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THE

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.
THE

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A

COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE

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FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE;

REVISED AND EDITED FOR
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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VOLUME III.

Cambridge:
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

London: CAMBRIDGE WAREHOUSE, 17, PATERNOSTER ROW.
Cambridge: DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO.
1877
Ga 112.465(3)
B

DEC 17 1982

078×247
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ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Γ.

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veying a favourable impression by the exhibition of character in and by the speech; and (3), working on the feelings of the audience, so as to bring them to that state of mind which is favourable to the orator's purpose; to excite an angry or a calm temper, love or hatred, envy, jealousy, righteous indignation, and so on, according to circumstances and the immediate occasion.

'The enthymemes too have been stated, whence they are to be supplied; for of enthymemes there are special (εἰθή) as well as common topics (τόποι)'. See the quotation from Spengel's Study of Ancient Rhetoric prefixed to II 23.

§ 2. 'The next subject to be treated of is style' (the manner of expressing oneself; including not only the language, but the manner of delivery; both in voice, declamation, the pronunciation, tone, rhythm, &c.; and—here Aristotle stops, and the Latin rhetoricians add—action, the appropriate gesticulation, management of the hands and the body in general, and especially the features): 'for it is not sufficient to know what to say, it is necessary also to know how to say it; and this contributes greatly to the impression conveyed of a certain character in the speech'. The tone of voice, the expression of the features, the gestures employed, the kind of language used, quite independently of the arguments, will materially assist the impression of moral (or any particular) character which the orator wishes to assume, on the minds of the audience. The ἡθος of ΙΙΙ 16.8 is part of this, the moral character imparted by the choice of language, of terms, tone and expression, significant of moral purpose, προαίρεσις.

§ 3. 'Now first of all, inquiry was naturally directed to that which is first in the natural order, the sources from which things themselves derive their plausibility or power of persuasion' (i.e. what are the sources of rhetorical proof of facts themselves; which of course is the basis of the entire art or practice, and therefore 'first in the order of nature'); 'and secondly, the due setting out (disposal) of these by the language;
and thirdly (τοις, of such things as these, the divisions of Rhetoric), what has the greatest force (or influence, is especially effective as a means of persuasion), but has not yet been attempted (regularly, systematically, as an art, no serious attempt has yet been made upon it), that which relates to delivery'.

§ 3. πρῶτον ἑγεμόνι κατὰ φύσιν] A similar phraseology occurs at the beginning of the Poetics, I 1, ult. ἀρχαμενοὶ κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων. And de Soph. El. init. ἀρχαμενοὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων. Victorius.

διαθέσθαι] denotes the 'disposal' or 'disposition', i.e. the investing of the speech with a certain character, putting it in a certain state, by the use of language: as the ἀκοομαί of a speech are said διαθέσθαι πως, to be brought into such and such a disposition or state of feeling by it: a common use of the verb. It does not mean here distribution, ordering, arrangement, which is not the special office of the graces and proprieties of language or style. There is another sense in which this verb is used by later writers, as Polybius, Dionysius, Diodorus, with λόγους and the like, disponere, in publicum proponere, in medium proferre, to dispose or set out (διά), as wares in a market for sale, etaler; which may possibly be the meaning here, though, I think, it would be less appropriate. Victorius renders it explanare. διάθεσις, in Longinus quoted below, seems to correspond to διαθέσθαι here in the sense in which I have explained it.

ἐπικεχείρηται] is a striking instance of that abnormal formation of the passive, which I have explained and illustrated in Appendix B on I 12. 22 [Vol. I. p. 297].

ὑπόκρισις, 'acting', properly includes, besides declamation, the management of the voice, to which Aristotle, as already mentioned, here confines it, § 4, that of the features, arnas, hands, and the entire body: and so it is treated by the Latin rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, &c. Longinus, Ars Rhet., (apud Spengel, Rhet. Gr. I 310), has a chapter upon it, following another περὶ λέξεως. His description of it is, μιμησις των κατ' αλληλους ἵκωτος παραστατεων ἡθων καὶ παθων καὶ διάθεσις σώματος τι καὶ τονον φωνης πρόσφοροι των ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν. δύναται δε μέγιστον εἰς πιστὸν κ.τ.λ. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 22, p. 1023 (Reiske), says of the great orator, κοσμούντος ἀπαντα καὶ χρηματιζοντος (σχηματιζοντος, Sylburg) τη προεύθυνῃ ὑποκρισίς ἦ δεινότατος ἀσκήτης ἐγένετο, ὡς ἀπαντές τα ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ εἰς αὐτῶν ὑδεύς ἐστι τῶν λόγων, κ.τ.λ. See Quint. xi 3. 5, on the effect of pronuntiatio, 'delivery, declamation', where he says that even an indifferent speech set off by the vigour and grace of action will have more weight or effect than the very best without it: in § 6 he quotes the opinion of Demosthenes, who assigned successively the first, second, and third place to declamation (pronuntiatio), and so on till his questioner stopped. In § 7 he quotes Aeschines' saying to the
Rhodians, who were admiring the de Corona as he recited it to them, *Quid si ipsum audissetis?* et M. Cicero unam in dicendo actionem dominiari putat. Cic. de Or. III 56. 213, from which the whole passage of Quintilian is taken. Also Brutus, LXVI 234, Lentulus’ opinion. XXXVIII 141, 142. XLIII 168 (Spalding ad loc. Quint.). On Demosthenes’ dictum. Bacon, *Essays*, Of Boldnesse, init., has this remark: A strange thing that that part of an Oratour which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a Player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of Invention, Elocution, and the rest; nay almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plaine. There is in humane Nature generally more of the foole then of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men’s mindes is taken are most potent.

‘(And this is not at all surprising) because in fact it was not till late that it made its way into the tragic art and rhapsody; for the poets at first (in the earliest stages of the drama) used to act their tragedies themselves’ (and therefore, as there was no profession of acting or professional actors, it was not likely that an art of acting should be constructed; the poets acted, as they wrote, as well as they could by the light of nature, without any rules of art).


ψε παρήλθεν] ίνωμα § 5, ψε προήλθεν; Poet. IV 17, η το μέγεθος (τῆς τραγωδίας)...ψε ἀπεσεμνύθη, also v 3.


'It is plain then that there is something of this kind in Rhetoric also as well as in poetry’ (declamation may be studied and practised for the purposes of Rhetoric, as well as for those of acting in tragedy and comedy or of rhapsodical recitation): ‘which, in fact, (i.e. the ‘poetical’ declamation), has been dealt with (treated artistically, see note on I 1. 3), besides others, by Glaucot of Teos in particular’.

This tautological repetition of καὶ, καὶ περὶ τῆν ῥητορικῆν, καὶ περὶ τῆν ποιητικῆν, is not unfrequent in Aristotile. Compare Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὦστηρ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη—οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. Ib. 1253 a 31, ὦστηρ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν—οὕτω καὶ χαριθέν.

Glaucot of Teos, an Ionian city on the coast of Asia Minor, is most probably the same as a Glaucot mentioned by Ion, Plat. Ion 530 D (so Stallbaum’s note ad loc.), as following his own profession as a rhapsodist, which seems suitable enough for one who writes on the art of tragic declamation, especially as acting and rhapsodizing are actually coupled.
ηται το πρωτον. δηλον ουν οτι και περι την ρητορικην
έστι το τοιουτον ωσπερ και περι την ποιητικην. ο περ
έτεροι τινες ἐπιργαματεύθησαν και Γλαυκον ο Τηος.
4 ἐστι δε αυτη μεν εν τη φωνη, πως αυτη δει χρησθαι
προς έκαστον πάθος, οιον πότε μεγάλη και πότε
μικρα και πότε μέση, και πως τοις τόνοις, οιον οξεια
και βαρεια και μέση, και ρυθμοις τισι προς έκαστον.
τρια γάρ ἐστι περι ον σκοπουσιν ταύτα δ' ἐστι

1 αυτη

1

Together by Aristotle in the preceding sentence. I should be disposed also to identify with him of Teos, the Glauc on quoted in Poet. xxv 23—seemingly as a poetical critic, which is also a kindred pursuit. See in Smith's Biogr. Dict. the third article on Glauc on.

Tyrwhitt ad loc. Poet. seems in favour of the supposition that the three Glaucons are one. A Glauc on who wrote a work on γλώσσαι (sic), Athen. xi 480 f, was at all events not far removed from the same studies. Schneider, ad Xen. Conv. III 6.

§ 4. ἐστι δ' αυτη] So all MSS and Edd., except Buhle, who reads αυτη. This surely must be right: αυτη seems to have no meaning here. Victorius retaining αυτη translates 'haec'.

'This (declamation, ὑπόκρισις) resides in the voice, in the mode of employing it, that is, for (the expression of) any emotion; that is to say, sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intermediate (between the two, middling, neither the one nor the other); and in the mode of employing the accents (or tones of voice), that is to say acute, grave, middle' (circumflex, from the combination of the two others, \( \wedge = \sim \)), 'and certain measures (times) in respect of each. For there are three things that are the subjects of such enquiries, magnitude (intensity, volume of sound), tune, time. οἰων] is here in both cases videlicet, 'that is to say', a direct specification of certain definite things; not, as usual, 'for instance', as an example or specimen, which supposes other things of the same kind, besides those expressly mentioned. Thus οἷον here does not mean that the three kinds of sounds and accents mentioned are mere examples of a much larger class, but they specify the exact number of kinds which are intended to be distinguished in either case. This is common in Aristotle. Instances are, few out of many, Pol. i 6, sub fin., δούλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἰων ἔμυκχον...μέρος. c. 7 sub fin. η δὲ κτητικ...οἰων ἡ δικαια. c. 8, 1256 a 36, οἰων οΐ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστειας κ.τ.λ. c. 13, 1260 a 6, οἰων τοῦ λόγου ξυντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. II 5, 1264 a 26, οἰων φρονους. Ib. c. 6, 1265 a 35, οἰων, 'I mean to say.' De Sens. c. 5, 443 a 10, τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἰων πῦρ ἀπρ ὀσμη. Plat. Gorg. 502 D. [ Cf. supra II 19. 26.]

On the modulation of the voice in the expression of the various emotions, see Cic. de Or. III. cc. 57, 58, §§ 215—219, where it is illustrated at length.

On the accents, and μέγεθος, ἀρμονία, ρυθμός, and their application to Rhetoric, see Introduction, Appendix C to Book III, p. 379 seq.
Now one might almost say (it is pretty nearly true to say) that these are the men that gain all the prizes in (lit. out of, as the produce or profit derived from, got out of them,) the contests (dramatic and rhapsodical), and as in these the actors have more power, influence, effect (over the audiences, and those who adjudge the prizes), than the poets nowadays, so likewise (has acting or declamation) in civil and social contests (the contests of the law-courts, and public assembly—comp. III 12. 2) by reason of the defects (the vicious, depraved character) of our constitutions' (as that of Athens, where I, Aristotle, am now writing).

The vice or defect, which permits these irregular and extraneous appeals to the feelings, and the influence which ‘acting’ thereby acquires, are attributed here to the constitution—comp. I 1. 4, where ‘well-governed states’, εὐνομούμενα πόλεις, states which are under good laws and institutions, are said to forbid them: if that of Athens were sound and healthy and right, ψυχή, ὀρθή, opposed to μοθηρία, they would not be allowed there. In the next section, 5, the defect is attributed to the audience: in the one case the institutions themselves are in fault, in the other the tempers and disposition of the hearers, whose taste and judgment are so depraved that they require the stimulus of these distorting (διαστρέφοντα, I 1. 5) emotions.

On the influence of acting in producing emotion, and thereby persuasion, see by all means Cicero’s description, de Or. III 56 § 213, seq., which furnishes an excellent illustration of what is here said. Note particularly the case of Gracchus, § 214. After a quotation from his speech Cicero adds, quae sic ab illo case acta constabat oculis voice gestu, inimici ut lacrinas tenere non possent. And Orat. c. XVII, est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, quam constet e voice et motu, § 55 and the rest.

§ 5. ‘But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance: and it (of ὑποκριμένη) is thought low and vulgar’ (in the sense of popular and unsubstantial, directed to show, not substance) ‘and rightly so considered’ (or, ‘when considered aright’; so Victorius. But the other is the more natural interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνω; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius ‘Si vere indicare volumus’: ‘consider’ in the two renderings has different senses).

φορτικός, see note on II 21. 15, opposed to χαριέσ in the sense of mental refinement and cultivation, Molestos et illepidos, quos Graeci μοθηρίους και φορτικός dicent; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Attici 18. 4
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 § 5.

οὗτος πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, οὐκ ὅρθως ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὅς ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσων, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλείω ἤπειραν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὕστερον μήπερ εὐφραίνει. δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τάλλα ἐξῳ τοὺ ἀποδείξαι περίπερα ἐστίν' ἀλλ' ὁμος μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἰρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ

(Gaisford). See Twining on Poet. note 263, pp. 540—544, where a number of examples illustrative of its various applications are collected. φορτικός, ἐπαχθός, ἐπιπλάστως (Suidas). The last of these two equivalents helps to explain a distinction in Eth. Eudem. I 4.2, of arts φορτικαί, περὶ χρηματισμῶν (engaged in money-making, mercenary), βάναυσον (mechanical), which is subsequently explained, λέγει δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μονὸν. This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: and ἐπιπλάστως ‘beplastered’ seems to correspond to this. And this same signification is plainly conveyed by the word here in the Rhetoric, which is immediately followed by ἀλλ' ἃς ὅους πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας, i.e. not only ὑποκριτικὴ, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικὸν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind, want of mental cultivation in persons: and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial, and in this point of view too low and vulgar to be entertained by a man of science or philosopher. It has precisely the same meaning in Pol. I 11, 1258 b 35. See Eaton ad loc.

'But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific, (directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ ἔλαι: I 7. 36—37, see note,) we must bestow the requisite (τίν) pains and attention upon it, not that it is right (to do so), but as necessary (for success in συνειδοποιούμενος: for, as to strict justice, that implies, requires, subaudīs, etc.,) looking for no more in the delivery of the speech than to speak it) in a manner which will give neither offence nor delight: for fairness requires that the case be fought on the facts alone, and therefore everything else outside the direct proof (of them) is superfluous: but still, as has been already said, they have vast influence by reason of the vice or defects (depraved taste and judgment) of the hearer'. Quint. II 17. 27 seq. Imperiti enim iudicant, et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sunt, ne errant. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientem concionem, atque omne concilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio præsumpta falsique testes: per quam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus, et prope in sola delectione ponatur. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae præsent. §§ 28, 29.

οὐκ ὅρθως ἔχοντος] If it be supposed (with Vater) that ὅς is omitted in this clause, comp. c. 3 § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἢδεσματί χρήσει ἀλλ' ὅς ἢδεσματι.
§ 6. 'Now (attention to) style (mode of speaking) is nevertheless in some slight degree necessary (has some slight portion of necessity) in every kind (department) of instruction: for it makes some difference in the clearness of an explanation whether we speak in one way or another; not however so much (as is generally supposed), but all this is mere fancy (φαντασία 'the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality, note on I 11. 6), and addressed to (for the sake of, to gratify) the hearer: for no one teaches geometry in this way. These tricks and graces of style, declamation and acting, have no power of instruction, and therefore are never addressed to any student; but only to a popular audience like that of the orator, which requires to be flattered or have its ears tickled (as Plato says in the Gorgias [463 C, κολακεία μόρον τῷ ρητορικῷ, and 502 E, ὅπερ παιδί...χαρίζοντο); to be amused and conciliated, as well as instructed and convinced.  

§ 7. 'Now that (the art which applies ύποκριτική to Rhetoric), whenever it reaches us (arrives), will produce the same effects as the art of acting (i.e. the application of it to dramatic poetry, § 3): some indeed have already to a trifling extent made the attempt to treat of it, as Thrasy machus in his Αἰσιος; in fact, a capacity for acting is a natural gift (part of that general love of imitation which is the foundation of all the imitative or fine arts, Poet. c. i) 'and less subject to rules of art' (more, or somewhat, spontaneous, αὐτοσχεδιαστική, extemporaneous, Poet. IV 14, of tragedy in its earliest stage), 'but when applied to language (declamation) it (the practice of it) may be reduced to an art. And therefore those who have the faculty (of ύποκριτική κατὰ λέξιν) obtain prizes in their turn' (again, πάλιν; of which τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ύπόκρισιν ῥήτοραν is an explanation, Victorius), 'as do also rhetoricians in respect of (by) their acting or declamation: for written speeches (in the ἐπιδεικτικόν γένος) owe more of their effect to the style and language than to the thought or intellectual part'; διάνοια (Rhet. II 26. 5, Poet. xix 2) meaning here the logical part of Rhetoric, the direct and indirect arguments.  

Thrasy machus and his Αἰσιος are described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, τῶν γε μὲν ὁλογράφων ἔτι γῆρας καὶ πεντάς ἕλκεμένων λόγων κηρυκτικὴ τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σβήνοι, ὀργίσατο τε αὐτὸ πολλὸν ἅμα διεινέαν ἅπαν γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ἐργασμένως ἐπήδουν κηλεύσε; ὡς ἐφι' διαβάλλων τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβάλει οὐδενὶ κράτοισι.  

On Thrasy machus see Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. IX Vol. III p. 268 seq., on the Αἰσιος 274, Spengel, Artium Scriptores [pp. 95—97, and Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, I esp. p. 244, also K. F. Hermann's Disputatio de Thrasy macho Chalcædio sophista,
§ 8. 'Now the origin of this was due, as is natural, to the poets: for not only are all names imitations (copies of things, which they are supposed to represent), but there was also the voice ready for use, the most imitative of all our members; and so it was (in virtue of the same imitative faculty, Victorius) that the arts were composed, that of rhapsodizing and of acting and of course (ye, to be sure) others'.

κωτὰς, in the sense of originating anything, 'to stir, set in motion', is found in Plut. Solon. 95 B, ἀρχομένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τῶν Θεῶν ήδη τὴν τραγῳδίαν κωτὰς (Victorius). Sext. Empir., adv. Math. vii 6, quotes Aristotle as having said that Empedocles πρῶτον μητροεική κεκινήσα: and Quintilian, iii 1. 8, doubtless also with reference to Aristotle, repeats this, primus post eos...movisse aliquia circa rhetorici Empedocles dicitur. Sext. Empir. again, p. 546, Bekk. adv. Math. x. πρῶτα ἡμεῖς § 2, of Socrates' 'origination' of the study of Moral Philosophy, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτῆς δόξας κεκινήσα. See Spalding ad loc. Quint., who quotes Athen. xiv 629 c, δειν ἐκκινήσαν αἱ καλονομέναι πυρρίξαι. Movere edem sensu apud Quint. iii 6. 10, 103, iv 1. 29.

ὀνόματα μημήματα] This is the Platonic theory, Cratyl. 423 A seq.

1 Welcker, Nachtrag, p. 239, note 175, accuses Bentley of a 'wonderful blunder' in the interpretation of κωτὰς in this passage, in saying, viz., that it signifies 'the first beginning of tragedy'—which it most undoubtedly does—and understands it himself of 'disturbing, altering', as κωτὰς φύομεν (and the proverb μη καίει Καμάρκαν, “let well alone,” quies non movere, “let sleeping dogs lie”). He says that Bentley's rendering is längst widerlegt. [Bentley, On Phalaris, i pp. 284, 386, ed. Dyce, pp. 262, 309, ed. Wagner.]
The conclusion is, 423 B, δύο λαμβάνει ψυχή, οὕτως δίω, μίμησις φανερά εκέπευσεν, ὥστε μιμητικὴν καὶ ὑμητὴν ὑποκριτικὴν ἐκάστῃ τῷ φανερῷ. “Olympiodorus ad Philebum Platonis tradit Democritum nomina vocales imagines rerum appellare consuevisse, διὸ ἀγάλματα φωνὴσαν καὶ ταύτα ἑστὶ τῶν δεόν, ὡς Δημόκριτος.” Victorius. Aristotle himself, de Interpretatione, sub init. 16α3, calls words τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθητῶν σύμβολα, and afterwards, line 7, ὑμητῆμα, signs or representatives, and copies, of mental affections, i.e. impressions, a theory quite different from that of Plato, which is here adopted. On the terms applied by Aristotle to express the nature of words, see Waitz, on Organon 16 a 4. Of the four employed, he says, σύμβολον is a subjective σημεῖον, and ὑμητῆμα an objective μίμησις. On imitation and the natural love of it, the origin and foundation of all the fine arts, see the first three chapters of the Poetics. In c. 4, init. imitation or mimicry is described as natural to man from infancy, and characteristic of humanity. [Dionysius Halic. de comp. verb. p. 94 (quoted in Farrar's Chapters on Language, chap. xi), μεγάλη τοῦτον ἀρχή καὶ διδάκταλος ἡ φύσις, η διούσα μιμητικὸν ἡμᾶς καὶ θετικὸν τῶν ονομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα.]

τὰ γὰρ ὑμητῆμα κ.τ.λ.] This is introduced to account for the poets having been the first who devoted themselves to the study of style or language, in this sense. Words being the copies of things, the poets, whose object is imitation, addicted themselves to the study of them, in order to be able better to represent the things of which they were images. Victorius.

αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν] Some of the writers on rhapsodizing, with which was naturally combined the criticism of Homer, are mentioned in Plat. Ion. 530 c, Metrodorus of Lampascus, Stesimbrotas of Thasos (Xenoph. Conv. III 6), and Glaucos, probably of Teos, mentioned above, § 3.

§ 9. ‘And as the reputation which the poets acquired in spite of the simplicity of what they said (the silliness of the thoughts expressed) was thought (by those who imitated them) to be due to their language, it was for this reason that the language (of prose) first took a poetical colour, as that of Gorgias. And still, even at this day, the mass of the uneducated think the discourses of speakers of this kind mighty fine. Such however is not the fact, but the language of prose and poetry is distinct.’

To the same effect Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 3, (v. 457, Reiske). Ly- sias' predecessors were not of his opinion about style—his was the ὁμοίωσις λόγος, the ‘smooth and simple’ style—ἀλλ' οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τινὰ προσεῖναι τοῖς δλοῖς ἐξήλισσαν ἵδιον, καὶ κατέφυσον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολὴν τοὺς πολλὰς χρόνους καὶ υπερβολὰς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἱδεῖς, ὑμητῶν τε γλωττοματικῶν καὶ ἕξων ἀρχῶν, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐξω- θότων σχηματισμῶν τῇ διάλαλγῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ καυσολόγῳ καταπληττόμενον τῶν ἱδεῶν, κ.τ.λ.] This was the new style introduced by Gorgias and his followers Polus and Licymnias (Alcidamas, &c.). Hermogenes, περὶ
ποιηταί λέγοντες εύθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πο-
ρίσασθαι τίνι δὲ τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τούτο ποιητικὴ πρότη-
γένετο λέξις, οἶον ἡ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ
tῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοὺς τοιοῦτους οἶονται διαλέγουσθαι
cάλλιστα. τούτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστων, ἀλλ' ἐτέρα λόγον
καὶ ποιήσεως λέξεως ἔστων. δηλοὶ δὲ τὸ συμβαίνον
ἴδειν, β', περὶ διεύθυνσις (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 395); on the third
kind of διεύθυνσις proposed by Gorgias and his school, oi σοφισταί; οἱ
'φανόμενοι λόγοι διεύθυνσιν οὐκ ἔστω λόγοι. γίνεται γὰρ τὸ πλείστον περὶ τὴν
λέξιν, ὅταν τραχεῖα καὶ σφοδρά τις ἡ καὶ σφετζαῖς συμφορήσεις λέξεως εἰς
εὐχαγγεῖλεν ταῦτας εὐνοιαίς ἐπιπλαίοις καὶ κοινά.

λέγοντες εὔθη κ.τ.λ.] Cic. Orat. I. 1175, of Isocrates, also a follower of
Gorgias, Quam enim videret oratores cum seueritate audiri poetas
autem cum voluptate, tum dicitur numeros secutus quibus eiam in orae-
tione uteremur, quam incunditatis causa tum ut varietas occurreret
satiati. So Theophrastus, Dion. Lys. Iud. c. 14, condemns this af-
fected poetical language of the Sicilian school of rhetoricians as childishly,
to ἱον καὶ ὑμοῖοι παντοῦδες, and unworthy of a serious purpose, καθωσπερε

On Gorgias' novel and poetical style and the figures that he intro-
duced into Rhetoric, see Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philology,
No. vii Vol. III pp. 66—7, 73—5, and on the rhetorical figures, which are
classified, 69—72. Comp. Cic. Orat. § 175 [paria paribus adiuncta et
similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quae sua sponte,
etiamenti id non agas, cadunt plerumque numerose, Gorgias primus inuenit,
sed eis est usus intemperantis. See also Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit,
i esp. pp. 57—64. As a specimen of the poetical style of Gorgias we have
his metaphorical term for vultures, ἵμφυκοι τάφοι, parallels to which may
be found in the poetics Lucræius and Spenser, Lucr. v 924, vīna videns vīvo
sepeliri viscera busto, and Faery Queen II 8. 16 (quoted by Munro), To be
entombed in the raven or the night. That this fancy for poetic prose was
with Gorgias a 'ruling passion strong in death', is proved by the phrase
used at the close of his life, 'At last Sleep lays me with his brother
Death'. Another of his death-bed utterances, ὠστερ ἐν σπαρω καὶ μείωνοι
συνοικίου ἀσμίνοι ἀπαλλάκτωμαι (Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 184),
may be illustrated by Waller's lines, The soul's dark cottage, battered
and decayed, Letts in new light through chinks that time has made).

Plato Rep. III 390 A, ἐν λόγῳ ἐν ποίησι. 'This is shewn by the result:
for even the tragic writers no longer employ it (sc. τῇ λέξις) in the same
way (as the earlier tragedians did), but just as they passed from the
(trochaic) tetrameter to the iambic measure because of all other metres
this most resembles prose, so also in the use of words (names or nouns)
they have dropped all that are contrary to the usage of ordinary con-
sversation, and have dropped also those with which the earliest (dramatic)
writers (subaudì poíēsates; especially Æschylus) used to adorn (their
compositions), a practice which is even now retained by the writers of hexameters (Epics): it is absurd therefore to copy those who themselves no longer employ that (the original) style'.

\(\text{ὅσπερ καὶ...οὔτω καὶ}\) This tautological repetition of \(\text{kai}\) in an antithesis is characteristic of Aristotle's style. [Cf. supra § 3.]

\(\text{ἐκ τῶν τεταμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβείον μετέβησαν}\) Poet. IV 17, 18, 19. \(\text{μάλιστα χάρις λεκτικῶν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμβείον ἐστὶ...πλείωση χάρις ἱαμβεία λέγουσα ἐν τῇ διάλεκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ. III 3 ult. where this passage is referred to. III 8. 4. Welcker, Nachtrag, p. 239.}

\(\text{ομοίωσατον τῶν ἄλλων}\) In translating this I have purposely retained the ungrammatical and illogical 'other' with the superlative, because the same blunder is equally common in our own language. Swift, Tale of a Tub, 'The most perfect of all others', Hooker, Eccl. Pol. 'of all other, they are...most inaffable'. Bacon, Essay Of Envy, 'one of the most able of his predecessors' (of whom he is no, and cannot be, one), 'of all other affections (envy) the most importunate and continual'. The examination of this, and the other irregular use of \(\text{ἄλλος}\), (πολλά καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἔστιν [Plat. Gorg. p. 473 c]), and the analogies in English, is reserved for an Appendix [this Appendix was apparently never written, though its intended preparation is also hinted in Mr Cope's translation of the Gorgias, p. 11. Compare note I to II 9. 9, τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοί μάλιστα].

\(\text{διάλεκτος}\) for 'common conversation' (properly dialogue): compare c. 2. 5, \(\text{ἡ εἰσοδία διάλεκτος}\), and Poet. XXII 14. In a somewhat different application \(\text{διάλεκτος}\) is the third and highest stage of 'sound', (1) noise, \(\text{ψῆφος}\), which even \(\text{inanimate things}, \text{brute matter, wood and stone, are capable of producing: (2) φωνή, φθόνγος, the indistinct voice of an animal: and (3) διάλεκτος, the distinct utterance of the μέροτες ἄνθρωποι, the power of conversation, characteristic of humanity. This distinction lies in the power which man has, and other animals (I believe) want, of pronouncing \(\text{consonants}, \text{which produce distinct, articulate words. On speech, as the characteristic of man, see Pol. I 2, 1253 a 10, seq. where λόγος is substituted for διάλεκτος, [also Isocr. Paneg. § 48, τοῦτο μόνον (sc. τὸν λόγον) ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ήναν ἕρμων ἔρμων ἔρωτος, and Cicero, de Off. I 16. 50, (ferea) rationis et orationis experites, de Oratore I §§ 32, 33].}

\(\text{οὔτο καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφεικασιν}\) Of this change, the lowering of the language of tragedy to the level of common life, the earliest author (as we are told in c. 2. 5) was Euripides, in his later plays, which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus, and Ion. The change was completely carried out in the New Comedy of Menander, Philemon Diphilus, &c. On this everyday character of Euripides' later and worse compositions—which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus and Ion—to which the language was
RHETORIKH Η. I §§ 9, 10; 2 § 1.

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έστιν, ὡς [δ'] οἱ πρότερον ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἐτί νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιοῦντες· διὸ γελοῖον μιμεΐσθαι τοῦτον οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρώνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὡστε φανερὸν ὑπὸ ἄπαντα ὁσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὁσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἰας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης οἱρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

CHAP. II.

P. 1404 A.

έστω οὖν ἐκείνα τεθεωρήμενα, καὶ ὁρίσθω λέξεως ἀρτή σαφῆ εἰναι. σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποίησει τὸ ἐαυτὸν ἔργον· καὶ μὴ ταπεινή

1−2 [The rendering given at the foot of p. 11 follows Bekker’s Oxford ed. of 1837, which has οἷς δ' (sic) οἱ πρώτων ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἐτί νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφελον' αὐτ'S but there is nothing to shew that Mr Cope deliberately preferred this to the text as printed in Bekker’s third edition; which is also approved in Spengel’s note, except that he would strike out the first ἀφελον', and not the second.]

made to conform, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. xxv. §§ 2, 3. In Arist. Ran. 959, Euripides is made to take credit for it, οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰςάγων, οἷς χρώμθε, οἷς ξύνεσμεν.

§ 10. 'And therefore it is plain that we must not go into exact detail in describing all that may be said about style, but confine ourselves to the kind of which we are now speaking (i.e. the use of it in Rhetoric). The other (the general view of the subject) has been treated in the Poetics'.

There is a useful note on the various senses of ἀκριβεῖα in Aristotle in Grant’s Ethics, 1. 7. 18. Here it is used in the first of these, of accuracy, or exactness, as shewn in minute detail, a complete survey of an entire subject.

CHAP. II.

Some general remarks upon Style and its virtues, and the various classifications of these in ancient and modern systems of Rhetoric, are given in the Introduction, as preliminary to the paraphrase of this chapter, pp. 279—282. [Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 43-]

§ 1. 'Let so much suffice for the consideration (observation) of that (τὰ περὶ ποιητικῆς, c. 1. 10); and (now) let it be regarded as settled (or determined) once for all that one virtue of style is to be perspicuous: for a sign of this is, that if the speech (or language) do not explain its meaning, it will fail to perform its own proper function'.

This is a reference to the rule first laid down by Plat. Rep. I 352 D seq., and adopted by Aristotle who constantly recur to it—see especially Eth. Nic. II 5, init.—that the virtue or excellence of anything, knife, horse, or anything that can be employed as an instrument, is determined by its ἔργον or special function, in the due performance of which it lies. If the special function of language is to explain one's meaning, it is plain that if it fail to do that—if it is not perspicuous—it does not answer its intended purpose.
§ 2. 'Of nouns and verbs' (the ultimate elements, and principal components, of language; see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III. p. 371. Poet. xxxi 8—9) 'perspicuity is produced by (the use of) proper names, a character not tame but ornate is imparted by all the rest of the (kinds of) words which are enumerated in the Poetics (c. xxi 4): to alter language in this way' (from the received and familiar expressions to which we are accustomed), 'invests it with a higher dignity' (because it makes it unusual, and strange; not familiar, which 'breeds contempt'); 'for men have the same feeling in regard of language as they have to strangers as compared with their fellow-citizens' (they disregard those whom they are in the habit of seeing every day, but are struck with the appearance of strangers, and pay them attention, if not always respect). To the note on κύρια ὀνόματα, Introd. p. 282, note 2, add that in the Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, and 30 (31) 6, these are called ὀικεία 'proper', by a different metaphor.

ἐξαλλάξαι ἐνδρα § 5, ἔξαλλασσεν τοῦ πρέπους, c. 3. 3, τὸ εἰσώθος ἔξαλ-λάττευ (which explains it: comp. Poet. xxii 3 ἐνδρα). So Poet. xxii 4, and 20, ὄνομα ἔξηλλαγμένον, xxii 3, (λέξις) ἔξαλλασσεσσα τὸ ἱδιωτικόν, 1b. § 8, ἔξαλλασσε τῶν ὀνοματών. From which it results that the meaning of the term is 'a change out of, or departure from ὀνόματα κύρια, the vulgar language, the ordinary mode of expression', for which something novel, unusual, striking is substituted. Isocr. peri ἀντιδιάσωσ § 179, λόγους διεξεύοντο πολὺ τῶν εἰθαμμένων λέγεσθαι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἔξηλλαγμένους; Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας, peri συγκρισιῶν ult. (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. iii 280), λέξεων περιτ- τῶν καὶ ἔξηλλαγμήν, καὶ ἀνωθήν. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 10, ἔξηλλαγμένον τοῦ συνήθους χαρακτήρος, 1b. c. 15, περιττά καὶ ἔξηλλαγμένον τοῦ συνήθους, de Thuc. lud. c. 28, τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξαλλασσεν ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθει, Ep. ii ad Amm. c. 3 ἔξηλλαγμένη τῆς συνήθους χρήσεως. Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v.

§ 3. 'And therefore a foreign air must be given to the language; for people are admirers of (or wonder at) what is far off, remote, and
all that is wonderful (excites surprise, raises our curiosity) is agreeable'.

Poet. xxiv 17, τὸ δὲ βαθμὸν ἡδὸν σημεῖον δὲ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὥς χαριζόμενοι. Comp. I 11. 21, on the pleasure of 'wonder', and the gratification of curiosity in learning: see the note.


'Now in verse of all kinds there are many ways of producing this effect, and there they are appropriate, because the subject (circumstances) and the characters (persons) of the story (the fable or poem) are further removed from common life; stand out of, and above, the ordinary level of humanity, Hist. An. I 14. I)—'but in prose compositions these (modes of giving novelty and variety to the language) must be much more sparingly used' (χρηστέων, or are appropriate to fewer occasions, τοῦθ', or rather ταῦθ', ἀρμότειν, Buhle), 'because the subject (theme, argument) is less (lower, less elevated),—(and this is true a fortiori in prose) for even in the other (in poetry) if a slave or a very young man were to use fine language it would be rather unbecoming, or (if any one else did so) on a very trifling subject, but on the contrary even in that (poetry, not 'prose' as Victorius), 'propriety consists in a due contraction and expansion (amplification)'; the adaptation of the language to the circumstances, raising or lowering it as the occasion requires. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 38. 153. Orat. LX 202. Also xxi 70, ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilium quam quid debeat videre. Πρέπον appellant hoc Graeci; nos dicamus sane decorum. § 72. Quam enim indecorum est de stiliicidis quum aput unum indicem dicas amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summissae est subtilliter! De stiliicidis dicere illustrates peri λιαν μικρῶν. On the language of poetry and prose, comp. Isocr. Evag. §§ 8—11.


1 ύπόθεσις, anything that is subjected as a foundation, a supposition or hypothesis, the basis of an argument, a first principle assumed, a theory, an underlying principle on which a scheme is to be built, the plot (ground plan) of a play, and so forth.
§ 4. 'Hence—from the necessity of paying attention to the selection of appropriate language in respect of characters and subjects—may be inferred (διὸ) the necessity of disguising the art employed, and of avoiding the appearance of speaking, not naturally, but artificially,' (πλαστὲς φιγοῦσι, of fiction, or artificial composition), 'for the one is persuasive, the other the contrary,' (comp. c. 8 § 1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον, πεπλάσθη ἡ δοκεῖ.) 'For people take offence at (lit. are at variance with, in opposition to) (one who employs artificial) as at one who has a design upon them, just as they do at mixed wines.'

Victorius quotes Plat. Symp. IV p. 661 D, διὸ φεύγουσι τὸν μεμγιμένον οἶνον οἱ πίνοντες; οἱ δὲ μεμγιμένους πεπωίματος λαθάνειν, ὅσο ἐπιβουλεύοντες.

From this curious coincidence it seems that "mixed wine" must have been proverbial for a concealed enemy: mixed wine, 'the mixing of liquors', being, as was supposed, of much more intoxicating character than unmixed.

Phyllinus is arguing against ποικὴ τροφὴ: simple food is always best.

