is difficult to see why this particular word should be used here. Perhaps we may render it ‘you are bringing home to us.’ L. and S. explain it as a metaphor from spinning, like Latin ‘deducere filum.’

ὅς οὖκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἕτειν] By search is meant mental search—the process of evoking knowledge out of one’s own inner consciousness. Plato accepts one of the horns of the dilemma, maintaining that one really knows the thing, having seen it in a prior state of existence. Things thus seen are forgotten, yet not so far as to be beyond recognition in case of their being alighted upon, so that search is always a hopeful task.

Πίνδαρος] The lines below are assigned by Boeckh (Pindar, vol. 81 B III. p. 623) to the Θρηνοι of Pindar.

οἴσι γὰρ ἄν . . . δέξεται] = παρ' ἄν ἄν δέξεται.

πένθος] Here = ‘guilt,’ which sooner or later brings suffering. πένθος is another form of πάθος, as βέβηθος of βάθος.

ἡρωες] The ω is shortened before the following vowel, so that the C word scans as a dactyl.

'Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχή] The logical order is—Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ὁ τι ἡ ψυχή, ἀτε ἀθάνατός τε οὐσα, κ.τ.λ., οὐ μεμάθηκεν.

ἐφαρκυία] Notice this word. What we call ‘learning’ is merely recollection, while the origin of knowledge is in an intellectual intuition of the truth of things. In the κόσμος νοητός things are visible to the eye of the mind, which are mere abstractions in the world of sense.

MENO, NOTES.  81 D–E.

D  ἀναμνησθέντα] Supply τινα. See note on 79 B.  
τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὁλον ἐστίν] This is one of the most famous of Plato’s doctrines. Cicero (Tusc. Disp. I. 24) admits the partial truth of it in an interesting passage, which will serve as an introduction to the coming interlude in the dialogue: ‘Habet (sc. animus hominis) primum memoriam, et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium; quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae. Nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Menon, pusionem quendam Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad ea sic ille respondet, ut puer; et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim respondens eodem perveniat, quo si geometrica didicisset. Ex quo effici vult Socrates ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari.’

St. Augustine too, no mean metaphysician, accepts the substantial truth of Plato’s doctrine without drawing his inference as to a previous state of existence. He says (Conf. X. 11): ‘Quocirca invenimus, nihil esse aliud discere ista, quorum non per sensus haurimus imaginis, sed sine imaginibus, sicuti sunt, per se ipsa intus cernimus, nisi ea quae passim atque indispose memoria continebat, cogitando quasi colligere, atque animadvertendo curare, ut tanquam ad manum posita in ipsa memoria, ubi sparsa prius et neglecta latitabant, jam familiari intentioni facile occurrant.’ St. Augustine had studied Platonism through the medium of a translation (Conf. VII. 9).

οὐτος ... ὅδε] οὐτος is here used, like ‘iste,’ as the pronoun of the 2nd person, ‘that of yours;’ ὅδε means ‘this of mine.’ We have a clear instance of the same use in Homer II. VIII. 109, where Diomede says to Nestor:

τούτω μὲν θεράποντε κομείτων, τῶδε δὲ νῶι  
Τρωαίν ἐφ’ ἵπποδάμοις ἰδύνομεν.

Here τούτω refers to the horses of the person spoken to, and τῶδε to those of the speaker.

ἀργοὺς πονήσει] Cp. Phaedo 85 C, D, where Simmias insists on the duty of speculative inquiry, even if certainty be unattainable.

E  Ναι, ὁ Σωκράτες] Meno accepts the doctrine of metempsychosis without surprise, and demurs only to that of ἀνάμνησις. Meno, we may remember, was imbued, through Gorgias, with the teaching of Empedocles, who held the doctrine of metempsychosis at least as firmly as Plato. Witness what he says of himself:

ἡδη γὰρ ποτ’ ἐγὼ γενόμην κοινός τε, κόρη τε,  
θάμνος τ’, οἰωνός τε, καὶ ἐξ ἀλὸς ἐμπυρος ἴχθυς.

(Diog. Laert. VIII. § 77; Tauchnitz.) Ritter and Preller read καὶ εἷν ἀλὶ ἐλλαστος ἴχθυς, which saves the line from absurdity. Empedocles is hardly likely to have said that he had been a broiled fish in his time.

18
ōútōs] ‘As you say.’ Cp. note on 81 D above; also Apol. 26 E, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς Διὸς, οὗτοι σοι δοκῶ, ‘Do I seem to you, as you say?’ Rep. II. 370 A, Ἀλλ’ ἵνας, ὡς Σάκρατες, οὗτοι μᾶς ἦν ἢ κεῖνος, where οὗτο means ‘in the way you suggest.’

πολλὰν ἀκολούθων] A sign of Meno’s wealth.

ἐντινα βούλει] In proof of the genuineness of the experiment, as a conjurer asks for any hat from the audience.

"Ελλην μέν] We may suppose an ellipse of some counterbalancing clause with δὲ—‘a Greek in race and language, but not educated.’ Cp. 89 C; Theaet. 162 A; Char. 153 C; Eur. Med. 676, Hipp. 316. The last passage is instructive, as the suppressed clause is supplied in the answer:

ΤΡ. ἀγνὰς μέν, ὡς ταῖ, χεῖρας αἰματός φέρεις;

ΦΑ. χεῖρας μὲν ἀγνάι, φρῆν δ’ ἐχει μία μα μα τι.

Stallbaum, from whom this note is drawn, illustrates the force of the μέν by that of the German particle ‘doch’: ‘Er ist doch ein Griech und spricht Griechisch?’

δύσθερα] For the pl. cp. Soph. 222 B; Euthyd. 275 E.


Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, κ.τ.λ.] We may now suppose Socrates gradually to construct the following diagram on the sand:

![Diagram of a geometric figure](image)

tοιοῦτον. The figure ABCD.

ἄλλο τι] In full ἄλλο τι ἢ, a common interrogatory formula in Plato. Cp. 97 A. It is practically equivalent to the Latin ‘nonne.’
There is an avoidance of bluntness about it characteristic of the polite Hellenic mind. To exhaust the negative is an indirect way of asserting the affirmative. Greek abounds in such negative terms as οὔκ ἄγενές, οὔκ ἄδηλον.

Riddell, denying that ἄλλο τι stands for ἄλλο τι ἢ, declares that ἄλλο τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French 'n'est ce pas que,' while ἄλλο τι ἢ may restrict the expected affirmation to some special portion of the sentence. A comparison of the instance before us with the ἄλλο τι ἢ in the next question shows that this distinction does not hold here. Digest § 22.

tó χωρίον] The figure AEFD.

83 A ἐτέραν τοσαύτην] The line DG.
ἀπὸ ταύτης δὴ] The line AG.

B ἀπ’ αὐτῆς] This is speaking inclusively, as the line AG itself is one of the four.
tοῦτο] The square AHIG.
tαυτὶ τέταρτα] ABCD, DCKG, BHLG, CLIK.

C τεττάρων γὰρ] In full—τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ποδῶν χωρίον ἐστὶν ἐκκαίδεκα ποδῶν χωρίον: ‘Four times a space of four feet is a space of sixteen feet, is it not?’
tῆς ἡμισέας ταύτησι] The original line AD. Notice the Ionic form ἡμισέας. See L. and S.
tοῦδε] The original square ABCD.
tοῦτο] The whole figure AHIG.
tοσαύτης] The line AD. Observe that the second of the terms compared has been attracted into the case of the first. Riddell, Digest § 168.

D τοῦσιδ’] The line AG.
E τὸ ἡμίσεος ταύτης] DM, the half of DG.
οἰδε] AD, which was originally supposed to be two feet.
δ’ δὲ] The line DM.
ἐνθέως, κ.τ.λ.] οἰδε is now the line AB, and δ’δὲ the line BN.

84 B προφύργου] Crasis for πρὸ ἔργου. For its use cp. below 87 A.
tότε δὲ πράξις] This is a hit at Meno for his readiness to preach about virtue. See 80 B.

D τετράπων τοῦτο] The original square ABCD.
tοῦτο] DCKG.
tρίτον τόδε] CLIK.
tὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε] BHLG.
E τὸ ὀλον τόδε] AHIG.
tοῦδε] ABCD.

85 A τεττάρους αὐταὶ] BD, DK, KL, LB.
tεττάρων δύνατων τούτων] The four squares bisected by the four lines.
The triangles BCD, DCK, KCL, LCB.

Of the size of BCD.

'in this' In DBLK.

'ta de tetapara, k.t.l.] 'What (multiple) of two is four?'

Tonde ouv posapouna ygynetai] tode is DBLK. This question is abrupt as compared with the preceding ones, though the leap is not more than a boy's intelligence would be sure to take unaided. Schleiermacher supposes a lacuna in the text, which he ingeniously supplies thus:

Σ. Tonde ouv posaplassion ygynetai toytou;
ΠAI. Δiplasion.
Σ. Tounto de peilikov ήν;
ΠAI. Tetrapous.
Σ. Tonde ouv posapoun;

The eye of the copyist might easily glance on from posaplassion to posapoun: but, on the other hand, the mind of Plato might easily have glanced over the missing link in the chain of argument.

συ φης, ὁ παί Μένωνος] Socrates says this as insisting on his position that the truths of science are latent in the minds of all. This is true of an a priori science like geometry, the truths of which are such that the mind cannot but recognise them when they are put before it.

τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι] We seem able to dispense either with the words peri δν ἄν μη εἰδη or with peri toytovn ἄν οὐκ οἶδεν. Stallbaum tries to vindicate the passage from the charge of redundancy by taking the first peri in close connection with eidoti, and translating thus: 'Itaque qui ignorat aliquid, quidquid illud sit, is tamen de eo quod ignorat, rectas verasque opiniones habere potest.' He takes peri ἄν ἄν μη εἰδη as a periphrasis for peri ὣτουουν. This seems somewhat forced, and perhaps the true explanation is that Plato, having started the question as a hypothetical case, peri ἄν ἄν μη εἰδη, drives home the apparent contradiction at the end by representing it as an existing fact, peri toytovn ἄν οὐκ οἶδεν—'Then in one who does not know, and about things which he is not supposed to know, do there exist true opinions about those things which as a matter of fact he does not know?'

eiβηφως εἰη] The periphrastic form of the perfect optative, which is invariable in the middle and passive, is found occasionally in the active also. Cp. for example Hdt. III. 64 μαθων δὲ ὡς μάτην ἀπολογεικέως εἰη τὸν ἄδελφου, ἀπέκλαε Σμέρδων: Rep. III. 393 C ad fin. γεγονοῦαι εἰη, 433 A, πεφυκύια εἰη.

ἀδάνατος ἄν ἡ ψυχῆ εἰη] It appears from the words that are put into the mouth of Socrates below, that Plato was himself conscious
of the weakness of this remarkable argument for the immortality of the soul. It breaks down from the first, for there is no notice taken of the possible supposition that the boy got the knowledge on coming into this life, that is to say, that it is part of his human nature. If necessary truth be the result of the structure of the human faculties, this a priori knowledge is got at the moment when the faculties are inherited. Neither is any notice taken of the position, which is a possible one, that the soul may have pre-existed, and yet not from eternity.

καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] For a similar distinction between essential and non-essential points of credence see Phaedo 114 D.

C οὗ μὲντοι ἄλλα] Of the same force as οὗ μὴν ἄλλα, ‘however,’ ‘not but that.’ ‘After οὗ μὲντοι is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἄλλα.’ Riddell, Digest § 155. The instance given in the Student’s Greek Grammar makes this very clear—ὁ ὑπὸς μικροῦ ἐκείνον ἔξεται χλίσεν ὁ μὴν (ἔξεται χλίσεν) ἄλλα ἐπεμεινὲν ὁ Κύρος.

διδακτῶν ὄντι αὐτῷ] See note on διδακτῶν, 70 A, and on τί αὐτῷ φησι, 73 C.

D εἰτε οὗ διδακτῶν] The οὗ may be supposed to coalesce with the διδακτῶν so as to form a negative term. Otherwise we might expect μη, as below 87 B, εἰτε ἀδυνατον εἰτε μη. For οὗ after εἰτε cp. Rep. I. 354 C.

[να δὴ ἔλευθερος ἦς] ‘In order that you may be really free.’ Cp. the words of Philo, himself a Platonist—Ἀναμφιβόλως καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ σπουδαῖος ἔλευθερος ἦστι (Π. 452, § 7, Tauchnitz).

E ποιόν τι] See note on τί ἔστι, 71 B.

εἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἄλλα] ‘At all events then.’ Cp. Rep. VI. 509 C; Riddell, Digest § 20.

λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, κ.τ.λ.] On τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως see note τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ, 72 E.

The passage which follows is the only difficulty in the Meno, and perhaps an insoluble one. The key to it has been lost for want of the diagram which should accompany it. Taking the words exactly as they stand in the text, they seem to run as follows:

‘By “hypothetically” I mean something of this kind. In a question of geometry, when one has asked, for instance, about a figure, whether it be possible for a given figure, being a triangle, to be inscribed in a given circle, a man might say, “I do not yet know whether your figure is of the kind required, but, as an hypothesis, I think the following consideration will help us. If this figure be of such a kind that when a man has described a figure on the given line of it, he falls short by a figure similar to the figure itself which
has been described thereon, one consequence seems to me to ensue, and again another, if it be impossible for it to be treated thus. Hypothetically, then, I am willing to tell you the result with regard to the inscribing of it in the circle, whether it be impossible or not.”

As to the meaning of these words, the following explanation may be attempted for want of a better:

Socrates wishes merely to illustrate the nature of a hypothesis, and he supposes a student to be asked whether it be possible for a triangle to be inscribed in a circle. The student replies that if it be a right-angled triangle, the case is one (namely, that it can certainly be inscribed in a circle), and if it be not, the case is another, and would have to be considered separately. But, in order to make the hypothesis more elaborate, the student, instead of speaking directly of a right-angled triangle, attempts to describe it by one of its properties. Unfortunately this property is not so distinctly stated as to be peculiar to the right-angled triangle.

Let ABC be a right-angled triangle. To let fall a perpendicular upon BC from the vertex A amounts to describing a triangle upon the line AC (or upon AD itself, see note on τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὑτοῦ γραμμήν, 87 Α), and the effect of such a perpendicular is that the remainder ABD is a triangle similar to ADC. To render the description peculiar to the right-angled triangle, it should be stated that the triangles into which it is divided are not merely similar to each other, but to the whole triangle (Euclid VI. 8). As a matter of mathematical fact, a circle can be described round any triangle whatever (Euclid IV. 5). But the question is not whether a triangle generally can be inscribed in a circle, but whether a given triangle can be inscribed in a circle of a given magnitude. To decide this is easier in the case of the right-angled triangle than in that of a triangle of another kind. For as the angle in a semi-circle is always a right angle, we have only to measure the length of the base and compare it with the diameter of the circle.

\[ \text{χωρίον] Properly 'space,' 'area.' But as every definite portion} \]
of space must have some shape, it is permissible to render it "figure."

87 A τὸ δὲ τὸ χωρίον [Stallbaum's contention that these words refer to the square previously described by Socrates seems put out of court by the words immediately preceding, τὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον. Socrates had not already described a circle in the sand. Notice that the τοῦτο following refers to the same thing as τὸ δὲ above, only that the point of view has shifted from the first to the second person. See note on ὁτος...δὲ, 81 D, above.

εἰ μὲν ἔστι, κ.τ.λ.] We have no clause with δὲ following, but the force of one is got from the words below, καὶ ἀλλο αὖ, εἰ ἄδυναιν.

τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν] These words admit of being construed 'the line given here,' in which case they might be referred to the perpendicular AD. If conjecture were within our province, we might imagine that the word δοθείσαν had somehow got substituted for ἡμίσεως. A triangle which admits of being divided into two similar triangles by a line drawn from the vertex and bisecting the opposite side might, to the uninstructed eye, appear more capable of being inscribed in a circle than another.

παρατείνασα] Supply τινα. Cp. ἀναμυνθέντα, 81 D, and see note on ὁτος...δὲ, 81 D, above.

εἰτε οὐ διδακτόν] See note on 86 D.

εἰ ποιόν τι ἔστι] English idiom does not admit of our bringing in a question in this hypothetical way. We have to say, 'What kind of thing in the soul must virtue be, to admit of being taught, or not to admit of it? ' Cp. Rep. I. 333 C; Xen. Mem. I. 4. § 14; ἀλλ' ὅταν τι ποιήσωσι, νομεῖσ αὐτοῦ σοῦ φροντίζειν; here we should say, 'What must they do before you will think that they have a care for you?'

τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος] See note on τίνος ὄντος ἄρετῆς, 79 E.

αὐτό] In apposition to τὴν ἄρετὴν. See note on τί αὐτό φησι, 73 C. Such an apposition is far more common with the relative than the demonstrative, e.g. Euthyd. 271 C. Distinguish this use of αὐτό from that in that in Theaet. 146 E, ἀλλὰ γιὰν ς ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὁ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, where αὐτό means 'as a thing in itself.'

Ε πλοῦτος δὴ] 'Wealth, of course'—said with allusion to the avarice of the Sophists and the character of Meno. The enumeration of bodily and external goods here given—health, strength, beauty, and wealth—is derived from a popular drinking-song, to which we have a reference in the Gorgias (451 E), οὕτως γὰρ ἐγκυκλοέαι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἄδοντων ἄνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σχολίον, ἐν ὧν καταρθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, οτι υγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν

24
Beauty, according to Greek ideas, was even more essential to happiness than strength. Cp. Euthyd. 279 A; Laws I. 631 C; 661 A.

σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] See note on τηλευτήν καλεῖς τι; 88 A

75 D.

ἀττα. See note on ἀττα, 78 C.

φρόνησις] Notice the tacit assumption of the identity of φρόνησις with ἔπιστήμη. In Xen. Mem. IV. 6. § 7, and in Plat. Theaet. 145 E Socrates makes a similar identification of σοφία and ἔπιστήμη. It was left for Aristotle to discriminate the meaning of the three terms.

διὰν μὲν ἄνευ νοοῦ θαρρῆ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. what Nicias says in the Laches 197 A, Οὐ γάρ τι, ἢ Δάχης, ἐγὼ γε ἀνδρεία καλῶς οὐτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μηθοβούμενον, ἀλλ’ ἄφοβον καὶ μωρὸν. In this dialogue courage is tentatively defined as ‘the knowledge of what is calculated to inspire fear or confidence, both in war and in all other matters’ (195 A). On the subject of brute courage see Arist. Eth. Nic. III. (8), §§ 10–12; and cp. Plato, Rep. IV. 430 B.

καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα] ‘Both learning and training.’ We have here the rhetorical figure ‘chiasmus,’ καταρτυόμενα referring to the former word, σωφροσύνη, and μανθανόμενα to the latter, εὐμάθεια.

αὐτὰ] This refers to ἀρετή, but the intervention of τῶν ἐν τῇ C ψυχῇ τι is sufficient to account for the neuter. The dative ὅφελεσθαι is the regular construction with a copulative verb. For Riddell’s view see Digest § 183.

καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰλα] This is an accusative, which is taken up again by the pronoun αὐτὰ at the end, owing to the long suspension of the construction.


ἴνα μηδεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] There is a zeugma underlying the use of ἧν S9 B here, since with the indicative it signifies a purpose not realised, while with the optative, in the next clause, the question of realisation is not raised. See Riddell, Digest § 57.

ἄλλα μὴ τούτῳ οὐ καλῶς ωμολογήσαμεν] ‘But can we have been C wrong in admitting this?’—‘Num hoc minus recte concessimus?’ The question is conveyed by μή, while οὐ coalesces with καλῶς. Cp. Lysis 213 D; Prot. 312 A ad fin.
For the absence of any clause with δὲ cp. note on Ἔλλην μὲν, 82 B.

Cp. Phaedo 67 C ad fin. καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑπείτα: and again 116 A ad fin. τῶν ἑπείτα βλον. When used strictly it means the time immediately following, and is not synonymous with τὸ μέλλον. Soph. Ant. 611:

τὸ τ’ ἑπείτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον
καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἑπαρκέσει
νόμος ὅδ’, κ.τ.λ.

After a verb involving a negative notion, such as that of ‘distrust,’ it is the usual construction in Greek to have the two negatives μὴ οὖν. So below, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

The mode of speaking which would be employed in some such amusement as draughts is transferred to the game of dialectic. Cp. Phaedo, 87 A; Charm. 164 D ad in.; Prot. 354 E; Gorg. 461 D; 462 A; Rep. I. 334 E, 345 B.

The optative imparts a hypothetical air to the question, οὐ being equivalent to εἰ τίνος. Cp. Charm. 171 E ad fin.; Lysis 214 D ad in. Stallbaurn. We may represent the force of the optative by using the past tenses in English—‘that if there were neither teachers nor learners of a subject, we should be right in conjecturing that it did not admit of being taught.’ So below 96 C.

In spite of all my efforts.’ Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. X. (7), § 8, καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ γῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ.

Anytus is here represented as the type of conventional propriety. He is referred to in the Apology as the most important of the three accusers of Socrates, who are called collectively οἱ ἄμφοι Ἀνυτός (Apol. 18 B; cp. Hor. Sat. II. iv. 3 ‘Anytique reum’). Personally he took up the quarrel of the manufacturing classes and political men against Socrates (Apol. 23 E). His father, Anthemion, had made his fortune as a tanner. Anytus was a prominent leader of the popular party at Athens, and was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants at the same time as Thrasybulus (B.C. 404. Xen. Hell. II. 3. § 42). His character has suffered more at the hands of later writers than of Plato. The Scholiast on the Apology calls him Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐραστής: and states further that out of annoyance at some jest of Socrates he bribed Meletus to prefer a charge of impiety against the philosopher. When the Athenians repented too late of their treatment of Socrates, Anytus was sent into banishment, while Meletus was condemned to death (Diog. Laert. II. § 43).
Polycrates] Polycrates was a tyrant of Samos, who flourished in the reign of Cambyses, and possessed the most powerful navy then in the world (Thuc. I. 13 ad fin.). His preternatural good fortune lost him the friendship of Amasis, king of Egypt, who surmised that he was destined to come to a bad end. This foreboding was verified through the gratuitous treachery of the Persian satrap, Oroetes, who entrapped and crucified him. He was a patron of the poet Anacreon (Hdt. III. 40–3; 120–5).

Ismias o Thebaidos] He is mentioned again in the Republic (I. 336 A) as an ambitious and wealthy man. We read in Xenophon’s Hellenics (III. 5. § 1) that he was one of the leading men among the Greeks who received a bribe from the Persians to make war on the Lacedaemonians during the campaign of king Agesilaus in Asia (about B.C. 394). As the death of Socrates took place in B.C. 399 this bribe cannot be alluded to as the origin of his wealth, though the words δόντος τινός look like it, unless Plato is here guilty of an anachronism, and has made Socrates anticipate an event which was fresh in his own mind as he wrote. In that case we would have here a clue to the date of the composition of the Meno.


ἀρ’ ὅταν τούτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν] ‘Does not the preceding question amount to the following?’ The three demonstrative pronouns, ὅδε, ὅτος, and ἐκεῖνος, correspond to the three personal ones, με, σε, ε, and derive their force from them. Now what a speaker has said is already in possession of his hearer; whereas what he is going to say, no one can know but himself. Hence ὅδε with its derivatives is used in introducing a speech or idea, while ὅτος with its derivatives is used in referring to what has already been stated. τούτο here means ‘what you have now heard;’ τόδε, ‘what I am going to tell you.’ Cp. note on ὅτος ... ὅδε, 81 D, and on τόδε τὸ χωρίον, 87 A; also Apol. 37 A, τὸ δὲ ὅν ἐστιν, ὅ ’Αθηναίοι, τοιοῦτον (what you have heard), ἀλλὰ τοιόνυμεν (what I am going to tell you) μᾶλλον.

ἵναι] = φοιτάν. Lat. ‘ventitare.’

τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα] ‘Does not the same thing hold?’ But probably the words ought to be taken adverbially, and the note of interrogation after ταῦτα abolished. The sentence will then run thus, ‘With regard to flute-playing then and the rest, is it not in the same way great folly,’ etc. In this case the pronoun, while referring to the sentence just expressed, is in apposition to the sentence succeeding, Riddell, Digest § 18.

ητούντα] In agreement with αὐτῶν, which has to be supplied as
the subject of παρέχειν, as is evident from the μανθάνειν following. Otherwise there is no reason for the change from the plural βουλομένους.

tούτων, οί μήτε προσποιούνται, κ.τ.λ.] 'Persons who do not claim,' οὔτε would refer to some definite individuals.

μήτ' ἑστίν αὐτῶν] For the transition from the relative to the demonstrative cp. Gorg. 452 D; Rep. III. 395 D, δὲν φαμεν χήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὑτῶν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι.

ἑστὶν σε] This is more complimentary than ἑστὶν σοι would have been. The latter would have meant 'you have the opportunity;' this means 'there is the opportunity,' i.e. 'I have the opportunity of your assistance.'

91 A ἥ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, κ.τ.λ.] See the note on η καὶ ἀρετῆς in the title of the dialogue.

ἕνους ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποτέμψαι] This is specified by Aristotle as coming under the sphere of the virtue of μεγαλοπρέπεια, Eth. Nic. IV. (2), § 15 καὶ περὶ ἑνών δὲ ὑποδοχᾶς καὶ ἀποστολᾶς.

B ὑποσχυσμένους] Cp. Laches 186 C.

οὕτωι εἰσιν] In full οὕτωι εἰσιν τοιοῦτοι.

C λαβθῆναι] 'To get himself ruined.' Riddell, Digest § 88, classifies this as an instance of the 'semi-middle' sense of the verb. Cp. Apol. 35 C, where ἐθίζεσθαι means 'to let yourselves be accustomed.' There is a good instance of this use in Aristotle (Eth. Nic. III. (1), § 9) δὲν ἐπανοὶ καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἥ μή, 'according as men let themselves be compelled or not.'

οὕτωι γε φανερά ἑστὶ λάβῃ] Notice that the copula is attracted into agreement with the predicate, Riddell, Digest § 202. Cp. note on τούτῳ δὲ φής μόριν, 79 B.

D Πρωταγόρας] Protagoras of Abdera, an elder contemporary of Socrates. He was the first to call himself a Sophist, and to demand a fee for teaching (Prot. 349 A). This fee is said to have been fixed at 100 minae: but if any pupil demurred to paying it, he allowed him to go to the temple, and deposit under oath whatever sum he thought equivalent to the benefit he had received (Prot. 328 B. C; Arist. Eth. Nic. IX. (1), § 5; Diog. Laert. IX. 52). According to the statement of Heracleides Ponticus, a disciple of Aristotle, Protagoras gave laws to the Thurians. As the colony of Thurii was founded by Pericles in B. C. 443, this statement exactly tallies with that of Apollodoros, who says that he flourished (ἀκμάζειν) in the 84th Olympiad, and accounts for the selection by the latter of that particular date (Diog. Laert. IX. Cp. § 50 with § 56). For the well-known story of how when a lad he was sent out to gain his living
as a porter, and attracted the attention and patronage of Democritus by his ingenuity in tying wood, see Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. V. 3, and cp. Diog. Laerct. IX. § 53. Chronological difficulties have been started with regard to it, on the ground that Democritus was younger than Protagoras (see Smith’s Dict. of Gk. and Rom. biography). According to Philostratus, the father of Protagoras was extremely rich, and entertained Xerxes on his way to Greece. This, however, would be quite consistent with subsequent poverty.

τῷ λύμῷ] ‘The hunger that would overtake them.’