'And as is the case with Theodorus' voice (lit. Theodorus' voice is affected) in comparison with that of all the rest of the actors' (there should be a colon, instead of a comma, at μεμγιμένους: καὶ οἶνος ἡ Θεοδώρου is continued from τὸν γὰρ πιθανὸν: it is an instance of the art disguising art, an artificial voice assuming the appearance of one natural and simple): 'for his voice appears to be that of the speaker (though it is in reality disguised), but the others as though they belonged to other people' (were assumed, with the character represented).

Theodorus, a celebrated tragic actor, is mentioned—generally with Polus or Aristodemus—by Dem. de F. L. § 274, bis; Arist. Pol. IV (vii) 17, sub fin., 1336 b 28, from which it appears that, like other great artists and performers, ancient and modern, he presumed upon his reputation and artistic skill: also by Plutarch, frequently, as Bellone an pace cl. f. Ath. c. 6, 348 f, de sui laud. c. 7, 545 F (a dictum of his to Satyrius the comic poet), Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, c. 21, 816 F, Theodorus and Polus taken as types of τῶν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ πρωταγωνιστῆν: probably, by Diogenes Laertius, who at the end of his account of Aristippus, II 8, § 103, 4, enumerates twenty Theodoruses (including the philosopher who gives occasion to this digression), and amongst them one οὗ τὸ φωναστικὸν (on the exercise of the voice) βιβλίου παγκόλων: a subject so germane to the profession of a tragic actor, that, although Diogenes says no more about him, one cannot help suspecting that he must be the same with the one here mentioned. Fabricius in his catalogue of Theodoruses, Vol. x, names him with a special reference to the passage of Aristotle's Politics, and a general one to Plutarch,
5 είναι, αἱ δ' αλλότριαι. κλέπτεται δ' εὖ, εάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰσθήσεως διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθή: ὁ περ Ἑυριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

ὅντων δ' ὅνομάτων καὶ ἰμάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὅνωμάτων τοσαῦτ' ἐχόντων εἰδή ὁσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλῶς ὄνυμαι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὄλγακις καὶ ὄλγαχος χρηστέον (ὅπως δὲ, ὡστερον ἔροιμεν,


§ 5. 'And this cheat (disguise, delusion) is fairly effected' (the assumed character escapes observation, is stolen from the view), 'if the composer selects for his composition words out of the ordinary language (of common life); such as are the verses of Euripides, who gave us the earliest specimen (hint or glimpse, ὑπὸ) of this kind of writing'.


ὑπέδειξε[ as I have pointed out, Introd. p. 284, note 2, q. v., may also signify 'traced as a guide', for his successors to follow. See also p. 285, note 1, on Euripides' style, and Archimelus' epigram there given.

'And of the nouns and verbs' (or subject and predicate, Introd. p. 371, Appendix A to Bk. iii), 'of which the speech (or language, in general) is composed, of which the nouns have so many kinds as have been considered in the treatise on Poetry' (c. xxii, where, in § 4, eight varieties are enumerated, and then defined seriatim, §§ 5—20), 'of these words, foreign or obsolete, and (long) compound words' (Aeschylean compounds), 'and words invented (manufactured for the occasion), are to be rarely employed, and in rare places (on rare occasions); where (these are), we will state by and by: (in cc. 3 and 7). The why, has been already stated; and that (the why) is because it (the use of them) varies (from the ordinary standard) towards, in the direction of, exaggeration (or excess) beyond propriety (what is becoming).

On γλώττας, διάλεξ ὀνόματα, see Introd. on c. 3, pp. 287, 8. πεποιημένον δ' ἐστίν ὁ διὰς μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τιμῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής οὖν τὰ κέρατα ἀγνηγεῖ καὶ τῶν ιερία ἀρητῆρα (Poet. XXI. 17).

AR. III.
§ 6. 'The proper (ordinary) name, and the special name of anything,' (οικεῖον, the thing's own or right name, its special designation, Victorius), 'and the metaphor, are alone serviceable for the language of prose. And a sign of this is, that these alone are used by everybody (are of universal application); for everyone makes use of metaphors, and the common (sanctioned by common usage) 'and appropriate words in his ordinary conversation: and therefore it is clear that good composition will have a foreign air (an air of novelty, something unusual, above the flatness and monotony of ordinary;' vulgar, talk: § 3), that (the art employed in it) may escape detection (pass unobserved, § 4), and that it will be clear and perspicuous, (in virtue of the κύριος and οικεῖον δομάτων). And in these, as we said (§3, in §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), consists the excellence of the rhetorical speech.

With the 'foreign', unusual character of good composition, comp. Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας § 77, (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 280), τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἐν τῷ χαρακτήρι τούτῳ περιτήν εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐξηλλαγένη καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον, οὕτω γὰρ ἔξει τῶν δύναμιν, ἡ δὲ κυρία καὶ συνήθης σαφῆς μὲν, λειτή δὲ καὶ εὐκαταφύτως.

κύριον δομα is δ χρώνται ἔκαστο (Poet. XXI 5), opposed to γλώττα & ἔτερο: the common, usual, established, term, for expressing anything, opposed to the foreign and barbarous, or archaic and obsolete γλώττα. The word derives its special meaning from the original signification of κύριος, 'carrying authority,' 'authoritative'; whence 'authorised, established, fixed (by authority), settled,' as κύριος νόμος, δόγμα, κυρία ἡμέρα, ἐκκλησία, opposed to the irregular ἐκκλησία σύγχρονης, convoked at uncertain times on special occasions: and hence applied to the established, settled, regular name of a thing. See further on κύριον δομα in note 2, Intro. pp. 282, 3. [On κύριος, compare notes on I 2.4 and 3.4.]

οικεῖον δομα expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor. It is something 'of one's own,' appropriate, peculiar, characteristic, special. This is the Latin 'nomen proprium,' of which Cicero says, de Or. III 37, 149, quae præficia sunt, et certa ('definite') quasi vocabula verum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis (natually belonging to them). From these are distinguished quae transferuntur (all metaphorical words)

1 Schrader quotes Cic. Orator, c. 24 § 81, Translatio frequentissimeermo omnis uilitur, non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum, siquidem est eorum geminare viles, siitare agrors, laetas esse segetes, luxuriosa frumenta.

2 'If the orator confines himself to these, his style may be novel and ornamental, yet without forcing itself unduly upon the attention, and perspicuous.' Paraphr. in Intro.
et quasi alieno in loco collocantur: aut iis quae novamus et facimus ipsi (all foreign innovations on the ordinary language, aliena, Cicero, γλώσσαι, διάλεκτα δύναμα, ποτομημα, &c.). Cicero and the Latins do not distinguish κόμα and οίκεια. Yet, as Victorius has pointed out, he uses terms exactly corresponding to those of Aristotle: de Or. III 39, 159, quod omnes translatis et alienis magis quam propriis et suis. For even if we understand here suis of their own language (as I suppose we should), this is immediately followed by nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum proprium non habet; and in pro Caecina, c. 18 § 51, we have, res ut omnes suis certis ac propriis vocabulis nominetur. oikieos stands for κόμα, Metaph. Δ 29, 1024 a 32, of Antisthenes, εὐθῶς φετε ἡμιών ἄξιών λέγεσθαι πλην τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνόσ.

§ 7. This is a parenthetical note: it has little to do with Rhetoric except so far as it occupies common ground with poetry, in the use of synonyms. ‘Of names (words) homonyms (ambiguous words, with more than one meaning) are useful to the Sophist’ (the fallacious reasoner; see Π 24.2, the topic of ὀμονυμία, and the note) — ‘for those are the (principal) instruments of his (logical) frauds or cheats; to the poet, synonymms’. The homonym and the synonym are defined at the commencement of the Categories. The former is a word of more than one signification, of which the several definitions do not agree; so that the name being the same, the one signification can be employed fallaciously for the other: synonyms are words which can be variously applied, in which the name and the definition (or meaning) do agree; as animal, can be said with truth of man and ox. Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 42, p. 116, on synonyms. Of homonyms Quintilian says, Inst. Or. VII 9. 2, singula afferunt errorem, quum pluribus rebus aut hominibus eadem appellatio est, (ὀμονυμία dictur) ut Gallus; avem enim, an gentem, an nomen, an fortunam corporis significet incertum est: et Aiax Tela- monis an Oilei filius. Verba quoque quaedam diver sos intellectus habent, ut cerno (with the application of it in suits of law). Of this logical application of κακωργεῖν, see the examples quoted in note on 1 1. 10.

‘By proper and synonymous I mean such words as πορέωςβαί and βαδίζεω: these are both of them proper and identical in meaning’. According to Trendelenburg, u. s., πορέωςβαί is the genus and βαδίζεω the species, both predicative of animals in the same sense: “Aristoteles enim constanter vocabulum (ὁμονύμως) ita frequentavit, ut vel eiusmodem generis formas vel genus et species, quatenus communi nomine comprehenduntur, synonyma diceret.” The use of these to the poet lies
The conclusion is, 423 B, ὅνωμα ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μὴν μὲν φωνῇ ἔκεινον, δὲ μιμεῖται καὶ ὑμνᾶει ὡς μοιμοῦσιν τῇ φωνῇ, δὲ ἐν μιμήται. "Olympiodorus ad Philebum Platonis tradit Democritum nomina vocales imagines rerum appellare consuevisse, ὅτι ἄγαλμα φωνῆται καὶ ταὐτά ἐστι τῶν θεῶν, ὡς Δημόκριτος." Victorius. Aristotle himself, de Interpretatione, sub init. 16α3, calls words τῶν ἐν τῇ φυσική παθημάτων σύμβολα, and afterwards, line 7, ὑμνάσματα, signs or representatives, and copies, of mental affections, i.e. impressions, a theory quite different from that of Plato, which is here adopted. On the terms applied by Aristotle to express the nature of words, see Waiz, on Organon 16 a 4. Of the four employed, he says, σύμβολον is a subjective σημεῖον, and ὑμερώμα a subjective μέμρισμα. On imitation and the natural love of it, the origin and foundation of all the fine arts, see the first three chapters of the Poetics. In c. 4, init. imitation or mimicry is described as natural to man from infancy, and characteristic of humanity. [Dionysius Halic. de comp. verb. p. 94 (quoted in Farrar's Chapters on Language, chap. xi), μιγάλη τούτων ἀρχή καὶ διδάκτας ἡ φύσις, ἡ ποιότης μηθηκοῦν ἡμᾶς καὶ θετικὸν τῶν ὅνωμάτων, ὡς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα.]

τὰ γὰρ ὄνοματα κ.τ.λ.] This is introduced to account for the poets having been the first who devoted themselves to the study of style or language, in this sense. Words being the copies of things, the poets, whose object is imitation, addicted themselves to the study of them, in order to be able better to represent the things of which they were images. Victorius.

αἱ τέχναι συνείσησαν] Some of the writers on rhapsodizing, with which was naturally combined the criticism of Homer, are mentioned in Plat. Ion. 530 C, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Xenoph. Conv. III 6), and Glaucos, probably of Teos, mentioned above, § 3.

§ 9. 'And as the reputation which the poets acquired in spite of the simplicity of what they said (the silliness of the thoughts expressed) was thought (by those who imitated them) to be due to their language, it was for this reason that the language (of prose) first took a poetical colour, as that of Gorgias. And still, even at this day, the mass of the uneducated think the discourses of speakers of this kind mighty fine. Such however is not the fact, but the language of prose and poetry is distinct.'

To the same effect Dionysius, de Lys. lud. c. 3, (v. 457, Reiske). Lyssias' predecessors were not of his opinion about style—his was the ἀφέλης λόγος, the 'smooth and simple' style—all 'οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τω ἀντικτρείνα τοῖς διὸς ἔξει ζλατων ἰδιώτην, καὶ κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολῆς τε πολλαὶς χρώμενοι καὶ υπερβολαὶ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τρισκείας ἰδιαιτέων, ὑμερώματος τοῖς γλυσσηματικοῖς καὶ ἔνων χρήσει, καὶ τῶν οὐκ εἰσιν διαζωτικοῖς τὴν διαλλαγὴ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κανονολογίᾳ καταπληττομένου τῶν ἰδιώτην, κ.τ.λ. This was the new style introduced by Gorgias and his followers Polus and Licymnious (Alcidamas, κ.τ.) Hermanogens, περi
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 § 9.

ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὕηθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἑδοκοῦν πο-ρίσασθαι τῷ ὑδε τῇ δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρότη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἶον ἡ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπειδεύτων τῶν τοιούτων οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιησιως λέξις ἔστιν. δὴνοὶ δὲ τὸ συμβαίνων

ἰδεῖν, β', περὶ δεινότητος (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 395); on the third kind of δεινότητα represented by Gorgias and his school, οἱ σοφιταί; ὁ φανόμενος λόγος δεινὸς οὐκ ὑπὸ τοιούτος. γίνεται γὰρ τὸ πλεῖστον περὶ τὴν λέξιν, ὅταν τραχεῖα καὶ σφοδρὰ τὸ ἡ καὶ σφιχτὰ συμφωνεῖσα λέξις εἰς ἑξαγγέλη τοὐτοις ἔννοιας ἐπιτολαίοις καὶ κοινάς.

λέγοντες εὕηθη κ.τ.λ.] Cic. Orat. IIII 175, of Isocrates, also a follower of Gorgias, Quum enim videret oratores cum severitate audiri poetas autem cum volupitate, tum dicitur numeros secutus quibus etiam in oratione uteretur, quin incundalitis causa tum ut varietas occurreret satietati. So Theophrastus, Dion. Lys. Iud. c. 14, condemns this affected poetical language of the Sicilian school of rhetoricians as childish, τὸ ἰον καὶ δρομον πανιδώδες, and unworthy of a serious purpose, καθαπελτείον ποίημα διὸ καὶ ἕτετο ἀρµόττει τῷ σπουδῇ κ.τ.λ. Plato, Rep. X 601 A—B.

On Gorgias' novel and poetical style and the figures that he introduced into Rhetoric, see Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. VII Vol. III pp. 66—7, 73—5, and on the rhetorical figures, which are classified, 69—72. Comp. Cic. Orat. § 175 [paria paribus adiuncta et similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quae sua sponte, etiamsi id non agas, cadunt fieri quernque numerose, Gorgias primus inventit, sed eis est usus in tempereantian. See also Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, esp. pp. 57—64. As a specimen of the poetical style of Gorgias we have his metaphorical term for vultures, ἵμφυκοι τάφοι, parallels to which may be found in the poets Lucretius and Spenser, Lucr. v 924, vivat videns vivō sepeliri viscera busto, and Faery Queen II 8. 16 (quoted by Munro), To be entombed in the raven or the hight. That this fancy for poetic prose was with Gorgias a 'ruling passion strong in death', is proved by the phrase used at the close of his life, 'At last Sleep lays me with his brother Death'. Another of his death-bed utterances, ὁσήρ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ ρέοντων συνοίκων δόμινος ἀπαλάττομαι (Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 184), may be illustrated by Waller's lines, The soul's dark cottage, battered and decayed, Let us in new light through chinks that time has made.

λόγον] prose, opposed to ποίησις. infra § 9, c. 2 §§ 3 and 6, ψυλλο λόγον, § 7, ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, § 8, ὁ λόγος τῶν μέτρων. Poet. II 5, VI 26. Plato Rep. IIII 390 A, ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει. 'This is shewn by the result: for even the tragic writers no longer employ it (sc. τῇ λέξιν) in the same way (as the earlier tragedians did), but just as they passed from the (trochaic) tetrameter to the iambic measure because of all other metres this most resembles prose, so also in the use of words (names or nouns) they have dropped all that are contrary to the usage of ordinary conversation, and have dropped also those with which the earliest (dramatic) writers (συμβολῳ ποιησιστες; especially Æschylus) used to adorn (their
οὔτε γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρώνται τὸν αὐτῶν πρόπον, ἀλλ’ ὁσπερ καὶ έκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τὰ λόγω τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὔτω καὶ τῶν ὄνοματων ἀφείκασιν ὡσα παρὰ τὴν διὰλεκτὸν
compositions), a practice which is even now retained by the writers of hexameters (Epics): it is absurd therefore to copy those who themselves no longer employ that (the original) style’.
ὅσπερ καὶ...οὔτω καὶ] This tautological repetition of καὶ in an anti-
thesis is characteristic of Aristotle’s style. [Cf. supra § 3.]
ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν] Poet. IV 17, 18, 19. μά-
λατα γὰρ λεκτικῶν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμβεῖον ἐστι...πλείστα γὰρ ἱαμβεία λέομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλους κ.τ.λ. III 3. 3 ult. where this
passage is referred to. III 8. 4. Wecker, Nachtrag, p. 239.
ὁμοίωτατον τῶν ἄλλων] In translating this I have purposely retained
the ungrammatical and illogical ‘other’ with the superlative, because the
same blunder is equally common in our own language. Swift, Tale of a
Tub, ‘The most perfect of all others’, Hooker, Eccl. Pol. ‘of all other,
they are...most infallible’. Bacon, Essay Of Envy, ‘one of the most able
of his predecessors’ (of whom he is not, and cannot be, one), ‘of all
other affections (envy) the most importune and continual’. The examina-
tion of this, and the other irregular use of ἄλλος, (πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξένοι
[Plat. Gorg. p. 473 c]), and the analogies in English, is reserved for
an Appendix [this Appendix was apparently never written, though its
intended preparation is also hinted in Mr Cope’s translation of the
Gorgias, p. 11. Compare note 1 to II 9. 9, τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτοπροφυταί.
διαλέκτου] for ‘common conversation’ (properly dialogue): compare
c. 2. 5, η ελεύθερα διαλέκτος, and Poet. XXII 14. In a somewhat different
application διαλέκτος is the third and highest stage of ‘sound’, (1) noise,
ψόφοι, which even inanimate things, brute matter, wood and stone, are
capable of producing: (2) φωνή, φθόγγος, the indistinct voice of an animal:
and (3) διαλέκτος, the distinct utterance of the μέρος ἄθρωσιν, the power of
conversation, characteristic of humanity. This distinction lies in
the power which man has, and other animals (I believe) want, of pronouncing
consonants, which produce distinct, articulate words. On speech,
as the characteristic of man, see Pol. I 2, 1253 a 10, seq. where λόγος is
substituted for διαλέκτος, [also Isocr. Paneg. § 48, τούτο μόνον (sc. τοὺς
λόγους) εἴ άπαντα τῶν ζῴων θνην ἐνυμεν έχοντες, and Cicero, de Off. I 16.
50, (ferae) rationis et orationis expertes, de Oratore I §§ 32, 33].
οὔτω καὶ τῶν ὄνοματων ἀφείκασιν] Of this change, the lowering of
the language of tragedy to the level of common life, the earliest author (as
we are told in c. 2. 5) was Euripides, in his later plays, which are to be
carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus, and Ion.
The change was completely carried out in the New Comedy of Menander,
Philemon Diphilus, &c. On this everyday character of Euripides’ later
and worse compositions—which are to be carefully distinguished from
such as the Medea, Hippolytus and Ion—to which the language was
RHETORIKHE Γ. I §§ 9, 10; 2 § 1.

ἔστιν, ὡς [δ'] oi πρότερον ἐκόσμου, καὶ ἐτὶ νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιοῦντες. διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρώνται ἐκεῖνοι τῷ τρόπῳ. ὡστε φανεροῦν ὅτι οὐχ ἀπαντά ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οῖας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἰρήται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

1 έστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὡρίσθω λέξεως CHAP. II. ἀρετή σαφῆ εἶναι. σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐργον· καὶ μῆτε ταπεινῶν

1-1 [The rendering given at the foot of p. 11 follows Bekker's Oxford ed. of 1837, which has ὡς δ' (sic) οἱ πρώτων ἐκόσμου, καὶ ἐτὶ νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀψίκησαν· but there is nothing to shew that Mr Cope deliberately preferred this to the text as printed in Bekker's third edition; which is also approved in Spengel's note, except that he would strike out the first ἀψίκησαν, and not the second.] made to conform, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. xxv. §§ 2, 3. In Arist. Ran. 599, Euripides is made to take credit for it, οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰσάγων, οἷς χρώμεθ', οἷς ἐνσειμαν.

§ 10. 'And therefore it is plain that we must not go into exact detail in describing all that may be said about style, but confine ourselves to the kind of which we are now speaking (i.e. the use of it in Rhetoric). The other (the general view of the subject) has been treated in the Poetics'.

There is a useful note on the various senses of ἀκριβεία in Aristotle in Grant's Ethics, i 7. 18. Here it is used in the first of these, of accuracy, or exactness, as shewn in minute detail, a complete survey of an entire subject.

CHAP. II.

Some general remarks upon Style and its virtues, and the various classifications of these in ancient and modern systems of Rhetoric, are given in the Introduction, as preliminary to the paraphrase of this chapter, pp. 279—282. [Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 43.]

§ 1. 'Let so much suffice for the consideration (observation) of that (tὰ περὶ ποιητικῆς, c. 1. 10); and (now) let it be regarded as settled (or determined) once for all that one virtue of style is to be perspicuous: for a sign of this is, that if the speech (or language) do not explain its meaning, it will fail to perform its own proper function'.

This is a reference to the rule first laid down by Plat. Rep. I 352 D seq., and adopted by Aristotle who constantly recurs to it—see especially Eth. Nic. II 5, init.—that the virtue or excellence of anything, knife, horse, or anything that can be employed as an instrument, is determined by its ἐργον or special function, in the due performance of which it lies. If the special function of language is to explain one's meaning, it is plain that if it fail to do that—if it is not perspicuous—it does not answer its intended purpose.
'And neither mean nor exaggerated' (beyond or above the true 
valuation of the subject it is employed upon, turgid, pompous, inflated), 
'but decent, appropriate, suitable' (a precept of propriety): 'for though 
it may be (ὅσοι) poetical language is not tame, yet it is by no means 
suitable to prose.' Comp. Poet. xxii 1, λέξεως δὲ ἄρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ 
tapeinην εἴναι. These are the two indispensable excellences of style, 
(1) clearness or perspicuity, and (2) propriety. On these see Introduc-
tion, p. 280.
§ 2. 'Of nouns and verbs' (the ultimate elements, and principal 
components, of language: see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. iii. p. 371. 
Poet. xxii 8—9) 'perspicuity is produced by (the use of) proper names, a 
character not tame but ornate is imparted by all the rest of the (kinds of) 
words which are enumerated in the Poetics (c. xxii 4): to alter language 
in this way' (from the received and familiar expressions to which we are 
accustomed), 'invests it with a higher dignity' (because it makes it unus-
usual, and strange; not familiar, which 'breeds contempt'): 'for men have 
the same feeling in regard of language as they have to strangers as com-
pared with their fellow-citizens' (they disregard those whom they are in 
the habit of seeing every day, but are struck with the appearance of 
strangers, and pay them attention, if not always respect). To the note 
on κύρια αύθαμα, Introd. p. 282, note 2, add that in the Rhet. ad Alex. 
25 (26) 1, and 30 (31) 6, these are called οἰκεία 'proper', by a different 
metaphor.
εξαλλάξας] infra § 5, εξαλλάττειν τοῦ πρέποντος, c. 3, 3, τὸ εὐωδὸς εξαλ-
lάττειν (which explains it: comp. Poet. xxii 3 infra). So Poet. xxii 4, and 
20, δύναμιν ἐξαλλαγένον, xxii 3, (λέξει) εξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἴδιωτικόν, Ib. § 8, 
ἐξαλλαγαί τῶν ὀνόματων. From which it results that the meaning of the 
term is 'a change out of, or departure from ὀνόματα κύρια, the vulgar lan-
guage, the ordinary mode of expression', for which something novel, 
unusual, striking is substituted. Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 179, λόγους 
dιεξόμενον πολὺ τῶν εἰδότων λέγαται παρ' ύμιν, ἐξαλλαγένους; Demetr. 
περὶ ἐρμηνειας, περὶ συγκρίσεως ult. (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. iii 280), λέξεω 
περιττῶν καὶ ἐξαλλαγέμην, καὶ ἀσυνήθη. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in 
Demosthene, c. 10, ἐξαλλαγέμον τοῦ συνήθους χαρακτῆρος, Ib. c. 15, 
περιττά καὶ ἐξαλλαγέμον τοῦ συνήθους, de Thuc. Iud. c. 28, τὴν διάνοιαν 
ἐξαλλάττειν ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθει, Ep. ii ad Amm. c. 3 ἐξαλλαγέμη τῆς συνήθους 
§ 3. 'And therefore a foreign air must be given to the language; 
for people are admirers of (or wonder at) what is far off, remote, and
3 πάσχουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δὲί ποιεῖν ἔγνυ
τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν,
ηδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστὸν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά
τε ποιεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖ· πλέον γὰρ ἔξ-
 Stateless ςερὶ δὲ καὶ σερὶ οὖς ὁ λόγος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς p. 113.
λόγοις πολλῷ ἐλάττωσιν ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων,
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δοῦλος καλλιεπότο ἡ λίαν νέος,
ἀπρεπέστερον, ἡ σερὶ λίαν μικρῶν· ἀλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν
τοῦτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενοι καὶ αὐξανόμενοι τὸ πρέπον.

all that is wonderful (excites surprise, raises our curiosity) is agreeable'.
Poet. xxiv. 17, τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ὡς σημεῖον δὲ, πάντες γὰρ προστίθησις
ἀπαγγέλλοντο ὡς χαριζόμενοι. Comp. i 11. 21, on the pleasure of 'wonder',
and the gratification of curiosity in learning: see the note.

ἔγνυ] infra § 6, ἔγνυκόν. Poet. XXII 3.

'Now in verse of all kinds there are many ways of producing this
effect, and there they are appropriate, because the subject (circum-
stances) and the characters (persons) of the story (the fable or poem)
are further removed’ from common life; stand out of, and above, the
ordinary level of humanity, Hist. An. i 14. 1)—'but in prose compositions
these (modes of giving novelty and variety to the language) must be
much more sparingly used' (χρηστῶν, or are appropriate to fewer
occasions, τοῦθ', or rather ταῦθ', ἀρμόττει, Buhle), 'because the subject
(theme, argument') is less (lower, less elevated),—(and this is true
a fortiori in prose) for even in the other (in poetry) if a slave or a
very young man were to use fine language it would be rather un-
becoming, or (if any one else did so) on a very trifling subject, but on
the contrary even in that' (poetry, not 'prose' as Victorius), 'propriety
consists in a due contraction and expansion (amplification); the adapta-
tion of the language to the circumstances, raising or lowering it as the
xxi 70, ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilium quam quid
decet videre. Πρῶτον appellant hoc Graeci; nos dicamus sane decorum.
§ 72, Quam enim indecorum est de stiliicidii quum apud unum iudicem
dicas amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maistate populi
Romani summisse et subtiliter! De stiliicidiis dicere illustrates peri λιαν
ῥημασί τε καὶ ὁνόμασιν, οὔτε κεκοσμημένος, αὐλ'...εἰς λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπι-
tυχοῦσιν ὁνόματι. Thuc. vi 83, Plat. Hipparch. 225 c, τῶν σοφῶν ῥημά-
tων...δόν οἱ δείκτες περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιεπούντας. Valckenae, Diatr. Eur.
Fr. p. 261 c.

1 ὑπόθεσις, anything that is subjected as a foundation, a supposition or
hypothesis, the basis of an argument, a first principle assumed, a theory, an
underlying principle on which a scheme is to be built, the plot (ground plan) of a
play, and so forth.
4 διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιούντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν περι-
πλασμένος ἀλλὰ περικότως. τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτοντιν, ὥσ γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα δια-
βάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οίνους τοὺς μεμιγμέ-
νους, καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν
τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἐοικεν
1 μεμιγμένου.

§ 4. 'Hence—from the necessity of paying attention to the selection of
appropriate language in respect of characters and subjects—may be
inferred (διὸ) the necessity of disguising the art employed, and of
avoiding the appearance of speaking, not naturally, but artificially,
(πλάτειν fingers, of fiction, or artificial composition), 'for the one is
persuasive, the other the contrary', (comp. c. 8 § 1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον,
πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ.) 'For people take offence at (iii. are at variance
with, in opposition to) (one who employs artifice) as at one who has a
design upon them, just as they do at mixed wines'.

Victorius quotes Plut. Symp. IV p. 661 D, διὸ φείγοντι τὸν μεμιγμένον
οἶον αἱ πίνουσει οἱ δὲ μεμιγμένει πειράζειν λανθάνειν, ὥσ ἐπιβουλεύοντες:
From this curious coincidence it seems that “mixed wine” must have been
proverbial for a concealed enemy: mixed wine, 'the mixing of liquors', be-
ing, as was supposed, of a much more intoxicating character than unmixed.
Pholinus is arguing against πωκήλ τροφή: simple food is always best.

'And as is the case with Theodorus' voice (iii. Theodorus' voice is af-
fected) in comparison with that of all the rest of the actors' (there should
be a colon, instead of a comma, at μεμιγμένου: καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου is
continued from τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν: it is an instance of the art disguising
art, an artificial voice assuming the appearance of one natural and
simple): 'for his voice appears to be that of the speaker (though it is in
reality disguised), but the others as though they belonged to other
people' (were assumed, with the character represented).

Theodorus, a celebrated tragic actor, is mentioned—generally with
Polus or Aristodemus—by Dem. de F. L. § 274, διὸ; Arist. Pol. IV (vii)
17, sub fin., 1336 b 28, from which it appears that, like other great
artists and performers, ancient and modern, he presumed upon his reputa-
tion and artistic skill: also by Plutarch, frequently, as Bellone an pace
cf. f. Ath. c. 6, 348 F, de sui laud. c. 7, 545 F (a dictum of his to Satyrus
the comic poet), Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, c. 21, 816 F, Theodorus
and Polus taken as types of τῶν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ προσαγωγοῦντιν: probably,
by Diogenes Laertius, who at the end of his account of Aristippus,
P II 8, § 103, 4, enumerates twenty Theodoruses (including the philo-
osopher who gives occasion to this digression), and amongst them one
οὗ τοῖς φωναστικῶν (on the exercise of the voice) βιβλίων παγκαλῶν: a
subject so germane to the profession of a tragic actor, that, although
Diogenes says no more about him, one cannot help suspecting that he
must be the same with the one here mentioned. Fabricius in his
catalogue of Theodoruses, Vol. x, names him with a special reference
to the passage of Aristotle's Politics, and a general one to Plutarch,
§ 5. 'And this cheat (disguise, delusion) is fairly effected' (the assumed character escapes observation, is stolen from the view), 'if the composer selects for his composition words out of the ordinary language (of common life); such as are the verses of Euripides, who gave us the earliest specimen (hint or glimpse, ύπο) (of this kind of writing).'


ὑπεδείξε] as I have pointed out, Introd. p. 284, note 2, q. v., may also signify 'traced as a guide,' for his successors to follow. See also p. 285, note 1, on Euripides' style, and Archimelus' epigram there given.

'And of the nouns and verbs' (or subject and predicate, Introd. p. 371, Appendix A to Bk. III), 'of which the speech (or language, in general) is composed, of which the nouns have so many kinds as have been considered in the treatise on Poetry' (c. XXI, where, in § 4, eight varieties are enumerated, and then defined seriatim, §§ 5—20), 'of these words, foreign or obsolete, and (long) compound words' (Aeschylean compounds), 'and words invented (manufactured for the occasion), are to be rarely employed, and in rare places (on rare occasions); where (these are), we will state by and by: (in cc. 3 and 7). The why, has been already stated; and that (the why) is because it (the use of them) varies (from the ordinary standard) towards, in the direction of, exaggeration (or excess) beyond propriety (what is becoming).

On γλῴσται, διωλε ὄνομα, see Introd. on c. 3, pp. 287, 8. πεποιημένον δ' ἐστιν ὃ διώλε μὴ καλυμμένον ὑπὸ τινος αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητῆς' οὖν τὰ κιρατα ἐμνυγες καὶ τὸν λεία ἀρητήρα (Poet. XXI. 17).

AR. III.
§ 6. 'The proper (ordinary) name, and the special name of anything,' (οἶκειον, the thing's own or right name, its special designation, Victorius), 'and the metaphor, are alone serviceable for the language of prose. And a sign of this is, that these alone are used by everybody (are of universal application); for everyone makes use of metaphors', and the common' (sanctioned by common usage) 'and appropriate words in his ordinary conversation: and therefore it is clear that good composition will have a foreign air (an air of novelty, something unusual, above the flatness and monotony of ordinary, vulgar, talk: § 3), that (the art employed in it) may escape detection (pass unobserved, § 4), and that it will be clear and perspicuous, (in virtue of the κύριον and οἶκεια όνομα). And in these, as we said (§§ in § 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), consists the excellence of the rhetorical speech'.

With the 'foreign', unusual character of good composition, comp. Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας § 77, (Spenge1, Rhei. Gr. III 280), that the κύριον γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι τοῦτῷ περιτῆρι εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἓξηλαγμένην καὶ συννήθη μᾶλλον, οὕτω γὰρ ἔξει τῶν ὄντων, ἧ δε κυρία καὶ συννήθης σαφῆς μείν, λειτοὶ δὲ καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοι.

κύριον δόνμα is δ χρώται ἕκαστοι (Poet. XXI 5), opposed to γλώσσα φ ετέρω: the common, usual, established, term, for expressing anything, opposed to the foreign and barbarous, or archaic and obsolete γλώσσα. The word derives its special meaning from the original signification of κύριος, 'carrying authority', 'authoritative'; whence 'authorised, established, fixed (by authority), settled', as κύριος νόμος, δόγμα, κυρία ἡμέρα, ἐκκλησία, opposed to the irregular ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος, convoked at uncertain times on special occasions: and hence applied to the established, settled, regular name of a thing. See further on κύριον δόνμα in note 2, Introd. pp. 282, 3. [On κύριος, compare notes on I 2. 4 and 3. 4.]

οἶκειον δόνμα expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor. It is something 'of one's own', appropriate, peculiar, characteristic, special. This is the Latin 'nomen proprium', of which Cicero says, de Or. III 37, 149, quae propria sunt, et certa ('definite') quasi vocabula verum, pae ne una nata cum rebus ipsis (naturally belonging to them). From these are distinguished quae transferuntur (all metaphorical words)

1 Schrader quotes Cic. Orator, c. 24 § 81, Translatione frequentissimae sermo omnis utiliter, non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum, siguidem est eorum geminare vitas, sitire agros, laetas esse segetes, luxuriosa frumenta.

2 'If the orator confines himself to these, his style may be novel and ornamental, yet without forcing itself unduly upon the attention, and perspicuous.' Paraphr. in Introd.
et quasi alieno in loco collocantur: aut ipsis quae novamus et facimus ipsi
(all foreign innovations on the ordinary language, aliena, Cicero, γλώσσα,
didace δόματα, πεποιθήμα, &c.). Cicero and the Latins do not distinguish
κύρια and ő kiếm. Yet, as Victorius has pointed out, he uses terms exactly
res closely corresponding to those of Aristotle: de Or. III 39, 159, quod omnes
translatatis et alienis magis quam propriis et suis. For even if we under-
stand here suis of their own language (as I suppose we should), this
is immediately followed by nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum pro-
prium non habet; and in pro Caecina, c. i 8 § 51, we have, res ut omnes suis
certis ac propriis vocabulis nominentur. oikeios stands for κύριος, Metaph.
Δ 29, 1024 a 32, of Antisthenes, ἐνθος ἐνθος ἐνθος ἐνθος λέγεσθαι πλη
τῷ oikeio λόγῳ ἦν ἐνθος.
§ 7. This is a parenthetical note: it has little to do with Rhetoric
except so far as it occupies common ground with poetry, in the use
of synonyms. ‘Of names (words) homonyms (ambiguous words, with
more than one meaning) are useful to the Sophist’ (the fallacious reasoner;
see II 24, 2, the topic of ὄνομα, and the note) — ‘for those are the
(principal) instruments of his (logical) frauds or cheats; to the poet,
synonyms’. The homonym and the synonym are defined at the com-
 mencement of the Categories. The former is a word of more than
one signification, of which the several definitions do not agree; so that
the name being the same, the one signification can be employed fal-
laciously for the other: synonyms are words which can be variously
applied, in which the name and the definition (or meaning) do agree;
as animal, can be said with truth of man and ox. Trendelenburg, El. Log.
Ar. § 42, p. 116, on synonyms. Of homonyms Quintilian says, Inst. Or.
VII 9, 2, singula afferunt errorem, quum pluribus rebus aut hominibus
eadem appellatio est, (ὄνομα, dicitur) ut Gallus; avem enim, an gentem,
an nomen, an fortunam corporis significet incertum est: et Aiax Tele-
monis an Oilei filius. Verba quaeque quaedam diversos intellectus habent,
ut cerno: (with the application of it in suits of law). Of this logical
application of ἀκούσθαι, see the examples quoted in note on I 1. 10.

‘By proper and synonymous I mean such words as πορεύεσθαι and
βαδίζειν: these are both of them proper and identical in meaning’. Accord-
ing to Trendelenburg, u. s., poréezthai is the genus and badizein the
species, both predicative of animals in the same sense: ‘Aristoteles
enim constanter vocabulum (ὄνομα)ita frequentavit, ut vel eiusdem
generis formas vel genus et species, quatenus communi nomine com-
prehenduntur, synonyma diceret.’ The use of these to the poet lies

2—2
§ 7, 8.

τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἡκαστὸν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἰδὴ
[μεταφορᾶς]¹, καὶ ὅτι τοὺς πλείστουν δύνανται² καὶ ἐν
ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις αἱ μεταφορᾶς, ἐξηται, καθάπερ
8 ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τοσοῦτον³ δὲ ἐν λόγῳ
dei μᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσοι εἰς ἐλατ- p. 114.

¹ μεταφορᾶς sine uncinis. ²-3 τούτο πλείστον δύναται τοσοῦτορ.
in this, that they help him to give variety to his diction, and relieve him
from the necessity of constantly repeating the same word.

'Now what each of these things is'—i.e. the things already enu-
erated, nominā propria, translatā, sūnōmā &c. (Victorius)—'and the
number of the kinds of metaphors, and that this, metaphor, is most
effective both in poetry and prose, has been already stated, as we said
§ 2, τῶν δὲ νομίμων καὶ ρημάτων—ἐκλειστα ὁμοματα δει εἰρήνης ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ποιητικῆς), in our work on poetry'. Max Schmidt, in his tract On the
date of the Rhetoric, Halle, 1837 (frequently referred to in the Introd.),
and before him Victorius, notices here, that the synonyms alone of all
the words here referred to do not appear in the Poetics; from which
each of them infers a lacuna in that work: more especially as Simplicius
had left on record that Aristotle had treated of them in his book on
poetry. There is another loss in that work indicated by a reference in
Rhet. I 11. 29 [and III 18.7] to the Poetics for an account of τὸ γελοῖον,
which is now no longer to be found there.

§ 8. 'And they require all the more diligent attention (φιλοπονεῖν
'labor' con amore; fond, affectionate, loving, care and pains), to be
bestowed upon them in prose, in proportion as the sources from which prose
draws its aids or supplies are fewer than those of verse': see ante § 3.
I have translated τοσοῦτορ which seems much more likely than τοσοῦσιν. If
the latter be retained, it can only mean 'so much as I have described', but
where? or when? I have no doubt that τοσοῦτορ is the right reading. '[οὖν
A (quod Bekkerum fugit) Q unde iam Victorius τοσοῦτορ restituit.' Spengel.]

'And perspicuity' (perhaps rather, 'clearness' in the sense of vivid,
graphic, representation?), 'and pleasure, and the foreign air, are con-
voyed by metaphor more than in any other way', (more than by any
other kind of word which can be used to give an extraneous interest to
language). ἦστι δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρήμενων πρεπόντως χρήσθαι,
καὶ διπλαὶ δύναμα καὶ γλῶττας, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι.
Poet. xxiii. 16. The pleasure derived from metaphors is that we learn
something from them; they bring into view hitherto unnoticed resembl-
ances between things the most apparently dissimilar. τὸ ἐν μεταφάρμῳ
τὸ το δύμων θεωρεῖν. Poet. xxii. 17. Top. Z 2, 140 a 9. This is
the fourth kind of metaphor, that from analogy, and by far the commonest
and most attractive. On the pleasure of learning, see I 11. 21 and 23, III 10. 2.

'And it can't be derived (acquired) from anyone else'. This does not
of course mean that one writer or speaker cannot borrow a metaphor

1 Demetrius, however, περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 82, (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 281), says,
ὅνα μέντοι σαφέστερον εἰ τοῖς μεταφοραῖς λέγεται καὶ κυριότερον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς
κυρίοις, ότι τὸ ἑρμηνεύειν δὲ μάχη (Π. N 339), κ.τ.λ. but this is by the vividness of
the description.
from another; but that the invention of metaphors is a mark of original genius, and therefore cannot be taught, derived from another in the way of instruction. Not that metaphors in general are confined to men of genius, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοράς διαλέγονται, § 6; but they all shew originality more or less, and are marks of natural (not acquired) ability, or genius, each in proportion to its merit. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο (τὸ μεταφορικόν) οὔτε παρ' ἄλλοις ἐστὶ λαβεῖν, εὐφυίας τε σημείων ἐστὶν τὸ γὰρ εὗ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὄρμων θεωρεῖν ἐστὶν. Poët. XXII 17. And therefore, the more remote the resemblance between the two objects brought together by the metaphor, the more ingenuity and natural ability is required for detecting it.

Harris, Philol. Inq., Part II, ch. 10, takes this view of the meaning; "that metaphor is an effort of genius and cannot be taught is here again (in the present passage) asserted in the words, καὶ λαβεῖν...παρ' ἄλλοι." Whately, on the other hand, denies that this means, "as some interpreters suppose, that this power is entirely a gift of nature, and in no degree to be learnt: on the contrary he expressly affirms that the 'perception of resemblances' on which it depends is the fruit of 'philosophy': but he means that metaphors are not to be, like other words and phrases, selected from common use and transferred from one composition to another, but must be formed for the occasion" [Rhetoric, chap. III p. 277 ult.]. Whatever Aristotle may have said elsewhere, it is certain that what he says in the Poetics, and therefore in this passage which is repeated from it, is what Harris has described: the close connexion of παρ' ἄλλοι λαβεῖν with the following εὐφυία shews this unmistakably. Besides this, a remark about borrowing metaphors from other people's speeches or writings is not only trivial in itself, but here altogether out of place: and if it were not, why should metaphors be singled out from all other forms of speech as things that should not be borrowed? Is not purloining your neighbour's thoughts or expressions or bons mots equally reprehensible in all cases? or may γλῶσσα and πεποιημένα and the rest, all of them be 'borrowed', and metaphors alone excepted? Victorius, according to Schrader, renders it, "non licet semper sumere ipsam ab alio auctore," which he approves, and interprets, that you mustn't be always beggaring or borrowing your metaphors from others, when you can and ought to invent them yourself. In my copy of Vettori's Commentary [Petri Victorii Commentarii in Opera Aristotelis, 5 vols. folio, published at Florence, 1548—1583], these words do not occur: the passage is there explained, as it should be, of 'acquiring metaphors' from any one but oneself: they being due to a natural ingenuity. Victorius also says that this remark, upon the inventive power which they presuppose, is introduced as an additional recommendation of metaphors: and refers to one of the topics of Top. III., the degrees of good, καὶ δ' μὴ ἐστι παρ' ἄλλοι πορίσασθαι ἢ δ' ἐστι παρ' ἄλλοι, what can't be procured from another, any native excellence or advantage, is superior to anything that can. Also c. 1, 116 δ' 10, τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ
§ 9. 'Epithets' (including not only single adjectives, but any ornamental or descriptive addition to a plain ὅνωμα κύριον, as a sauce to a joint; see Introd. p. 289) 'and metaphors must be made appropriate (in the former, to the subjects to which they are applied, in the latter to those to which we transfer them from something else): this appropriateness will proceed from the proportion' (between the epithet and metaphor and the thing it is applied to in either case: "si ex proportione duxerimus, observaverimusque ut ipsa sibi mutuo respondeant, similemque rationem inter se habeant." Victorius): 'otherwise (εἰ μὴ εἶσαν ἀμφότεροι) the impropriety will be apparent, glaring, (by the juxtaposition), because the opposition of two contraries becomes most apparent when they are placed side by side of one another. But (on the contrary) we must consider, as a scarlet coat is suitable to a youth, so also (what is suitable) to an old man: for the same dress is not becoming to both'.

煅煤，煅烧] in the emphatic sense, equivalent to φανερὸν εἶναι—which occurs in the parallel passage, ν. 23. 30—is illustrated in note on ν. 2. 1, and ν. 7. 31 [p. 141]. The observation that παράλληλα τὰ ἑνωμένα μᾶλλον φαίνεται is a favourite one with Aristotle. The parallels from the Rhetoric are quoted in note on ν. 23. 27. Add Dem. de F. L. ν. 192, παρ' ἀλληλα γάρ ἐσται φανερῶτερα.

An inappropriate epithet may be illustrated by the substitution of amabile and formosum for horrendum and informe in Virgil's line, Monstrum horrendum informe ingens cui lumen ademptum: a metaphor is inappropriate when you bring some incongruous notion into juxta-position with the object which you 'invest' with your metaphor, like an old man with the incongruous dress of a scarlet coat;—although viridis is not inappropriate to senectus, though greenness and old age might seem incongruous, because in this application of the metaphor the proportion or ratio is observed between the freshness implied in the green vegetation and the freshness and vigour of old age, and the two are thus brought under a common genus. When old age is called the evening of life the metaphor is appropriate, because there is a true proportion or analogy; evening: the day: old age: man's life; evening and old age are under a common genus, viz. the close of a period, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, ἱντά; comp. Poet. xxii 10, ταμεῖν, ἀφιετον ἀμφω γὰρ ἄφθαλεν τι ἑτύν. But when Shakespeare [Hamlet, iii i. 59] speaks of taking arms against a sea of troubles there is neither proportion nor congruity: and in such cases, when the two notions are placed side by side, and so brought directly into contrast, the incongruity becomes at once apparent. This kind of solecism is usually called 'confusion of metaphor'.
§ 10. 'And if you want to set off anything (if praise is your object), you must take your metaphor from the superior (better, more honourable or valuable) things that fall under the same genus; if blame, from the inferior. As an instance of my meaning; since contraries are (the extremes of the species) under the same genus, to say that one that prays, begs, and one that begs, prays, is to do this; because both of them are kinds of petition'. These are the two extremes of the genus petition, or solicitation; praying the highest form, begging the lowest; 'as also (besides others, καὶ) Iphicrates (called) Callias (whom he wished to depreciate) μητραγύρτης instead of δραυχος ['a mendicant priest', instead of 'bearer of the mystic torch']. The other (Callias) replied, that he (his opponent) never could have been initiated (or he would have been incapable of such a mistake), else he would not have called him μητραγύρτης but δραυχος—for it is true (adds Aristotle, by way of explanation) that they are both attached to the service of a goddess (both come under the common genus 'servants of a goddess'), but the one is a term of honour, the other of dishonour.' It is much like calling the Precentor of a Cathedral a ballad-singer.

τὰ ἐννατία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει] This is the definition of 'contrary', ἐννατίον: τὰ πλείον ἄλλα ἀλληλοκατ' τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐννατία ὄριζονται, Categ. c. 6, 6 a 17.

Καλλίας is the third of that name, the son of the third Hipponicus, of that noble and wealthy Athenian family, of which the heads received these names alternately during several generations, Arist. Ran. 283, Ἰππονίκος Καλλίας καὶ Ἰππονίκοκαλλίας. The title of δραυχος, hereditary in his family, is especially assigned to him by Xenophon, Hellen. vi 3, 3, Καλλίας ὁ δραυχος. His pride in this distinction would of course have rendered him much more susceptible to the slight conveyed by Iphicrates' ignorant, or malicious, mistake. The substitution of the one word for the other, though evidently interpreted by Callias (from his reply) as a mistake made in ignorance of the distinction between the two—perhaps wilfully, to save his dignity—is much more likely to have been intentional and malicious. Callias was a vain foolish man—see Xenoph. l. c. § 3, ult. and Callias' speech §§ 4, 5, 6—and Iphicrates, the self-made man, who had risen to distinction by his own merits, εἰς οἰνος ἐπὶ σά, would doubtless have enjoyed a joke at the expense of the pompous and empty 'descendant of Triptolemus' (Xen. l. c.) and hereditary δραυχος of the Great Mysteries. Xenophon mentions him as one of the ambassadors to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in virtue of his here-
RHETORIKHS Γ 2 § 10.

ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δαδοῦχον ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεῶν, ἀλλὰ
ditary προσεύχεσθαι of that state. There is a good account of this Callias by Mr Elder in Smith's Biogr. Dict. He is the entertainer of the Sophists in the Protagoras, and the host of Xenophon's 'Banquet'. On Callias and his family, its wealth and splendour, see Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. IV c. 3, pp. 42, 3 (Lewis' Transl.), and Heindorf's learned note on Protag. 311.

The δαδοῦχος was, as we have seen, an office of great distinction. The δαδοῦχος led the procession of the μύσται from Athens to Eleusis on the fifth day of the great Eleusinia, the torch-day, ἡ τῶν λαμπάδων ἡμέρα. See Dict. Antiq. Art. 'Eleusinia,' p. 373 b. Rich, Dict. Gr. and Rom. Ant. s. v. p. 232.

μητραγύρτης, on the contrary, implies everything that is vile and contemptible: it is the designation of a class of profligate beggars, chiefly women, who attached themselves to the worship of some particular deity—usually Cybele, the Magna Mater, from which μητραγύρτης is taken—at whose festivals they attended to ply their profession, that of ἄγιρεα, collecting alms, stiperem cogere, and then practised every kind of imposture and indulged in every variety of licentiousness. They seem also to have gone their rounds through the great houses in cities, Plat. Rep. II 364 b—c, fortune-telling, and with charms and spells (as to draw down the gods from heaven) and other nostrums for sale. They carried about with them an image of the goddess in whose name they asked alms. Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 629, compares them to mendicant friars or Béguines, and designates them viles Metragyrtai. Menander wrote two or three plays upon them, the Θεοφορομείη and Μητραγύρτης (or Μηναγύρτης, so Meineke, Fr. Comic. Gr.), Menander, IV 163, on which see Lobeck, ibid. 645, note), and the Ἴρεα, which, from the lines εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς κυμβάλους ἀνθρωπος εἰς ὁ βούλεται, Lobeck supposes (apparently with little reason) to have been directed against the Mητραγύρτης. Meineke, ib. Menand. IV 140. Compare on their character, Antiphanes, Fragm. Μισσοπονίου, Meineke, Ib. III 86, ἄτικα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσα μετα γε νῦν Δια τοὺς μητραγυρούντας γε τολύ μαρνεῖν καὶ μερώτατον τοὺς ἑτοίν, κ.τ.λ. On incantations and the like, see Ruhnken ad ἐπαγωγαί, p. 114. To this extremity Dionysius the younger, once tyrant of Syracuse, was finally reduced, αὐτὸς δὲ Διονύσιος τέλος μητραγυρῶν καὶ τυμπανοφοροῦντος σκίπτον τὸν Βιοὺν κατέστρεψε : Clearchus ap. Athen. 541 c (Victorius). The μητραγυρῶν, male and female, did not confine themselves to a single goddess, though Cybele was their favourite, but also attached themselves to the service of Isis; and apparently to that of Demeter and Cora (from the present passage); of Opis and Arge, Hdt. IV 35; and in general, of those whose worship was of an orgiastic character, see by all means Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 10, s. v. ἄγιρεα. Here there are two goddesses implied, Demeter in δαδοῦχος, and Cybele in μητραγύρτης. There is a short article in Dict. Antiq. on the subject under ἄγιρτης.

ἄγιρεα is used to signify collecting alms, or begging, several times by Herodotus; twice, for instance, in IV 35. By Homer, ἄγιρεσθαι and ἄγιρ-
The next is a case of the same kind; of two possible designations of actors one takes the lowest and most contemptuous, the other the opposite and highest and most complimentary. Διονυσοκόλακες represents them as parasites or flatterers, not worthy to be companions or friends of the god; the lowest and most degraded form of service, of Dionysus the patron deity of the stage and its belongings (Aristophanes passim) τεχνίται as 'artists', or 'artistes' as the lower kind of professional performers, singers, dancers, posture-makers, are fond of calling themselves nowadays by way of dignifying their profession: the term is actually applied to them by Dem. de F. L. § 212, of Philip who collected at a festival πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας; on which Ulpian (quoted by Shilleto ad loc.) τοὺς υποκριτας οὕτω καλεῖ καμίκους τε καὶ τραγικοὺς. Shilleto adds, ut aitum in Graecis artificibus, Cic. pro Murena 13 (29). [Ar. Problems 30. 10, 956 b 11, διὰ τί οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνίται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ποηροὶ εἶναι; referred to by Aulus Gellius, XX 4. Comp. Alciphron, ΠΠ 48, (Δικύμων τῶν τραγῳδίων) ὥσ τις ἂν ἀραιοτάτου φως ἕνεκα αὐτοκράτορος καλεῖται πρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν Διονυσοκόλακῶν ἔρισα (Otto Lüders, die Dionysischen Künstler, 1873, pp. 58—63).]

The common genus or notion which unites Διονυσοκόλακες and τεχνίται as 'contraries' is that of service to a deity: the τεχνίται as well as the κόλακες being assumed as actors, to be devoted to his especial service. The distinction is that between true art, and low buffoonery. This, as far as I can see, is the whole meaning of the passage.

Victorius however, and Schweighäuser on Athen. vi 249 F, drag in here, wholly as I can conceive beside the point, another sense of Διονυσοκόλακες in which it was applied to the flatterers of Dionysius of Syracuse—of whose filthy and disgusting practices Theophrastus (quoted in Wytenbach on Plut. p. 53, f.) gives some revolting examples—in a double sense, of Dionysus and Dionysius: see their notes for the explanation of this. (It is supposed by them and Mr Shilleto u.s. to be a joke; if so, it is of a very frigid description.) Wytenbach says (note ad Plut. L c.) "Actores scenici honesto nomine dicebantur οἱ περὶ Διόνυσου τεχνίται, per contemptum Διονυσοκόλακες" : which is no doubt all that is meant here, though he refers to Victorius' note, who makes a great deal more out of it. This special sense of τεχνίται is fully confirmed by another passage of Athen. v 198 B describing a magnificent procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus (cc. 25—30), μεθ' οὗ ἐπορεύετο Φιλίσκος ὁ ποιητής, ἱέρεις ὁν̄ Διονύσου, καὶ πάντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνίται. It
occurs also in Diog. Laert. x 4. 8, Epicurus called τούς περὶ Πλάτωνα (Plato's followers) Διονυσικόλακες, και αὐτῶν Πλάτωνα χρυσοῦ (which is translated 'Dionysii assentatores' in Cobet's corrected version, though Dionysius can surely have nothing to do with the matter, any more than here). Here also the word is a term of reproach; and seems by this time to have become proverbial for gross and low flattery: "tanquam assentatores eos, non sodales, insimulans." Victorius. Victorius understands the term, as here used, to express the lowest order of attendants on the stage (parasites of Bacchus), such as the scene-shifters, candle-snuffers, and such like menials of a modern theatre, but another passage of Athen. xi 538 ε, καὶ ἐκτοτε οἱ πρότερον καλοῦμενοι Διονυσικόλακες 'Ἀλεξανδροκόλακες ἐκλήθησαν, διὰ τὰς τῶν δώρων ὑπερβολὰς ἐφ' οἷς καὶ ἤσθη ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρος. This occurs in a list of the entertainments which were exhibited in a great marriage-feast given by Alexander after the capture of Darius, taken from a work of Chares, 'the histories of Alexander'. Now whether ἐφ' οἷς ἤσθη refers to Alexander's delight at their gifts (neut.) or at themselves (masc.), that is, their acting, in either case their employment could not have been of the mean and degrading character attributed to it by Victorius—in the one case they were too rich, in the other, if they amused him, they must have been actors, or at all events above the degree of menials, though their acting may have been mere grimace and buffoonery.

'And one (to vex and lower them) calls them?' (whether this means any 'one' in particular, we do not know) 'parasites of Dionysus (low buffoons), whereas they themselves style themselves artists: and each of these is a metaphor (artist as applied to them is a metaphor, I suppose, because the proper object of art is production—tēchē mēta λόγου ποιητική, ταῦτα δὲ εἰς τέχνη καὶ ζητεῖ μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῶς ποιητική: and soiseis being distinguished from πράξεις, anάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιητικὰς ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναυ. Eth. Nic. vi 4, 1140 a 7 seq.—and these men produce nothing; their profession is practical, ends in πράξεις, or action), 'the one for the purpose of (lit. belonging to) blackening (soiling, defaming), the other the contrary'.


'And pirates nowadays call themselves purveyors'. So Pistol, in Merry Wives of Windsor, i 3. 49, "Convey the wise it call: Steal, foh! a fico for the phrase!"

νῦν] referring to the early times spoken of by Thucyd., i 5, when the Greeks ἐτράπαυσαν πρὸς ληστεῖαν...οὐκ ἦσθινος πως αἰσχύνην τοῦτον τοῦ ἔργου,
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 2 §§ 10, 11.

έξεστι λέγειν τόν αδικήσαντα μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν, τόν δ' ἀμαρτάνοντα αδικήσαι, καὶ τόν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ ὦς ὁ Τίλεφος Εὐριπίδοιον φησί, κῶσις ἀνάσων κάποτας εἰς Μυσίαν,
ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μείζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατ' ἄξιαν οὐκ ἐκλεπται οὐν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἀμαρτίᾳ, εἶν μὴ ἠδείας ἢ σημεία φωνῆς, οἶον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει τὸ καλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραγην
φέροντο δὲ τι καὶ δόξας μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. On what follows, see Homer, Od. III 73, and elsewhere.

On the actual πορστηγαλ at Athens, see Schneider's note on Arist. Pol. I 11, ult., Comm. p. 65. συρρήσεις ἢ ἑπίδεια ἢ σημεία φωνῆς, οἶον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει τὸ καλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραγην
φέροντο δὲ τι καὶ δόξας μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. On what follows, see Homer, Od. III 73, and elsewhere.

'And therefore (by the same rule) wrong may be called 'error, and error wrong' (both of them kinds of injury or offence; that is here the supposition in ἀμαρτάνειν; but the one is a crime because it is done with a bad προαίρεσις or moral purpose, the other a venial offence; ἀναιν δὲ κακίας ἀμαρτήματι κ.τ.λ. Eth. N. v 10, 1135 ὁ 18 seq.) 'and stealing either taking or robbing (on a grand scale)'.

A phrase like that of Euripides' Telephus, "He lords it over the oar (sways it, like a sceptre, the emblem of royalty), and having on his departure for Mysia," is unbecoming (inappropriate), because ruling, swaying, lording, is too big, pompous, for the value (measure, merits) (of the object described); and so, the disguise (concealment) is not effected (the art or effort becomes apparent, συφρα, § 5).

κῶσις ἀνάσων κάποτας εἰς Μυσίαν] The rest of the sentence is supplied by the Schol. ἵππωματος πολεμίῳ βραχίων. The first line should be read [not, as in the MSS, κῶσας ἀνάσειν, καὶ σπόδας εἰς Μυσίαν, but] as it is by Dindorf, Poet. Sc., Fragm. Eur. Tel. 20, and Wagner, Fragm. Tel. 10 (Fr. Trag. Gr. II 359), κῶσις ἀνάσων κάποτας εἰς Μυσίαν. ἀνάσειν takes the genit. and dative, not the accus. κῶσις ἀναξ and ἀνάσεις et similia are found elsewhere in Eurip. Helen. 1048, Cyclops [86], and Aesch. Pers. 378. In Aeschylus the pompous phrase is much more characteristic. The cautious and sober Sophocles never employs it.

§ 11. 'There is also a fault (which may be committed) in the (composition of, and the sound thence arising of the) syllables of a word if (i. e. if ever, or when) they are not signs or marks (indications, representations) of sweet or agreeable voice' (i. e. if, when they are pronounced, or expressed by the voice, they don't produce an agreeable sound; φωνή is the sound of the voice, or the voice as uttered, and forming words) 'as Dionysius the Brazen calls poetry in his elegies "Cal- liope's screech," because they are both voices"—and so far his metaphor was right: both terms fall under the same genus, φωνή, the met. εἴσοδος πρός εἴδος—'but his metaphor is a bad one by reason of its insignificant sounds'.

κραγην] a screech, scream, any harsh and dissonant sound. κράζειν,
with which it is connected, expresses the harsh voices of certain animals as the ‘croak’ of the raven and the frog, and the ‘bawling’ of a man, all suggestive of disagreeable associations. The ‘badness of the metaphor’ seems to reside in this. ἀπὸ δὲ φωνῆς, it is true, nothing but a non-significant voice or sound, applied, Poet. xx §§ 5, 6, 7, to sounds like syllables, and conjunctions, which signify nothing by themselves, but only in combination with other sounds or words; and opposed to σημαντικαί, sounds which do signify something each by itself, as noun and verb §§ 8, 9. But these non-significant sounds, which represent discordant and unmeaning cries, are here to be interpreted as expressing also the associations which they suggest, and so κραυγῆς, which suggests all these disagreeable cries and screams, is particularly ill applied as a metaphor to the sweetest of all voices, such as that of a Muse.

‘Dionysius the Brazen’, so called from having first suggested the use of bronze money at Athens, Athen. xv 669 D, was a poet and rhetorician, ibid., whose floruit is to be referred to the earlier part of the fifth cent. B. C., judging from a remark in Plut. Nic. c. 5, 526 B, where we are told that there was in Nicias’ household a man called Hiero, who claimed to be the son of Dionysius the Brazen. A further account of him is to be found in Smith’s Biographical Dictionary, Dionysius no. 16; and a collection of the fragments of his elegies, amounting to seven, in Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. p. 432 [p. 468, 2nd ed.]. In fragm. 5 there is a still worse specimen of his metaphors preserved, which beats even the κόππας ἀνάστει, and in the same kind of fault. καὶ τινες οὖν ἄγοντες ἐν εἰρετή Διονύσου, σμαρσοῦν καί καταλικάν ἑρεταῖ.

[On the Bronze coinage of Athens, see Beule’s Monnaies d’Athènes, pp. 73—77. It seems impossible to say with certainty, either when it first came in, or what is the date of the oldest bronze money extant. Leake supposes it probable that it came in soon after the first unsuccessful attempt to introduce it, while Beule thinks that the early extant bronzes are of the age of Alexander. It is certain they were in circulation in the time of Philemon, the Comic poet. See Leake’s Numismata Hellenica (European Greece), p. 22. These details are due to Professor Churchill Babington.]

On harshness of sound in composition, see Hermog. περὶ ἱδεῶν Ταμ. α’. c. 7, περὶ τραχύτητος, Spengel Rhet. Gr. I. 299. Of the second class, the ἀδίφις ἱσωτῶν σκηνρᾶι, the harshness arising ‘out of themselves’ from the disagreeable combination of the letters, ἀτραπός, ἀμαρττεν, ἄγνιμε, and such like, are given as examples. In the same treatise Ταμ. β’. c. 4, (I 359), there are some remarks upon the connexion of sounds with pleasant associations, which make the sounds themselves pleasant.

§ 12. ‘Further, they must not be far-fetched, but from things kindred (cognate) and of like form must be transferred notions (in the form of words) hitherto nameless in the fashion of names (so as to become new names), any one of which as soon as spoken will be clearly perceived.
The second line of this enigma, which completes it, is found in Athen. x 452 c, the only author, says Victorius, who gives it entire, οὗτος συγκόλνεις ὅστις σύναμα ποιεῖν. τούτῳ δὲ σημαίνει τῆς σιγῆς προσβολήν. It is inserted amongst the αἰνίγματα, No. viii in the Anthology, Vol. iv p. 288, Jacobs' ed., and preceded by another on the same subject in four lines. The first line is also quoted, Poet. xxii 5, Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας § 102, (Demetrius recommends that enigmatical expressions of this kind should be avoided), and Plut. Symp. sap. 154 b (Victorius). Harris, Philol. Inq. Pt. ii ch. 10, on enigmas. [On the cupping-instrument referred to in the riddle, compare Juvenal xiv 58 (with Mayor's note), iam pridem caput hoc ventosa cucurbita quaerit.
Bronze specimens about four inches high, found by Pompeii, may be seen in the Museum at Naples.

'And in general, from all ingenious, well-constructed, enigmas good metaphors may be derived: for all metaphors convey (imply) an enigma, plainly therefore a metaphor (so borrowed from a good enigma) must be itself well converted (i.e. a well-selected metaphor). Cicero thought less highly of enigmas as a source of metaphors; at all events metaphors, accumulated till they become enigmas, are reprehensible. De Or. III 42. 167, est hoc (translatio) magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obscuritas fugienda est: etenim hoc genere non est quae dicuntur enigmata.

ev metechneta] is rendered by Cicero (according to Victorius) ratione translatæ, and quae sumpta ratione est, de Or. III 40. 160. τὸ ἐπικεῖσθαι μεταφοράμεν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, Eth. N. V. 14, sub init.

§ 13. 'And (metaphors should be taken) from things fair and noble (subaudī δεὶ λαβεῖν μεταφοράς): but the beauty of a word (especially a noun, which can represent some visible or audible object), as Licymnius says, resides either in the sound or the sense (the thing signified), and the ugliness in like manner'.

When Aristotle wrote τὸ μὲν, he seems to have intended to introduce τὸ δὲ to correspond as the second member of the division, which was afterwards carelessly changed into ἦ. It is surprising however that he never corrected such palpable blunders as these, for which he must have had frequent opportunities. Did he think that they were of no consequence in writing, of which the object was instruction only? He says at any rate, III 1. 6, that no one pays much attention to style in teaching geometry.

ἀνὰ καλῶν] Cic. de Or. III 41. 163, seq. Et quoniam haec vel summa lex est in verbis transferendis ut sensum feriat id quod translatum sit, fugienda omnis turbatio earum rerum ad quas eorum animos qui audient tranahet similitudo. Nolo dici morte Africani castratum esse rempublicam; nolo stercus curiae dici Glaucliam: quamvis sit simile, tamen est in utroque deformis cogitatione similitudinis. Quint., VIII 6. 14—17, quotes the line of Furius Bibaculus (Hor. Sat. II 5. 41), Iuppiter hibernas cana nive conspexit Alpes.

καλὸς δὲ ὁνόματος] Theophrastus, according to Demetrius peri ἔρμηνειας, §§ 175—5 (Rhet. Gr. III 300, ed. Spengel), recognised three sources of beauty in words, (1) the appeal to the sight, the direct suggestion of beautiful objects by the words which are associated with them; (2) to the ear, by the sound of the words themselves; and thirdly διάνοια, by the 'meaning' or 'sense', Licymnius' σημασία, and Aristotle's δυνάμεις the νόης, virtue, force, i.e. significance, its power of suggestion. These are illustrated by Demetrius, I. c., the first by θαυμάζων, ἄνθοφορον χρῶς: the second by Καλλιστρατος, Ἀρμοῖν, (the λλ and η seem
to have pleased his ear): and the third by ἄρχαῖος as compared with παλαιός, the former being suggestive of higher and nobler associations: οἱ γὰρ ἄρχαῖοι ἄνδρες ἐντιμότεροι. It seems from this that the distinction between the first and third of these sources of beauty in a word is that first is the direct suggestion, by word-painting, of a beautiful object of sight, as a rosy cheek or skin: the third is the remoter suggestion of beauty, by inference, from association, as ἄρχαῖος suggests worth and respect; this form of suggestion has an intellectual character, and is therefore represented by Theophrastus as διάνωσα. To the direct suggestions of sight in the first class, Aristotle afterwards adds all the other senses—as music to the ear, a well-remembered flavour to the palate, smell to the nose, soft and warm things to the touch. The second of the three, is the actual sound of the word, suggesting nothing else; Licymnius’ ψόφος, and Theophrastus’ and Demetrius’ πρὸς ἀκοήν.

Tois ψόφοις] There are [as already remarked supra p. 12, in 1 § 9, διάλεκτος], three degrees of sound in an ascending scale. The first and lowest is ψόφος ‘noise’, such as even inanimate things are capable of when struck. The second is voice, φωνή or φθόγγος (as distinguished from speech,) which is shared by all animals that have a throat. The third is distinctive of the human race, διάλεκτος (sometimes called λόγος), discourse, articulate speech. ψόφος as distinguished from φωνή will include all sounds which, though human, do not proceed from the voice and organs of speech: such as sneezing, coughing, hissing, whistling (πνεύμωπος) and so on. These particulars are taken from two passages, Ar. Hist. Anim. IV 9, 535 a 27—b 3, and Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 14 (p. 72, Reiske). Of sound, ψόφος, in its most general sense, as the object of hearing, see de Anima ii 8. De Sens. c. 3, init. Ib. c. 1, 437 a 10. Hist. An. i 29, 488 a 31, seq., of the distinctions of animals, in respect of the sounds they make.

What is known of Licymnius, I have collected in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. ix Vol. iii pp. 255—7. [Plato Phædrus p. 267 C, τὰ δὲ Παλών τῶς φανεροῖς μουσίᾳ λόγων…ονομάτων τε Λικυμνίων, ἀ έκεῖνο ἐδώρισατο πρὸς ποίησιν εἰνείς. Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit. i 75,76.]

‘And again thirdly (a third observation upon metaphors), which solves (furnishes an answer to, serves to refute) the sophistical argument (theory or position); for it is not true, as Bryson said, that no one ever uses (that there is no such thing as) foul or indecent language, if (if—as the case really is, i. e. since or because) the same thing is signified by saying this or that (by using the broad word or disguising it by a veil of ὑποκορισμός), for this is false: for one term is more properly applied to an object than another (represents it more literally and directly), and is more assimilated to it, and more nearly akin to it, by setting the
thing more directly before the eyes (and so making it more vivid, striking, and impressive)\).

Of Bryson, I have collected what is known in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. v Vol. II pp. 143—6. In this dogma of the impossibility of indecent language he seems to have anticipated the Stoics—see Cicero’s famous letter to Paetus on this Stoic libertas loquendi, *u.s.* p. 144 note. *Suo quamque rem nomine appellare* was their statement of this ‘liberty’, to call everything its right and proper name without shame or disguise, to call a spade a spade, to use the language of a Swift or Aristophanes. Aristotle answers Bryson by a simple denial of the fact. It is not true that there is no difference in the use of words in respect of their moral effect upon us; the broad and literal expression presents the abomination much more vividly and impressively to the mind, naked as it were, than the same notion when half hidden from the view by a decent veil which conceals a great deal of its deformity. On this subject of plain speaking, besides Cicero’s letter to Paetus (ad Div. IX 22), already referred to, see Cic. de Off. I 35, 128 where the Stoics are again introduced. Cicero takes the moral and delicate side of the question. *Eth. N.* IV 14, 1128 a 23, ἰδοὺ δ’ ἐν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν καμαχέων τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν τοῖς μὲν ἢ γελοιοῖν ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια (the covert insinuation: this is the difference between coarse and refined indelicacy). Ar.’s opinion upon the subject is given much more strongly and decidedly, *Pol. IV* (vii) 17, 1336 ὅ 3, ἰδοὺ μὲν ὅν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πᾶλαις, ἐπεὶ ἄλλο τι, δεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζετο ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερὸς λέγειν ὑπόνοιας τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς. Perhaps one of the wisest observations the author ever made. *Comp. Quint.* VI 3.29.

‘And besides, it is not under the same conditions and circumstances that it signifies this or that, so that on this ground again we must assume that one (mode of expression) is fairer or fouler than another: for though both of them do express (or signify) beauty and deformity, yet not qua beautiful and deformed (in so far as they are beautiful and the reverse, and in no other respect): or, if the latter also, at all events in different degrees’. These two different effects of αἰσχρολογία seem to be thus distinguishable. We are first told that the use of the broad word is offensive because it suggests directly and immediately, paints on the mind a vivid picture of the ugly, foul or impure object: nothing is said of any further, indirect, associations connected with it, and the bad effect arises solely from the strength or vividness of the impure or ugly impression. But in the second case the effect of the plain speaking and its associations is contrasted with those that may be produced by softening the term, or employing one which signifies the
same thing, but suggests an entirely different and innocent set of associations. As in the instances given by Cic. in de Off. 1 35. 128 liberis dare operam. Here all the associations which would be at once suggested by the broad, obscene word, are diverted, and another set introduced, connected solely with children, as the result of the intercourse, and perfectly free from all impurity. In the one case it is the mere comparison of strength and intensity that makes the difference, in the other there is a difference of kind. 'The fair term and the foul term it is true mean the same thing, point to the same object, but not in respect of beauty and deformity alone simply and solely (§), but besides that, there are associations suggested by which the one may be invested with a moral and the other with an immoral character, either altogether, or at all events in different degrees': ἀφιεῖ γάρ...μᾶλλον καὶ ἄττον. An example of these words suggestive of unpleasant associations which are willingly avoided by the well-bred and refined under the name of αἰσθητολογία, is to be found in Plat. Gorg. 494 C, where Socrates is made to apologise to Callicles for shocking him by the use of terms such as ψοράν, κυψέαν.

'These are the sources from which metaphors may be taken; from things beautiful either by the voice (the sound of the word itself when uttered), or by the force or meaning' (what it indirectly suggests: as δύνασθαι, to have the power, force, virtue, when applied to words, denotes their 'value', in the sense of meaning or signification, see note on I 9.36; so δύναμις the subst. may of course be similarly employed), 'or by (i.e. conveyed by) the sight or any other sense'. These terms have been already explained. ὧσεὶ ἀλλὰ τω ἄισθησει is illustrated by Victorius from Cic. de Or. III 40.161, Nam ut odor urbanilitatis, et mollitudo humanitatis, et murmur maris, et dulcedo orationis, sunt duxa a ceteris sensibus; ulla vero ocularum multo acriora, quae ponunt paene in conspectu animi quae cernere et videre non possimus.

'But it is preferable (διαφέρει here, to surpass, excel) to say rose-fingered dawn, rather than purple-fingered, or, still worse, red-fingered.' The latter suggests cooks' hands, or other vulgar associations. The rose on the contrary reminds one of what is agreeable to the sight, and the smell. Add to this from Campbell, Phil. of Rhet., Bk. III ch. I § 1, (Vol. II p. 142, 2nd ed.), that the last of the three epithets compared is the vaguest and most general, and therefore the worst: the second better, because more special; and the first best of all, because the most particular, the red (purple Campbell says) of the rose. He also mentions the gratification of the two senses.