ἐγγὺς καὶ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Just about seventy years of age;’ Lat. ‘Fere septuaginta annos natum.’

eὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαιναι] It is extremely difficult to reconcile this statement with the often-repeated story that Protagoras was banished from Athens for blasphemy, and his books publicly burnt. After all, our earliest authority for this anecdote is Cicero (De Nat. Deor. I. ch. 23). The next best is Josephus (against Apion II. 37). It is told also by Philostratus (p. 494, Teubner’s ed. vol. II. p. 13), by Diogenes Laertius (IX. § 52), and by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. XIV. 19. § 6. ed. Heinichen). By the time the story reaches Philostratus, Protagoras is hunted over land and sea, and drowned in a small boat in attempting to escape the Athenian trieremes. How is it that in all that has been written by Plato and Xenophon with regard to the trial of Socrates for impiety, there should not be a single reference to the similar charge brought against Protagoras, who was, intellectually, the most prominent man of his day?

ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι] e. g. Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus of Acragas. See Prot. 314 C; Rep. X. 630 C; Theag. 127 E ad fin.

πολλοῦ γε δεύσοι μαίνεσθαι] The usual construction with πολλοῦ δεῖν is the simple infinitive, as here and below 79 B, πολλοῦ δεῖς εἶπεῖν (cp. Apol. 30 D, 35 D, 37 B; Dem. de Cor. p. 263 ad fin., de Fals. Leg. p. 356): but it may be followed by the accusative article (Theaet. 166 D).

οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες. This might be taken to mean ‘who intrust’ the young men to them (i.e. to the Sophists): but it seems more natural to take it in the sense of ‘who allow them to.’

ἄλλον] We have here the idiomatic use of ἄλλος, which allows B of such expressions in Greek as ‘there was no tree nor any other grass in the place.’ In this passage we may render it ‘either;’ sometimes ‘besides’ suits better. Cp. Apol. 36 B, τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων, Rep. III. 401 A; and see Riddell, Digest § 46.

οὐ ... εἶν] ‘If you were entirely without experience of it.’ See C note on εἶν, 89 E.
The γάρ points to an ellipse. 'But let this pass, for,' etc.

The aorist may be used of a contemporaneous act, if it be not regarded as continuous—'benefit in the telling.' Stallbaum remarks that it would certainly have been φράσων in the imperative.

Practically the upper class of Athenian citizens. Cp. Rep. VIII. 569 A.

And in investigating what you have heard me say, I will tell you what we are investigating.' See note on 90 C.

Notice that adjectives can be followed by a cognate accusative as well as verbs. Cp. Apol. 20 A ad fin. ἃς ἐμελλέν αὐτὸ καλῷ τῇ κάγαθῳ ποιήσειν τῷν προσήκουσιν ἄρετίν: ibid. D, τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κυνούντων ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. See Riddell, Digest § 3.

'Or whether this is not a thing that a man can transmit, or one receive from another.' The force of the verbal adjective is active.

Supply ἄν φαίης from above.

Imperfect infinitive.

For the construction cp. Rep. IV. 421 E ad in. τοὺς νεῖλ ... χεῖρος δημιουργοὺς διδάσκαται. Riddell says that the ascription to the middle voice of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another' is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (διδάσκαται) by some passages in the Meno. He declares that the whole point of the present passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself, fortifying his assertion by a comparison with 94 C, where the active ἐναίδευσε is used of a father getting his son taught by others (Digest § 87). But, if this be so, why did Plato add ὃσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθών
Besides, is it likely that the ‘Olympian’ would have had time, even if he had the ability and inclination, to teach his son circus-riding? As for the argument that the active voice in 94 C really conveys (on the principle of ‘qui facit per alium facit per se’) the meaning that is supposed to be peculiar to the middle, this is a reason for allowing the use to the active voice rather than denying it to the middle. Cp. the parallel passage in the Protagoras (319 E). On the whole then we may safely say that ‘the third sense of the middle voice’ need not be expunged from the grammars.

σου] Ethic dative.

ἐν τοῖς ἄριστοις] Cp. Theaet. 186 A, ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα, where Campbell remarks that in such expressions the article retains its demonstrative force, comparing Euthyd. 303 C ad fin. and Oed. Col. 742 (Dindorf).

Λυσίμαχοι] This son of Aristeides the Just appears along with Melesias, the son of Thucydides, among the interlocutors in the Laches. They are there represented as old men, lamenting the neglect of their own education, and resolved not to let their sons suffer in the same way. Lysimachus had been intimate with Sophroniscus, the father of Socrates, and belonged to the same deme as the philosopher—that of Alopecae (Laches 179 C, D; 180 C, D). We learn from Demosthenes (against Leptines, p. 491) that the Athenians, in gratitude for his father’s services, assigned him an allotment of land in Euboea, together with a sum of money, on the motion of Alcibiades. Aristeides, the son of this Lysimachus, was committed to the charge of Socrates: but the latter confessed subsequently that his attempts to educate him had proved a complete failure (Laches 200 C; Theaet. 151 A ad in.). He does not appear to have succeeded much better with Thucydides, the son of Melesias (Theag. 130 A, B).

ὑεῖς] These sons of Pericles figure in the Protagoras (315 A, 319 E, 328 C); they are referred to in the First Alcibiades (118 D, E) as being foolish. The Scholiot on the passage adds the information that they were nick-named, each of them, βλαστομιμίμαμας, which practically amounts to ‘booby’ (cp. Aristoph. Clouds 1001). Valerius Maximus, therefore, is rhetorical in speaking of them as youths of great promise (‘duobus mirificis adolescentibus’) when describing the strength of mind with which Pericles bore their loss. They fell victims to the plague within four days of one another, B. C. 429 (Val. Max. V. ch. 10, ext. § 1).

ἀλλά μὴ οὐκ ἡ διδακτόν] The phrase is repeated in E below. Cp. Apol. 39 A, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὔ τοῦτ’ ἡ χαλεπόν. The easiest explanation of such expressions is to suppose an ellipse of some word like
δέδομαι οτ Joel. Riddell classifies them as instances of the presump-
tive variety of the deliberative conjunctive; Digest § 59.

τόυς φαυλοτάτους] There is a touch of the Socratic εἰπάνεια about this. The instances already selected had really been the
strongest possible.

ἀδυνάτους] For the acc. following cp. Polit. 295 B, ἔτει τοῦτ
ἀν δυνατός ἂν: Hipp. Min. 367 E. See note on δύνασθαι, 77 B.

C Θοικυδίδης] The son of Melesias. A conservative statesman at
Athens, and unsuccessful rival of Pericles.

Μελησίαν] See note on Λυσίμαχον, 94 A.

ἀκοή] ‘To remember by hearsay’ is certainly a loose expression:
but μεμνησαί preceding is practically equivalent to oἰσθα, and accepted
by the speaker as such.

Οὐκὸν δηλον, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence is perfectly perspicuous,
though highly involved. It contains two dependent clauses, the
former of which has a μέν both in the protasis and the apodosis,
which is answered by a corresponding δὲ in the protasis and apodosis
of the latter. For a similar arrangement of particles cp. the long
sentence in the Apology, 28 D, E, beginning Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινα. In the
sentence at present before us the influence of the negative in οὐκ ἂν
ποτὲ extends over both the dependent clauses. The real gist of the
dependent clauses lies in the participles δαπανώμενον and ἀναλώσαντα
respectively, and not in the verbs. Cp. Apol. 31 B, where see Rid-
dell’s note and Digest § 303. The second of the two dependent
clauses may be rendered thus—‘and yet have omitted to teach them
those things in the case of which he had no need to spend anything,
in order to make them good men.’

D ei didaktov ἣν] The singular is sufficiently accounted for by
supposing that the writer has in his mind the question ἄρα didaktov
ἡ ἄρετη;

καὶ οἰκίας, κ.τ.λ.] We have here an answer to the rhetorical
question just put—‘Why, he was not only a member of a great house,
but,’ etc.

τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τίς] τίς is put for τίνα by attraction to the relative
clause intervening. Cp. Apol. 41 A, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς,
οὑπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεὶ δικάζειν, Μίνας τε καὶ Ἡραδάμανθος. See the
instances collected by Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 192.

E Ἀλλά γάρ, κ.τ.λ. ‘But the fact is, my friend Anytus, I am afraid
that virtue is not a thing that can be taught.’ For ἀλλὰ γὰρ in this
sense cp. Apol. 19 C, D and 25 C ad in., and see Riddell, Digest
§ 147. It is usual to explain ἀλλὰ γὰρ by supposing an ellipse (cp.
note on 92 C). Here, for instance, the full expression might be—
‘But why say more? For,’ etc.
εμοὶ πικρὸς τέθνηκεν ἦ κεῖνοι γλυκὺς,
and see Riddell, Digest § 170.

*Ἀνυτός μὲν] This is answered, though late, by ὁ ὤν δὲ below. 95 A
Two pairs of counter-balanced clauses, one pair with πρῶτον μὲν and ἐπιείται (for ἐπιείται δὲ), the other with the ordinary μὲν and δὲ intervene before we get the antithesis which was latent in the mind of the speaker when he began.

διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ἦ, κ.τ.λ.] For τε followed by ἦ instead of the usual καὶ cp. Theaet. 143 C ; Ion 535 D. Stallbaum.

οἷς μηδὲ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘If they are not even agreed about this.’

Γοργίου] This is a kind of partitive genitive—‘What I most C admire in Gorgias.’ Cp. Apol. 17 A, μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα. Similar instances are Theaet. 161 B ad fin.; Prot. 329 C ad in.; Rep. II. 367 D.