§ 14. 'In the epithets also, the application of them may be made (they

AR. III.
μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἤ αἰσχροῦ, σῖν ὁ μητροφόντης, ἐστὶ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίωνος, σῖν ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἔδιδον μισθὸν ὅλιγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὅρευσιν, οὐκ ἦθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραῖν ἀεὶ ἡμόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἰκανῶν ἐδωκεν, ἐποίησε

χαίρετ’ ἀελλοπόδων θυγατρὲς ἵππων

καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν. ἐτὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 15 ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἐστὶ δ’ ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὃς ἐλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀρι-
The terms are therefore by no means co-extensive: Aristotle, who has merely illustrated this form of language by examples of diminutives, has taken them alone as the most distinctive class of words which convey by the termination endearment and contempt. The form of endearment used in extenuation diminishes the bad, the contemptuous employment of them diminishes the good.

There are no less than thirteen varieties of Greek diminutive terminations, which may be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 103. Donaldson, Gr. Gr. § 361, 3. f. aa, p. 320, gives only ten. Both of them have omitted a form ἀντικιω, which occurs in Arist. Pax 214, where the Schol. has καταφρονησσως ἠνεκα. It is to be noted that some of these diminutives in -διω have the long, though by the ordinary rule it is short. τφιδιων, Ar. Nub. 93. οδιδιων, Nicom. Inc. Fr. ap. Meineke, iv. 587. σοφιδιων, Arist. Fragm. et octies ap. Comic. Fragm. ἄργοφιδιων, Av. 1622. ιματιδιων, Lysistr. 470. δικαστηριδιων, Vesp. 803, and others, ap. Fritzsche ad Arist. Ran. 1301. πονιδιων has the long and short, Arist. Ran. 1301, and Nub. 997. The long arises from a contraction, so that ποροφιδιον must be derived from πορνιδιων, and is a diminutive of a diminutive. [Kühner Gr. Gr. § 330.]

On Latin diminutives, Madvig, Lat. Gr. § 182. “By means of lus, la or lum, and culus, cula or culum, are formed diminutives (nomina diminutiva) which denote littleness, and are often used by way of endearment, commiseration, or to ridicule something insignificant, e.g. hortulus, a little garden, matercula, a (poor) mother, ingeniolum, a little bit of talent.”

On English diminutives see a paper by Sir G. C. Lewis, Phil. Mus. I 697 seq. in Marsh’s Lect. on the Eng. Lang., Smith’s ed. p. 218; and Latham’s Eng. Lang. c. xv § 337; also a paper by J. C. Hare in (Hare and Thirlwall’s) Phil. Mus. Vol. i. p. 679. These are in kin, ling, and et, let (from the Norman, French and Italian (e. m. c.), Marsh. Lect. u. s. Lect. xiv. § 6). To which Latham adds ie (Scotch), (lassie, doggie), en (chicken, kitten), et and let, trumpet, lancet, pocket, owlet, brooklet, streamlet; och (Grimm), bullock, hillock: paddock, butlock, hummock (Lewis). “The Greek word μειωσις means diminution; μικροσμα means an endearing expression. Hence we get names for the two kinds of diminutives; viz. the term meiotic for the true diminutives, and the term hypocoristic for the dim. of endearment.” Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, III 664 (ap. Latham). The contemptuous diminutive in English is ling; lordling, bantling, foundling, underling, hirling.

By diminutive I mean that which diminishes the evil and the good (which belongs to the proper meaning of a word; by the addition of a
CHAP. III.

From the graces and excellences of style we now pass on to some of its defects. These are comprehended under the term ψυχρά, 'faults of taste'; expressions stale and cold, flat, lifeless, opposed to πρόσφατα 'fresh'. The import and origin of this word, as applied to style, are illustrated in Introd. pp. 286, 7. The faults lie mostly in some kind of exaggeration, or turgid and bombastic phraseology, the error of excess. Add to the examples there given, Dem. de Cor. § 256, de F. L. § 207, τὸ ψυχρὸν τούτο ὅνωμα (the name of εὐργήτης applied to Philip).

Demetrius, περὶ ἔρμηνειας § 116, refers (in his chapter περὶ ψυχροῦ τοῦ ἀντικείμενου τῷ μεγαλορχιστεί) to this division with the author's name. All the details are omitted, and only one of the examples, the ψυχρὸν ἰδρώτα in § 3, is given. There is no doubt a lacuna.

§ 1. 'Faults of taste are shewn (are made to appear; arise, grow) in four points of style or language; first in compound words, instances of which are Lycophrón's 'many-visaged heaven', his 'vast-topped earth', and his 'narrow-passaged shore'.

On διαλκ ὅνωμα, see Introd. p. 287. All the compound words mentioned are words compounded of two significant elements, ὅνωμα σημαίνουσα, Poet. xxii. 1, 2, i. e. of words which have an independent sense of their own; opposed to such as are only significant in combination with others, as prepositions, conjunctions, particles.


μεγαλορχιστέον] κορφή is a mountain-top. To one who lived in Greece and knew nothing beyond it, the Earth might well seem to be covered with vast summits.
καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὁνόμαζε, πτωχόμονος κόλαξ, ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευροκή-
σαντας. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας "μένουσ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν Ῥ. 1406.

ἄκτην στενοπόρον] also belongs to the mountainous character of
Greece. The cliffs come down precipitously to the very edge of the sea
(in which there are no tides), leaving but a narrow passage for horseman
or foot-passenger. The word is used appropriately enough by the poet
Aeschylus, P. V. 729, and Eur. Iph. Aul. 1497; also by Herod. VII 211.

[Blass, in his brief notice of Lycophron, die Attische Beredsamkeit,
II p. 235, while conjecturing that several of the phrases here quoted
must have come from a panegyric in glorification of Athens and her heroes,
and of Theseus in particular, is led by the Sophist’s application of πέλαργον
ἄρα to Xerxes in § 2, to refer ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον to the Hellespont.
It would be more reasonable, however, to take the hint supplied by his
allusion to Sciron in the same section, and explain it of the narrow path
which runs like a cornice along the precipitous sides of the cliffs of Sciron
on the coast of Megara (Eur. Hippol. 1208, Σκίρωνος ἀκῆς, Strabo IX
p. 391, αἱ Σκιρωνίδες πέτραι πάροδον οὐκ ἀπολεῖναι πρὸς βαλάντιν’ ὑπὲρ
ἀιτῶν δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ δῶξιν ἡ ἐπὶ Μεγάρας, and Pausanias 1 44 § 6 (Bekker), τὴν
ἀνωμαλίαν ἀπὸ Σκίρωνος (δῆν) Σκίρων πρῶτος ἐποίησεν ἀνδρῶν ὀδεῖν
ἐὐφάνεις. Hadrian (as Pausanias adds) made this narrow ledge εὐφώραρι,
but the cliff and its pathway have since once more become an ἄκτη
στενοπόρος, which is described by Leake (Northern Greece, II 414) as
‘only practicable by foot-passengers’.]

On Lycophron the Sophist, see Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred
Phil. No. v, Vol. II. p. 141 seq. Not to be confounded with Lycophron
the tragic poet, the author of Cassandra, who lived at Alexandria in the
reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, towards the middle of the third cent. B.C.

‘And the name given by Gorgias, “beggar-witted or pauper-witted
flatterer”’, πτωχόμονος κόλαξ, as Victorius understands it, inops ingenium.
Or perhaps rather one who prostitutes his literature and intellectual ac-
complishments to flattery and sycophancy to make a living by them,
‘making his Muse a beggar.’ (‘This can hardly mean ‘arm an dichter-
isch Egabung,’ as Rost and Palm explain. Liddell and Scott give with
greater probability “living (or rather starving) by his wits.” It might
also mean, “one whom poverty inspires” ( cui ingeni larditor Venter).
Wit and poverty are the hackneyed attributes of the Greek parasite,
and in a comic poet the epithet would probably have been thought happy.
A similar compound, πτωχολαξώω, is quoted from Phrynichus com.
(Meineke, C. G. II p. 582).” Thompson’s ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179 note.]

ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευροκήσαντας] ‘forsworn, and oath-observing’.
The objection here is to κατευροκήσαντας, in which the κατ’ is su-
perfluous. All that Gorgias meant might have been equally well ex-
pressed by the simple εὐρόκειν ‘to keep one’s oath’; or rather the simple
opposition of false and true, which he has exaggerated into two long
words. ευρόκειν, though itself a compound, seems to be regarded here as
a single word. The Schol. has on this, καὶ τὸ κατευροκήσατα λέγεται ἐπὶ ἀληθῶς ἀμώσαντος’ οὐχ ἀρμὸζε δὲ ἡ λέξις αὐτή ῥηθήκαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς
πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὅψιν γιγνομένην,“
καὶ “τελεσφόρον φήθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενησθαι,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθό τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν,” καὶ “κυνάχρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἑδαφὸς,” πάντα γὰρ ταύτα ποιητικά διὰ τὴν διπλωσιν 2 φαίνεται. μία μὲν οὖν αὐτὴ αἰτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρήσθαι γράφται, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ἑρέξην πέλωρον ἀνδρά, εἰςόντος τὸ ἀληθὲς, οἷον δὲ ὑπὲρ γῆς δυτῶν τοῦ ἕλιου ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, i.e. this is like expounding 'it is day' into the longer and more pompous phrase 'the sun is above the earth.'

μένου μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς πληρουμένην πυρίχρων δὲ τῆς ὅψιν γιγνομένην] ‘And Alcidas’ phrases, “His soul saturated with wrath, and his face growing the colour of fire” (fire-coloured)’. This, as I have noted in the account of him in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. III, p. 266, is an exemplification of three of the new figures which Gorgias, his master, had recently introduced into Rhetoric, ἀντίθεσις, παράσώφα or ἱσοκολος, and ὁμοιοτέλεσσον, on which see 1b. No. VII, III 69—72. The ψυχρὼν objected to is of course the διπλων ὄνομα, πυρίχρων ['flame-flushed'].

‘And “end-fulfilling deemed he would be their zeal”, and “end-fulfilling established he the persuasion of his words”, and “dark-blue-coloured the sea’s foundation”. (ἐνάσεως is indigo blue, also dark in general)—‘for all these have a poetical character arising from (due to) the doubling’.

τελεσφόρος may be translated by Shakespeare’s “thought-executing” fires; but that is poetry [King Lear III. 2. 4.—τελεσφόρος became commoner in later Greek prose, as remarked by Lobeck, Phrynickius, p. 673 (referred to by Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, p. 491 infra].

An account of Alcidas will be found in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. III, pp. 263—8 (omit pp. 264, 5, where the proof of a paradox is unnecessarily undertaken). [See also Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, pp. 491—528 of Transactions of Vienna Academy, XLIII 2, 1863; and Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, II pp. 317—335.]

§ 2. On the second defect of rhetorical style, γράφται, see Introd. p. 288.

‘Now this is one cause (of ψυχρώτης); another is the employment of obscure and unintelligible words. As Lycophron calls Xerxes a “hugeous” man, and Sciron (the famous robber who gave name to the Scironian rocks; put to death by Theseus, after Hercules the greatest eradicator of nuisances from the land of Attica) a “bale” of a man’. 

γράφται] Whether those which have never been much in use, unusual; or those which have gone out of use, obsolete or archaic; or those which belong to a foreign language or dialect. Comp. Julius Caesar’s rule, tanguam scopulum fugere inauditum atque insolens verbum (Aulus Gellius 11.10).

πέλωρον] This word frequent in Hom. and Hes. under the forms πέλωρ, πέλωρος (subst.), πέλωρος and πέλωρος (adj.); πέλωρος twice in Aesch.
καὶ Σκίρων σίνυς ἄνηρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκρατῶς τῆς διανοίας ὀργή τεθηγμένον. τρίτω δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐπὶ-

and once in Eurip. Iph. T., had it seems become obsolete in Arist.'s time. Comp. infra 7 § 11.

σίνυς ἄνηρ] If σίνυς stands for the actual robber, ὁ Πιτυνκότης, rival and contemporary of Procrustes, and Sciron, all of whom Theseus disposed of, he may be translated a "Turpin-man:" but the word is also used to represent the "incarnation of all mischief and destructive agency"—see Monk on Eur. Hippol. 981, and the authors cited; comp. the old poetical words σίνθεα, σίνος, (σίντης of the great robber and ravager, the mischievous, destructive lion, Hom. II. xx 165,) and σίνος. Both σίνος and σίνυς occur in Aeschylus in the abstract sense of mischief or destruction, and if σίνυς is to be so understood here, as I rather think it should, bale, an old English word of similar import, may serve to express it. [Suidas s. v. Σίνυς' ὀνομα λήπτοβ βλαστικοῦ.]

ἀθυμα τῇ ποιήσει] And Alcidamas "toys to poetry." The rest of the phrase is supplied below § 4, "to apply to or introduce toys in poetry". ἄθυμα is a childish amusement, ἄθυμην to sport like a child, of a child's sport or pastime. So employed by Homer, Pindar, Apoll. Rhod., Anthol. (guiniques), Euripides (in his Auge, Fragm. VIII Wagner, VI Dindorf) νηπίωτος ἄθυμας, and by Plato in the solemn semi-poetical Leges, VII 796 B. See Donaldson on Find. Nem. III 44, παις ἐν ἄθυμε, also Meineke ad Fragm. Crat. ὀδυσση, XVI; Suidas ἄθυμα, παιγμον. It seems from this that 'toy' is the corresponding English word; which is actually used by Spenser in the same more general sense of 'a childish sport or amusement,' and in this sense is with us obsolete. Faery Queen, Bk. I. Cant. 6, 28 "To dally thus with death is no fit toy, Go, find some other play-fellows, mine own sweet boy." 'Gawd' is another word now obsolete that might represent it.

τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν] and the outrecedance of his nature. ἀτασθαλία, ἀτασθάλος, ἀτασθάλη, a poetical word denoting 'mad, presumptuous arrogance'; found in Homer and Herod., and also in an epitaph of Archedice quoted by Thucyd. VI 59, ὥν ἦθη νοῦν ἐν ἀτασθαλίαν. ['Retchlessness,' for recklessness, is similarly an unfamiliar word with ourselves, and may serve as an illustration, if not a rendering of this use of ἀτασθαλία.]

καὶ ἀκρατῶς—τεθηγμένον] and 'whetted with the unadulterated' (hot and heady, like pure unmixed wine) 'wrath of his mind.' The γλώττα here is τεθηγμένον, a not very rare, but usually poetical, metaphor for exasperated, excited, provoked, irritated; sharpened like a knife or tool, or an animal's teeth. Examples from the tragic poets are supplied by Valck. on Eur. Hippol. 689, ὀργὴ συντεθηγμένοις φρένας: it is opposed to ἀμβλύνειν as Aesch. Theb. 721, τεθηγμένον τοι μ' ὀκταμβλύνεις λόγοι, comp. P. V. 308, Soph. Aj. 585, γλῶσσαν τεθηγμένη. Ib. Fragm. 762, Inc. Trag. Dind., Eur. Cycl. 240, Electr. 836. Xenophon however has employed it several times; Cyrop. i 2 10, 6. 19, 6. 41, II i. 4, 5, 7, Mem. III 3. 7. Lat. acuerre. [Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas p. 492, notes that
The third vice of style lies in the misuse of "epithets", that is, in introducing them either too long, or out of season (out of place, we say), or too frequent (numerous); for in poetry it is suitable enough to say "white milk" (a Homeric epithet of course; as red wine, fair women, &c. in ballad poetry), but in prose it is not only less appropriate, but also, if they be employed to satiety (excess), they convict (detect, expose, the art of the composition) and make it plain that it is poetry: for, to be sure, it must be used; for it varies the customary style and gives a foreign air to the language.

On *epitheta* see Introd. p. 289. The over-long 'epithets' are illustrated by those of Aeschylus in Tragedy, and Aristophanes in Comedy—who sometimes strings together an entire line of epithets, as ἀρχαιομελειστιδοφρυνιχήρα, of Phrynichus' μέλη [Vesp. 220]. Such epithets are of course most inappropriate to prose. The excessive length may also be shewn in the 'descriptive additions' to a substantive, which often takes the place of a regular *epithet*.

*Dei* γε *χρήσθαι αὐτῇ* i.e. to a limited extent; taking care at the same time that the poetical character of the language be not marked and apparent (reading ἀυτῇ the *vulgata lectio* retained by Bekker). Spengel with Αὐτῇ: Victorius and Vater αὐτοῖς; but the variation of the customary language is far more applicable to poetical usages than to epithets: in fact I doubt whether *ἐξαλλάσσει* could be applied to *epitheta* with any satisfactory meaning).

*ἐξαλλάσσει* *supra* c. 2 § 2, note, and § 5. ἕνεκὴ τὴν λέξιν supra c. 2 § 3.

'But the mean should always be our aim, for (the reverse of moderation, excess) does more mischief than careless, random, speaking, (over-doing it, exaggeration, is worse than entire carelessness, taking no pains at all): for the one no doubt wants the good, but the other (has) the bad (the defect in the one case is negative, the mere absence of special excellence, in the other it is positive). And this is why Alcidamas' (epithets) appear tasteless; because he employs them, not as the mere seasoning but as the actual meat (pièce de résistance, the substance, not the mere adjunct or appendage): so frequent, and unduly long (μείζονα τοις δεόντος, too long) and conspicuous are they'. Victorius is doubtless right in his opinion that these three words are a repetition in slightly altered terms of the three views of epithets at the commencement of the section; *unseasonableness*, the importunity with which they engross the attention, is now represented by the conspicuousness or
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ξενικήν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχαζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μείζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῆ λέγειν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Άλκι-

δάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται: οὐ γὰρ ἰδύσματι χρήται ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὔτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπίδηλοις, οἴον οὐχ ἰδρώτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἰδρώτα, καὶ οὐκ ἐίς Ἰσθμίαν ἀλλ’ ἐίς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν

undue prominence which produces the same effect. A fair specimen of this pompous inflated writing, in epithet and metaphor, is given in Auctor. ad Heren. IV 10. 15, nam qui perdellionibus venditat patriam non satis supplicii dederit si praeceps in Neptunias depulsus erit lacunas. Paeniteat igitur istum qui monies bellī fabricatus est, campos sustulit pacis.

[ἐπίθελος, ‘obtrusive’, ‘glaring’. Bernays proposes ἐπὶ δήλος, apparently without due cause, though Vahlen quotes it with approval.]

[The little that is left of Alcidamas seems to justify Aristotle’s strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets: e.g. πυρὶ σοφιστῶ, § 6, ἀντίτυπος καὶ προσφάτης τῶν χαλεποτέρων ἐπίμελεια, § 7, ὁ ποδάκης δρομεύει, § 16, εὐλύτρον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγχυνθα χρώμενον ὕγρος καὶ πιλανθρώπως μεταγερίζεσθαι τῶν λόγων, § 17, ἡ γραφὴ...ἀπορον καὶ δεσμώτων τῆς ψυχῆς καθισταί καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοσχεδιαστικοῖς ἐυφωπίας ἐπάσης ἐπιπροσθεν γίγνεται, (where for ἐυφωπίας we should surely read εὐφωπία which is a suitable contrast to ἀπορον and is supported by § 26, τοῖς αὐτόματοι εὐφόρημαν ἐμποδῶν ἐτού, and by the fact that εὐφωπία, εὐφωπος, ἀπορία and ἀπορον occur at least ten times in the thirty-five sections of the rhetorician’s diatribe, e. g. § 34, which is also an instance of the superabundance of epithets here criticised; τὴν γνώμην εὐλυτον καὶ τὴν μνήμην εὐφωπον καὶ τὴν λήθην ἄδηλον). See also Vahlen, Alkidamas, u. s. pp. 508—510, and Blass (who has edited Alcidamas, Gorgias, and Antisthenes in the same volume as Antiphon), die Attische Beredsamkeit II 328.]

‘For instance, (he says) not ‘sweat’, but “the moist sweat”; and not ‘to the Isthmian games’, but “to the general assembly (great convo-

cation) of the Isthmian games”; and not ‘laws’, but “laws the kings of cities”; and not ‘running’, but “with the impulse of his soul at speed”; and not merely ‘a Museum, or haunt of the Muses’, but “a Museum of all Nature that he had received”; and “sullen-visaged (or sullen-looking, with sullen aspect) the care (solicitude, anxiety) of his soul”; and “artificer” not of ‘favour’, but “of universal public favour”; and “steward (administrator, dispenser) of the pleasure of the hearers”; and “concealed”, not ‘with boughs’, but “with the boughs of the wood”; and “he clothed”, not ‘his body’, but “his body’s shame”; and “counter-imitative (responsive-answering) the desire of his soul”; and “so extravagant (inordinate, [abnormal]) the excess of the wicked-

ness”.
πόλεις βασιλείς νόμοις, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἄλλα δρομαῖα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμη, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσείον ἄλλα τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν. μουσείον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἄλλα πανδήμων χάριτος δημουργὸς, καὶ αἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἄλλα τοῖς τῆς ὑλῆς κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σώμα παρῆμπισχὲν ἄλλα τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δ’ ἀμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον,

πόλεων βασιλείς νόμοις] Frigm. Pind. quoted by Plat. Gorg. 484 b, νόμος ὁ πάνων βασιλείς διατῶν τε καὶ ἀδικάων, and Sympos. 196 c, οἱ πόλεως βασιλείς νόμαι. [Also by Herod. III 38, καὶ ἄρθρας μοι δοκεῖ Πιθάρου ποίησαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλεία φήσαι εἶναι, quoted by Thompson on Gorg. u.s.]

τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν μουσείον] I have above translated this quite literally, and own that I do not fully understand it: παραλαβῶν seems suspicious: Α’ has περιλαβῶν, which does not much mend the matter. Perhaps all the meaning lies on the surface, and there is none underneath. Victorius says that μουσείον is locus a musis bonisque artibus frequentatus: and translates, cum naturae museum accipisset: adding, appellat igitur hic quoque τῆς φύσεως epitheion, cum adhonatur illi nominat ad naturam eius explainandam. [Vahlen discusses the phrase in his article on Alcidamas, u.s., pp. 494—6, and suggests that the passage originally stood as follows: δρομαία τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμῆ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν μουσείον, which he translates “mit der Seele Sturms drang den Wissensschatz der Naturum fasend.” μουσείον occurs in a well-known passage of the Phaedrus, 267 b, τὰ δὲ Πολοῦ πῶς φράσωμεν ἀν μουσεία λόγων, οἷς διπλασιολόγων καὶ γραμματικῶν καὶ εἰκονολόγων, and an interesting account of the word may be found in Thompson’s note. Vahlen, who holds that μουσεία λόγων there means Redeschulen, in denen man das διπλασιολόγων καὶ γραμματικῶν καὶ εἰκονολόγων, lernen konnte, suggests that by τὸ τῆς φύσεως μουσείον Alcidamas here intends to express what in ordinary language would have been expressed by some such phrase as ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεως ἑστία. In illustration of this view, he quotes a fragment of Diogenes Laertius, viii 2. 56, where ‘Ἀλκιδάμας ἐν τῷ Φυσικῷ says of Ἐμπεδοκλῆς’ Ἀναξαγόρου διακούσαι καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τοῦ μὲν τῆς σεμιώτητα γέλασαι τοῦ τε βιοῦ καὶ τοῦ σχέδιος, τοῦ δὲ τῆς ψυσιολογίας.—In Stobaeus, 120, 3, the quotation of two lines of Theognis ἐκ τοῦ 'Ἀλκιδάματος Μουσείον shews that as a title of a book (whatever its exact meaning may be) the term is not so modern as might be supposed. (Compare Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit II 322, note.)

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...ποίμα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθρίας ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῇ ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἁσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἄδολεσχίαν ὡταν γὰρ γιγνώ-

...σκοντι ἐπεμβαλλή, διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς τῷ ἐπισκοπεῖν'

From the passage of Aristoph. it seems that this word, like ἀντιστροφος, should have after it a dative of the object to which it answers; what that object was in Alcidamas' declamation Aristotle has not informed us.

'And this is at the same time a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes quite a poem (a mere bit of poetry: plain prose is turned by this inflated style into poetry).

ἔξεδρον, from the analogy of ἐκτόπος, ἐκτόπιος, and the actual use of the word—as ἔξεδρον χώραν ἔχειν, of birds of omen in an unlucky quarter of the heavens, Arist. Av. 275; ἔξεδροι φρενῶν λόγοι 'words beside the seat of the wits', Eur. Hippol. 985, οὐκ ἔξεδροι, ἀλλ' ἐκτόπος ἀνήρ, Soph. Phil. 212—must mean 'out of its proper seat or place', 'abroad'; and hence as an exaggeration of excess, 'extravagant', as translated.

On these extracts from Alcidamas Victorius remarks, 'Cum autem haec omnia a mediis quibusdam orationibus sumpsit, ut vitiisae tantum locutionis exemplum sint, non est quod miremur aut plenam sententiam in nonnullis non esse; aut desiderari, ut in hac, verbum unde casus nominum regantur.'

'And so this poetical diction by its unsuitableness introduces absurdity and tastelessness into their composition, and obscurity which is due to the verbiage: for whenever (a speaker or writer) accumulates words (throws a heap of them) upon one already informed (already acquainted with his meaning), he destroys (breaks up, dissolves, effaces) all perspicuity (distinctness) by the cloud (or darkness, obscurity) in which he involves his meaning' (lit. which he brings over it; ἐπικοτείν τῇ κρίτει, I 1.7, see note: to over-cloud, over-shadow, obscure).

ἀδολεσχία[...the accumulation of unnecessary or unmeaning words: ἀδολεσχία is idle, empty, chatter, prating. It is applied to Socrates and the Sophists by Aristoph. Nub. 1480, 1485, and Eupol. τῶν πτωχῶν ἀδολέσχην, Fragm. Inc. X (Meineke, II 553), comp. XI (lb.) ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτῶν ἐκδίδαξαι, ὡς σοφιστή, Aristoph. Fragm. Tagenist. III (Meineke II 1149) ἐν ἐν τῶν ἀδολεσχεῖν εἰς γέ τες. Supra II 22.3, infra III 12.6, Eth. N. III 13, 1118 a 1, de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.

ἐπεμβάλλη], "Similiter locutus est Plat. Cratyl. 414 D, de inculcatis alicui nominis syllabis, ὅταν ἐπεμβάλλοντες ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὄνομα τελευτώ-

...τες ποιοῦσι μὴ δὲ ἐνα ἄνθρωπον συνείναι ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ δώμα. Illae enim impediunt ne unde ductum id nomen sit videri possit. Idem affirm-

...avit M. Varro, de L. L. multa enim verba litteris commutatis sunt inter-

...polata." Victorius.

'And people in general, use their compound words (τοῖς, those that they do use) when it (what they want to express) is nameless (has no single word to represent it) and the word is easily put together (the combination is easily made), as χρονοτριβεῖν: but if this be carried too far
of & other poets. For this is why compound words are most serviceable to the dithyrambic poets—τῶν δ' οὐνόματων τὰ μὲν διπλὰ μαλίστα ἄρωτες τοῖς διθυράμβοις, Poet. XXI 18—for these are noisy, "full of sound and fury"; full of pompous, high-sounding phrases' (on ψόφος see III 2.13); 'and obsolete or unusual, to Epic poets, for language of this kind has a stately (majestic, dignified, proud, solemn, and scornful or disdainful) air; and metaphor to writers in iambics, for these they (i.e. the tragic poets) now-a-days—since they have quitted the tetrameter—employ, as has been already stated. III 1.9 comp. infra 8.4, and Poet. IV 18. The reason, conveyed by γὰρ, is this: I say iambics, not tetrameters, because now-a-days, &c.

[χρονοτρίβειν.] Compare our 'pastime,' which is also a λόγος εὐσύνθετος. So in Daniel's Ulysses and Siren, "Delicious nymph! suppose there were No honour or report, Yet manliness would scorn to wear The time in idle sport." Isocr. Paneg. § 41, ἡδίστασα διαρμῆσαι.

On compound words, as connected with dithyrambic poetry, Demetrius, peri' ἐρμηνείας § 91, says, έπιτέλευτα δὲ καὶ σύνθετα οὐνόματα, οὐ τὰ διθυράμβικα συγκείμενα, οὕνεκα θεωράτοις πλάνας, ουδὲ στρατον θυσπόρων στρατον, ἀλλ' εὐκότα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνθείας συγκείμενοι (such as νομοθεία, ἀργυεῖ•

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The dithyramb at Athens became at and after the end of the fifth cent. the wildest, and (in point of style) most licentious and most extravagant of all the kinds of poetry. See note in Introd. on III 9, pp. 307, 8, and the ref. to Aristoph. there given; Bode, Gesch. der Hell. dichtk. Vol. II. Pt. II. p. 111 seq. and 290 seq.; and Müller, H. G. L. s. xxx. To use words suited to a dithyrambic poet is therefore an exaggeration of the ordinary defect of the introduction into prose of poetical language.

Plat. Phaedr. 238 D, οὐκέτι πόρρῳ διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, Ibid. 241 E, έβδη ἐπὶ φθέγγομαι, οὖν οὐκέτι διθυράμβοις. Cratyl. 409 C, (σελαναί) διθυράμβωδες γε τούτου τούτου. Dionys. Dinarch. Iud. c. 8, of the imitators of Plato, διθυράμβωδη όνόματα καὶ φορτικὰ εἰσφέροντες, Lys. Iud. c. 3, Γοργίας ...οὐ πόρρῳ διθυράμβων εἷνα φθέγγομένοι, de adm. vi. dic. in Dem. c. 29, Ep. ad Pomp. c. 2 (of Socrates' poetical outburst, Phaedr. 237 Ἄ), ψόφοι τατ' εστὶ καὶ διθυράμβω, (p. 763 R) and (764) where the words of Phaedr. 238 D (u. s.) are quoted. Hor. Od. IV 2.10, of Pindar, per audaces nova dithyrambos verba devolvit, Donaldson, Theatre of Gks. p. 37, note 3; and the references. διθυραμβεῖν is a step beyond τραγῳδεῖν in pomp and exaggeration of language.

σεμνὸν γὰρ] σεμνός, contracted from σεβόμενος, lit. an object of worship: applied again to the heroic measure or rhythm, III 8.4.

On these pass:ve forms in Greek and Latin, see Donaldson, New
αὐθαίρετα: η ἡμεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἵαμβείοις: τούτοις γὰρ

4 τῶν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ εἰρηται. καὶ ἐτὶ τέταρτον τὸ

ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίγνεται: εἰς τακ γὰρ καὶ

μεταφορὰι ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται

γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ μεταφοραί), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ

σεμνὸν ἀγαν καὶ πραγματικοῦ ἀσαφεῖς δὲ, ἄν πόρρωθεν.

Crat. § 410, Varro, p. 406 (ed. 11), 97. Add to the Greek examples
given σεμνός and ἐρωμός and to the Latin, somnis (sopor).

καὶ αὐθαίρετα] This means that the ἄνωθεν γλῶτται affect an air of
independence and hauteur; they, like the αὐθαίρετα, the self-pleaser, self-
willed, stubborn, haughty, independent man, will not conform to ordinary
usage, and scornfully affect singularity. Comp. Poet. 22 IV 9, τὸ γὰρ
ηρωίδων σταυρομάτων καὶ ὑγκώδεστων τῶν μέτρων ἤστιν, διὰ καὶ γλῶτταν
cαι μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιsta.

§ 4. And further, the fourth vice of style is shewn in metaphors;
for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are laughable—
for the comic poets also employ metaphors—others from their exaggera-
tion of the stately (solemn) and tragic (pompous) style: if far-fetched,
they are obscure" πόρρωθεν, see on ΙΙΙ 2.12. "As Gorgias, "things (πρά
gματα, actions, occurrences, events, business) all fresh and raw".
This certainly is a good exemplification of what it is designed to illustrate: it
is obscure. It seems, however, to mean nothing more than 'recent
events', events fresh, and with the blood in them: the metaphor from a
beast just killed. It therefore corresponds to πρόσφατος, 'fresh', which also
stands for 'recent'. πρόσφατος is specially applied to 'fresh meat'. See
Lobeck On Phrynichus, p. 375, note: examples of πρόσφατος are there
given, p. 374. "And these things thou hast sown in disgrace,
and reaped in misery". For it smells too much of poetry'. [Both the
extracts probably belong to the same context, and may perhaps be
combined by rendering them thus: 'all was green and unripe (fresh and
flushed with sap), and this was the crop that you sowed in shame to reap
in ruin'. χλωρὰ καὶ ένυμα possibly refer to the green and unripe stalks
of corn, with the sap still fresh in them. This assumes that αἷμα can be
used metaphorically of 'sap', both coming under the generic notion of
'vital juice'. If so, the metaphor is a sufficiently bold one. Thompson
(ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179) notes that ένυμα (which is the reading of
Q, Y and Z) is 'well supported, and cannot but be right,' and remarks
that while the metaphor of sowing and reaping is a mere commonplace,
"pallid and bloodless affairs" would need apology even from a modern.]

A metaphor, nearly resembling the first of these two, occurs in
Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας, § 116, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν μεταφορᾷ τῷ ψυχρόν,
τρέμοντα καὶ ἀχρὰ τὰ πράγματα. Longinus περὶ ἔρους 3.2, τάνητι καὶ τὰ
τῶν Δεοτίνων Γοργίου γελοῖται γραφοντος, "Ξέρσης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζέων," καὶ
"γάτης ἐμπύρωχα τάφοι" [comp. supra I § 9, on the poetical style of Gorgias].

Hermogenes also, περὶ ἱδεῶν Τομ. α', περὶ συμμέτρου 226 (p. 292,
Spengel), Rhetores Graeci, vol. 11.) gives some examples of exaggerated
metaphors, ἐκκενυμερεων, καὶ τὰ περιπατώς ἐσωτόν, καὶ τὸ λαποδυμών
οίνον Γοργίας "χλωρὰ καὶ ἑναμα τὰ πράγματα· σὺ
de ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἐσπειρᾶς κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας"
ποιητικὸς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν ψιλο-
σοφίαν ἐπιτείχισα τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν
calὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κατοπτρον, καὶ "οὐδὲν τοι-
οῦτον ἄθυμα τῇ ποίησει προσφέρων." ἀπαντᾷ γὰρ
tην Ἑλλάδα: and a few lines below, τάφους ἐμψύχους τοὺς γύπας,
but without the author's name. The objection to some of these met-
phors, as the 'sowing and reaping', the 'selling oneself', and above all,
Alcidamas' 'mirror of human life', seems to shew a change of taste from
ancient to modern criticism. We certainly should object to none of
these; and the 'mirror' in particular has become one of the commonest
metaphors in our language. The 'sowing and reaping' appears in Plato,
Phaedr. 260c (see Thompson's note), and Aesch. Pers. 821. In Cic. de
ad Cor. xv. 42—4. Ep. ad Gal. vi. 7 (and Lightfoot ad loc.). "They
that sow in tears shall reap in joy: he that now goeth forth weeping,
and beareth forth good seed, shall doubtless come again with joy, and
bring his sheaves with him," Psalm cxxvi. 6, 7. Possibly the antithesis,
one of Gorgias' new inventions, may have helped to offend Aristotle's
tastes, and it is the effect of the whole phrase, and not of the harmless
metaphor alone, that has unconsciously provoked his disapprobation: yet
the same occurs in the simple psalm.

[καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κατοπτρον. Alcidamas elsewhere uses this
metaphor from a mirror, in the form of a simile, περὶ σοφίστων, § 32, εἰς
δὲ τὰ γεγραμμένα κατάγοντα ἀπὸ τὸν κατόπτρον ἑωρᾶται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἐπίδοσεις ῥημάτων ἑτέρων. The present passage and those already quoted
in § 3 τοῖς τῆς ὑλῆς κλάδων ἀπεκρύψεις κ.τ.λ. (Odysse. vi 128) and κανόνων
τὸ τῆς βαλαττῆς ὁδοῖς, probably belong to a declamation on Odysseus
(or on the Odyssey); while τελεσφόρος τὴν πεῖθα τῶν λόγων κατέστησα
§ 1), and παρθενίων χάρισμα δημιουργός καὶ ἀλκοόμοι τῆς τῶν ἀκούόντων
θεώρης (§ 3), point with equal probability to a pamphlet on Rhetoric.]

'And as Alcidamas (follower of Gorgias), (called) philosophy a
"fortress to threaten" (a standing menace to), the laws; and the
Odyssey a "fair mirror of human life"; and "introducing no such
toys, or gawds, in his poetry"—for all such things are subversive of
credibility, for the reasons already stated'. These are, that forced
metaphors, and all such-like artificial graces and ornamens, make the
art and the labour of composition apparent; make the speech appear
studied and affected, and therefore premeditated and unreal, and without
serious purpose: oíκε εὖ κλέπτεται : the language of genuine emotion, of
earnest and real conviction, which are required for persuasion, being
always simple and natural. Probably the most perfect example of art
thus disguised by art is to be found in Mark Antony's speeches over
Caesar's body in Julius Caesar; and the first thing he does is to impress
upon his audience the entire artlessness and unstudied simplicity of
his address: *I am no orator as Brutus is, but, as you know me all, a plain, blunt man that love my friend, &c [III 2.221].