πέπονθα] πᾶσχω is often used thus to express a state of mind.

Cp. Apol. 17 A ad in.; ibid. 22 A.

οἶσθ’ ὅτι] ‘Are you aware, I say?’ An infinitive clause, τῶν D ποιητῶν ταύτα ταύτα λέγειν, would have sufficed, except for emphasis. The οἶσθ’ ὅτι is repeated for the third time below.


ἐν τοῖς ἔλεγείοις] See Theog. lines 33–6. The second distich is quoted also by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (I. 2. § 20).

συμμίσγνα] The Epic and Ionic form συμμίσγω, for συμμίγνυμ, is used sometimes by Plato himself. See Phileb. 23 D ad in.; Laws III. 678 C.


λέγει πως] ‘He somehow says.’

Ἔχεις οὖν ἑπειν, κ.τ.λ.] On the divorce of practice from theory in the case of political virtue see Arist. Eth. Nic. X. (9), § 18, who evidently has the conclusion of the Meno before his mind. See also Laches 186 C.

ἀλλου ὀτουου ἐπίγιματος, οὖ, κ.τ.λ.] A strong instance of inverse attraction, where the antecedent is drawn into the case of a relative not yet expressed. So below C, πράγματος οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι, κ.τ.λ. It is like Vergil’s ‘Urbem, quam statuo, vestra est.’ It differs from the case in 94 D, in that the relative clause has there already come in to modify the subsequent construction. Here
we have the effect produced during the process of mental conception. See Riddell, Digest § 191. To the instances there given add two from Stallbaum, Lysis 221 B ad fin.; Rep. VII. 520 D. In another part of the Digest (§ 26 D) Riddell explains this genitive on a different principle and refers us to § 191 for reasons why it is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative. Perhaps he intended to alter the later passage.

οὐχ ὅπως] ‘Not only not,’ which is sometimes the meaning of ‘non solum,’ or ‘non modo,’ in Latin. Riddell remarks that the negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οὐ χ ὅπως clause; Digest § 152.

C Εἰ δὲ γε μὴ, κ.τ.λ.] Supply οὐκοῦν from the last question.

πράγματος οὗ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. 89 E and note.

D ἦ τίς ἂν εἰῆ] Render ἦ, ‘or if there are.’ It does not introduce the second member of the dependent question, which is suppressed.

καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος] See note on 75 E.

προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν] The parallel construction of the neuter gerundive was an archaism in classical Latin.

‘Aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum est.’

Lucr. I. 112.

Yet Cicero has it in the De Senectute (ch. 2 ad fin.) ‘viam ... quam nobis quoque ingrediundum sit.’

E  ἦ ἵσως καὶ διαφεύγειν, κ.τ.λ.] The construction here appears hopeless. Two things seem clear, namely, that the ἦ refers us back to ζητητέον before the parenthesis, and that τὸ γνώναι is subject to διαφεύγειν. Stallbaum explains the passage by supplying ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ from ζητητέον. The best of the instances he adduces as parallel are Crit. 51 B; Gorg. 492 D; Rep. VII. 525 B: but none of these present the change of subject which constitutes the difficulty here. This passage could only be assimilated to the rest by taking ἡμᾶς as subject to διαφεύγειν, and forcing upon the words the meaning ‘or else perhaps we must abandon the attempt to ascertain.’ With a different punctuation from Hermann’s it would be possible to say that διαφεύγειν is loosely put for ὅτι διαφεύγει and is coordinate with the clause immediately preceding. In that case render, ‘Or that else perhaps we cannot know,’ etc.

ὅτι μὲν] This is answered by ‘Ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν below in 97 A. In what follows we have an instance of what Riddell calls ‘binary structure,’ as the clause ὅτι οὐκ ἂν, κ.τ.λ. simply repeats in a slightly different form the preceding one ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἁγαθοῦς, κ.τ.λ. Riddell, Digest § 229.
NOTES. 97 A—E.

97 A

ēan μὴ φρόνιμος ο[...] Supply δ ἡγούμενος.

Πῶς δὴ ὅρθως λέως[...] Stallbaum says that ὅρθως is here used 'materially,' quoting Soph. Ant. 567

ἀλλ' ἤδε μέντοι μὴ λέγ' οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' ἔτι.

He might have quoted Theaet. 147 A, ὅταν εἰσώμεν πηλός. But surely the sense is against him? Meno does not want Socrates to explain the meaning of the word 'rightly;' he wants to know what else could guide rightly but wisdom. Supply ἡγεῖσθαι therefore with ὅρθως.

οὐδὲν χείρων] 'Quite as good'—by the figure 'meiosis' or B 'litotes.'

tὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δέξα ἤν ἀληθῆς] 'Whereas right opinion was that too,' namely, 'a guide to right action,' understood from ἡγεῖται.

The pronoun refers to the sentence preceding, and stands as predicate to the one which it introduces. This passage is not analogous to Apol. 23 A, on which see Riddell, Digest § 19 (where a mistake in the punctuation of the text is incidentally corrected—τὸ δὲ,—κιν-

dνευει instead of, as printed, τὸ δὲ κινδυνευει). Nor does it bear any resemblance to Rep. IV. 443 C, in which τὸ anticipates the sentence coming as a subject.

οὐκ ἄει τυγχάνοι] The ἄν has to be supplied from above. Its repetition there, perhaps, led to its omission here. There are, however, occasional instances to be found of the optative used potentially without ἄν. See Riddell, Digest § 66.

πολὺ τιμωτέρα] On the superiority of knowledge to right D opinion cp. Rep. VI. 506 C.

εἴπω] Deliberative conjunctive.


ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐστὶ παρ' ὑμῖν] The language here is playful, and we are not to infer that such marvellous automata existed at Athens any more than in Thessaly. The way in which Aristotle speaks of them plainly shows that they were mythical— ἀσπερ τὰ Δαιμόλου φαίν ἢ τοὺς τοὺς Ἡπαίστου τρίποδας. (For the latter see Homer II. XVIII. 376.) The Scholiast on this passage of the Meno supplies a rationalistic explanation of the legend. He says that the early statuaries used to make images with their eyes closed, and their legs in one block. But Daedalus, by representing the eyes of his statues as open, and giving an air of motion by the separation of the legs, made them so life-like that they actually seemed as if they might walk off, if they were not looked after.


C 2

35
Rep. VI. 505 B, where κεκτήμεθα in one line is followed by ἐκτῆσθαι in another.

πρὸς τῷ οὖν δῆ, κ.τ.λ.] Notice the ‘rhetorical interrogation,’ answered by the speaker himself, the object being to awake attention. Riddell, Digest § 325.

cαὶ γάρ αἱ δόξαι] ‘For true opinions also.’ καὶ γάρ is here equivalent to καὶ γάρ καί. Cp. Apol. 18 E, καὶ γάρ ὑμεῖς, κ.τ.λ. So Symp. 176 B; Gorg. 467 B. Stallbaum.

98 B ὠς οὖκ εἰδώς, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Am speaking from conjecture, not from knowledge.’

οὐ πάνυ] ‘Non omnino,’ but used by litotes for ‘omnino non.’

eἰπέρ εἶεν] Subjunctive use of the optative, where the principal clause is itself optative. Riddell, Digest § 73.

D οὐδείς ἐπικτητα] ‘Nor are they so to be acquired,’ i.e. in the course of nature. οὐδὲτερον preceding is plural in sense.
eἰ διδακτὸν ἐστιν] ἢ ἀρετὴ has to be supplied from οἱ ἀγαθοὶ above.

Κἂν εἰ γε διδακτὸν εἰη, φρόνησις δὲν εἶναι] This was implied in the words in 87 C, ἢ τοῦτο γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;

99 A [‘Wherewith.’

B οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα] ‘Themistocles and the like.’ Cp. Apol. 18 B, τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτον, ‘Anytus and his coadjutors.’ The person mentioned is himself included. So Crat. 399 E ad fin. This way of speaking is as old as Homer. See Iliad III. 146; VI. 436, 7.

οὐδὲν διαφέροντος] We have here extended to practical statesmen the same half-jocular theory of inspiration which Plato elsewhere applies to poets and rhapsodists. See Apol. 22 B, C; Ion 533 E.

ἄληθῆ καὶ πολλά] It may be, as Stallbaum says, that this is not the same thing as πολλὰ καὶ ἄληθῆ, but that the καὶ serves to intensify the πολλά—‘a great many true things.’ But cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. I. (10), § 12 μεγάλα καὶ πολλά.

D αἲ γε γυναῖκες] Women of all countries are strong in the language of admiration. In the Cratylus (418 C ad in.), Plato alludes to the conservative influence exercised by women upon language. Compare the admiration expressed by Crassus for the diction of his mother-in-law, which reminded him, he declared, of Plautus and Naevius (Cic. de Orat. III. § 45).

θεῖος ἀνὴρ] Plato has Atticized the expression. In the Laconian dialect it would be σεῖος ἀνὴρ (Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. (1), § 3).

36
ΜΕΝΟ, NOTES. 100 A–C.

ἐφη Ὀμηρος] Od. X. 495.

ταύτων ἄν καὶ εὐθὺς] 'In the same way such a man would be at once (καὶ εὐθύς).

φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.] 'It is plain that virtue comes.'

ἐστιν δὲ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις] By saving them from the dis-

grace of condemning Socrates.
INDEX OF PERSONS.

(n appended refers the reader to the notes.)

Aleuadae, 70 B., n. on τὴν πόλιν.
Alexidemus, 76 E.
Anthemion, 90 A.
Anytus, 89 E–95 A, 99 E, 100 C.
Aristeides, 94 A.
Aristippus, 70 B, n.
Anthemion, 90 A.
Anytus, 89 E–95 A, 99 E, 100 C.
Aristeides, 94 A.
Aristippus, 70 B, n.
Cleophantus, 93 D, E.
Daedalus, 97 D.
Empedocles, 76 C, n.
Endorus, 94 C.
Gorgias, 70 B, n, 71 C, D, 76 B, C, 95 C, 96 D.
Homer, 100 A.
Ismaenias, 90 A, n.
Larissaeans, 70 B.
Lysimachus, 94 A.
Melesias, 94 C.
Meno, see note on title.

Paralus, 94 B.
Pericles, 94 B.
Persephone, 81 B.
Pindar, 76 D, n, 81 B, n.
Polycrates, 90 A, n.
Prodicus, 75 E, n, 96 D.
Protagoras, 91 D, n, E.
Socrates, passim.
Sophists, 91, 2.
Stephanus, 94 C.
Teiresias, 100 A.
Themistocles, 93 D, E.
Theognis, 95 D, E.
Thessalians, 70 A, n, B.
Thucydides, 94 C, n, D.
Xanthias, 94 C.
Xanthippus, 94 B.

THE END.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Binding</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>An Elementary Latin Grammar</td>
<td>By J. Barrow Allen, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>Rudimenta Latina</td>
<td>By the same Author.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>A First Latin Exercise Book</td>
<td>By the same Author.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>A Second Latin Exercise Book</td>
<td>By the same Author.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 35s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerram</td>
<td>Anglice Reddenda; or Extracts, Latin and Greek, for Unseen Translation</td>
<td>By C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
<td>Fourth Edition.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerram</td>
<td>Reddenda Minora; or, Easy Passages, Latin and Greek, for Unseen Translation</td>
<td>For the use of Lower Forms</td>
<td>Composed and selected by C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 15s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee-Warner</td>
<td>Hints and Helps for Latin Elegiæs.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 35s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargent</td>
<td>Easy Passages for Translation into Latin</td>
<td>By J. Y. Sargent, M.A.</td>
<td>Seventh Edition.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargent</td>
<td>A Latin Prose Primer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caesar. The Commentaries (for Schools).</strong></td>
<td>By Charles E. Moberly, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Gallic War. Second Edition</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Gallic War. Books I, II.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Civil War</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catulli Veronensis Carmina Selecta,</strong></td>
<td>By Henry Walford, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 35. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>secundum recognitionem</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cicero. Selection of interesting and descriptive passages.</strong></td>
<td>By Leonard Huxley, B.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De Senectute.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pro Cluentio.</em></td>
<td>By W. Ramsay, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 35. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>First Action against Verres; Oration concerning the command of Gnaeus Pompeius; Oration on behalf of Archias; Ninth Philippic Oration.</em></td>
<td>By J. R. King, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>In Q. Caecilium Divinatio</em></td>
<td>By J. R. King, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Speeches against Catiline.</em></td>
<td>By E. A. Upcott, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 25. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Philippic Orations.</em></td>
<td>By J. R. King, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 105. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Select Letters.</em></td>
<td>By Albert Watson, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Letters. Text.</em></td>
<td>By the same Editor.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Selected Letters.</em></td>
<td>By the same Editor.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cornelius Nepos.</strong></td>
<td>By Oscar Browning, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horace. With a Commentary. Volume I.</strong></td>
<td>By Edward C. Wickham, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Odes, Carmen Seculare, and Epodes.</em></td>
<td>Head Master of Wellington College.</td>
<td>New Edition. In one or two Parts. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horace. Selected Odes.</strong></td>
<td>By E. C. Wickham, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>In one or two Parts.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Edited, with Introduction, Notes, etc.</em></td>
<td>Crown 8vo. 65.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or separately, Text and Introduction, 3s.</td>
<td>Notes, 3s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livy. Selections (for Schools).</strong></td>
<td>By H. Lee-Warner, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Caudine Disaster.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hannibal’s Campaign in Italy.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Macedonian War.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF SCHOOL BOOKS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livy.</strong></td>
<td><em>Books V—VII.</em> With Introduction and Notes.</td>
<td>By A. R. Cluer, B.A. <em>Second Edition.</em> Revised by P. E. Matheson, M.A. <em>In one or two parts.</em></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livy.</strong></td>
<td><em>Books XXI—XXIII.</em> With Introduction and Notes.</td>
<td>By M. T. Tatham, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livy.</strong></td>
<td><em>Book XXII.</em> With Introduction and Notes.</td>
<td>By the same Editor.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ovid.</strong></td>
<td><em>Selections</em> (for the use of Schools). With Introductions and Notes, and an Appendix on the Roman Calendar.</td>
<td>By W. Ramsay, M.A. Edited by G. G. Ramsay, M.A. <em>Third Edition.</em></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ovid.</strong></td>
<td><em>Tristia,</em> Book I.</td>
<td>Edited by S. G. Owen, B.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plautus.</strong></td>
<td><em>Captivi.</em> With Introduction and Notes.</td>
<td>By W. M. Lindsay, M.A. <em>In one or two Parts.</em></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plautus.</strong></td>
<td><em>Trinummus.</em> With Notes and Introductions.</td>
<td>By C. E. Freeman, M.A. and A. Sloman, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sallust.</strong></td>
<td><em>Bellum Catilinarium</em> and <em>Jugurthinum.</em> With Introduction and Notes, by W. W. Capes, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tacitus.</strong></td>
<td><em>The Annals.</em> Books I—IV. Edited, with Introduction and Notes for the use of Schools and Junior Students, by H. Furneaux, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tacitus.</strong></td>
<td><em>The Annals.</em> Book I. By the same Editor.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. limp, 2s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terence.</strong></td>
<td><em>Adelphi.</em> With Notes and Introductions.</td>
<td>By A. Sloman, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terence.</strong></td>
<td><em>Andria.</em> With Notes and Introductions.</td>
<td>By C. E. Freeman, M.A., and A. Sloman, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terence.</strong></td>
<td><em>Phormio.</em> With Notes and Introductions.</td>
<td>By A. Sloman, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tibullus and Propertius.</strong></td>
<td>Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by G. G. Ramsay, M.A.</td>
<td><em>In one or two Parts.</em></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virgil.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by T. L. Papillon, M.A. <em>In Two Volumes.</em></td>
<td>Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.; Text separately, 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virgil.</strong></td>
<td><em>Bucolics.</em> With Introduction and Notes, by C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
<td><em>In one or two Parts.</em> Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virgil.</strong></td>
<td><em>Aeneid I.</em> With Introduction and Notes, by C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. limp 1s. 6d.</td>
<td>In two Parts. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virgil.</strong></td>
<td><em>Aeneid IX.</em> Edited with Introduction and Notes, by A. E. Haigh, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap 8vo. limp 1s. 6d.</td>
<td>In two Parts. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GREEK.

Chandler. *The Elements of Greek Accentuation* (for Schools).
By H. W. Chandler, M.A. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.


Veitch. *Greek Verbs, Irregular and Defective*: their forms, meaning, and quantity; embracing all the Tenses used by Greek writers, with references to the passages in which they are found. By W. Veitch, LL.D. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.


---

*A SERIES OF GRADUATED READERS.*

**Easy Greek Reader.** By Evelyn Abbott, M.A. In one or two Parts. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

**First Greek Reader.** By W. G. Rushbrooke, M.L., Second Classical Master at the City of London School. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Second Greek Reader.** By A. M. Bell, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

**Fourth Greek Reader**: being Specimens of Greek Dialects. With Introductions and Notes. By W. W. Merry, D.D., Rector of Lincoln College. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

**Fifth Greek Reader.** Selections from Greek Epic and Dramatic Poetry, with Introductions and Notes. By Evelyn Abbott, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

---

**THE GREEK TESTAMENT.**

**Evangelia Sacra Graece.** Fcap. 8vo. limp, 1s. 6d.

The Greek Testament, with the Readings adopted by the Revisers of the Authorised Version. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.; or on writing paper, with wide margin, 15s.