ἐπινείχεμα in the first extract from Alcidamas, is interpreted in this passage in the Lexicons of Rost and Palm, and Liddell and Scott—in Stephens' *Thesaurus* it is quoted but not explained—‘a bulwark or defence of the laws’. But ἐπινείχεμα in its proper literal sense seems to be invariably used of an offensive, not defensive, fortification, to command and annoy an enemy's country, like Decelia, which, τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπορεύετο, Thuc. vii. 27. 3 (Bekker, in Thuc. viii. 95, reads τείχεμα for ἐπινείχεμα, on this account) as indeed is required by the ἐπι with which it is compounded; and *philosophy* may be used in the attack, as well as the defence, of established laws and institutions, whether it be understood as speculation or scientific research.

'And Gorgias' address to the swallow, when she discharged her excrement' [rather, 'dropped her leavings'] upon him as she flew over, is in the best style of tragic diction, (τὸ δὲ Γ. ἀρσότα, sc. ἐργαταί) "For shame, Philomel", said he. For to a bird it was no disgrace to have done it, but to a young (unmarried) lady it was. And therefore he was right in his reproach to describe (speak of) her as she was, and not as she is'. The simplicity of all this is delightful. I could fancy Aristotle winking to his imaginary reader as he wrote the explanation, ὅρωσι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., a bird, you know, &c. [The anecdote illustrates the habit of irony ascribed to Gorgias in 7 § 11, *infra*, μὲν ἐπιφώνεις ὀπερ Γοργίας ἑποίει, as noticed in Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 180.]

περιττομα] in medicine and natural history is 'a secretion'. It occurs constantly all through Ar.'s writings on Nat. Hist. *Plut. Symp.* p. 727

D (Victorius), in telling the same story, uses the broad Aristophanic word: Γοργίας δὲ ἀ σοφιτὴς χελιδόνος ἀφέσης ἐν αὐτὸν ἀπόστασιν, ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτήν, οὐ καλὰ ταύτην, ἐπεν, ὃς Φιλομῆλα.

On the transformation of Proce and Philomela authorities differ. Thucydides, ii. 29, referring to the story, seems to adopt Gorgias' view, and make Proce the nightingale. Ovid seems to leave the point unsettled, *Metaph.* vii. 667 seq. But tradition in general, and English poetry in particular, have always associated Philomela with the nightingale; e.g. 'Less Philomel will deign a song. Milton's *Paradise Lost*, 56.

Victorius notices on this passage that Aristotle includes under the designation of metaphor more than is now recognised as belonging to it. The case here, he says, is a mere hypallage or change of name. *Comp. Cic. Orator* c. xxvi. 93, 94. *Hanc vulgari litteris quia quasi summutantur verba pro verbis, metonymiam grammatici vocant, quod nomina
CHAP. IV.

From metaphors (c. 2), and the abuse of them (c. 3), we pass on in this chapter to the simile, *eikón*, which differs from the metaphor only in this, that the latter concentrates, or fuses into one, the two things or notions brought into comparison. The former separates them by the particle of comparison *ὅταν*. Thus the simile may be regarded as an expanded metaphor. See further on this in Introd. p. 290, and the references to other authorities.

§ 1. "The simile too is a metaphor, the difference between them being slight: for when he (Homer)" says of (his, or the great) Achilles "and as a lion he rushed on", it is a simile, but when, "he rushed on, a (very) lion", a metaphor: for (in the latter) because they are both brave, he transferred to Achilles the appellation of lion."  

§ 2. "The simile is useful also in prose, but seldom (to be employed), since it has a poetical character. They must be used like metaphors (the same rules must be observed in the use of them as of metaphors); in fact they are metaphors, only with the difference already stated."
to any topic, example, argument, or anything else that is to be ‘brought forward’. Supra c. 2, 10, 13, infra c. 6, 7, also 11 22, 16, 17. Top. Θ 1, 153 a 14, et passim. Isocr. Areopag. § 6.

§ 3. ‘An example of the simile is’ (lit. Similes are a thing like that simile which), ‘that which Androton (directed, discharged) against Idrieus, that he was like the curs when they are let loose (untied); for they fly at you and bite, and so Idrieus was vicious (or savage) when he was freed from his chains’.

Androton was an Athenian orator, whose name occurs coupled with many opprobrious epithets not only in the speech delivered against him (Or. 22), but also in that against Timocrates in which he is very frequently mentioned. He was sent on an embassy with Melanopus and Glauceus, Dem. c. Timocr. §§ 12, 13, alibi, to Mæsopus prince of Caria 377—351 B.C. Idrieus was his brother, and Androton may have met him at his court, and there had the encounter with him which ended in the discharge of his simile. The Scholiast on Isocr. p. 4 b 27 (ap. Sauppe, Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.) tells us that he was a pupil of Isocrates, and the writer of the ‘Atthis’, ‘a work on the history of Attica’, Biographical Dictionary—which settles the question raised in that Dictionary about the identity of the orator and author—and the Scholiast adds that he was also the defendant in Demosthenes’ speech contra Androtonem.

Idrieus was a prince of Caria who succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother Mæsopus in 351 B.C. See Mr Bunbury’s Art. in Biogr. Dict. He is mentioned by Isocrates, Philippus § 103, as ευφρόσυνας τῶν ἐν περὶ τῆς ἄξιον. This speech was published in 346 B.C. (Clinton), and therefore subsequent to his accession. It may be presumed that the imprisonment with which Androton taunts him was due to his brother, and of course prior to his accession to the throne. He is referred to again without his name by Demosthen. in the speech de Pace, § 25,—this was also delivered in 346 B.C. (Clinton F. H. 11 360)—as ‘the Carian’, who had been permitted to take possession of the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes. [A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, 1 351, 440.]

‘And Theodamas’ comparison of Archidamus to Euxenus—minus his geometry, by proportion: for Euxenus also will be Archidamus plus geometry’ (a geometrical Archidamus). Nothing is known of the three persons here mentioned. Theodamas compares Archidamus to Euxenus without his geometry; and so—by the rule of proportion, i.e. in the same proportion—will Euxenus be to Archidamus with geometry: i.e. equal, both being alike rascals. The proportion is that of equality. With ἐν τῷ ἀναλόγου supply λόγο, ‘in the ratio, or relation, of proportion’.

AR. III.
In this we are referred to the 'proportional metaphor', the last and most approved of the four kinds described in Poet. xxi 7—16. Comp. Rhet. iii 10, 7, where the proportional met. is illustrated at length. Victorius, who agrees in this explanation, supplies a parallel case from Diogenes Laertius, Polemo, iv 3, 7, ἐλευθέρων ἐν τῶν ὑπὸ 'Ομήρου ἑπικῶν εἶναι Σοφικλέα, τῶν δὲ Σοφικλέα Ἀργοκόν. Theodamas has taken this common mode of comparison and applied it to the equal worthlessness of Archidamus and Euxenus. It was probably a standing joke at Athens. The case may have been something of this kind:—Two contemptible fellows, one of them priding himself upon a little knowledge of geometry, are comparing or disputing their respective merits: "you needn't say any more about the matter," says Theodamas, a bystander, who was listening much amused to the discussion, "you are both equal, Arcades ambo, a pair of fools, only Euxenus is a geometrical Archidamus, Archidamus an ungeometrical Euxenus."

1 And that in Plato's Republic (v 469 ν), that "the spoilers of the dead are like curs (κυνίδιος, contemptuous, diminutive: an improvement on Plato, who merely says κυνῶν), which bite the stones (thrown at them) without attacking, setting upon, the thrower". Aristotle, like Bacon, quoting from memory, and assuming a knowledge of the original in his readers, has left out the explanatory part of the illustration which is supplied by Plato. Victorius cites Pacuvius, ap. Nonium, in Armorum judicio, Nam canis, quando est percussa lapide, non tam illum appetit, Qui se sicit, quam illum eum lapidem, qui ipsa icta est, petit.

καὶ ἡ εἰς τῶν δήμων. This, which originally stood in MSS Q, Yp, Zp, and the early editions, καὶ ὁ δημοσθένης εἰς τῶν δήμων, was first corrected by Victorius from MS A.*

1 And that (simile, understand eikōn.) (directed) against democracy, that it is like a ship-owner (or ship's captain) strong but slightly deaf. This again is a mere allusion to or reminder of, 'what every one must surely remember', Plato's celebrated illustration (Rep. vi 488 A) of the evils of democracy by the comparison of it to the undisciplined, untrained, turbulent, anarchical, crew of a ship: each of them, though utterly without qualification for the charge, ready to dispute with the captain the direction and control of the vessel. The passage is referred to by Cicero, de Off. 1 25. The words quoted by Ar., few as they are, are not correct: he makes the μηχαληρος the representative of the δῆμος, the whole state; in Plato the κυκληρος—the ship-owner, who in this case is captain, and steers his own vessel—is the governor, or governors, of the unruly mob of citizens.

1 And that (ἐκεῖνος, as before) applied to the poet's measures, that they are like the bloom of youth without beauty (actual beauty of features):
κλήρῳ ἵσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκάφῳ δέ. καὶ ἦ ἐis τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι ἐσοκε τοῖς ἀνευ τά κάλλους ὕραιοις. ὸι μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθιστάντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα ὑπὸ ὁμοία φαῖνεται. καὶ ἦ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, ἔοικειν P. 1407.

αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ὥς τὸν ὕμων δέχεται μὲν, κλαυστοντα δέ. καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, ὅτι ὁμοίοι τοῖς πρώιοισ·

for they, when their bloom has faded (worn off, when they have lost it), and the other (the poet's measures) when they are broken up, seem utterly unlike (their former selves). This also comes from Rep. x 601 b, ἐσοκε (τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν) τοῖς τῶν ὕραιων προσώπων, καλῶν δὲ μὴ, οἷα γίνεται ίδειν ὄντα αὐτὰ τὸ ἄθος προλῆπτη. All poetry is imitation of natural objects, which are invested with certain 'colours' by the poetical art, in which the entire interest and beauty of poetry lie. These colours resemble the bloom on a youthful face, which is merely superficial, when there is nothing corresponding underneath, no beauty of feature or solid attraction. The imitation of the objects themselves may be bad and incorrect, as the face itself may be plain; so that when the bloom, the poetical colours, the graces and ornaments, and especially the numbers, are removed, there remains only a substratum, which may be worthless, of the direct imitation. Horace, Sat. i 4.60, has pronounced, as is well-known, a directly contrary opinion, at least in respect of the better kind of poetry. After applying to Lucilius' verses much the same criticism as Plato does to poetry in general, he adds, Non, ut si solvas 'postquam discordia tetra Belli ferratos postes portasque refregit; Inventias etiam distincti membra poetae; from Ennius. Compare Isocr. Evag. § 11, ἥρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντων τὰ μὲν ὑμῶν καὶ τὸς διανοίας καταλύει, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλυόμενον φανερώται πολὺ καταδεώστε τῆς δόξης ἢ τῶν ἐχομεν πρὶν αὐτῶν. Also Rhet. III 1.9.

With the expression comp. Eth. N. x 4, 1174 φιλ. ὄνομα τοῦ άθως ἡ ὅρα, pleasure is like the bloom on the ἐνέργεια, the realized, active energy: illustrated by Zell's note ad loc., from Valerius Paternclus [II 29.2], of Pompeius, forma excellens, non ea qua fios commendatur aelatis, sed ex dignitate constanti. Youthful bloom, distinct from, and independent of, personal beauty.

And that of Pericles against the Samians, that they are like babies (παιδίου, 'little children') which cry whilst they take the morsel (or sop) offered them'. ψώμος recurs, under the form ψώμιμα, in the third simile following, where it is explained. The comparison made here by Pericles of the Samians to babies, which take their food, but cry while they take it, refers to their conduct after the final reduction of the island by Pericles in 440 B.C., Thuc. i 115—117, after an eight months' contest, ἐξενεμαχήθησαν ἐντό ημᾶς. The sop, i.e. the nourishment, benefits, favours, they had received—from the Athenian point of view—consisted, thinks Schraeder, in their freedom, and liberation from the yoke of the Persians and the oligarchs. They nevertheless, though they accepted them, most ungratefully and unreasonably grumbled. Buchle refers to Diodor. XII 27.

And (of Pericles again) against the Boeotians; that they are like their
own holm-oaks: for as these are cut down (knocked about or down) by themselves' (dashed one against another by the wind; so Victorius; or 'cut down', split by wedges and mallets made of their own wood, like the "struck eagle" of Aeschylus, Waller, and Byron), 'so are the Boeotians, by their civil (or domestic) contentions'.

'And Demosthenes compared the people' (of the Athenian, or some other, democracy: understand ἐκαστόν, which is expressed in the next example) 'to the sea-sick passengers in the vessels at sea'. Their squeamishness, fastidiousness, nausea with the existing state of things, constant desire of change, is produced by the perpetual agitation, fluctuation of their political condition and circumstances, the tumultuous waves of the stormy sea of civil commotion: they are sick of the present, and long for change. The Demosthenes here mentioned is, by general consent, not the Orator; more probably the Athenian general of the Peloponnesian war in Thucydides [sine causa, says Spengel].

The very remarkable fact that the name of the great Orator is in all probability only once mentioned by Aristotle—II 24. 8, where Demades' condemnation of his policy is quoted—though the pair were living together for many years in the same city—is parallel to a similar silence of Bacon as to his great contemporary Shakespeare; but still more remarkable in the former case, from the constant occasion offered to the writer on Rhetoric of illustrating his rules and topics from the practice of the first of speakers. It has been already noticed in the Introduction, pp. 45, 46, and notes, where the cases of supposed mention of or allusion to Demosthenes are collected and examined. And this omission will appear still more remarkable when it is contrasted with the nine closely printed columns of references and citations in Spengel's Index Auctorum ad Rhetores Graecos III 312, seq.

'And Democrats' comparison of the "orators" to the nurses who themselves swallow the morsel (which they have previously chewed and softened for the baby), and smear (or slobber over) the babies with the spittle (that they have used in the process). This is the case of the lawyer and the oyster in the caricature; the legal practitioner swallows the savoury contents, and presents the rival claimants with a shell apiece; so the public speakers swallow the substantial profit themselves, and besmear the audience with their uncouth flattery. Comp. Ar. Eq. 715, (Κλέω) ἐπίστοραμε γὰρ αὐτόν (τὸν δῆμον, represented as a toothless old man that must be fed like a baby) οἷς ψωμὶζεται ('Ἀλλαντόπωλης) καθ ὄσπερ αἶ τιθαι γε στιξεῖς κακῶς μασώμενος γὰρ τῷ μὲν ὀλέγον ἐντιθεν, αὐτὸς δ'
σθένης Κηφισσόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ ἐίκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενοι εὐφραίνει. πᾶσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ ἐκείνου τριπλάσιον κατιστάκατα. Democrats, the author of this saying, seems, from a passage of Plutarch (in Vict.), Pol. Praec. 803 D, to have been notorious for biting and offensive sayings, τὸ λυπάν τεῖρος τοὺς δειοντάς: two of them are quoted. Two persons of this name are mentioned by the Orators. One, son of Sophilus, of the deme of Phyla, in a list of the ambassadors sent to Philip in 347 B.C., after the fall of Olynthus (in the spurious ψήφισμα, Demosth. de Cor. § 29, see Dissen), and again in another questionable ψήφισμα, Dem. de Cor. § 187, purporting to be Demosthenes’ decree for the appointment of ambassadors to Thebes and the other Greek states, to negotiate an alliance, and arrest the progress of Philip, June, B.C. 338, Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, sub anno. The other, of Aphidna, Isaeus, περὶ τοῦ Φιλοτίμωνος εὐλόγου, § 22, and Aesch. de F. L. § 17. Nothing more seems to be known of either of them. The two are confounded in the article of Smith’s Biographical Dictionary, Democrats No. 1; and the saying here quoted is styled “a fragment of one of his orations.”

‘And Antisthenes’ comparison of Cephsiodotus the thin (slight, lean) to frankincense, because he gives pleasure by wasting away’. ὁ λεπτὸς seems to have been a sobriquet of Cephsiodotus; and may also indicate a second point of resemblance between him and frankincense, namely his slight, vaporous, unsubstantial nature. Bulle quotes in illustration the German proverb, die Juden nehmen sich nirgend besser aus als am Galgen. ὁτι ἀπολλύμενοι εὐφραίνει means that that was the only enjoyment that was to be got out of him: all the rest of him, his properties, qualities, character, was anything but enjoyable, bad and vicious. On λεπτὸς contrasted with παχὺς, and men distinguished by this personal peculiarity, Athenaeus has three chapters, XII 75—77, p. 551, seq.

Antisthenes is most likely the Cynic philosopher, who outlived the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, sub anno 365, and was therefore contemporary with Cephsiodotus. He, like his successor, Diogenes, had a habit of bitter sarcasm, of which the saying here quoted is a fair specimen. It is truly a bitter jest. See the account of him in Cotton’s art. in Smith’s Biogr. Dict. Vol. I, p. 208 a. A long list of his sayings is given by Diog. Laert. in his life, vi 1, some of which are caustic enough. Mr. Grote, in his account of Antisthenes, Plato, III, p. 504, seq., has not specified this cynical feature in his character. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, II 304—316.]

Cephsiodotus, ἐκ Κεραμέων. Distinguished by Sauppe (Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. III, p. 77) from the general of that name, mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. §§ 153, 156, 163, 167, as sent (about 359 B.C.) to cooperate with Charidemus in the Hellespont and Chersonese, and elsewhere; by Aesch. c. Ctes. § 51, seq.; by Suidas and Harpocration. Cephs. ἐκ Κεραμέων, the orator, is referred to in Dem. c. Lept. § 146, together with Leodamas, Aristophon, and Deinias, as one of the best speakers of the time; and again, § 150, οὖν οὗτως ἄστων ὤψεως ἢτον τῶν λεγόντων δεινὸς εἰπείν. The Cephsiodotus who was sent (with Callias, see note on III 2. 10) to the congress at Sparta in B.C. 371, Xen. Hellen. vi 3. 2, vii 1. 12, seems more
likely to have been the orator than the general; and so Schneider pronounces, ad Xen. l. c. Three more bons mots of the same are quoted, infra III 10. 7. In Mr Elder’s art. Cephasdotus No. 2, Biog. Dict., the two are identified. [Arnold Schaefer distinguishes them, Dem. u. s. Zeit III 2, 155—6.]

*For all these may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors: and therefore, plainly, all those that are popular when expressed as metaphors, will be also (if required) similes, and similes metaphors without the descriptive details (the detailed explanation). “A simile is a metaphor writ large, with the details filled in; this is λόγος.” Introd. p. 290.

§ 4. *The proportional metaphor should always be reciprocally transferable, and to either of the two congener; for instance, if the goblet is Dionysius’ shield, then also the shield may be appropriately called Ares’ goblet. Such then are the elements of which the speech (or discourse in general, or prose) is composed*. This section, and its concluding observation, are fully explained in detail in the Introd. pp. 290—292, to which the reader is referred.

Anaxandrides (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. III. 201, Anax. Fr. Inc. xxxi.) as well as Antiphanes (Kauvës, Meineke, Fragm. III. 58) quote this metaphor of Timotheus in ridicule. From Athenaeus, xi. 502 B, we learn that the goblets which Anaxandrides calls φίλας "Aresos are παν καρνοτα, ‘walnut-shaped’. This tends to confirm Twining’s remark, on Poet. xxi. 12, note 185, that there was a resemblance in shape between this kind of cup and a shield, which helped to suggest and justify the metaphor. He refers, as also Buhle ad loc. Poet.—see also Gräfthen, ad Poet. p. 157—to Hom. II. xxiii. 270, on the shape of the φιάλη, πέμπτα δ’ δύνατα φίλάν ἀπρώτων οἶκε and the notes.

I have followed Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, in his recent ed. [1867], who agree in excluding from the text the superfluous καὶ ἐπὶ, before τὰς ὀμογενῶν,—apparently a mere repetition of the preceding καὶ ἐπὶ before βάτερα.

CHAP. V.

Here commences the second division of λίγες, the treatment of style as it appears in the combination of words in sentences, and the connexion of the latter in harmonious periods. The ἀρχη, the beginning, basis or
foundation, of style in this sense, is purity of language, τὸ Ἑλληνίζειν, pure and correct Greek, in idiom and choice of words, opposed to barbarism, solecism, and all impropriety in general. The subject of Purity has been already treated in the Introduction, under the head of ‘General observations on Style,’ p. 279, note 3.

The divisions of the chapter, the five heads to which Purity may be reduced—to which are added in the last section two supplementary topics which belong rather to perspicuity, punctuation and μεταξολογία, or parenthesis—are explained and illustrated by references to the works of other rhetoricians, in the analysis, Introd. pp. 292—5.

The classification is, as we shall see, extremely imperfect and deficient; and, moreover, the distinction of purity and perspicuity is not carefully observed. Most probably Aristotle did not recognise it at all. Nearly all the precepts given in this chapter are referrible to perspicuity rather than purity.


τὸ Ἑλληνίζειν τὸν Ἑλληνισμόν, φράσεις αὐδάπτωτος (Diogenes Laertiou, Zeno, VII. 59). τὸ Ἑλληνικόν τριτόν ἢ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν συνθέσειν διασώζειν τῶν ὄνομάτων ἐπὶ πάντων’ οἱ πολλοί ἢ τὸ ακριβεῖον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς, καὶ τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ οἱ γραμματικοὶ ἢ τὴν κυρίωτητα τῶν ὄνομάτων τῆς κατὰ φύσιν προσέκουσαν τῶν πράγματος’ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (Schol. ad Plat. p. 70 ap. Gaisford). This takes quite a different view of the meaning of the word to that of Aristotle; in the one case the ‘purity of the Greek’ is shewn in the choice of words, in the other in the connexion of sentences by observance of the idiom of the language. But in fact both of these belong to ‘pure Greek’: and purity is a negative quality of style, consisting in the avoidance of error (φράσεις αὐδάπτωτος, emendata locutio) in the shape of (1) solecism (Aristotle’s view, idiomatic, grammatical, blunders), (2) barbarism; the latter, the use especially of foreign words (whence the name), or any similar impropriety. Atque, ut Latinae loquitur, non solum videndum est ut et verba offeramus ea quae nemo iure reprehendet, et ea sic et casibus et temporibus et genere et numero conservemus, &c. Cic. de Orat. III. 11. 40. In the next section he includes pronunciation. The examples of σολωκισμόν, the opposite to Ἑλληνισμόν, given in de Soph. El. 32, 182 a 13 and 34, are both of them grammatical errors: one who is guilty of either, ὅποι ἂν δοκεῖ Ἑλληνίζειν. In the same, c. 3, 165 ὅ δ’ ἅμα, σολωκίζεις is defined, τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζεις. [Dem. Or. 45 (κατὰ Στεφάνου α’) § 30, ύμεις ὅ ὄνος αὐτῶν ὑπειλήφατε, ὅτα σολωκίζει τῇ φωνῇ, βάρβαρον καὶ εὐκαταφρονήτῳ εἶναι.]

(Pure, correct) Greek is the foundation of style: this falls under five heads or divisions.

§ 2. ‘The first of these is (the proper use of) connective particles, that is, when they are made to correspond, in such a natural position (relation) of priority or posteriority to one another in the sentence, as some of them
λῆλων, οὗν ἐνιοῦ ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὁστερόν ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν ὁ δὲ. δεῖ δὲ ἐστὶ μέμνειν ἀνταποδίδοναι ἄλληλοις, καὶ μὴτε μακράν ἀπαρ-ταίν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδίδοναί τού

require; as μὲν and ἐγὼ μὲν require δὲ and δὲ (as correlative)¹. That is to say, the connective μὲν (ὁ 'μὲν' σύνδεσμος) requires an answering δὲ in the apodosis, the one particle necessarily implying the other; and the same with ἐγὼ μὲν, and ὁ δὲ; μὲν with ἐγὼ necessarily implies a second, or other person, some one else, (see note on 1 6. 22, and Donaldson, New Cratylos, § 154, there cited,) correlative and subsequent or posterior: and therefore in the construction of the sentence μὲν is placed before (πρὸ-
τερον), δὲ after (ὑπὲρον).

On σύνδεσμος as a 'part of speech', see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III c. 2, p. 371 seq.; and on its various senses in general, ib. Appendix D, p. 392; and again p. 437, in the analysis c. 25 (26) of the Rhet. ad Alex. The rule here given for the treatment of connectives is derived originally from Isocrates' τεχνη. Ibid. pp. 437, 8. The Rhet. ad Alex. also has it, c. 25 (26), 1, μετὰ δὲ συνδεσμοὺς οὐκ ἀν προείσθη ἀποδίδου τοῖς ἄκο-
λουσται; which is then exemplified by μὲν and δὲ, and καὶ, καὶ.

ἀποδίδοναι] to render, or 'assign, to its proper place', see note on 1 1. 7. ἀντ-ἀποδίδοναι (in the following clause) is to do this so that there is a 'reciprocal correspondence' between the two, ἀν-ἄλληλοις. But this reciprocal correspondence between them should be introduced (by the speaker, δεῖ τὸν λέγοντα) before the audience has had time to forget (ἐστὶ μεμηται, sc. ἀκροαθή, while he still retains in his recollection) the first of the two connectives, with its accompanying clause; and the two should neither be too widely separated, nor should (another) conjunction be introduced before that which is absolutely required; for (such a construction) is seldom appropriate. "But I, as soon as he told me—for Cleon came entreating and requiring (claiming, demanding)—set out with them in my company." For in examples like this, several clauses with conjunctions are prematurely inserted before that which is to correspond as the correlative.

The example of this faulty construction here given is one of the very few which Aristotle has manufactured, contrary to his usual rule of citing examples from the sayings or writings of others supplied by memory. This has been noticed as one of the characteristic differences which distinguish Aristotle's Rhetoric from the Rhet. ad Alex.—see Introd. p. 414¹—the author of the latter, almost invariably, illustrating his precepts by examples of his own. The example itself, as appears from the πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι of the ensuing clause, is to be regarded, not as an actual exemplification of the fault, but only as a suggestion of what might be. In itself it is clear enough: but if these parenthetical clauses be multiplied—as in fact is very often done in Aristotle's own writings—between protasis and apodosis, the hearer, or reader, is very apt to

¹ Where "the single exception, of 111 16" requires modification: but the ex-
ceptions are extremely rare.
άναγκαιον ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἀμύοττει. "ἐ γώ δ', ἐπεὶ μοι εἶπεν (ἳλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενος τε καὶ αξιών), ἔπορευόμην παραλαβῶν αὐτοῦ." ἐν τούτω λοι πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένον συνδέσμου προεμβεβλητεὶς σύνδεσμοι εἴαν δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταζύ γένηται 3 τοῦ ἔπορευόμην, ἀσαφές. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὑνόμαι σήμερον εἰρέων 4 καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχονσιν, τρίτον μὴ ἀμψιόδολοι;

forget the commencement of the sentence, and the argument becomes confused.

'But if the clauses that intervene (before) ἔπορευόμην (between the πρόσωποι and it) be numerous, it becomes obscure'. μεταζύ is not unfrequently used with only one of the two extremes, between which the intermediate lies, expressed: examples are, Arist. Ach. 432, Τιθέουσαν ἰδὼν μακάρια, κεῖται δ' ἀνυπότικόν θυσίας ἑαν, μεταζύ τῶν Ἰονίων. Aesch. Choeph. 55, τὰ δ' ἐν μεταξιώμης σκότου, for σκότου καὶ φῶς. Others in Shilleto's note on Dem. de F. L. § 181, who compares with the last instance, our own twilight, i.e. 'betwixt (darkness and) light'. Add Soph. Oed. Col. 583, τὰ ἐν μεσόφω τὸ 291 (with Schneidewin's note). Eur. Hec. 437. [Isoc. Paneg. § 70, ἐν τῷ μεταζύ τῆς χώρας, Dem. de Corona § 32, τὸν μεταζύ χρόνον τῶν ὄρκων.]

A violation of this rule is pointed out by Arnold, on Thuc. I 32. 1. Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 14, 15. The parenthesis, τὸ μεταζύ, is there called interiectio. Interiectio, qua et oraiores et historicorum frequenter utuntur, ut medio sermone aliquem inserant sensum, impediri solet intellectus, nisi quod interponitur breve est; Virg. Georg. III 79—83 being adduced as an example. This is properly referred by-Quint. to perspicuitas.

§ 3. 'So one point (or head, of merit in style) appears, resides, in the due construction of connectives (conjunctions) a second is to call things by their own proper (special) names, and not by terms that are general (comprehensive; i.e. names of classes, abstract terms').

τὰ περιέχοντα is explained by Victorius and Schrader, 'periphrases, circumlocutions', such as the general definition for the particular object under it, the λόγος for the ὄνομα; or a description in several words substituted for the single ἰδιόν ὄνομα, as Ibericas herbas for spartum, durulas murias pisces for sulcamenta, Quint. VIII 2. 2, 3, and others, quoted by Schrader from Cic. de Div. II 64. This is περιφράως, a roundabout, not direct, expression of your meaning, circumlocutio, circuitus eloquendi, Quint. VIII 6. 59—61.

I have followed this explanation myself in the paraphrase, Intro. p. 293; but I now see that the word cannot bear this meaning, and adopt the explanation of Schweighäuser on Athen. VII 309 Α (q. v.), who understands by it the γενος, the genus or class name, which, being an abstract, general term, is of course less perspicuous than the direct expression of one of the particulars, (ἰδια, of which the class is composed,) by the name of the concrete individual; as animal or man than John
and Thomas. The genus may be said ἐπείρεσιν 'to comprehend, embrace, include', the species, and individuals of which it is made up; and conversely ἐπείρεσαι of the included object, τὸ ὑποκείμενον, Anal. Pr. 1 27, 43 b 23, 29. Comp. Met. Δ 2, 1013 b 34, τὰ ἐπείρεσις ὅτι ὅν τῶν καθ' ἐκαστά. Ib. Θ 2, 1046 b 24, μά γὰρ ἀρχὴ περιέχεται, τὸ λόγῳ. Moreover ὃνομασίᾳ, which must be carried on to περιέχουσιν, can hardly stand for describing's consisting of many words.

§ 4. 'Thirdly, to avoid ambiguous terms; but that, (viz. to avoid them,) only if the purpose be not the contrary': the contrary, viz. to perspicuity, that is obscurity. If your object is to be obscure, you should then not avoid, but make use of, these equivocal terms, to hide your meaning and mystify your audience.

ἀμφιβολαί [1 15. 10. ἀμφιβολαί is one of the fallacies of language, παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, 'ambiguity' in words connected in a sentence, 'in the proposition'; distinguished from ὄμωνυμα, ambiguity in single words, de Soph. El. c. 4. It is exemplified, l. c. 166 a 6 seq. See above, in preliminary observations to II 24. These two last precepts are most probably taken, like the preceding on σύνδεσμος, from Isocrates' τέχνη; and appear also in Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὄνομαζε τοῖς οἷς εἰκόνις ὄνομασαν ὅτι ἀν λέγησι, διαφεύγων τὸ ἀμφιβολον. See in the analysis of this treatise, ch. 25, Introd. p. 437. The qualification, ἀν μὴ τὰναντία προσαρμήται, seems to be Aristotle's own. On the various kinds of ἀμφιβολαί, ambiguities, in Rhetoric sunt innumerables (Quint. vii 9). They may be referred to two general heads; in singulis verbis (ὁμωνυμία), and conjunctis (Aristotle's ἀμφιβολαί).

'As is done (ambiguous terms employed, by speakers and writers) whenever, having in fact nothing to say, they make a pretence (affect) of saying something; for such (those who pretend to a meaning when there is none) express this no-meaning in verse (comp. III 1. 9, οἱ ποιηται λέγοντες εὔφηθε κ.τ.λ.), Empedocles, for instance: for this (roundabout, circuitous, phraseology) circumlocution cheats (deludes) by the multitude (accumulation) of words, and the listeners are affected (i.e. imposed upon) in the same way as the vulgar in the presence of diviners; that is, when (the latter) pronounce their ambiguous utterance, they express their approval by a nod of assent, “Croesus, if he pass the Halys, shall destroy a mighty realm”.

The oracle leaves it doubtful whether the power or dominion to be destroyed is his own, or some other. Herod. I 53, 91. Oracles are proverbially ambiguous and enigmatical. [Macbeth, v 8. 19, Be these juggling fiends no more believed That palter with us in a double sense; That keep the word of promise to our ear; And break it to our hope. Cicero, de Divin. I 56. 116 (to Pyrrhus), Aio te Aedica Romanos vincere posse.]

Perhaps the two following verses of Empedocles' collected fragments,
καὶ πάσχοισιν οἱ ἀκροταῖ ὦ περ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν ὦταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμ-
παρανεύοσιν.

Κροῖσος Ἀλν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύει.

Karsten, p. 100, lines 106—7, may in some degree illustrate Aristotle’s allu-
sion to this writer, and his sound without sense;

Neikόs ἀ νυλόμενον δίκα τῶν, ἀπάλαντον ἁμάρτη,
καὶ Φιλότης μετὰ τούτων ἵση μηῖκός τε πλάτος τε.

Karsten’s remarks on Empedocles’ style, de Emp. vita et studiis p. 60,
(prefixed to the Fragm. and Comment.) well illustrate this passage, to
which he refers. He notices the obscurity of his diction, which appears
especially in the symbolical terms, such as ἁδρία, by which he some-
times designates the elements—see for instance the four lines, Fragm.
211—214—and in the ambiguities ascribed to him here by Aristotle,
“Nonnunquam vero ad oraculorum gravitatem adsurgit, quales sunt ver-
sus illi, ἡσυχίων ἀνάγχης χρήμα κ.τ.λ. Fragm. init. ἄλλα τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμι-
μων κ.τ.λ. v. 404. Quamobrem minime miramur quod affirmat Theodo-
retus, seriores fatidicos ex Empedoclis potissimum versibus oracula sua
compilasse.”

Aristotle says of him, Poet. I 11, οὐκέν δὲ κοινὸν ὄντων ὀμήρω καὶ ἔμπε-
δοκείη πλὴν τὸ μέτρον διὸ τῶν μὲν ποιητῆς δίκαιων καλεῖν, τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν
μᾶλλον ἡ ποιητὴν. It is curious to contrast this contemptuous judgment
of his poetry and the general character and value of his writings, as it
may be gathered from the two passages of the Rhet. and Poet., with the
glowing eulogium of Lucretius, de rerum nat. 1 716—733. After describ-
ing the wonders and good things of Sicily, his birthplace, he concludes,
Nil tamen huc habuisse viro praeclarius in se, nec sanctum magis ex
mirum carumque videtur. Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius voci-
ferantur et exponunt praecrara reperta, ut vir humana videatur stirpe
creatur. And still more remarkable is Aristotle's contradiction of him-
self, if Diogenes Laertius' quotation, VIII 57, is to be depended upon, ἐν
dὲ τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν φήσιν ὅτι καὶ Ὄμφρικος ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεῖνος περὶ τὴν
φράσιν, κ.τ.λ.—comp. the passage of the Poetics—the possible explana-
tion, that what he said in the one refers to the style, and in the other to
the contents, of Empedocles' poem, is excluded by the contemptuous
remark upon his style in the Rhetoric. On the passage of Lucretius, see
Munro's note, I 733.

Of the vagabond impostors who hawked about spurious oracles and
predictions under the names of μάντες and χρησμολόγοι, prophets or
diviners and soothsayers, Aristophanes has given us specimens, Hiero-
cles in the 'Peace,' 1252, foll., and the nameless χρησμολόγος in the
'Birds,' 959, foll.

'And by reason of the less liability to mistake in general (by follow-
ing this course) diviners are accustomed to deliver their predictions in
(through the channel, or medium of) general terms of the fact (which is
prophesied), fraus latet in generalibus; for a man is much more likely to
make a hit in playing "odd and even" by saying "even" or "odd", than
καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἐλαττον εἶναι ἀμάρτημα, διὰ τῶν Ῥ. 1407 δ. γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγονσι οἱ μάντεις: τύχοι γὰρ ἀν τίς μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἀρτία ἢ περίσσα εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἐσται ἢ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολογοί οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε. ἀπαντά δὴ ταῦτα ὦμοια: ὥστ' ἀν μὴ τοιοῦτον τίνος 5 ἐνέκα, θευκτέον. τέταρτον, ὥς Προταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἀρρένα καὶ θηλεὰ καὶ σκεῦη. δεὶ any particular number that he has in his hand; or that (the event predicted) will be than when (it will be); and this is why the soothsayers never add (to their prediction) the precise time (lit. the definition of the when). All these then (circumlocutions, ambiguities, and the like) are alike (in being faults) and therefore, unless for some such (reason as was before suggested), to be avoided.' Of ἀρτιασμός "odd and even," (a child's game, played with ἀστράγαλος, or knuckle-bones, Plato, Lysis 206 B, ἱρίας ἄστραγαλος παμπάλλος,) an account is given in Becker's Charicles, on 'the games,' p. 354; and of the corresponding Latin game par impar in Gallus, p. 504. Ludere par impar, Hor. Sat. II. 3. 248 (Heindorf's note), Ovid, Nux Eleg. line 79, est etiam, par sit numerus, qui dicat, an impar. The game might be played with any kind of counters, beans, acorns, coins—in Carion's house, after he had grown rich, Arist. Plut. 816, "the servants played at odd and even with golden staters." It is usually described as played by two persons, one of whom held in his closed hand a number of counters, and the other had to guess whether it was odd or even. This was no doubt one way of playing it, but there was also another not quite so simple, as appears from this passage of the Rhetoric, and also from the Schol. on Plut. 1057, in which the guess was made at the number, πόσα. In the Plutus, l. c., the game is played with 'walnuts,' κάρυα, and the Scholiast's comment is, "one grasps a handful of walnuts, and with his hand stretched out asks, how many? and if the other guesses right, he receives all the contents of his hand; if wrong, he pays the number found in the other's hand when opened.'' οἱ χρησμολογοὶ οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε] On this intentional indefiniteness and obscurity of would-be prophets, Victorius refers to Aeschines c. Ctes. § 99, who contrasts Demosthenes with other ἀδέλφων, who ὅταν τι πεύκοντα ἀριστα καὶ ἀσφή πεύκοντα λέγειν, φοβούμενοι τὸ δηλυ- χον: and, to the same effect, of a supposed citation from the Sibylline verses, Cic. de Divin. II. 54. 110, Callide enim qui illa compositum perfect ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur, hominum et templem definitione sublata.

§ 5. 'Fourthly, to observe Protagoras' division of the classes (classification) of nouns, into male, female, and inanimate (prop. implements): for these also must be correctly assigned, each to its proper place'. This is illustrated by an example of two participles in the feminine following ἤ.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 5 §§ 5, 6.

γάρ ἀποδιδόναι καὶ ταύτα ὅρθως "ἡ δὲ ἑλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα φηστο." πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλγὰ καὶ ἐν ὅρθως ὄνομαξεν. "οἶ δὲ ἑλθόντες ἐτύπτον με.

ὠλώς δὲ δὲι εὐανάγγελον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὐφραστὸν ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὁ περ ὁι πολλοὶ

On the import of this, the earliest attempt at Greek grammar, and other similar essays of Protagoras in the same line, see Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. VII. Vol. III. p. 48 seq. in the article on Protagoras. I have there, and subsequently in a note, Introd. p. 293, endeavoured by comparison of various passages on the subject to determine its meaning, and I need not here repeat what is there said. At all events it is not the now recognised grammatical classification of 'genders of nouns', masculine, feminine and neuter. γένη is not here 'genders', though the later grammar adopted this name to express it; but simply 'classes'. This is a genuine precept of 'Ελληνισμός, 'purity of language', as is also the next.

§ 6. 'Fifthly, in the correct expression (by change of termination) of many, few, and one', followed by an example of a plural participle and verb. This is of course the due expression of the number of nouns, and the observation of the concord, or agreement of adj. with subst. or pronoun, or verb with nom. case, in number. Victorius thinks that ὄλγα stands for what was afterwards distinguished as the dual number. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 11. 40.

'And, as a general rule, every written composition must be easy to read, or—which is much the same thing—to speak, or deliver'. Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 17. Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας, § 193 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 304), γραφική δὲ λέξις (written composition) ἡ εὐανάγγελος. αὐτή δὲστων ἢ συνηθισμένη καὶ οἷον ἰσαρθισμένη τοῖς συνδέομαι, i.e. written composition must be carefully and well constructed, with due regard to the conjunctions, and the connexion of sentences, or syntax in general. This is opposed to declamatory speaking, ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις, ἡ διαλεκτική, in which the want of exact connexion—particularly asyndeton, the omission of καὶ—often aids the effect: comp. § 194.

'This is wanting (in compositions in which) conjunctions and other connecting particles are numerous, and such as are not easy to punctuate, like those of Heraclitus'. This does not contradict what was said before about the necessity of conjunctions, &c., to ensure perspicuity, it only condemns the excessive use of them; a long string of connected clauses is apt to lead to obscurity: the due mean is to be observed, here as elsewhere. With what follows compare Demetrius, u. s. § 192, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνεδρον καὶ διαλεκτικόν ὃλων ἀσφαλές πάντων ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστου κάθοδον ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν λύσιν, ἀντε ἡ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ γὰρ ταύτα σκοτεινὰ ποιώ τὸ πλεῖστον ἡ λύσιν, and Theon, Progymn. peri διηγήματος § 187 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. 11 82), παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν (ambiguity arising from punctuation) τὰ Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βιβλία σκοτεινὰ γέγονε κατακόρως αὐτῇ χρησιμε- ποιμίν, ἦτοι ἐπίτηδες ἢ καὶ δὲ ἀγνωσίας (the fault had been previously illustrated)
Quintilian, vii. 9. 7, classes this as one of the varieties of amphibolia (ambiguity), viz. per collectionem, ubi dubium est quid quo referri oporteat, exemplifying it from Virgil, Aen. i. 477 lora tenens tanem. § 8, unde controversia illa, Testamento quidam iussit poni statuam auream hastam tenentem. Quaeritur, statua hastam tenens aurea esse debeat, an hasta esse aurea in statua alterius materiarum? — ō skoteivòs, in the above passages of Demetrius and Theon, is of course an allusion to Heraclitus' well-known sobriquet, ō skoteivòs; his ‘obscurity’ was proverbial. This want of punctuation is not by any means the only, or indeed the principal, source of the obscurity of the mystic enigmatical sayings of the ‘dark’ philosopher. The remains of these have been collected by Schleiermacher, Bernays [and Bywater] in their respective tracts, and several of the most remarkable quoted by Thompson in his note on Butler’s Lect. on Anc. Phil. i. 313, note 10; see also Diog. Laert. ix. 1, vita Heracliti.

diaistícei] dia stícei, (‘to prick’), is ‘to distinguish or duly distribute by pointing or punctuation’. Two examples similar to this are given in de Soph. El. c. 4, 166 a 36, in illustration of the fallacy of diaístêsis.

‘For to punctuate Heraclitus’ writing is a hard matter (a difficult job, a business), owing to the uncertainty as to which of the two (words), the preceding or following, (any particular word) is attached; as for instance, at the commencement of his (αὐτός, masc.) composition, where he says, “Of this reason constant (being) ever (reading τοῦ ἐόντως αὐτ) men come into being devoid of understanding”; for this leaves it uncertain to which of the two (ἐόντως or δεόντως γίνονται) the word ever should be attached by the punctuation’. Bekker, who in his first edition reads τοῦ δεόντως, has in the third altered it to τοῦ δεόντως. Spengel retains the former—which is the reading of ms A (or A). τοῦ δεόντως, which had been already proposed by Victorius from a passage of Sext. Empir., is undoubtedly right. The words are quoted also by Clemens Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 716, by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XIII, and by Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. vii. 132, who extracts several lines, reading τοῦ δέοντως, and omitting αὐτ, which are cited and commented on by Schleiermacher in his tract on the fragments of Heraclitus, No. 47, p. 482. Clemens and Eusebius have τοῦ δεόντως (Schleierm.). The λόγος, according to Sextus—and this is confirmed by Heraclitus’ context, which he quotes—is the universal reason, ὁ δεός λόγος, of which men are unconscious, depending rather upon sense, though it is the true κριτήριον. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν κακόν λόγον καὶ δεόντως, καὶ οὖ κατὰ μεταχείρισις γενόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀλληλείας φησίν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. This interpretation of course requires δεόντως. An additional argument in its favour is suggested by Schleiermacher, that if δεόντως had been the reading in Aristotle’s copy of Heraclitus, he would have found no difficulty in the reference of αὐτ. The title of his σύγγραμμα—which is omitted by Diogenes in his life, ix 1, though the σύγγραμμα itself is twice mentioned, §§ 6, 7, and some of its contents quoted in the 7th and follow-
RHOTIKHS Γ §§ 6, 7.

τῷ ὑστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἄρχῃ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος: φησὶ γὰρ "τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐόντος αἰὲ ἀξένετοι ἀνθρωποὶ γίγνονται" ἀδηλον γὰρ 7 τὸ αἰὲ, πρὸς ὁποτέρω διαστίκαι. ἐτί δὲ ποιεῖ σολακικεῖν τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ἐάν μὴ ἐπιζευγνυθῇ ἄμφοιν ὁ διαστήματος—seems to have been periphrēσεως; the ordinary title of works upon similar subjects by the earlier cosmical speculators, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, &c.

ἔργον] of something hard, difficult of execution, laborious—in the same sense as ἔργῳδης, ὀφεροσ, which is derived from it—occurs occasionally in various Greek writers, though it is exemplified by only one instance in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. It is used sometimes without, sometimes without, χαλπόν. Arist. Ran. 1100, χαλπόν οὖν ἔργον διαφεῖ. A number of instances of ἔργον in this sense and ἔργῳδης are to be found in the fragments of the Comic poets, Menander, Diphilus, Posidippus, Apollodorus; for instance, ἔργον—ἀνοικὶ ἡμερὰ μεσαντίθησα μία ἔργον ἐτι μαζαὶ συνθεῖα—δῦναι ἔργον ἐκ λόγου πίστων λαβεῖν, κ.τ.λ. See the Ind. to Meineke's Fragm. Comic. Gr. s. v. Xen. Mem. iv 7, 9, ἔργον εἰναι εὑρεῖν λατρῶν κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 187 E, μέγα ἔργον...καλὸς χρῆσθαι, Ib. Tim. 28 C, τὸν ποιητὴν...εὑρεῖν τὸ ἔργον καὶ εὑροῦσα, κ.τ.λ. Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. § 34, ἀλλ' ἄφθασαν λόγων—τούτ' ἔργον εὑρεῖν. It occurs more frequently in Aristotie, and is, I think, almost confined to the later of the classical Greek writers. Arist. Pol. ii 7, 1266 b 13, ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεαρότερον εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. iii 15, 1286 a 35, ἐκεί δ' ἔργον ἀμα πάντας ἀργυρίδην καὶ ἀμαρτέιν. Eth. Nic. v 13, 1137 a 13, τούτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον (a harder task) ἥ τα υγιεία εἰδέναι. Ib. c. 3, 1130 a 8. Topic. E c 4, 133 b 16, c. 5, 134 a 19, θ 3, 159 a 5, c. 11, 161 b 32, πλέονος ἔργον δεομένων. Hist. Anim. ii 6, ὅστε ἔργον εἰναι ἰδιεῖν. Ib. vi 20, 7, 30, 2, ix 40, 29, ἔργον δ' ἐστι λαβεῖν. ἔργῳδης occurs, Eth. N. i 13, 1102 a 25, ix 2, sub σύμπε, c. 7, 1168 a 24, c. 10, 1171 a 5, and Top. Z 1, 13 b 9, ἐργῳδιστερον. In Latin we have negotium similarly employed, and nullo negotio; and Virgil has opus; Hoc opus, hic labor est, Aen. vi 129.

ὁποτέρῳ διαστίκαι. Bekker in margin of 4to. edition "an δει στίχαι!" He (and Spengel) has now returned to the vulgata lectio διαστίκαι, sub-audi δει. Gaisford conjectured δει διαστίκαι.

§ 7. 'And further a solecism is made if, in combining (two words) in one phrase (and grammatically connected with a third; as two subs. with one verb, or two verbs with a subst.), you fail to assign one which is equally appropriate to them both (lit. and again, a solecism is made, by not assigning, that is, if you don't unite in construction with them, i.e. with the two verbs or nouns, which are not expressed, one which is appropriate to them both: in other words, if you do assign to them a third word which is appropriate only to one of them). For instance, to see is not common to sound and colour (won't combine with, is not appropriate to, both) but to perceive is '.

σολακικεῖων] See note on σολακία, ii 16.2 [and Dem. Or. 45 § 30, quoted on p. 55].
64 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 5 § 7—6 § 1.

ἀρμόττει, οίνον ἡ ὕσφον ἡ χρώμα: τὸ μὲν ἵδων οὐ
κοινόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθόμενος κοινόν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ ἂν μὴ
προθεῖς εἶπης, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οίνον
“ἐμελλόν γὰρ διαλεξθεῖσα ἐκείνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ
ὡδὲ πορεύεσθαι,” ἀλλὰ μὴ “ἐμελλόν γὰρ διαλεξθεῖσα
πορεύεσθαι, εἶτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὡδὲ ἐγένετο.”

1 εἰς ὤγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ CHAP. VI.

ἐπιζευγνωσά, which occurs again c. 6 § 5, and c. 9 § 7, seems to be
technical in this grammatical application, of ‘uniting’ as it were ‘under
a vinculum or bracket’; the yoke in the Greek fulfilling a similar function
in uniting two animals, as a bracket, in arithmetic or algebra, unites two
or more symbols that are placed under it. So that ἐπιζευγνωσά is to
place the ἑνόν ὑπὸν the two words, and so bring them together in one
construction. This solecism, as Ar. rightly calls it, usually passes under
the respectable name of a figure, grammatical or rhetorical. It is the
figure εὐγμα or σύλληψις, the office of which has been already explained.
It is illustrated at length in the note on 1 4.6.

ψόφον and χρώμα are ‘governed’ by ἵδων following. Why Aristotle
should have chosen to write ἡ the alternative, instead of καὶ the copula,
which he clearly means, no one I suppose can guess. I have taken for
granted, as Victorius has also done, that he does mean and, and not or,
and have so translated it. A bad instance of ἐυγμα is given in note 1,
Intro, p. 295, from the immaculate Isocrates, Paneg. § 80 (καὶ σωτήρις
ἀλλὰ μὴ λυμεώς ἀποκαλεῖσθαι).

It tends to obscurity too (is an offence against, violation of, perspicuity
if you intend to introduce a number (of words or details) in the middle
of a sentence, not to complete the sense first (πρό, before you proceed,
lit. not to put first, that which will remove what would else be the obscu-
rit). For instance, “I intended, after having talked to him about this
and that and so and so”—here the details are to be introduced; but
these are so long, that before the speaker has come to the end of his
sentence the hearers have forgotten the beginning—“to start:” instead
of, “I was about to start after my conversation with him, and then (when)
this and that and so and so happened.” This is μεταξολογία, interiectio
(Quint.), or Parenthesis. See Intro, p. 295.

CHAP. VI.

Of ὄγκος (swelling), pomp, grandeur, dignity (Auct. ad Heren. IV 13.18,
dignitas), of style; most appropriate to ἔρις poetry: Poet. xxiv. 9,
tο γὰρ ἥμων στασιμώτατο καὶ ὑγιόδειτατο τῶν μέτρων ἑτάν. Ib. § 6,
ο τοῦ ποιήματο ὄγκος. See Gräfenhan’s note ad loc. So Dion. Hal. de
Dinarch. Iud. c. 7 (Vol. V. 643, Reiske), τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς τὸ μὴ τραγικὸν
μὴ δὲ ὑγιόδεις ἑχ. This is near akin to σεμβλητός, on which Hermogenes
has a chapter, περὶ ἱδέων, τομ. α’. (Spengel, Ῥητ. Gr. II. 287), and περὶ
σεμανὸς λόγον, περὶ εὐρέσεως, τομ. θ. c. 11 (Ib. p. 255), and again περὶ
μεγίστου, in the preceding chap. 10, p. 286. So Demetrius writes περὶ
RHETORIKHs Γ 6 §§ 1, 2.

λόγω χρήσθαι ἄντ' ὄνοματος, οἰον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλὰ εἶπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἱσον. εἰς δὲ συντομίαν τὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄνομα καὶ ἐὰν ἁἰσχρῶν ἄπροτές· εὰν μὲν ἕν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἁἰσχρῶν, τοῦνομα μεγαλοπρέπειος, in his peri ἐρμηνείας, § 38, seq. (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III. 270 seq.): and Dion. Hal., de Dinarch. Iud. 3. 7, attributes μεγαλοπράσεια to Demosthenes' style. And in these writers ὄγκος, μέγεθος, and ἁξιώμα (dignity) are often associated as characteristics of style. In Top. Θ 1, 155 b 22, ἢ εἰς ὄγκον τοῦ λόγου (one of the four motives for multiplying ἱσομετρίας), it means nothing more than a device for swelling out, increasing the bulk of, the discourse or argument.

In the language of Rhetoric we see that ὄγκος implies excellence and is a virtue of style. In the vulgar usage of common life, when it and its derivatives are applied metaphorically, as they often are, it may bear either a favourable or an unfavourable interpretation. In the latter case the 'pomp' of style becomes 'pomposity', and the 'swelling phrases' turgid and inflated ampullae. And in a moral sense the same notion of fastus is attached to it, and it comes to denote vanity, ostentation, arrogance, as Plat. Meno 90 a, where it is personal, and opposed to κόσμος. In Soph. Oed. Col. 1162, βραχὺν μύθων οὐκ ὄγκον πλέων is a short conversation without 'bulk', not unnaturally and unreasonably swelled out or lengthened. ὄγκοβεισ χάδη in the same author (Fragm. Inc. ap. Stobaeum, No. 679, Dind.) has the same sense in a moral application. And so ὄγκον ἀφεὶν, Soph. Aj. 129. τὸ ὄγκηρον, Ar. Eth. N. IV. 13, sub finem, is again 'inflated', of mere bulk without solidity, show without substance; i. e. morally, 'ostentation', a pretentious air and exterior, assumption. See Ernesti, Lex. Tech. Gr. s. νν. ὄγκηρον, ὄγκος, ὄγκοβος, ὄγκωδες.

§ 1. 'To dignity, amplification of style, the following things contribute; first, the substitution of definition (or detailed description) for the (direct, proper) name (of the object); to say for example not circle, but "a plane figure which is in all points equidistant from the center". One would have supposed that this was an exemplification rather of the unfavourable sense of ὄγκος: it also seems to be opposed to what was said c. 5. 3, τοῖς ἐλάσμοις ὄνοματε λέγοντι καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχοντι: and in fact dignity ought not to interfere with perspicuity. The two precepts, however, do not in reality contradict one another. The use of abstract, general terms, instead of the plain and direct individual names, is a source of obscurity: there is no obscurity, but rather the contrary, in setting forth the definition of it at length. 'For (the purpose of) brevity the contrary (is the rule), the proper name, and not the definition'. Both of these precepts appear in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 22 (23) §§ 3 and 5. They are probably taken, like the others mentioned in Introd. pp. 437, 438, from Isocrates' τίκη.

§ 2. 'And if (you have to express) anything ugly or foul' (to the eye or to the mind and moral sense), 'or unbecoming, if the foulness or indecency is in the (conception, explanation, description, i.e.) meaning and associations, use the word, if in the word itself, the description'. See on ἀειχρολογία, note on c. 2. 13, and the distinction there laid down.

AR. III.
§ 3. 'And setting forth (representing) things by metaphors and the descriptive and ornamental epithets (epithets proper, and any descriptive addition to a noun), guarding at the same time against giving them a too poetical character'. One of the characteristics of Thucydides is τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ὄνομάτων, according to Dionysius, de Thuc. Iud. 24; as likewise of Gorgias and his school, who exaggerated this defect so that their prose made a near approach to dithyrambs.

§ 4. 'And to make one many (to put plural for singular) after the manner of the poets: they say, though all the while there is only one harbour, "to Achaean harbours". [Victorius refers to the treatise περὶ ὄψεως, 23 § 2 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. I 274), ἵνα δὲν προσπίπτει τὰ πληθυντικὰ μεγαλορρημονότερα, καὶ αὐτῷ διὸ θεοκομοῦντα τῷ ἄρχω τοῦ ἄριστοῦ, which the writer illustrates by quoting Soph. Oed. Rex 1403—7, ἐγάμοι γάμοι κ.τ.λ.]

λιμένας εὶς 'Ἀχαϊκοῦς' There are five instances of λιμένας for a single harbour in Euripides, and one in Sophocles, but none of them is 'Achaean harbours'. Victorius says that he has not been able to find the passage.

And again, "Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablets", the letter, namely, which Iphigenia was proposing to send by one of the two strangers to Orestes at Argos. Iph. Taur. 727.

πολύθυροι restored (for πολύβρυνοι) from πολύθροι found in one MS, describes the many leaves of the tablets: this, which was less than the simpler form, with only two leaves, shows that it was a long letter.

On δίλτος, comp. Becker's Charicles, p. 162 note [Vol. I. p. 285, of unabridged German ed.], Rich's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. s. v. cera p. 144. The leaves of the tablets, which were thin slabs or plates of wood coated with wax, were sometimes shaped like doors (a very natural form to give them), whence the name 'θύρα. Pollux IV 18 (ap. Herm. ad Iph. T. 715), οἱ δὲ Ἀττικὸν γραμματεῖον διθύρων καὶ διθύρας τὰς πτύχας, ἄχρι δύο ἐβάθε ἄνει πτύχας, καὶ τρίτυχον καὶ πολύτυχον. Hesychius, θύρηδας Ἀττικὸ τὰς γραμμάτων πτύχας, καὶ διθύρας λέγουσι, οὐ τρίθυροι, ἄλλα τρίτυχον τρίτυχοι. Paley, ad loc., well compares the δίλτος with its wooden leaves to 'the modern ivory memorandum-book'. Becker, u.s., observes that these wax tablets were only used for letters, and matters of no permanent moment. They could be fastened with a string and sealed, Paley on Iph. Aul. 37.

διαστυχαὶ is interpreted by the Lexicons as equivalent to πτυχαί, and meaning 'folds'—not of course, though the difference is not stated, folded like a modern letter, of paper, which this explanation sug-
gests, but in another sense of πτυχή or πτύξ, 'a leaf, layer, slab, or plate.' It is repeated in line 793, γραμμάτων διαπυκάσ. The Commentators, who are totally silent on the subject, appear to take the same view. As it seems necessary to assign some meaning to the διά, we may suppose that it expresses the division of the leaves, whether two or more; but in the latter case, derived from the primary division into two. Hermann and Paley have both noticed, what is sufficiently apparent, that Aristotle here has mistaken Euripides' meaning. It is quite plain from the epithet πολίθωροι, that the plural is to be understood literally of the several leaves of the tablets. If Euripides had written δέλτοι he would have used the licence ascribed to him by Aristotle.

§ 5. 'And not to combine (two cases with one article, Victorius: τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός), but to assign or attach (ἀποδίδωσι or προστίθεναι, understand ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, or by σύν, from ἐπικατανύσα) each to either (an article in either instance to either case) τῆς γυναικός τῆς ἡμετέρας, 'that wife of ours'. But if conciseness be the object (if you would express yourself concisely), the contrary, τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός, 'our wife.'

§ 6. 'And to use (as a rule) in speaking (and writing) conjunctions and other connectives; or, for conciseness, to write without connectives, but not without connexion: as either πορευθεὶς καὶ διαλεγθεὶς, or πορευθεὶς διαλέχθην. It is impossible to translate this into English, so as to shew the difference in the two Greek phrases, because the approved translation of the second is to convert the participle, which we seldom use in this connexion, into a finite verb connected by a copula with the verb succeeding: so that in our language the two expressions become identical.

ἀνυφέτως λόγος is composition in which the conjunctions and other connecting particles, especially the copula, are omitted; and therefore more or less loose, unconnected, incoherent. Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. p. 45. It is to be observed that as connecting particles occur much more frequently in Greek than in our own language, the want of them, which constitutes ἀσυνδετόν, would be much more disagreeable to the Greeks than to us, and would give the composition the appearance of being both naked and disjointed. Consequently the general rule (which is stated here) is to avoid it: but in special cases, where the aim is to give emphasis and vigour, rapidity and conciseness to a narrative, it may often be used with advantage, as the examples will shew. Demetrius peri ἐρωτείας, § 192, τὸ ἀνυφέτελος καὶ διαλειμμάτων διὸν ἀσφαλές πᾶν.

ἀνυφέτως is defined alike in several of the later Greek rhetoricians, Hermogenes, peri μεθόδου δεινότητος, 11, Phoebammon, Tiberius, Herodian, Zonaeus and others, as the 'omission of συνδεσμον'; and all alike exemplify it by the omission of καὶ, which is no doubt the most frequent
7 διελέχθην. καὶ τὸ Ἀντιμάχου χρήσιμον, ἢ εἰ ὁὐ νῦ ῥήματος ὑπὲρ εἰς τὸν Τεμπεσσού, ἔστι τις ἤμεος ὀλίγοις λόφοις.

case. Comp. Cic. Orat. xxxix 135, who speaks of it as one of the orationis lumina et quodammodo insignia, quum demptis coniunctionibus dissolute plura dicantur. Quint. IX 3. 50, figuram, quae quia coniunctionibus carat dissolutio vocatur; apta quum quid instantius dicimus; nam et singula incitantur et quasi plura sunt, seq. Confer omnino Dem. Phil. p. 118, § 27, Ibid. p. 130 § 130, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου Ἐλλήνων συγκαλέων συνάγειν διδάσκειν νομοθετεῖν. The speeches of Lysias against Eratothenes and Andocides both conclude with an asyndeton of this kind. The former ends thus: πανοραμα καταγρόν. ἀπερίδοτον, ἡφαίστειν, περίπατος ἔχετε, δικαίωμα, ἔδειξε ἐκείνοις, which Aristotle quotes Rhet. III 19. 6, at the end of the work; and of course wrongly. See also III 12. 2 and 4, where a similar example is given; not to omit Cicero’s, abicit excelsit, evasit, erupsit [in Catilinam II § 1]. Demetrius perί ἐρμηνείας, § 194 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 304), ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικῶν ἡ λύσις παράδειγμα ἔγκεισθω τόδε ἰδεύξαιν, ἐγκυκλοφορία, τεμπέσσον, φίλη, κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of § 6 is this. If you wish to add pomp and dignity to your style, as in an ordinary narrative, employ conjunctions—Victorius refers this to the so-called figure ἐν δίδῳ δοιν, hendiadys, pateris libamus et auro, in brevia et Syrtes, molemque et montes insigni altos imposuit, from Virgil’s Georg. and Aen.—Or, if you don’t employ conjunctions, at any rate don’t break the connexion between the parts of the sentence; if on the other hand (as he implies elsewhere) you want to be concise or give vigour and animation to your language, asyndeton will often do it.

§ 7. ‘And the (practice) of Antimachus is useful (for this purpose), to draw the materials of a description from the attributes, (qualities, virtues, excellences,) which (the thing described) has not, as he does in the case of Teumessus, “There is a windy low hill”; for in that way the amplification may be carried to infinity’. This is a quotation from Antimachus’ Thebæis, the expedition of Adrastus and his six Argive companions against Thebes, the ἐν τῇ ἢλιῳ Ἐθῆσ. In this he had occasion to mention Teumessus, “a village of Boeotia in the plain of Thebes, standing upon a low rocky hill of the same name”. Launching out, as his manner was, into an episodical encomium of this little hill, he expended many verses upon it διὰ πολλῶν ἔπων, “enumerating all the virtues that did not belong to it”. Strabo, IX 2, Boeotia, p. 409. Strabo, like Aristotle, only quotes these five words, adding, as a reason for breaking off there, γνώμων δὲ τὰ ἔπη. This same poem is referred to by Horace, A. P. 146, Nec reditum Diomedis ab interitu Melagri; a narrative of Diomedes’ fortune and return seems to have been interwoven with the main subject of the poem. Düntzer, Epic. Gr. Fragm. p. 99. (The fragments of Antimachus are collected by Düntzer in this volume, p. 99 seq. and Nachtrag pp. 38-43.)

The Scholiast Porphyrius, on the verse of Horace, says, Antimachus fuit cyclicus poeta: hic adgressus est materiam, quam sic extendit ut
viginti quattuor volumina (i.e. books) impleverit antiquam septem duces usque ad Thebae perduceret. On the connexion of the two stories, see Welcker Ep. Cyclus, p. 163; also quoted by Orelli ad loc. Antimachus was an elder contemporary of Plato. The occasion of their meeting is related by Plutarch, Lysand. 18, and differently by Cicero, Brutus 51 § 191, Antimachum, Clarium poetam, qui quum convocatis auditoribus legeret eis magnum illud quod novitatis volumen suum (the Thebais), et eum legentem omnes praeter Platonem reliquissent, Legam, inquit, nihilominus: Plato enim mihi unus instar est omnium millium. (Welcker pronounces both forms of the story unworthy of credit.) In magnum Cicero no doubt refers not to the merit or celebrity, but to the bulk of the poem. His style is spoken of by Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 22 (v. 150, ed. Reiske), together with that of Empedocles, Findar, Aeschylus, Thucydides and Antiphon, as belonging to the αυτοτρόπη κλης, already described. To class him with these authors may seem to imply approbation. Quintilian, X 1. 53, in a comparison of the Epic poets, places him next to—though far below—Homer. Contra in Antimacho vis et gravitas et minime vulgare eloquentia genus (this agrees with Dionysius) habet tandem. Sed quamvis et secundas fere grammaticorum (of Alexandria) consensus deferat; et affectibus et incunditate et dispositione et omnino arte deficitur, ut plane manifesto appearat quanto sit aliud proximum esse, aliud secundum: (so Horace of Jupiter, nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum; proximos illi tamen occupavit Pallas honores). He is called by some authors Clarian, by others Colophonian. Claros was a small town near Colophon, a colony and dependency of it. Most probably Claros was his birthplace, for which the more important and neighbouring mother-city was substituted. See further on Antimachus in Schrader and Buhle's notes; and on Teumessus, Valken. ad Phoen. 1107.

[ἐξ δὲ μὴ ἔχει. This device of description by a series of negations may be exemplified by Homer's Odys. vi 43, (Olympus) ὁδ' ἄνδροι τινάσσεται ὁμὴν πορ' δὲ βραχὺ δεῦται ὁμὴ διοικήτας (and Lucr. III. 18). There are some striking instances in an expanded Anglo-Saxon paraphrase by Cynewulf of Lactantius' poem de Phoenice, And there nor rain nor snow, nor breath of frost, Nor blast of fire, nor rush of rattling hail, Nor fall of rime nor scorching heat of sun, Nor lasting cold nor drought nor winter-shower... (This translation is due to the Rev. W. W. Skeat.)

'This mode of treatment, that the things are not there, (or that the object of praise or censure has them not,) may be applied to things either good or bad (to bad things in a panegyrick, to good as virtues, accomplishments, merits of all kinds, in a censure or invective), in whichever of the two ways it may be serviceable (or, whichever of the two the occasion may require). Hence (from the absence of a certain quality or attribute) the poets also derive their epithets (ἦνα here stands for an adjective: see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III. on ἄνδρα and ἄνδρα)
such as a stringless or lyreless music'—music, but without the ordinary accompaniment or instrument, the strings of the lyre, or the lyre itself: applied to the sound of the wind-instrument, the trumpet—for they apply privative epithets; this being popular when expressed in the metaphors of proportion, as when the (sound or music of the) trumpet is called a lyreless music'.

ἐκ τῶν στερημάτων...ἐπιφέρουσι τ. liti. they attach epithets borrowed or derived from privations: στερῆσαι and ἐρέσι being one of the four forms of opposition: Categ. c. 10, 11 6 17 and 12 a 26 seq.

μεταφορά...ταῖς ἀνάλογοις] ἀνάλογοι in this combination seems to be used adverbially; comp. supra c. 4 §§ 3, 4, τίν μεταφοράν τιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, ἐνθρεά τ. 7 § 10, τοῖς ἀνάλογοι. On the proportional metaphor, the best of all the four kinds, I have already referred (on III 4.4) to the Introd. pp. 290—292. See also Appendix B Bk. III on Metaphor, where this is fully explained.

Comp. with this section Poet. XXI 15, 16 ὡς δὲ τῇ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς (the proportional, to wit) χρήσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγερώνως τοῦ ἀλλότριον ἀφοβίσα τῶν ὁλεθρίων τιν, οἷον ἐν τίν ὀπίσθεν ἕτοι τόπον μὴ Ἀρεως ἀλλ' ἀπων (Victorius' emendatio palmaria for the vulgata lectio ἀλλ' ὀσων).

I transcribe Twining's excellent note on this passage, which well illustrates our present subject. Note 189, p. 446. "Metaphors from their nature are in danger of being obscure or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. If the simple substitution of the improper for the proper term would be obscure or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an image or comparison (referring to Demetrius, περὶ ῥηματικὰς § 80); it may be used analogically, and we may say φιάλη Ἀρεως or φιάλη ἀπων; or if that be not sufficient for perspicuity—that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner or circumstances in which the expression is introduced—we may join these (φιάλη Ἀρεως ἀπων), or even add to either of them the proper word itself. There is a fine instance of this negative mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah li. 21, 'Thou drunken, but not with wine'. The same end is often answered by an epithet affirming of the thing expressed some quality of the thing signified; thus ships are floating bulwarks [Mason's Ode to the Naval Officers], and the lyre a chorded shell, where Dryden [Song for St Cecilia's Day, line 17, 'Jubal struck the chorded shell'] has made the same use of the affirmative epithet chorded that Theognis did of the negative ἄχροδος in his metaphorical expression for a bowl, φόρμα γῆ ἄχροδος (comp. Rhet. III 11.11, and Demetr. περὶ ῥηματικὰς § 85, quoted in Introd. p. 297). Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor; as in the πτερωτοῖς ἄρωσι (1Ph. Aul. 251) of Euripides, 'winged chariots'. Here we have a double metaphor: chariot for ship, and wing for sail.'
He then concludes with four examples of these privative explanatory epithets from the Greek Tragedians, which I have already quoted with some others in the Introduction p. 297, in the note on this passage of the Rhetoric. Add to these Cephasodotus' 'parti-coloured millstones', μύλωνας ποικίλους, III 10.7, by which he meant to represent the 'crushing' properties of the Athenian 'triremes' in devastating the coasts and islands and exacting tribute. These differ from millstones in having their sides gaily painted in various colours. ἄπτερος φάτε, Aesch. Agam. 267 (contrasted with ἔτσια πτεροίητα), ἄπτερος ὄρνες, Eur. Iph. Taur. 1095. [Eur. Phoen. 791 (*Ἀρπη) κόμον ἀναλότατον προξενεύεις, 808 Σφιγγὸς ἀμφοτέρασες εὖν φίδας, Herc. Fur. 879, 891, 892. Similarly the Italian poet, Guarini, called birds 'winged lyres'.]

It remains to notice the proportion of the metaphor, which, according to Victorius, is Trumpet: sound of trumpet (anonymous): lyre: μῆλος, the music of the lyre (properly so called). To qualify the harshness, throw light on the obscurity, of this improper application of the word μῆλος, the epithet ἄλωρον "not that of the lyre" is added.

One more remark on privative epithet, which has not been pointed out. They have two uses, the one to qualify, the other to contradict, the substantive they are joined with. In the latter case they are not metaphors at all. This is what is called the figure αὐτονόμον, which combines in one expression two contradictory notions of which the one denies the other: ἡχούρον ἄδωρα δόρα (Aj. 655), an enemy's gifts are no gifts at all; χάρις ἄχαρας "graceless grace", or "thankless favour"; μήτηρ ἀμήτερος, Soph. El. 1154; γάμος ἄγαμος, Oed. T. 1214; δουλον διόκησιν, Phil. 554; ὅπως δύνας ἴβαν θράσος ὀς δύκας (Eur. Hipp. 821, 867), insaniens sapiensia, strenua inertia.

CHAP. VII.

On the general subject, and the connexion of the several parts of this Chapter on Propriety, see the Introduction, pp. 297–303, where they are treated in full.

The passages of Cicero and Quintilian in which the same subject is dealt with are referred to in p. 298: and p. 299 has a note (1), with various references on ἰθος and πάθος in style.

§ 1. ‘Style will have propriety, if it be made to express feeling (the various emotions) and character, and be proportionate to the subject-matter’. The perverse transition from the feminine to the abstract neuter ἀνάλογον (sc. πράγμα, as in triste lupus stabilis et sim.) is characteristic of Aristotle's carelessness in writing. Perhaps, however, it may be used adverbially as in c. 6 § 7 (see note).

§ 2. ‘This proportion consists in a style of composition (λέγων of speaking and writing) such as is neither off-hand (i.e. careless and slovenly, αὐτονομικὸς is 'extemporaneous') on a dignified, nor stately on a slight and mean (lit. cheap), subject, and has no ornamental epithets (ἐπι σεβός refers to ἐπιθημα) attached to mean words; otherwise, it (the composition) has the appearance of mere comedy (i.e. laughable; its subject
The text is a passage from a Greek work, discussing the concept of "tragic poetry" and "august fig". It references Cleophon's poetry and the propriety of the language used in tragic poetry. The text also mentions the word "sacrum" and its use in Greek literature. The passage discusses the relationship between the poet and the audience, and the role of the poet in conveying the tragic message.
κόσμος] This is mentioned as one of the kinds (είδος) of poetical and ornamental words, with γλώττα and μεταφορά, Poet. xxii. 7, and again § 19, as an άνωμα. έτι δέ τα τωιάτα το κύριον και μεταφορά και κόσμος. It is therefore a poetical or ornamental word. άπαι δε δυναμένα είσιν ς κύριον ς γλώττα μεταφορά κόσμος πεσομένον κ.τ.λ., eight in all. Poet. xxii. 4. All these are defined seriatim except κόσμος. Twing in his note on § 17, argues from this that Aristotle could not have intentionally omitted this alone, and that the explanation of κόσμος is one of the many lacunae which had to be supplied in Aristotle's miss, one of the διαβρωμένα— the moth- and worm-eaten passages, as Strabo calls them in his celebrated account of the transmission of Aristotle's manuscripts (XIII. 1). In the Paris ms, indeed, there is a mark of omission which Buhle and Hermann have indicated in their editions. He understands κόσμος to signify "such an epithet as embellishes or elevar the thing to which it is applied." Though he quotes this passage of the Rhetoric, he does not notice that είνα here applied to it proves that the kind of ornament intended by κόσμος is an ornamental epithet. See also Graev. on Poet. xxii. 17, p. 159 and on xxiv. 9, p. 189, where tois επίθετοις κόσμοι is quoted from Dionysius de admirabilis vi dicendi in Demosthene c. i, (vi 955. 12, ed. Reiske) and again, de Thuc. iud. c. 23, p. 864. 2.