**Novum Testamentum Graecae juxta Exemplar Millianum.** 18mo. 2s. 6d.; or on writing paper, with large margin, 9s.
**LIST OF SCHOOL BOOKS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author, Edition, Notes</th>
<th>Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Novum Testamentum Graece.</strong></td>
<td>Accedunt parallela S. Scripturae loca, necnon vetus capitulorum notatio et canones Eusebi. Edidit CAROLUS LLOYD, S.T.P.R., necnon Episcopus Oxoniensis.</td>
<td>8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek Testament Primer.</strong></td>
<td>An Easy Grammar and Reading Book for the use of Students beginning Greek. By REV. E. MILLER, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outlines of Textual Criticism applied to the New Testament.</strong></td>
<td>By C. E. HAMMOND, M.A. Fourth Edition.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aeschylus. Agamemnon.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by ARTHUR SIDDWICK, M.A. Third Edition. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AeschyUis. Choephoroi.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by the same Editor.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aeschylus. Eumenides.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by the same Editor. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aeschylus. Prometheus Bound.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by A. O. PRICKARD, M.A. Second Edition.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aristophanes. The Clouds.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by W. W. MERRY, D.D. Second Edition.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aristophanes. The Acharnians.</strong></td>
<td>By the same Editor. Third Edition. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aristophanes. The Frogs.</strong></td>
<td>By the same Editor. New Edition. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aristophanes. The Knights.</strong></td>
<td>By the same Editor. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cebes. Tabula.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes, by C. S. JERRAM, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demosthenes. Orations against Philip.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes. By EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., and P. E. MATHESON, M.A., Vol. I. Philippic I and Olynthiacs I—III. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euripides. Alcestis.</strong></td>
<td>By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euripides. Hecuba.</strong></td>
<td>By C. H. RUSSELL. Immediately.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euripides. Helena.</strong></td>
<td>By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euripides. Heracleidae.</strong></td>
<td>By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euripides. Iphigenia in Tauris.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes. By the same Editor.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euripides. Medea.</strong></td>
<td>With Introduction, Notes and Appendices. By C. B. HEBERDEN, M.A. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Herodotus. Book IX.</strong></td>
<td>Edited with Notes, by EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A. In one or two Parts.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Herodotus. Selections.</strong></td>
<td>Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and a Map, by W. W. MERRY, D.D.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homer. Iliad, Book I.</strong></td>
<td>By the same Editor. Third Edition.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homer. Iliad, Books VI and XXI.</strong></td>
<td>With Notes, &amp;c. By HERBERT HAILSTONE, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d. each.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homer</td>
<td>Odyssey, Books I-XII</td>
<td>By W. W. Merry, D.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homer</td>
<td>Odyssey, Books XIII-XXIV</td>
<td>By the same Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homer</td>
<td>Odyssey, Books I and II</td>
<td>By the same Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucian</td>
<td>Vera Historia</td>
<td>By C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>The Apology</td>
<td>By St. George Stock, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>Meno</td>
<td>By St. George Stock, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophocles</td>
<td>(For the use of Schools.)</td>
<td>Edited by Lewis Campbell, M.A., and Evelyn Abbott, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophocles</td>
<td>Oedipus Rex: Dindorf's Text</td>
<td>With Notes by W. Basil Jones, D.D., Lord Bishop of S. David's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theocritus</td>
<td>Edited</td>
<td>With Notes by H. Kynaston, D.D. (late Snow')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Easy Selections (for Junior Classes). With a Vocabulary, Notes, and Map.</td>
<td>By J. S. Phillpotts, B.C.L., Head Master of Bedford School, and C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Selections (for Schools)</td>
<td>With Notes and Maps. By J. S. Phillpotts, B.C.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Anabasis, Book I</td>
<td>With Notes and Map. By J. Marshall, M.A., Rector of the High School, Edinburgh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Anabasis, Book II</td>
<td>With Notes and Map. By C. S. Jerram, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Anabasis, Book III</td>
<td>By J. Marshall, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Vocabulary to the Anabasis</td>
<td>By J. Marshall, M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Cyropaedia, Book I</td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes. By C Bigg, D.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Cyropaedia, Books IV, V</td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes. By C. Bigg, D.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Hellenica, Books I, II</td>
<td>With Introduction and Notes. By G. E. Underhill, M.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF SCHOOL BOOKS.

## EARLY AND MIDDLE ENGLISH, &c.

- **Tancock. An Elementary English Grammar and Exercise Book.** By O. W. Tancock, M.A., Head Master of King Edward VI’s School, Norwich. Second Edition. ... Extra fcap. 8vo. 15. 6d.
- **Tancock. An English Grammar and Reading Book, for Lower Forms in Classical Schools.** By O. W. Tancock, M.A. Fourth Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

- **Earle. The Philology of the English Tongue.** By J. Earle, M.A., Professor of Anglo-Saxon. Fourth Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- **Earle. A Book for the Beginner in Anglo-Saxon. Third Edition.** By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- **Sweet. An Anglo-Saxon Primer, with Grammar, Notes, and Glossary.** By Henry Sweet, M.A. Third Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- **Sweet. An Anglo-Saxon Reader. In Prose and Verse. With Grammatical Introduction, Notes, and Glossary.** By the same Author. Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Extra fcap. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- **Sweet. A Second Anglo-Saxon Reader.** By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- **Sweet. Anglo-Saxon Reading Primers.**
  1. **Selected Homilies of Ælfric.** Extra fcap. 8vo, stiff covers, 1s. 6d.
  2. **Extracts from Alfred’s Orosius.** Extra fcap. 8vo, stiff covers, 1s. 6d.
- **Sweet. First Middle English Primer, with Grammar and Glossary.** By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- **Sweet. Second Middle English Primer. Extracts from Chaucer, with Grammar and Glossary.** By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- **Morris and Skeat. Specimens of Early English. A New and Revised Edition. With Introduction, Notes, and Glossarial Index.**
  - Part I. From Old English Homilies to King Horn (A.D. 1150 to A.D. 1300). By R. Morris, LL.D. Second Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 9s.
- **Skeat. Specimens of English Literature, from the ‘Ploughmans Crede’ to the ‘Shepheardes Calender’ (A.D. 1394 to A.D. 1579). With Introduction, Notes, and Glossarial Index.** By W. W. Skeat, Litt. D. Fourth Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Editor(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Langland.</strong> The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman, **</td>
<td>by William Langland. Edited by W. W. Skeat, Litt. D. **</td>
<td>Fourth Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chaucer.</strong> I. The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales; The Knights **</td>
<td>Edited by R. Morris, LL.D. **</td>
<td>Fifty-first Thousand Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chaucer.</strong> II. The Prioresse Tale; Sir Thopas; The Monkes Tale; **</td>
<td>The Clerkes Tale; The Squieres Tale, 6e. Edited by W. W. Skeat, Litt. D. Third Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chaucer.</strong> III. The Tale of the Man of Lawe; The Pardoneres Tale; **</td>
<td>The Second Nonnes Tale; The Chanouns Yemannes Tale. By the same Editor. New Edition, Revised Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gamelyn, The Tale of.</strong> Edited by W. W. Skeat, Litt. D. **</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minot.</strong> The Poems of Laurence Minot. Edited, with Introduction **</td>
<td>and Notes, by Joseph Hall, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wycliffe.</strong> The Books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the **</td>
<td>Song of Solomon: according to the Wycliffite Version made by Nicholas de Hereford, about A.D. 1381, and Revised by John Purvey, about A.D. 1388. With Introduction and Glossary by W. W. Skeat, Litt. D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spenser.</strong> The Faery Queene. Books I and II. Edited by G. W. **</td>
<td>Kitchin, D.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Book I. Tenth Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Book II. Sixth Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hooker.</strong> Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I. Edited by R. W. Church, **</td>
<td>M.A., Dean of St. Paul's. Second Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Marlowe and Greene.—Marlowe’s Tragical History of Dr. Faustus, and **</td>
<td>Greene’s Honourable History of Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay. Edited by A. W. Ward, M.A. New Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marlowe,</strong> Edward II. Edited by O. W. Tancock, M.A. Second **</td>
<td>Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. Paper covers, 2s. cloth, 3s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shakespeare.</strong> Select Plays. Edited by W. G. Clark, M.A., and **</td>
<td>W. Aldis Wright, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers. The Merchant of Venice. 1s. Macbeth. 1s. 6d. Richard the Second. 1s. 6d. Hamlet. 2s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edited by W. Aldis Wright, M.A.</strong> **</td>
<td>The Tempest. 1s. 6d. As You Like It. 1s. 6d. A Midsummer Night’s Dream. 1s. 6d. Twelfth Night. 1s. 6d. Julius Caesar. 2s. Coriolanus. 2s. 6d. Richard the Third. 2s. 6d. Henry the Fifth. 2s. King John. 1s. 6d. King Lear. 1s. 6d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF SCHOOL BOOKS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Editor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist; a popular Illustration of the</td>
<td>R.G. Moulton, M.A.</td>
<td>Crown 8vo. 5s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles of Scientific Criticism.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sold separately, Vol. I. 4s., Vol. II. 3s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In paper covers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lycidas, 3d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Allegro, 3d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il Penseroso, 4d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comus, 6d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 15. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunyan. The Pilgrim's Progress.</td>
<td>E. Venables, M.A.</td>
<td>Edited with Notes, 8vo. 5s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In white Parchment, 6s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dryden. Stanzas on the Death of Oliver Cromwell; Astraea Redux;</td>
<td>W.D. Christie, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annuus Mirabilis; Absalom and Achitophel; Religio Laici; The Hind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the Panther.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addison. Selections from Papers in the 'Spectator.' With Notes.</td>
<td>T. Arnold, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In white Parchment, 6s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steele. Selected Essays from the Tatler, Spectator, and Guardian.</td>
<td>Austin Dobson.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In white Parchment, 7s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes, by A.C. Fraser, LL.D.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 12. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope. II. Satires and Epistles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parnell. The Hermit.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paper covers, 2d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson. I. Rasselas.</td>
<td>G. Birkbeck Hill, D.C.L.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. limp, 2s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In white Parchment, 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson. II. Rasselas; Lives of Dryden and Pope.</td>
<td>Alfred Milnes, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lives of Pope and Dryden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stiff covers, 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson. III. Life of Milton.</td>
<td>C.H. Firth, M.A.</td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 13 6d.; cloth, 23. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson. IV. Vanity of Human Wishes.</td>
<td>E.J. Payne, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paper covers, 4d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gray. Selected Poems. Edited by EDMUND GOSSE. Extra fcap. 8vo. Stiff covers, 1s. 6d. In white Parchment, 3s.