'Αθηναίος τραγικός. 'Ηρών, 'Αμφαράος, 'Αχιλλεύς, 'Ιάκωβας, 'Ερυθών, 'Ομός, 'Ερώτης, 'Δευτέρως, περαιτερώς, Τηλεφόρος, Suidas. He is omitted in Wagner's collection, Fragnm. Trag. Gr. vol. iii. We learn from Poet. ii. 5, that his subjects and characters were neither above nor below the level of ordinary, every-day, life and character. To the same effect it is stated in Poet. xxii. 1, that his style was low or humble, ταπεινός, and devoid of all poetical ornament. Grafnahan, ad loc. ii. 5. Id. ad Poet. xxii. 1, "qui humili dictione imitatur vulgares mores."

To Suidas' list of 10 tragedies must be added the Μανδρόσουλος, de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 27, σών το Κλεοφών ποιεί εν τῷ Μανδροσουλῷ, where it is quoted in illustration of a mode of argument.

εἶ δὲ τὸν τὸν τὸ χαῖρει [av] That αὐτός, which Bekker puts in brackets, may be retained and justified with εἶ and the optative, will be seen by referring to the Appendix (D) on εἶ δύναις αὐτός 20. 5 [Vol. ii p. 336].

πάντα] the feminine of ποίει and δεσπότης, is a female title of honour, equivalent to διστοί, implying reverence and high station, 'august'. It is best rendered by 'Lady'. It has two forms, πάντα and πάντα—δοσία, πάντα δεσίν, Eur. Bacch. 370—and in both the α is short, and can therefore be elided. There is a good article on the word in Liddell and Scott's Lex. which will supply further information.

§ 3. 'Emotion is expressed, if insult (wanton outrage) (be what you
4 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δεὶ όμοιός. πιθανοὶ δὲ τὸ πράγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις. παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς are describing), by the language of one in anger; if impiety or anything foul or base, by that of indignation and ruthless (hesitat’ion) even to name (or mention) it; what is praiseworthy, by that of admiration; what is pitiable, in a low tone and language, and so on for the rest in like manner’. With ἀγαμένον and ταπεινὸς supply λέγοντος. [For ἀδηλῇ καὶ αλοχρᾷ κ.τ.λ., compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) § 9, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ βλασφημίαν ἔχει τινά, καὶ ὀνομάζειν ἀκινήτας ἀν ἐν ὑμῖν ἐμα.] ἀγαμένον as in Plat. Phaedo 89 Α, ‘approvingly, admiringly, with admiration’, ὡς δὴ καὶ εὐμνῆς καὶ ἄγαμον τῶν νεανίσκων τῶν λόγων ἀπεδίκησα. The word is rare, and the meaning here has been doubted. Victorius, cum laetitia, ‘with delight or exultation’. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 9, omnibus perpensis, inclines to the opinion that in Aristotle (that is, here: in Plato, it has the other meaning,) it signifies admirabiliter, magnifice, ‘admirably, so as to be admired’; which seems to me the least likely of the three.

ταπεινῶς] seems to combine Horace’s dolet sermone pedestri (A. P. 95) of the language, with Cicero’s summissa voce [Orator § 56] of the tone of voice: a low tone in expressing pity is appropriate to both.

§ 4. ‘This appropriate language (proper or peculiar to the emotion to be represented) also gives a plausible air to the facts (or statements under consideration): for the mind draws a false inference to the truth of the speaker (the reality of his emotion, and hence to the truth of his statements), because every one under similar circumstances feels the same—so that they (the audience) are led to think, even though the fact is really not so, that the things (the facts of the case, the things under consideration) are as the speaker represents them (αὐτὰ ἔχεις φήσῃ, Buhle), and (besides this) the listener always has a fellow-feeling with one who speaks with emotion, even though what he says is naught (worthless; proves nothing’).

οἰκεία] comp. infra § 7, διόμενα οἰκεία τῇ ἔκτι.

παραλογίζεσαι κ.τ.λ.] The fallacy is this. A speaker puts himself into a passion in describing some atrocity imputed to his opponent, assuming the tone of anger or virtuous indignation, which would naturally be provoked by the act as described. People always sympathize with the expression of emotion, and the audience, knowing what it is to be angry themselves, and perceiving by reference to their own experience the ‘appropriateness’ of the language, tone, and gestures, to the true expression of the passion, draw from this the fallacious inference that the speaker must be in earnest, as they were when they were similarly affected, and therefore that the facts that he states must be true: arguing from the truth of the delineation to the truth of the fact stated.

The logic of the fallacy is explained in de Soph. El c. 5, 167 ὅ τ’ seq. It proceeds from the false assumption, in antecedent and consequent, that they are reciprocally convertible: that if a consequent always follows an antecedent the converse is likewise true, and that the consequent in-
PHILOPHS Γ 7 §§ 4—6.

After the language &c., used is the ordinary sign of the emotion represented, as they themselves know from their own experience; and does usually arise in men as a consequence of such facts as those alleged: the antecedent is then falsely inferred 'reciprocally' from the ordinary, but not necessary or universal, consequent. This may be otherwise represented as a confusion between the σμέιον, the usual and ordinary, and the τεκμήριον, the universal and necessary, accompaniment of something thereby signified. Comp. Poet. xxiv 18, ἓστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴοναι γὰρ ἄθροισιν, διὰν τούτῳ δόσιν τοῦτο ἃ τῷ γυμνόνιν γίνεται, εἰ τὸ ὑστερῶν ἑστι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γυμνότατον τοῦτο ἢ ἕστι λείψεις. And with the language of our text, infrά paraлογίζεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχ. Twining in his note on the passage of the Poet., at the end of n. 222, p. 488 [II p. 352, ed. 2], has quoted and translated this sentence of the Rhetoric, § 5. 'And this is the reason why many (speakers) try to stun (overwhelm, confound) their hearers with the clamour that they raise'. The speaker carries, that is, his déινος or exaggeration even to the excess of mere empty noise and clamour, thinking thereby to produce a deeper impression upon the audience, who will suppose that the depth and sincerity of his feeling are in proportion to the noise he makes. The δὲ is, because the listener always sympathizes with the language and raised tone of passion; the more violent the expression of it, the more he is likely to be affected. Thuc. vii 42 has κατάληψις to describe the 'consternation', abattement de coeur, of the Syracusans at the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

§ 6. 'And this mode of proof arising out of (external) signs (exhibited in language, tone, and action) may be invested also with an ethical character, in that (in so far as) that which is appropriate (i.e. the appropriate language, &c.) to each class and moral state (i.e. character, ἠθός; the sum of the moral states and habits which characterizes the individual) is attendant upon each of them. The datives γένει and ἔξει seem to belong equally to ἀκολουθεῖ and ἀρμόττουσα. Compare, with what is said here of ἔξει and ἠθός, III 16. 9.'

In the Introduction, p. 108 foll., on ἠθός, I have endeavoured to shew (against Spengel) that there are three kinds of ἠθος distinguished by Aristotle in the Rhetoric; (1) the ἠθός ἐν τῇ λέγοντι the personal character exhibited by the speaker himself, serving as a kind of proof of his sincerity, competency, and good will; (2) the characters of certain
ages and classes, with which the speaker must be previously acquainted, in order to accommodate his general tone, and the opinions he expresses, to the tastes and dispositions of his audience, their political sentiments and such like: as for instance an audience of rich and poor, young and old, aristocratic and democratical, must be addressed each in a different tone and with different language, suitable to their several opinions and prejudices; and (3) what I have called the `dramatic' characters, which are treated only in the third book as belonging to style, and are still more important, and occupy a larger share of attention in poetry (especially dramatic poetry)—and therefore in the Poetics xv—than in the prose of Rhetoric. These consist in the accurate representation of personal character, as described by Horace, A. P. 114 seq. See also the instances given in the parallel passage, III 16.9, above referred to. This is what is now called ‘keeping’, and seems to me to be totally distinct from the second, which refers to classes; although the two have some points in common. The principal differences between them are that the latter describes personal peculiarities, and is an ingredient of propriety of style: and the two are therefore treated in different parts of the work. The dramatic ἱδος, morata oratio, does however in some inferior degree assist the argument, as Aristotle has just told us, and is a kind of δείκτης; it conveys a favourable impression of the accuracy of the speaker, and the truth of his description.

By class I mean (according to age, different ages) the various ages of life, youth, manhood, old age; and (sexes) woman or man, and (natives of different countries) Lacedaemonian or Thessalian; and by states (moral states) those by which the character (or quality) of a man’s life is determined: for it is not every kind of state that determines the character of men’s lives. *Εξεις, an acquired, developed, permanent, habit, is a general term (opposed to διάθεσις an incomplete and progressive state, Categ.) and applicable to various states in men and things, physical as well as intellectual and moral. It is only the last two that determine the ἱδος.

§ 7. ‘If therefore (the speaker) use the words (language) also appropriate (οἰκείος, domestic: hence properly belonging to, things of one’s own: hence special, appropriate, &c) ‘to the (given) state, he will produce this character (i.e. convey it to his speech): for the clown’ (rustic, boor: ἄφροικος, country-bred, opposed to δαστείος, city-bred, polished, as urbanus to rusticus) ‘would not use the same language nor in the same way (sc. the same tone, pronunciation, action), as the educated gentleman’. These are the two ἐξεις of ἐντραπέλα ‘easy, well-bred pleantry’ and its opposite ἄφροικα, ‘rusticity, boorishness’; the contrasted ‘conversational virtue and vice’, of Eth. Nic. II 7, and IV 14. Comp. Poet.
άγροικος ἄν καὶ πεπαίδευμένος εἶπεν. πάσχονδι δὲ τι οἱ ἀκροταὶ καὶ ὃ κατακόρως χρώνται. οἱ λογογρά-φοι, "τίς δ' οὐκ οἶδεν;" "ἀπαντες ἰσασιν" ὁμολο-γεὶ γάρ ὁ ἀκούων οἰσχυρόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ οὐ περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

8 τὸ δ' εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἀπάν. P. 1408 b.
9 των τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν. ἀκός δ' ἐπὶ πάση ύπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον· δεὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν1. P. 132.

ΧV 4, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνδρευν μὲν τὸ ἱθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμόττον γνωκεὶ τὸ ἄνδρεαν ἢ διαφή εἶναι.

What follows is a note suggested by the preceding remarks upon the παθητικὴ λέξις, and not very closely connected with the immediate subject of 'propriety'.

'The hearers are affected also in some degree (some impression is also made upon the audience) by what (a trick which) the speech-writers employ to a nauseous excess; (the introduction viz. of such phrases as) "Who doesn't know?" "Everybody knows." For the listener is shamed into an admission (of the fact) that he may be supposed to share (what is assumed to be) the feeling of "everybody else".

On λογογράφου, the paid writers of speeches for the use of plaintiff or defendant in the law-courts, a much-despised class, see note on ΠΠ ΙΙ. 7. Victorius supposes, in accordance with his preconceived opinion of a still continued hostility between Aristotle and Isocrates, that the latter is here alluded to; quoting four instances of it from Isocrates and two from Demosth. de Cor. This is hardly enough to sustain the charge. On this subject, see Introd. p. 41, foll.

§ 8. Of propriety in the use of every τότος and every ornament of style. 'The seasonable and unseasonable', fitness in regard to time, place, occasion, 'is common alike to all the kinds'. This observation is thought by Victorius to be suggested by the 'nauseous excess' of the preceding section.

§ 9. 'A remedy for every excess (exaggeration in style) is the notorious practice of speakers: a speaker, that is, should pronounce censure on himself beforehand (in anticipation of the possible disapprobation of the audience): for [then, the exaggeration] is thought to be sound and right since the speaker himself is quite aware of what he is doing'.

τὸ θρυλούμενον] See note on ΠΠ 21. 11.

The reading of all MSS is προσεπιπλήττει, which the staunch Bekker and Spengel, the consistent adherent of A or A5, both retain. Nevertheless, the emendation προσεπιπλήττει makes excellent sense, and its rival is decidedly inferior; and a passage of Quintilian, VIII 3. 37, which seems to have been copied from this of Aristotle and repeats his words, has (in the Greek words) προσεπιπλήσθειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ, and a little above, praec- minientium, which also seems to be a reminiscence of προσεπιπλήττειν; Spalding (ad loc. Quint.) and Gesner approve, and Casaubon had.
already suggested this emendation, and Stephens introduced it in his Lexicon. Supported by this evidence, and the common-sense view of the case, I venture to read προσπευδήτες. The passage of Quintilian above referred to runs thus:—Et si quid periculosius fínixisse videbimus, quibusdam remédíis præemuniendam est, ut ita dicam; si licet dicere; quodam modo; permitte mihi sic uti. Quod idem ei iam in ís quaé licentíus translata erunt pröderit, quae non tuto díc possunt. In quo non falli iudicium nostrum sollicitudine ípsa manifestum est. Qua de re Graecum illud elegántissimum est, quò præci-pitúrum, προσπευδήτεσσιν (sic) τῆς ὑπερβολῆς. And again § 50, sed hoc quoque quíam a prudéntibus fít (πιλιν οὐ λαβántει γε ὁ ποιεῖ), of another doubtful use of μελόσις. If we keep προσπευδήτες, it is "to add something in the way of rephrenishment of oneself"—so Vater;—which certainly gives a fair sense.


§ 10. The greatest care and pains are always requisite to give the speech an artless, natural, and unstudied character; the rule artis est celare artem is of the utmost importance in effecting the end and object of a speech, persuasion or conviction. See, for instance, III 2. 4; 5; 8. 1. This applies equally to proportion, as an element of propriety. It has been laid down that a certain proportion (or resemblance) of style, tone, and manner to the subject is always to be observed: but this, if carried too far, will defeat its own object; the study will appear, and the suspicions of the hearers will be aroused. For instance, there is a proportion in the tone of voice and manner of delivery, in the expression of features and the action, to the subject of the words delivered: these however should not be all employed at once: if the words have a harsh sound—σκληρὰ ὀνόματα are exemplified by Hermogenes περὶ ἰδεῶν, α', περὶ πραξινόσ, p. 236, II 300 (Rhet. Gr. Spengel), by ἀγαπᾶς, ἑμαρτεῖν, ἡγαμυπε, &c., and again, Ib. B', (II 359), by a line from Homer in which ἀγιὰς ἑμαρτεῖ, both of them objectionable on this ground, occur together. "The voice and the features and the rest should not be made to assume a harsh expression, else the study becomes apparent—it will give the composition a stiff and studied appearance, make it look affected and overdone: whereas, if one or two of them are made to correspond, and the rest not, the same effect is produced, whilst the artifices escapes detection". Introd. pp. 301, 2. Compare on this subject, Cic. de Or. III 57. 216.

'Further, not to employ all these proportions (or correspondences) together; for by the observance of this precept (following this rule) the listener is deluded (i.e. the art is disguised). I mean, to take an instance if the words used are harsh (in sound), not to (extend the harshness) to
the tone of voice and the features and the other appropriate (correspondences or proportions): (we must supply here either χρήσεως from χρήσασθαι preceding; or, ad sensum, from σκληρά για, σκληρότατα προσφέρεων, or something else similar). 'Otherwise the true character of each of them (their studied and artificial character, πνευματικά supra 2.4) becomes manifest.'

Vahlen, in his observations on the Rhetoric, Trans. Vien. Acad. p. 144 (already referred to), says, that nothing else can be implied in τοις ἀρμόττοσιν than the adaptation of voice and feature to subject, already specified; and therefore proposes to strike out καί before τοις ἀρμόττοσιν so that τοις ἀρμόττοσιν may be connected with, not distinguished from, the two preceding. This seems to me quite unnecessary. Besides the two proportions specified by Aristotle, there is at all events ὑπόκρισις, appropriate action or gesticulation, that may be brought into correspondence; and also the mode of delivery may be distinguished—at all events for the nonce—from the other three. And he adds a similar objection to another perfectly innocent καί, in 15. 28, καί ὅσον κ.κ.λ., the sense (as I have explained it in the paraphrase of the Introduction) being at least equally good with, as without, the conjunction.

In the succeeding clause—which guards against a possible misapprehension of the foregoing, as though it were meant that all this kind of adaptation should be avoided, and intimates that the mean is to be observed here as everywhere else; that we do not rush into the opposite extreme, like those who dum viabant stuili vitia in contraria currunt—the connexion of thought might seem to require that εἳν ἔτι and εἴν τὸν should change places. If the two clauses, εἴν ἔτι, εἴν τὸν, are to be connected in sense, we require some kind of opposition, expressed by a restrictive or adversative particle such as μέντοι, δέ, or ἀλλὰ, to establish this, and not one that conveys an inference or consequence, which does not follow from the foregoing.

'But if (the speaker introduce) one and omit the other (make the adaptation in some cases, in others not), he does the same thing (really has recourse to study and art) and yet escapes detection. So then'; (it results in a general way from all this,) or, 'well then—as I say—if things soft and mild (for instance, the expression of compassion) be represented by a harsh tone and language, or harsh things in soft tone and language (so Victorius), it (the expression or things expressed) loses all its plausibility (or power of persuasion). If εἴν τὸν be retained, it must be understood (I think) as I have rendered it. There will be no connexion between the clause which it introduces and that which immediately precedes it, and εἴν τὸν will be a mere continuative, as in the narrative use of μέν εἴν—the inferential, as with our then, having degenerated into a temporal sense, denoting mere continuation or succession. The clause will then be a sort
of general conclusion from all that has been said in this section on the adaptation of delivery to subject-matter. ἀπίθανον, see III 3.4.

§ 11. ‘Compound words, epithets’ (including descriptive additions of more than one word) ‘more than one (several), and strange (foreign, unusual) words, are most appropriate to the language of emotion: an angry man may be forgiven (excused) for saying a wrong heaven-high, or for calling it colossal’. I have translated κακὸν ‘wrong’, on the supposition that the speaker is a complainant in a court of justice, and that the ‘evil’ at which he is so indignant is some injustice or wrong done to him by the defendant, against whom he is inveighing.

ουρανόμυκες] is an example of a διπλοῦν ὄνομα, πελάριον of a ξένων. Comp. III 3.2, where πέλαρος (the alternative form) is cited as an instance of a γλώττα, an antiquated or barbarous term that requires explanation. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντίδεως § 134, has used the former word quite in cold blood, τὸ δὲ κατορθώθηκεν οὐρανόμυκες ποιήσωσαν, ‘your success they will exalt as high as heaven’. Aristophanes has it as an epithet of ψωφή, Nub. 357, and again of κλός, 459, in a chorus. Herod., II. 138, of excessively tall trees, and so Hom., Od. v. 239, of a pine. Aesch., Agam. 92, of the beacon-light, in the πάροδος of the chorus.

With ὄργιζομένῳ κ.τ.λ. comp. III 11.16, where ὕπερθύαλη, the figure hyperbole, or any excess or extravagance, is said to be most used by men in anger, and is illustrated by two quotations from Homer. Also Hermog., περὶ ἱδεῶν ἀ. (Rhet. Gr. Spengel, II 302.3) περὶ σφοδρότητος (vehemence), quotes a number of instances of this exaggerated language and long compound words from Demosthenes when he was affecting indignation, λαμβεισάφος, de Cor. § 139, γραμματοκινής, I. 209. ‘Nearly the whole of the speech against Aristogeiton,’ he says, ‘is a specimen of this vehement language’: and then proceeds to illustrate it from his other writings: [the speeches against Aristogeiton are, however, undoubtedly spurious.]

‘And also (this kind of language may be used) when (the speaker) has fairly’ (lit. already, by this time, then and not till then: on this use of ἦδη, ὡσπο, ὁδικτα, see note on I 1.7) ‘overmastered (got into his power) his audience, and worked them up into a fit (raised them to the height) of enthusiasm, either by praise or blame or indignation, or love (which he has assumed towards them); as Isocrates also (as well as others, καὶ) does in his Panegyric, at the end: φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη’. This is, as usual, a misquotation; Isocrates wrote, Paneg. § 186, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην (Aristotle ought not to have forgotten this, for it is a striking case of ὁμοτέλεστον, or rhyming termination, one of the new figures introduced into Rhetoric by Gorgias and his school): φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσῳ τινὶ χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζώντας ἕξιν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τούτῳ τοῖς θύροις ἀριστεύσατας; It is in fact a finely written sentence.

‘And again, οἱ τιμεῖς ἔθλησαν κ.τ.λ. (Paneg. § 96, another striking sen-
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 7 § 11.

η πελώριον επείν. καὶ ὅταν ἔχει ἠδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι ἡ ἐπαίνοις ἡ ψόγοις ἡ ὀργὴ ἡ φιλία, οἴον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, "Φημὴ δὲ καὶ γνώμη" καὶ "οἱ τίνες ἔτλησαν" φθεγγοῦνται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐνθουσιαζόντες: for men (in general) give utterance to such language in their enthusiasm (the language of inspiration), and therefore (the audience) also being themselves in a similar state of feeling (having been brought thereto by the orator) are plainly ready to accept and approve of it.

It is worth noticing that ἐτλησαν, 'in that they brooked to &c., is characteristic of poetico, and is rare in Attic prose: though found in Xenophon, Cyrop. III 1. 2, οὐκέτι ἤδη εἰς χειρὰς ἔδειν. The corresponding prose form is ἐτλησαν, which indeed is the manuscript reading in Isocrates I.c. and is corrected by the editors from the present passage and Dionysius Halic. de adm. vi dicendi in Dem. c. 40.

ἄχρις Comp. Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s.v. "τῶν ἀκροατῶν, auditores occupatos tenere, obesidisse oratione. Ar. Rhet. III 7, ubi permutat cum τῷ ἐνθουσιασμῷ, extra se rapere." [Cicero, Orator § 210, id autem (numerosa oratio) tum valet cum is qui audit ab oratore iam obsessus est ac teneitur; and (for δῶν ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσα) compare ib. § 99, si is non praeparatis auribus inflammare rem coepit; furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinulentus videtur.

The careless introduction of the superfluous τε after φθέγγονται, repeated infra c. 11.7, τὸ τε γὰρ τὴν ἄρχην κ.τ.λ., is abundantly illustrated by Shilleto, Dem. de F. L., critical note on § 176, τὴν τε γὰρ ἐφίημην κ.τ.λ., including this passage amongst his instances. [See Bonitz, Zeitschrift f. Ost. Gymn. 1867, pp. 672–682, quoted in Index Aristotelicus s.v. τε, ad fin., where, amongst other passages, a reference is given to Pol. VII 14 § 6, 1333 a 1, τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἄρχειν φασὶ δεῖν πρῶτον.]

'This also accounts for the fitness of this kind of language for poetry, because poetry is inspired. It must therefore (be used) either in the way above described, or with irony, as Gorgias did, and (in) the passages of Plato's Phaedrus'. The 'passages' referred to are 231 D, ἦν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφήλητος...γένομαι, μηθαυμάσθη τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πάροι διαφάμων φθέγγωμαι, alluding to the exaggerated and enthusiastic expressions with which Socrates had been inspired by the local influence; in particular to the rhapsody at the conclusion of his speech, ἐφραμώον τωσθείσα πεισθασα ἀγωγή κ.τ.λ., and 241 E, οὐκ ἢσον ὅτι ἢδη ἢτι φθέγγωμα, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι διαφάμως, καὶ ταύτα γέγονα; ἐὰν δ' ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐπεφερόν ἄρμαται, τι με οἰκείοισειν; ἢρ' οἰσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν...σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσατο;

A specimen of Gorgias' irony is found in Ar. Pol. III 2, 1275 b 26, Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἵσος ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνεύομενος, ἔθη, καθάπερ δημος εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημοσίων πεποιημένους, οὐκαὶ καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημοσίων πεποιημένους εἶναι γὰρ τίνας λαρισασανοῖς, so read, with Schneider, for λαρισασανοῖς retained by Bekker. "Aristotle

AR. III.
refers to an ingenious evasion of an awkward question. Whilst Gorgias was in Thessaly, where he seems to have spent a considerable time at Larissa, some Thessalian, who had no doubt heard his boast that he was able and ready to answer any question upon any subject, took him at his word, and asked him what constituted a citizen.—This is the constitutional question which gives occasion to Aristotle's quotation.—Partly in jest, and partly because he was really at a loss, he replied, that citizens were made by citizen-manufacturers: as the vessels made by mortar-manufacturers were mortars, so those made by the Larissaean-manufacturers were Larissaean citizens" or Larissaeans: for there were such people as Λαρίσεατοσκούλ. Λάρισα, besides the Thessalian city, denotes also some kind of kettle or other cooking-utensil. The reply is much the same as if some one being asked, What makes a citizen of the town of Sandwich? were to answer, 'a cook, for he is a sandwich-maker'; and is no bad specimen of the way in which Gorgias most likely fulfilled his promise of solving any problem whatsoever that was proposed to him. It may be doubted whether, as Schneider supposes, there is also an ambiguity in δημοφυγαν: the word bears also the sense of a magistrate, as the grammarians tell us, especially in Doric states. Larissa was not a Doric state: but we learn from K. O. Müller, Dor. Bk. III ch. 8. 5; from Thuc. v 17, ἐν Μαρτυρίᾳ οἱ δημοφυγαν καὶ ἡ βουλή...ἐν" Ἡλίδο οἱ δημ. καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἐχοντες, and from a (doubtful) letter of Philip, Dem. de Cor. § 157, Πελοποννησίων τοῖς δημ.; that the use of the term was not confined to these, and Aristotle applies it to 'magistrates' in general, Pol. VI (iv), 4, 1291 a 34. See further on this subject, Müller's Dorian, u. s. 3 From a note in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. III No. VII p. 80, with additions [see also p. 180 of Thompson's edition of the Gorgias].

CHAP. VIII.

On rhythm in Prose.

In the paraphrase of the Introduction I have already given an outline of the contents of this chapter and their connexion, with references and some details, pp. 303—306. And on rhythm in general, and its application to prose, there is an Appendix (C), pp. 379—392; in which is a full account of its original and derived significations in the first part, and of its distinction from μέτρον in the second. The commentary on this chapter will therefore deal principally with the details of the language, allusions, and such particulars as require explanation, which are omitted in the paraphrase.

In the fragments of Isocrates' τέχνη, collected by Benseler in the Teubner series, Vol. II p. 276, we have the following, fragm. 4—cited from
γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀμα καὶ ἔξιστησιν, προσέχειν γὰρ

Maximus Planudes ad Hermog. and Joannes Siceliotes—ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω· ἔξιστω γὰρ γνώριμα λόγως καταφαίνεται γὰρ ἀλὰ μετὰ ὁμοίως πάντῃ ῥυθμῷ, μᾶλυντα λαμβάνει ἣ τροχαῖος. The first of these precepts is in entire agreement with Aristotle, § 1; the disagreement of the second with the statements of § 4 is equally striking. It seems from what is said of Thrasyanax and the paean in § 4, that the subject of prosaic rhythm was not included in the γῦρων of himself and the succeeding writers on Rhetoric. It does not appear even in the Rhet. ad Alex. Cicero, de Or. III 44. 173, attributes to Isocrates the first introduction of 'numbers' into prose composition.

Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (p. 197 R.) refers to this chapter of Aristotle in support of his observations on rhythm in prose. His own opinions on the subject are given, pp. 195, 6.

References are made by Cicero to this chapter (§ 4 et seq.), de Or. I 47. 182, 183, in the course of his dissertation on rhythm, from § 171 foll. The same subject is treated, Orat. c. LXIII 212 seq. The various rhythms heroic, iambic, trochaic, &c. are discussed in c. LXIV, where Aristotle's opinions, as expressed in this chapter, are twice referred to, §§ 215, 218. In § 214 we have, temeritas ex tribus brevibus et longa est, quem (sc. paenan) Aristoteles ut optimum probat, a quo dissentio. Cicero is referring to this chapter, from which the other references are taken: and as this is not found there, he must be either quoting inexacty, from memory, or perhaps confounding Aristotle's opinion on the point with that of one of the other rhetoricians whom he mentions, § 218. There is likewise an incorrectness in the opinion which he there attributes to Aristotle, that the paean is, aptissimus orationis vel orienti vel mediae: Aristote says nothing of the 'middle' of the sentence.

Compare also, Demetrius περὶ ἕρμηνειας, περὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, § 38 seq. (Rhet. Gr. Spengel, III 270—273) who also refers thrice to this chapter of the Rhetoric. Quint. IX 4. 45 seq. There are references to this ch. in §§ 87, 88.

On the abuse of rhythm, which degrades and is incompatible with the sublime, there is a short chapter in Dionysius περὶ δύσως, c. 41.

§ 1. 'The structure (figure, fashion) of the language (i.e. prose composition) should be neither metrical (run into verse) nor entirely without measure or rhythm: for the one has no power of persuasion, because it is thought to be artificial (supra, c. 2. 4, πεπλασμένως), and at the same time

1 A remarkable instance of this defect in composition is quoted by Twining on Poet., note 36, p. 209, from Dr Smith's System of Optics—where, as he truly says, one would least expect to find such a thing—the beginning of Bk. I c. 2 § 47, Where parallel rays Come contrary ways And fall upon opposite sides. This is decidedly more metrical than a parallel instance in one of Dr Whewell's treatises on Mechanics, Hence no force however great, Can stretch a cord however fine, Into an horizontal line, Which is accurately straight [Whewell's Mechanics I p. 44, ed. 1819, Facettiae Cantabrigienses p. 162]. Quintilian is particularly indignant at this introduction of a verse into prose writing: versum in oratione fieri multo foedissimum est, totum; sed etiam in parte deformē, IX 4. 72. [For iambic verses in the prose of Isocrates, see Paneg. § 170, ἔχριν γὰρ ἀνδρὸν ἐτερ ἵνας ἔνωι and Spengel's Artium Scriptores, pp. 152—4.]

6—2
poiei twn omoiw, pote palin hei. wospere oun twn
cronikwn proulambanousi ta paidia to "tina arietai
2 epirotoson o apelenuveroymenos; Kleioa." to de ar-
rubhmon apéran ton, de de peparavai me, mh metrw
also diverts (the hearers' attention, from the main subject or the proof of
the fact): for it makes him attend to the recurrence of the similar
cadence. And so (the audience anticipate the answering or recurring
cadence) just as the children anticipate the answer to the herald's sums-
mons, "Whom does the freedman choose for his attorney? and the answer
is, Cleon".

epirotos one who is charged or entrusted with the management of
his case, or of any business as deputy for another; procurator, epirotos
Kalasapos, Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. c. 17, 813 E, o w autw mvi ou epemelh
toyton, o de epirotos Malas, 'his man of business, deputy, agent'.

On Cleon's self-assumed functions of public prosecutor and poor
man's advocate, see Grote, Hist. Gr. ch. LIV, Vol. VI. p. 667 seq. An
example in Arist. Ran. 569, (one of the tavern-keepers says,) 'i de bhe
kleseon ton proostatyn Kleonai mou, (and the other) o de eisw', eiswep epi-
tych, apérbalov, ou auton epirotwmen: from which Mr Grote draws his
inferences as to the real nature of Cleon's misrepresented policy. The
children, in the illustration, are so accustomed to the invariable reply to
the herald's proclamation, for an attorney or deputy to plead some freed-
man's cause—who by law was not allowed to speak for himself in court—
that they have learned to say 'Cleon' whenever the question is asked.
It has not been noticed that this story is told in the present tense, as if
the children were in the habit of doing this in Aristotle's own time. Can
it be meant that the custom had been handed down from generation to
generation for a century or so after Cleon's death? If so, it is a very
remarkable fact.

With the opening words of the chapter, comp. Cic. Orat. LI 172, Is
(Aristoteles) igitur versum in oratione vetat esse, numerum iubet. Ib.
§ 189, of verses unintentionally introduced by the orator in his speech,
Inculcamus per imprudentiam...versus; vitiosum genus, et longa animi
provisione fugiendum. With diplhano x.r.l., comp. Ib. LXII 209, Si enim
semp er utare (these studied arts and tricks of rhetoric), quum satietatem
adserit tum quale sit etiam ab imperitis agnoscur. Detrahit praeterea
actionis dolorem, adserit humanum sensum actoris, tollit funditus veritatem
et fidem... LXV 220, Mutilum interest utrum numerosa sit, id est, similis
numerorum an plane et numeris constet oratio. Alterum si fit, intoleran-
bile vitium est; alterum nisi fit, dissipata et inculta et fluent est oratio.

§ 2. 'That (composition) which is (entirely) devoid of rhythm (has
no measure) is (indefinite (or, unlimited), but it ought to be limited, only
not by metre (like verse): for the infinite (indefinite, unlimited) is dis-
pleasing and (i.e. because it) cannot be known. But everything is
defined (or limited) by number; and the number (numerus in both its
senses) of the structure of the language (prose composition) is rhythm,
of which metres are so many sections'. Here we pass for a moment into
Platonic metaphysics. The doctrine of the formless, vague, indefinite,
ПИТОРΙΚΗΣ Γ 8 §§ 2, 3.

δει ἀνδέσ γαρ καὶ ἀγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον. περαιτει
dε ἀριθμὸ πάντα· ὅ δε τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως
3 ἀριθμὸς ὑθμός ἔστιν, οὐ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τιμητὰ. διὸ
ὑθμὸν δεῖ ἐχεῖν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μητημα
γαρ ἔσται· ὑθμὸν δὲ μη ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται

unlimited, infinite of more or less, of degree; into which τὸ μέτρων order,
harmony, measure, symmetry, law—the mean—are introduced by the
limiting πέρας, the definite principle; coming originally from the Pytha-
goreans, is adopted and expounded by Plato in the Philebus, 23 E et seq.
The principle is applied to the numbers or measures of music and com-
position, verse and prose, 26 A, ἐν δὲ ὀδεί καὶ βαρεί (the tones of music)
καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείρων οὐσίν, ἀρ’ οὐ τάντα ἐγγυόμενα τάντα (τὸ
πέρας καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον) ἀμα πέρας τα ἀπειρώματα καὶ μουσικήν συμπάζων τελειω-
terata ἐξουσίαν; From him Aristotle undoubtedly borrowed his con-
ception of rhythm, as he did likewise his grand division of ὅλη, the
informis materia, the potential, unenergized matter, the material cause of
to things; and λόγος, the formal cause, that which gives form and sub-
stance to the brute matter, energizes or realizes it into complete exis-
tence, and is the original design, or conception in the mind of the Creator,
the 'what it was to be,' τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: and also his doctrine of the
'mean.' With ἀγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον, compare Anal. Post. A 24, [86 a 5.]
ἐστι δ’ ἦ μὲν ἀπειρα οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ δὲ πειράται ἐπιστήμη. Metaph. B 4,
999 a 27, τῶν ἀπειρῶν πᾶς ἐνδεχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; κ.λ.

On τὸ ὑθμόν ἀπειρον, compare Cic. Orator, LXVIII 228, Hanc
igitur, sive compositionem sive perfectionem sive numerum vocari placet,
adhibere necesse est, si ornate velis dicere, non solum, quod ait Aristoteles
et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio, seq. On ὑθμός,
μέτρον, 'measure of time', Ib. § 227, sonantium omnium quae metiri
auribus possunt.

περαιτει...ἀριθμὸ πάντα] This axiom is doubtless derived ultimately
from the Pythagoreans, who traced the laws of the universe in numbers
and mathematical symbols. Καὶ πάντα γα μᾶν τὸ γενναικήμαν ἀριθμὸν
ἔχοιτι, οὐ γὰρ οἶν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοθήμεν οὔτε γνωσθήμεν ἄνευ τοῦτο, ap.
Stobaeum, Böckh, Philolaos, p. 58. "The finite in number is the cal-
culable, that which the mind can grasp, and handle; the infinite is the in-
calculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself
to law, and hence remains unknowable." Grant, Essay on At. Ethics,
p. 202 (1st ed.[p. 252, 3rd ed.]). Probl XIX 38, ὑθμὸ δὲ χαῖρομαι διὰ τὸ
γνώμων καὶ τεταγμένων ἀριθμῶν ἔχειν, καὶ κινέων ἡμᾶς τεταγμένος’ αἰκιστέρα
γὰρ ἢ τεταγμένη κύησις φιέτει τῆς ἀπάτης, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ φίλους μάλλον.
This illustrates ἀριθμὸ τὸ ἀπειρον. With ὑθμὸς...οὔ τὰ μέτρα τιμητά, comp.
Poet. IV 7, τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὧν μόρα τῶν ὑθμῶν ἔστι, φαινον. i.e.
metres, verses or systems of verses, are definite lengths or sections, into
which the indefinite matter of rhythm is as it were cut. Similarly it is
said, III 9.3, that the period and all metres are measured by number.