Gray. Elegy, and Ode on Eton College. . . . Paper covers, 2d.

Goldsmith. Selected Poems. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by AUSTIN DOBSON. . . . . . . . . . . Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d. In white Parchment, 4s. 6d.


The Deserted Village. . . . Paper covers, 2d.

Cowper. I. The Didactic Poems of 1782, with Selections from the Minor Pieces, A.D. 1779-1783. Edited by H. T. GRIFFITH, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Cowper. II. The Task, with Tirocinium, and Selections from the Minor Poems, A.D. 1784-1799. By the same Editor. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

Burke. I. Thoughts on the Present Discontents: the two Speeches on America. Edited by E. J. PAYNE, M.A. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.


Byron. Childe Harold. With Introduction and Notes, by H. F. TOZER, M.A. . . . Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d. In white Parchment, 5s.

Scott. Lay of the Last Minstrel. Edited with Preface and Notes by W. MINTO, M.A. With Map. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 2s. In Ornamental Parchment, 3s. 6d.


FRENCH AND ITALIAN.


Saintsbury. Short History of French Literature. By the same Author. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

**LIST OF SCHOOL BOOKS.**

**Beaumarchais.** *Le Barbier de Sèville.* With Introduction and Notes by Austin Dobson. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Blouët.** *L’Éloquence de la Chaire et de la Tribune Françaises.* Edited by Paul Blouët, B.A. (Univ. Gallic.) Vol. I. French Sacred Oratory. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Corneille.** *Horace.* With Introduction and Notes by George Saintsbury, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Corneille.** *Cinna.* With Notes, Glossary, etc. By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d. cloth, 2s.

**Gautier (Théophile).** *Scenes of Travel.* Selected and Edited by G. Saintsbury, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Masson.** *Louis XIV and his Contemporaries;* as described in Extracts from the best Memoirs of the Seventeenth Century. With English Notes, Genealogical Tables, &c. By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Molière.** *Les Précieuses Ridicules.* With Introduction and Notes by Andrew Lang, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

**Molière.** *Les Femmes Savantes.* With Notes, Glossary, etc. By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d. cloth, 2s.

**Molière.** *Les Fourberies de Scapin.* With Voltaire’s Life of Molière. By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Molière.** *Les Fourberies de Scapin.* With Voltaire’s Life of Molière. By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d.

**Musset.** *On ne badine pas avec l’Amour,* and Fantasio. With Introduction, Notes, etc., by Walter Herries Pollock. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

---

**NOVELETTES:**

- Xavier de Maistre. *Voyage autour de ma Chambre.* By Gustave Masson, B.A., 3rd Edition Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Madame de Duras. *Ourika.*
- Alfred de Vigny. *La Veillée de Vincennes.*

*Voyage autour de ma Chambre, separately, limp, 1s. 6d.*

---

**Perrault.** *Popular Tales.* Edited, with an Introduction on Fairy Tales, etc., by Andrew Lang, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

**Quinet.** *Lettres à sa Mère.* Edited by G. Saintsbury, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

**Racine.** *Esther.* Edited by G. Saintsbury, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

**Racine.** *Andromaque.* With Louis Racine’s Life of his Father. By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Regnard.** *Le Joueur.* By Gustave Masson, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

**Brueys and Palaprat.** *Le Grondeur.*
Sainte-Benue. Selections from the Causeries du Lundi. Edited by G. SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Sévigné. Selections from the Correspondence of Madame de Sévigné and her chief Contemporaries. Intended more especially for Girls’ Schools. By GUSTAVE MASSON, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Voltaire. Mérope. Edited by G. SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Dante. Selections from the ‘Inferno.’ With Introduction and Notes, by H. B. COTTERILL, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Tasso. La Gerusalemme Liberata. Cantos i, ii. With Introduction and Notes, by the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

GERMAN, GOTHIC, ICELANDIC, &c.


Lange. The Germans at Home; a Practical Introduction to German Conversation, with an Appendix containing the Essentials of German Grammar, By HERMANN LANGE, Third Edition. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Lange. The German Manual; a German Grammar, a Reading Book, and a Handbook of German Conversation. By the same Author. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Lange. A Grammar of the German Language, being a reprint of the Grammar contained in The German Manual. By the same Author. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Lange. German Composition; a Theoretical and Practical Guide to the Art of Translating English Prose into German, By the same Author. Second Edition 8vo. 4s. 6d. [A Key in Preparation.]

Lange, German Spelling: A Synopsis of the Changes which it has undergone through the Government Regulations of 1880. Paper cover, 6d.

Becker’s Friedrich der Grosse. With an Historical Sketch of the Rise of Prussia and of the Times of Frederick the Great. With Map. Edited by C. A. BUCHHEIM, Phil. Doc. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.


Heine’s Harzreise. With a Life of Heine, etc. Edited by C. A. BUCHHEIM, Phil. Doc. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d. cloth, 2s. 6d.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Editor(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heine's Prosa, being Selections from his Prose Works.</td>
<td>C. A. Buchheim, Phil. Doc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessing. Laozoon. With Introduction, Notes, etc.</td>
<td>A. Hamann, Phil. Doc., M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessing. Minna von Barnhelm. A Comedy.</td>
<td>C. A. Buchheim, Phil. Doc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessing. Nathan der Weise.</td>
<td>C. A. Buchheim, Phil. Doc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niebuhr's Griechische Heroen-Geschichten.</td>
<td>Emma S. Buchheim</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth, 2s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiller's Historische Skizzen:—Egmonts Leben und Tod, and Belagerung von Antwerpen.</td>
<td>C. A. Buchheim, Phil. Doc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiller. Wilhelm Tell. With a Life of Schiller; an Historical and Critical Introduction, Arguments, a Complete Commentary, and Map.</td>
<td>C. A. Buchheim, Phil. Doc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiller. Wilhelm Tell. Translated into English Verse by E. Massie, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiller. Die Jungfrau von Orleans.</td>
<td>C. A. Buchheim, Phil. Doc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>[In preparation.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Müller. The German Classics from the Fourth to the Nineteenth Century.</td>
<td>F. Max Müller, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Crown 8vo. 21s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright. An Old High German Primer.</td>
<td>Joseph Wright, Ph.D.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright. A Middle High German Primer.</td>
<td>Joseph Wright, Ph. D.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet. An Icelandic Primer, with Grammar, Notes, and Glossary.</td>
<td>Henry Sweet, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MATHEMATICS AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Aldis. *A Text Book of Algebra (with Answers to the Examples).* By W. Steadman Aldis, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.


**Ruled Exercise Books adapted to the above.** (Fcap. folio, 2s.)

Hensley. *Figures made Easy: a first Arithmetic Book.* By Lewis Hensley, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6d.

Hensley. *Answers to the Examples in Figures made Easy,* together with 2000 additional Examples formed from the Tables in the same, with Answers. By the same Author. Crown 8vo. 1s.

Hensley. *The Scholar's Arithmetic.* By the same Author. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Hensley. *Answers to the Examples in the Scholar's Arithmetic.* By the same Author. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

Hensley. *The Scholar's Algebra.* An Introductory work on Algebra. By the same Author. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.


May likewise be had in parts as follows:—


Euclid. *Geometry in Space.* Containing parts of Euclid's Eleventh and Twelfth Books. By the same Editor. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.


Madan. *Tables of Qualitative Analysis.* Arranged by H. G. Madan, M.A. Large 4to. 4s. 6d.


Stewart. *A Treatise on Heat,* with numerous Woodcuts and Diagrams. By Balfour Stewart, LL.D., F.R.S., Professor of Natural Philosophy in Owens College, Manchester. *Fifth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Combination Chemical Labels. In two Parts, gummed ready for use. Part I, Basic Radicles and Names of Elements. Part II, Acid Radicles. Price 3s. 6d.

**HISTORY, POLITICAL ECONOMY, GEOGRAPHY, &c.**

Danson. *The Wealth of Households.* By J. T. Danson. Cr. 8vo. 5s.


Hughes (Alfred). *Geography for Schools.* Part I, Practical Geography. With Diagrams. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.


Lucas. *Introduction to a Historical Geography of the British Colonies.* By C. P. Lucas, B.A. Crown 8vo., with 8 maps, 4s. 6d.


**ART.**

Hullah. *The Cultivation of the Speaking Voice.* By John Hullah. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.


Upcott. *An Introduction to Greek Sculpture.* By L. E. Upcott, M.A. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.

**Student’s Handbook to the University and Colleges of Oxford. Ninth Edition.** Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

*Helps to the Study of the Bible,* taken from the *Oxford Bible for Teachers,* comprising Summaries of the several Books, with copious Explanatory Notes and Tables illustrative of Scripture History and the Characteristics of Bible Lands; with a complete Index of Subjects, a Concordance, a Dictionary of Proper Names, and a series of Maps. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

**A Reading Room has been opened at the Clarendon Press Warehouse, Amen Corner, where visitors will find every facility for examining old and new works issued from the Press, and for consulting all official publications.**

All communications relating to Books included in this List, and offers of new Books and new Editions, should be addressed to

THE SECRETARY TO THE DELEGATES,
CLARENDON PRESS,
oxford.

London: HENRY FROWDE,
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER.

Edinburgh: 6 QUEEN STREET.

Oxford: CLARENDON PRESS DEPOSITORY,
116 HIGH STREET.
University of Toronto Library

DO NOT REMOVE THE CARD FROM THIS POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket
LOWE-MARTIN CO. LIMITED