§ 3. ‘From this it may be inferred that the speech (i.e. prose com-
position) should have rhythm, but not metre; otherwise it will be a poem
4 εὰν μέχρι τοῦ ἦ. τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἤρως σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὴς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἰαμβὸς αὐτὴ

(verse-composition). Its rhythm however should not be exactly and nicely finished; (i.e. with exact and systematic accuracy so as to be continuous, and pervade the whole structure of the writing. The description of prose rhythm by Hermogenes, περὶ ἱδεὼν ἂ', Intro. p. 391, Appendix on ῥυθμὸς, will serve as a commentary on this and μέχρι τοῦ: 'and this will be effected if it be only carried up to a certain point (and there stop short; left incomplete and irregular; not finished and systematic, like verse').

§ 4. ‘Of (the three) rhythms, the heroic (hexameter, epic) is (too) stately (or solemn), and deficient in conversational harmony’. By using the word ‘harmony’, I have left it open whether we are to understand by ἀρμονία ‘harmony’ in its ordinary musical sense—in which case the meaning will be ‘that particular kind of harmony which is adapted to ordinary conversation’, the language of common life, and inferior to that of the heroic rhythm—a somewhat non-natural interpretation; or in the primary, more general sense of the word, ‘an adaptation or fitting of parts into an organized whole’, which with λεκτικὴ will signify ‘deficient in conversational structure’, in an adaptation of parts fitted for conversation (Dionysius uses ἀρμονία as equivalent to λέξις, for-style of composition); the iambic is the very language of the vulgar, and therefore of all measures the iambic is most frequently uttered in common speech (or conversation); but it wants (the acquisition of, γενισθεῖν) solemnity and dignity and the power (or faculty) of striking. The trochaic is too farcical (has too much of the comic dance about it; reminds one of its indecency and buffoonery: is totally devoid of all dignity and sobriety, too light and lively): this is shown by the trochaic tetrameters, for its tetrameter is a tripping (running, rolling) measure.

ἀ...ῄρως] The ‘heroic’ measure, also called ‘dactylic’, ‘hexameter’, ‘epic’, including the spondaic and anaepastic, is one of the three kinds of rhythm, its basis, βάρος—corresponding to the ‘feet’ in metre—expressing the ratio of equality 1:1. See further on the doctrine and ratios of rhythm, in the Appendix on that subject, Intro. p. 387, foll. where the statements of the following sections are illustrated. The epithet σεμνὸς has been already applied to it in ΠΠ 3.3; Dionysius, de Isocr. lud. c. 11 (p. 557. 3, Reiske), designates it by the similar epithet μεγαλόπρεπῆς. Comp. Poet. XXII 9, τὸ ἥρωικὸν οὐσιμέτατον καὶ ὀψικονδέτατον τῶν μέτρων.

σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὸς καὶ ἀρμονίας δεόμενος is the vulgata lectio. But to say that the heroic or hexameter measure—Homer’s verses for instance—are deficient in harmony is absurd in itself, and contradictory to the evidence of our own ears, and all ancient authority: at all events Dionysius was not

1 This may possibly be included in the meaning of the word here: but if so, it is quite subordinate. In the references from other authors it is predominant.

2 τρόχερὸς ῥυθμὸς. There are some bars in the overture to Auber’s Bronze Horse, which, to those who are acquainted with it, will perfectly represent the measure of trochaic tetrameter, and illustrate the epithet here used, implying a light, tripping, metre.
of that opinion, who says, de Comp. Verb. c. 18 (p. 109, Reiske), the exact opposite; ἀνταλλακτικὸς πάντα ἐστὶν σεμινὸς καὶ εἰς κάλλος ἀρμονίας ἀξιολογητάτος. Victorius, from Demetrius, peri ἐρμωνείαις § 42, ὑπὲρ ἰδίων σεμινὸς καὶ ὅν λογικὸς, which leaves ἀρμονίας δεόμενου to explain itself as it best may. I have adopted with Tyrwhitt on Poet. IV 19, ἔσμεντερ διλεγαί (λέγομεν) καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας, the reading suggested by that passage, which had been already proposed by Vincentius Madius, ad loc., and since approved by Spalding ad Quint. IX 4. 76, and finally adopted by Bekker and Spengel, each in his latest ed.

[λαμβάνω... ἐλέεις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν] This has been already noticed, III 1. 9, and twice in Poet. XXXII. 19. The Latin rhetoricians make the same remark upon their own language. Cic. de Or. III 47. 182, Orat. LVI 189, magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio, LVI 192. Quint. IX 4. 76, IIII (trimetri) minus sunt notabiles, quia hoc genus sermoni proximum est.

ἐστήσαν] is used here in a much milder sense than its ordinary one, to strike, excite, mettre hors de soi, to displace or remove a man out of his ordinary state of feeling, to a higher one of excitement; whereas in this metaphorical application, it usually implies a much more violent emotion than mere admiration or amusement, as Demosth. c. Mid. 537 ult., ταῦτα κυρὶε, ταῦτα ἔξωσαν ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν, 'drives men besides themselves, drives them mad.' Eur. Bacch. 850, πρῶτα θ' ἐστήσαν φρενῶν ἐνεῖς ἀλαφρῶν λύσαν, equivalent to ἐξω δ' ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρενός, in line 853.

τροχαῖος κορδακικόντερος] Cic. Orat. LVI 193, Trochaenum autem, qui est eodem spatio quo chorus, cordacem appellat (Aristoteles), quia contractio et brevitas dignitatem non habet. Quint. IX 4. 88, herois, qui est idem dactylus, Aristotelis amplior, iambus humanior (too like the language of vulgar humanity) videatur: trochaenum ut nimirum currentem (τροχεῖον) damnet, eique cordacis nomen imponat. Harpocr. κορδακικόντερος: ὁ κόρδαξ κομικῆς ὀρχήσεως ἔδει ἐστιν, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλειον ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τραγικῆς ὀρχήσεως. Suidas κορδακίζει: αὐσχρά ὀρχήσει (the rest as Harpocr.). The characteristics of the κόρδαξ, a kind of Comic dance, may be gathered from notices in Theophr. Char. 6, peri ἄπονολας, 'desperate recklessness,' where it is a mark of this character to dance the cordax sober and without a mask: in Aristophanes, who takes credit to himself, Nub. 540, for never introducing it into his comedies: in Athenaeus, XIX 28, ult. 630 ἔρως τε καὶ μεθύνῃ καὶ κορδακικόντει τοῦ δυνάμειον φέρειν κτλ. It seems therefore to have been accompanied by the grossest indecencies, so that no respectable person could allow himself even to look on the performance of it. See further in Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. XXVII. 7.

This however is not the point of the reference here. But the κόρδαξ
was accompanied by verses in the trochaic tetramer, and these are identified; and all that is implied here by the term is the lightness, the want of gravity and dignity, and the dancing tripping measure, afterwards expressed by τροχέρος; as we see also in the passages of Cic. and Quint. This character always belonged to the tetramer; and hence we are told that the dithyrambs, from which Tragedy took its rise, were originally written in this measure, which was afterwards exchanged for the iambic, the metre nearest to the language of ordinary conversation, when the dialogue had been introduced, and Tragedy assumed a regular form. Τὸ τε μέτρον (of Tragedy) ἐκ τετραμέτρου ιαμβικοῖον ἐγένετο; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἑχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὁρχησικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέγοις δὲ γενομένης αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὔφρον μάλιστα γὰρ λεπτὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ιαμβικῶν ἔστω (Poet. IV 19). Comp. Rhet. III 1. 9.

These rhythms being set aside, (they are in fact reducible to two, the proportions 1 : 1, and 2 : 1, iambus and trochee, and — respectively) the third 'the paean remains, the use of which began with Thrasymachus, though he and his followers couldn’t tell what it was (did not know how to define it). The paean1 is the third (of the rhythms) and closely connected with the preceding: for it has the ratio of three to two (3 : 2, three short, and one long syllable equal to two short), whilst the others have that of one to one (dactyl, spondee, anapaest), and two to one (iambus and trochee), severally. And one and a half (3 : 2 : 1, the ratio of the paean) is connected with these (two) ratios ['next to’ both ratios, i.e. the mean between the two extremes, 1 : 1 and 2 : 1], and that is the paean’. On this see Introd. Appendix on ῥυθμός, pp. 387, 8. The paeanic ratio includes also the bacchius and cretic. These three ratios are the βασικῆς of the three measures.

§ 5. ‘Now all the rest (of the ῥυθμοῖ) are to be discarded, not only for the reasons already mentioned, but also because they are metrical (too suggestive of the cadence of regular verse): but the paean is to be adopted: for it is the only one of the rhythms named which cannot be made into a regular verse, and therefore (the use of it) is most likely to escape detection’. ἀπὸ μῶνον γὰρ κ.τ.λ., that is, it is an element of rhythm, not metre. Hermann, Elem. doctr. metr. II 19, de vers. Cret. (near the beginning of the chapter), has a criticism of this passage which

1 Aristotle writes παιάν: Cicero, paean in the Orator, and paean in the de Oratore: Quintilian, paean.
he quotes, attributing to the author a misconception of the nature of the 
paeanic measure, which has caused him to fall into the error of denying 
it to be a metre¹. See Cic. Orator, § 194, paean autem minime est 
aptus ad versum; and the whole section. Also § 218, numerus a qui-
busdam (Aristotle, no doubt), non pes habetur. ‘At present the one 
(form of) paean is employed (at the end) as well as at the beginning 
(of the sentence), but the end ought to be different to the beginning’. 
Vater proposed to supply τελευτώτες before καὶ ἀρχόμενοι: but in a 
writer like Aristotle the supplement or opposite may be very well sup-
posed to be implied in the καὶ.

§ 6. ‘There are two kinds of paean opposed to one another, of which 
the one is suitable at the beginning (of the sentence or period), as in 
fact it is employed: and this is the one which begins with the long 
(syllable), and ends with three short. Δαλογενὴς εἶτε Λυκίαν, “O Delos-
born, or if perchance Lycia” (were thy birthplace). The poet, whose 
alternative is cut short by the inexorable brevity of the quotation, 
was doubtless going on, as the manner of the ancient poets is, to offer 
the deity whom he was addressing the choice of the various titles under 
which he was known and worshipped, expressive of place of birth, 
special character or office: which was done to avoid the possibility of 
giving offence by omitting any title of honour of which he might be 
specially proud. The following specimens of a very frequent custom 
will suffice to illustrate it. Hor. Carm. Sec. line 14, Lenis Ithyia... 
sive tu Lucina probas vocari seu Genitalis. Sat. II 6. 20, Matutine 
pater, seu Iane libentius audis. [We may also compare Horace's enu-
meration of the favourite haunts of Apollo, qui rure puro Castaliae lovít 
crines solutos, qui Lyciae tenet dumeta natalenque silvam Delius et 
Pataraeus Apollo. Od. III 461.] Ζεύς, δοσίς ποτ’ ἐστίν, εἰ τόθ’ αὐτῷ φίλος 
κεκλημένος, τοῦτο νῦν προσωπώποι. Agam. 147. The author of the paean 
was apparently about to add after Λυκίαν, νέμων or some such word, 
offering the god the alternative birthplace of Lycia, if he happened to 
prefer it. The Homeric epithet Λυκηγῆς, II. Δ 101, 119, is usually 
supposed to denote his Lycian birthplace, Pataría, though Müller, Dor. 
II 6. 8, would ‘rather understand” by it ‘born of light’. On the epithet 
Δύκεως, frequently applied to Apollo by the Tragedians, as Aesch. 
R. 203 (Schneidewin), Electr. 6, &c. &c., see Müller’s Dorians, II 6. 8, 
where the various significations of Apollo's titles are discussed at length; 
and Donaldson’s New Cratylus § 269, on the connexion of Δύκεως with

¹ Though I cannot see much force in Hermann’s argument against Aristotle, 
yet it must be owned that it is odd to deny that to be metrical, which derived its 
very name from the hymns to Apollo which were principally written in that measure, 
as may be seen from the two specimens here quoted.
eiδη ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἐν ἄρχῃ ἄρμότει, ὡσπερ καὶ χρώνται. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν οὗ ἄρχει μὲν ἡ μακρὰ, τελευτῶσι δὲ τρεῖς βραχείαι.

Δαλογένες εἶτε Λυκίαν καὶ

χρυσεοκόμα' Ἐκατε παῖ Διὸς.

ἐτερὸς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὗ βραχείαι ἄρχουσι τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευταία.

μετὰ δὲ γὰρ ὑδατα τ' ὁκεανὸν ἥφανσε νῦξ.

οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ. ἡ γὰρ βραχεία διὰ τὸ

λευκὸς καὶ -λύκη. [In G. Curtius' Greek Etymology, § 88 λευκός and ἄμφιλύκη, and § 89 λύκος, no such connexion is suggested.]

Brandis' 'Anonymous' [Philologus IV. 1] reads "Δαλογένες", εἶνα, "Λύκεικα ἐκάργυς".

Victorius has noted that this and the following quotation are both commencements of paens to Apollo, from which the name of the metre is derived; and each of them exemplifies the 'paean at the beginning'.

"Golden-haired Archer son of Zeus". The other, the opposite to this, in which three short syllables form the beginning, and the long one comes at the end. "After earth and its waters, night obscured (blotted out) ocean". In the Greek line there are four pure paens, all of this construction ----: but Ar. appears to quote it as an exemplification only of this form of paean in the last place of the verse, or rhythm.

εἴ ἐναντίως = ἐναντίως, οὗ ἐναντίως, ex opposto. Polit. VIII (v) 11, 1314 a 31, ὁ δ' ἐτερος σχεδὸν εἴ ἐναντίως εἴ ζεις τοῖς εἱρμένους την ἑπιμέλειαν. Herod. VII 225, οὗ μὲν εἴ ἐναντίως ἐστις ὑμών. Thucyd. IV 33, εἴ ἐναντίως οὗτος καταστήκηκεν, 'opposite', opposed to ἐκ πλαγίου. Ep. ad Titum ii. 8, οὗ εἴ ἐναντίως. εἴ ἐναντίως is the more usual form. The ellipse to be supplied is according to Bos, Ellips. p. 325 (562, ed. Schäfer), χάρας, corrected to ἀρχής by Schäfer ad loc., q. v., where several instances of the omission of that word are produced. But the ellipse of ὁδὸς, in one or other of its cases, is very much more common than that of χάρα or ἀρχή, in the formation of adverbs and quasi-adverbs in the feminine, genitive, dative and accusative; such as ἐς τῇ ταύτῃ τῆς ἐκείνης ἄλλη et sim. — a large number of instances of these three varieties of the ellipse of ὁδὸς is collected under that head in the work referred to, pp. 188—192; and at p. 192 init. εἰς ἐναντίως φύομαι is rightly inserted among them by Leisner (one of the earlier editors).

'And this makes a (true and proper) end: for' (γὰρ: the reason of this, that the long syllable is required for the end, may be inferred from the consideration that follows of the incompleteness, &c. of the short syllable) 'the short syllable by reason of its incompleteness makes (the rhythm appear) mutilated (cut prematurely short)'. Cic. Orator, §§ 214, 215, 218, u. s.
RHETORIKHΣ Γ § 6, 7; 9 § 1.

7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὑρισκόμεν δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἁρρυθμοῦν, καὶ τίνες εὑρισκόμεν ποιοῦσι ρυθμὸν καὶ πῶς ἑξοντες, εἶπον· τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἁνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἱρο—

CHAP. IX.

κόλοβος] truncus, de Soph. El. 17, 176 a 49, δοσ μὴ σαφῶς ἄλλα κόλοβος ἄροτρας, παρά τότε συμβαίνει ο ἀλεχος. Poste, 'elliptical.' For other examples see the Lexicons.

But the (sentence or period) should be broken off (brought abruptly to a close) and the end marked by the long syllable—not (however) by the scribe (or copyist), nor by a marginal annotation (marking the end of the sentence), but by the measure itself. διὰ with the accusative, which indicates the cause or motive, (not the medium, channel or means, which is διὰ with genitive,) here implies that the indication of the end of the sentence should not be due to the scribe or his marks, stops, or what not, but solely to the rhythm: that the end should appear by the abrupt close of that.

παραγραφή, a by-writing, or marginal annotation. That these were occasionally stops appears from our use of the word 'paragraph': just as the words that we use for stops, comma, colon, period, originally represented members of the period or the whole period itself. Victorius aptly quotes, Cic. Orat. c. LXVIII § 228 (already referred to), quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio, quae non aut spiritu pronuntianatis aut interductu librarii, sed numero coacta debet insistere.

And to the same effect de Orat. III 44. 173, where the librariorum notae are again mentioned. Victorius also cites Isocr. Antid. § 59—to the clerk of the supposed court—δρέαμεν ἀπὸ τῆς παραγραφῆς ἀναγωγῆς κ.κ.Λ. Ernesti Lex. Tech. Gr. s. v. [In the papyrus of the Funeral Oration of Hyperides, preserved in the British Museum, and edited in fac-simile by Professor Churchill Babington, the approach of the end of a sentence is indicated by a short interlinear dash below the first word of the line in which the sentence is about to close.]

§ 7. 'So this subject, that the composition should be rhythmical, and not altogether without rhythm, and what rhythms, and how constructed, make style rhythmical, is finished and done with'.

CHAP. IX.

We now come to another kind of ἀρμονία, the adaptation of the several parts of the sentence to one another in order to its fit composition (apta compositio, Cic. [de Orat. III 52, 200]), shewn in the arrangement of its words and subordinate clauses. The subject of the chapter is accordingly the period and its construction; and some of its leading figures—those originally introduced by Gorgias and his school—are illustrated by several examples from Isocrates' Panegyricus.
The two principal varieties of style, the εἰρομένη and κατεστραμμένη λέξεις, the latter more usually called περιοδική, the style of Demosthenes, Isocrates, and the more finished rhetoricians, there is a detailed account in the Introduction, in the analysis of this chapter, p. 306 seq. So that we may at once pass on to the translation, and the particular points of interest and difficulty that the text offers. On Dionysius' distinction of three varieties of style, see p. 306, note 4. On the εἰρομένη λέξεις, the earlier style of Hecataeus, Herodotus and the λογογράφοι, see p. 307, and 306, note 5; and on ἀναβολαί, to which this style of prose is compared, p. 307 note 1. The opposite style, ή κατεστραμμένη, is described at length, pp. 308—310. See Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. συντρέ-φεων. For a good description of both, following Aristotle, see Demetr. peri ἔρωμειας § 12.

§ 1. 'The style must be either loose and concatenated' (the sentences loosely strung together, connected solely by connecting particles, as δὲ, καί, like onions on a string) ¹ and one only by the connecting particle, like the preludes in the dithyrambs, or close and compact (i.e. periodic) and resembling the (regular) antistrophes of the old lyric poets', Pindar Arion, Stesichorus, and the like. The last of the three is said to have owed his new name of Stesichorus—his original name was Tisias—to his having been the first to bring the chorus to a stand, make it stationary, for a time at least; and give it order, regularity, symmetry, and dignity. This is also attributed to Arion.

§ 2. ‘Now the loose style is the ancient (original) one. “This is the setting forth of the researches of Herodotus of Thurii.” This style which was formerly universal is now confined to a few. By loose I mean that which has no end in itself except the completion of the subject under discussion. And it is displeasing by reason of its endlessness (or indefinite length or character, supra c. 8. 2); for every one desires to have the end distinctly in view'. Quintilian, VIII 5. 27, thus describes the εἰρομένη λέξεις, soluta fere oratio, et e singulis non membris sed frustis collata, structura caret. Cicero, Or. LV 186, notices the want of ‘numbers' in Herodotus and his predecessors: which may possibly include the periodic structure of sentences; as Aristotle does, infra § 3, ἄριθμον σχε τι ἐν περιόδοις λέξει.

'Ἡροδότου Θουρίου' This appears to be the reading of all MSS, except that Aε has θυρίου. Herodotus did actually join the colony established at Thurium in 443 (Clinton, F. H. sub anno 443, col. 3), and was thence sometimes called a Thorian from this his second birthplace. So Strabo, XIV c. 2, (Caria), p. 657, of Halicarnassus; ἄνδρες δὲ γεγόνασιν ἦς αὐτῆς Ἡροδότος τε ὁ συγγραφέως, δυ στερον Θουρίου ἐκάλεσαν, διά τὸ κοινωνήσαι τῆς εἰς Θουρίους ἀποκλείας. Plut. de
teron μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρώναι. Λέγω
δὲ εἰρομένην ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ’ αὐτήν, ἀν μὴ τὸ
πράγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἐστὶ δὲ ἀνήδες διὰ τὸ
ἀπειρόν τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθοράν.
διό περ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήριοιν ἐκπενδέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται:

exilio, c. 13, τὸ δὲ, "Ἡρόδωτον Ἀλκικαρνασσίως ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις ἦδε," πολ-
λοι μεταγράφωσι, "Ἔρωτένθη Θουρίου." μετάφηγε γὰρ εἰς Θουρίους, καὶ τῆς
ἀποκλίας ἐκείνης μέτεχε. Id. de Herodoti malignitate c. 35, καὶ ταύτα,
Θουρίου μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων νομίζομεν, αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀλκικαρνασσίων περιεχό-
μενον. The second of these passages may be interpreted to mean, that
the reading in Plutarch's time was often found altered in the copies of
Herodotus' history, from 'Ἀλκικαρνασσίως' to 'Θουρίου; and if so, no doubt
Aristotle's copy may have had that reading, which he transferred to his
Rhetoric. But on the other hand, Demetrius, περὶ ἐρμηνείας, § 17 (περὶ
περίδου), in quoting the same passage, follows the reading of all our MSS
'Ἡρόδωτον Ἀλκικαρνασσίοις ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις ἦδε. Which, together with two
other inaccuracies of quotation (in the Rhet.), the transposition of ἦδε,
and the writing ἀπόδειξις for ἀπόδειξις—Demetr. preserves the correct
form—leads me rather to conclude that the variation from our text is due
here, as we have already seen in so many other instances, to our author's
carelessness in quoting from memory, without referring to the original.
Aristotle was a book-collector, and no doubt possessed a copy of Herodo-
tus. Victorius thinks that the reading here is sufficiently justified by the
fact that Herodotus did actually become a citizen of Thurii, and was so
called. But the point here to be decided is not whether he was ever so
called by others, or even by himself at odd times; but whether he did,
or did not, write himself a Thurian at the commencement of his own
history: which I deny, and attribute the implied assertion of that fact as
a mere misquotation to our author himself.

... And this is why it is only at the goal that (the runners) pant (or
gasp) and become faint, because whilst they are looking forward to the
limit of the race they don't flag before that (i.e. before they have reached
the goal)'. This, as I have said in Introd. p. 311, note, seems the ex-
planation of the illustration which is required by the application of it and
by the context. The sight of the goal before them, the term of their
labour, keeps up the racers' spirits and stimulates their exertions, so that
they neither faint nor fail till they reach it: then ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται,
they breathe hard, and their exertions being over, their sinews are
relaxed, they slacken and grow languid. This interpretation, which is
opposed to that of Victorius (see note u.s.), makes the καμπτήρ, which is
properly the turning-point of the δίαλος—whence its name—here the
goal of the σταδίων or single race, in a straight line: the καμπτήρ of the
δίαλος being in fact the πέρας of the σταδίων. If the καμπτήρ were
intended here for the turning-point, the statement made of it could not be
true, for in that case the runners would not come in sight of the goal
until they had passed the καμπτήρ. So in Eth. N. v. 1. 2, 1095 b 1, an illus-
 ration is borrowed from the single foot-race, the σταδίων; ὀσπερ ἐν τῷ
3 προορώντες γάρ το πέρας ού κάμνουσιν πρότερον. η 
σταδίφ απ' των ἀδοθετῶν επί το πέρας η ἀνάσαλω (to illustrate the 
Platonic απ' τῶν ἄρχων ή επί τάς ἄρχας). And similarly the Tragic poets 
express reaching the term or end of life by κάμνειν, which seems to imply 
the necessity of this explanation. Soph. Oed. Col. 91, ἐνταῦθα κάμνων 
tῶν 
ταλαντωρίων βίων. Eur. Hel. 1666, διαν δέ κάμνης καὶ 
tελευτήσῃς βίων. 
Electr. 950, πρὶν αὖ τέλος γραμμῆς ἰκηταί καὶ πέρας κάμνη 
Bíou. Hippol. 87, τέλος δὲ κάμνωμι' ὄστερ ἥραμνη βίω. This single course is also called 
dρόμος ἀκαμπτός, οὔτος, οὔτε, οὔ οὖ̂, Pollux et Hesychius ap. 
Stallbaumer in Phaedo 72 B. The καματήρ, or τήλη, with the inscription κάμνων, 
was called τέρμα, βατήρ, τέλος and νύσσα. Comp. Krause Gymn. ü. Agon. 
der Hell. 1 140.

ἐκλύονται] Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 150, πρὸς τῶν πόλεων ἐκλύοντες 
(slack, remiss). Ib. ant. § 59, ἢ οὖ̂ν μὴ παντασάμεν ἐκλυθά (be 
exhausted) πολλάν ἐτὶ μοι λεκτέων δυνών. Ar. Pol. VII (vi) 6, πολὺ 
ἐκλύοντα, of 
crazy vessels. Ib. Hist. Anim. IX 1. 32, ἵσω δὲ ἐκλύονται (of taming 
elephants). Xen. de Ven. 5. 5, dogs lose their keen smell in the 
summer διὰ τὸ ἐκλυόμεθα τὰ σάματα. Ar. Probl. XXX 1. 6, λιαν πολὺς 
(όνου) ἐκλύει, de Gen. Anim. 1 18. 51, ἐκλυσία, relaxation, weakness. 
Ib. V 7. 21, ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ κινόσα τὴν φωνήν ἐκλύονται.

§ 3. ‘Such then is the loose (‘jointed’ Mure, H. G. L.) kind of style; the 
compact, condensed, concentrated, kind is the periodic, that which is 
constructed in periods: by period I mean a sentence (lit. kind of style or 
composition) having a beginning and end in itself, and a magnitude such as 
can be readily taken in at one view’. The other style is ἀσειρος, ἄρρετα, 
indefinite, continuous, running on without end, and without proper 
divisions; and therefore cannot be comprehended in one view. ἐυσύνοπτον, 
comp. Pol. IV (vii) 4, ult. ἢ μεγίστη ὑπερβολὴ πλῆθους...συνύσωπος, (for 
purposes of supervision). So of a tragedy, Poet. VII 10. 74, ἠχείν μὲν 
μεγάθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι. On the construction ἔτι 
ἱερομηνίᾳ τῆς 
λέξεως, for ἡ ἱερομηνία λέξεως, see the examples in Matthiae's Gr. Gr. 442. 2. 
Add this, and Isocr. Paneg. § 132, τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς, 
Arist. Pol. VIII (v) 10, 1312 b 20, πολλά τῶν καταλύσων.

‘A style of this kind is agreeable, and easy to be learnt’ (εὐμάθης, 
passive; see Aesch. Eum. 442, Soph. Aj. 15, Trach. 611, where ‘easy 
to be learnt’ means ‘readily intelligible’); ‘agreeable, because it is the 
contrary of the endless, indefinite, and also because the listener 
is constantly thinking by reason of this constant definite conclusion 
(or limitation of each sentence) that he has got hold of something 
got something in his grasp—in the way of a conclusion) for himself (αὐτῷ, 
retained by Bekker and Spengel; guære autēr?); whereas, to have 
nothing to look forward to (no conclusion to anticipate) either to be, 
or to be finished (ἀνέσθη, ὥστε τινὰ ἀνέσθη), either fact, or effect, is 
disagreeable’. It occurred to me that εἶναι, which seems superfluous, 
might have arisen from a repetition of the εἰν in προοίμιον. The 
translation will then be, ‘nothing to look forward to nor to finish (get 
done, effect)’: ἀνέσθη identifying the hearer with the speaker, as if he 
himself had to come to the conclusion. Comp. § 6, ὅρμων ἐπὶ τὸ πόμηρο, 
καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἦχεν οὐ ἔνατο ὁρὸν, ἀντίστασθαι πανσαμένου.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Ι 9 §§ 3, 4. 95
μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως ἕστιν ἢ ἀποκαταστάσεως λέγοντος: λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἐξουσαν ἄρχην καὶ τελευτην αὐτῆν καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσυνοπτίου. ἤδεια δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμάθης, Ρ. 1409δ. ἤδεια μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ δὲ μηδὲν προνοεῖν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀνεῖναι ἀνδὲς. εὐμάθης δὲ ὅτι εὐμημόνευτος. τούτῳ δὲ, ὅτι ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ ἐν περίοδοις λέξις, ὁ πάντων εὐμημονευτότατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μημονεύουσι μᾶλλον τῶν χυόνν. ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ὃ μετρεῖται. 4. δὲ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοικεῖσθαι καὶ

'And easy to be learnt because easily recollected: and this because the periodic style can be numbered, and number is of all things the most easily recollected'. The proportions, or relations of the several parts or members of the period to the whole, and to one another—its symmetrical structure—can be expressed in numbers, like the numerical relations of rhythm, c. 8. This gives the periodic structure a hold upon the memory, by its definite proportions, which is entirely wanting to the continuous and indefinite succession of the other.

'And this is why every one recollects metres (verses) better than (disorderly) irregular prose; because it has number which serves to measure it'.

τῶν χυόνν] is the soluta oratio (Cic. Orat. § 228, alibi), the διαλειμή or διερθμένη λέξις (Demetrius): the incoherent style, words poured out at random, in confused mass, one after another, without order or discrimination. Thus, in distinguishing the symmetrical structure of verse from the comparative confusion and disorder of prose, Plato, Legg. VII 811 d, writes λόγων, οῦς ἐν ποιήσασιν ἡ χυόνν οὕτως εἰρημένους (where οὕτως is, Platonice, 'just as they are', 'just as it happens', 'indiscriminately', 'without order or regularity'; or 'without consideration', 'just as it may be'. Heindorf Gorg. § 127 and Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v.; Phaedr. 264 B, οὗ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβληθῶσι τα τῶν λόγων (helter-skelter, like rubbish shot out of a cart; Thompson). Rep. VII 537 C, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα...γενόμενα (taught promiscuously). Isocr. Panath. § 24, ὅμως ἂν εἶναι δόξωμα τοῖς εἰκή καὶ φορτικῶς καὶ χύδην ὅτι ἦν ἑπέλθη λέγουσι (who utter at random, promiscuously anything that comes into their head). Arist. Pol. IV (vii) 2, 1324 b 5, τῶν πλείστων τομίων χύδην οἷς εἰπεῖν κεημένων (shot out in a heap, indiscriminately, at random, without order or system), de part. An. IV 5 27, ὡς διεσταρμένα χύδην. The passage of Plato, Legg. u.s., is referred to by Dionysius, Ars Rhet. X 6 (v 381 ed. Reiske), οὗ χύδην, οἷς ἔτυχον βεβληθῶσι τα ἐνθυμηματα.

§ 4. 'The period must also be completed (or brought to a conclusion)
μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὁσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ιαμβεία,
Kaludow mēn ἡδε γαία Πελοπείας χθονός·
τούναντίον γαρ ἐστιν ύπολαβείν τῷ διαρείσθαι,
ὁσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Kaludōnα εἶναι τῆς
Πελοποννῆσου.

by the sense (καὶ, as well as by the structure and rhythm) and not broken
off abruptly (without completing the sense; διακόπτειν ‘to cut in two’),
like Sophocles' iambics, “Calydon is this land of the Pelopian soil—”;
for the contrary supposition (to this real fact) arises from (ἰλ. is caused
by; dativus instrumenti) this (wrong) division (in general), as also in
the instance given, that Calydon belongs to the Peloponnesus”.

We learn from the Anonymous Scholiast on this passage (see Brandis'
tract [Philologus IV i] pp. 46, 7,) and more precisely from the Schol. on
Ar. Ran. 1269, that this verse comes not from Sophocles, but from
Eur. Meleager, of which it is the commencement. See Wagner, Fragn.
Eur. Mel. 1 (Fr. Tr. Gr. ii 270). The second verse, which completes
the author's meaning, is supplied by Lucian, Conv. c. 25 (Hemsterh. III. 436),
and Demetr. peri ἱρμηνείας § 58 (Rhet. Gr. Spengel III 275), εἰς ἀντιπόθεμος
πέδι· ἔχουσιν εὐθαλομον; and the three following by Wagner, u. s. This
makes it clear that this misstatement was not due to Euripides. As to
the substitution of Sophocles for Euripides as the author, I have no doubt,
from the abundant evidence we have already had, that it is due solely to
a lapse of memory on Ar.'s part, and that no alteration of the text, as sug-
gested by Vater and Bühle, is required.

The stop, or pause, which the speaker or reader makes, when intro-
duced in the wrong place, may make a complete alteration in the mean-
ing: as here, if the verse be read as an entire sentence with the pause at
χθονός, it conveys the meaning that Calydon is situated in the Pelopo-
nesus, which is contrary to the fact: but if it be read continuously without
a pause with the ensuing line, the true sense becomes clear. διαρείσθαι
here is equivalent to διαστῆσαι III 5. 6, comp. Anon. ap. Brandis, p. 47, οὐά
εἰσιν κατὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν, καὶ ἐνάντια μὲν διαστήσεσθαι ἄλλην διάνοιαν
ἀπαρίσομεν, ἐνάθα δὲ διαστήσεσθαι ἄλλην. This is in fact the ‘fallacy of
division’, de Soph. El 4, 166 a 33, παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν, where two verses
are quoted in illustration.

Demetrius u.s. quotes the two verses in illustration of a different kind
of fault; the interpolation of a σύνθεσις—in which he includes interjec-
tions—by authors, as an explētive. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναπληροῦντες, φησί,
tῶν σύνθεσιν ὕπειροσ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς τοῖς τῷ καὶ τῷ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐπος λέγοντεν,
οἷον εἴ τε ὤδε λέγω, Καλοῦθων μὲν ἦδε γαία Πελοπείας χθονός, φεῦ, ἐν ἄντι-
πόρθμοι πεδί· ἔχουσι εὐθαλομον, αἱ αἱ. ἄν γὰρ παρέλειπε το αἱ αἱ καὶ τῷ φεῦ
ἐνθάδε, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πανταχοῦ μάτην ἐμβαλλόμενον σύνθεσις.

The MSS, with the exception of Afr., have Πελοπείαι, which is found also
in Demetrius and retained by Bekker and Spengel; MS A' Lucian, the
Schol. on Aristophanes, Dindorf (Eur. Fragn. Mel. 2), and Wagner, read
the more usual form Πελοπείας. The text of Euripides, who alone of the
5 periosodos de ἢ μὲν ἐν κωλοῖς ἢ ὑ ἀφελείς. ἔστι δὲ ἐν κωλοῖς μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ δηρημένη καὶ εὐανάπτυνυτος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαίρεσι ὁσπερ ἡ εἰρημένη περιόδος, ἀλλ' ὀλη. κωλοῦ δ' ἔστι τὸ ἔτερον three Tragedians uses the word, has Πικλόμος in five places, including the line of the Meleager (Beck's Index).

§ 5. 'A period may be either divided into clauses, or simple (confined to one)'. Ar. himself defines what he means here by ἀφελής, viz. μικρόκολος, a sentence consisting of a single member, without the complication, or elaborate construction of the period. ἀφελής properly denotes smooth and level, without inequalities or irregularities, as Arist. Eq. 527, διὰ τῶν ἀφελῶν πεδίων ἐφέτε. It is therefore 'plain' as opposed to 'mountainous', literally and metaphorically, level, easy to be traversed, simple, plain; whereas the mountain is suggestive of difficulty. It is applied by Dionysius, de admirabili dicendi in Demosthenes [c. 2] to Lysias' style, which is said to be λιτή καὶ ἀφελής, 'smooth and plain or simple'. Lysias' style is in fact a medium between the εἰρωμένη λέξις of Hecataeus and Herodotus, and the complex periods of Isocrates and Demosthenes: and a comparison of the sentences of Lysias with those of Demosthenes will clearly show the difference between the ἀφελῆς and ἡ ἐν κωλοὶς περιόδος. Quint. IX 4.124, 12. 5. Genera eius (periodi) duo sunt: alterum simplex, quum sensus unus longiore ambitu circumducitur; alterum, quod constat membris (ἐν κωλοῖς) et incisis, quae plurès sensus habent. Habet periodus membra minimum duo: medius numerus videntur quattuor (so Cic. Orat. § 221), sed recepti frequentem et plura.

' The period in clauses or divisions must be complete in itself, duly divided (its members distinct and definite), and such as can be easily delivered without stopping to draw breath' (lit. easily breathed, well adapted to the limits of the breath).

εὐανάπτυνυτος] Cic. de Or. III 44. 175, Rudis orator incondite fundit... spiritu non arte determinat. Orat. § 228, Non spiritu pronuntiantis... debet insister.

'Not however (μὴ, if, provided, it be not) by the mere (arbitrary) division (as if the speaker might pause for breath, wherever he pleases,) as (in) the period already cited (Kalvə criticisms...), but as a whole. A member or clause is one of the two parts of this. By simple I mean a period of a single member'. It appears from this that a period, according to Ar., is a sentence that includes a complete sense, and is thereby distinguished from a κώλον or member of it: which is a member or part of a whole, and therefore incomplete until the whole has been expressed. The period therefore is twofold, simple, μονόκολος, and compound, ἐν κωλοῖς. The phrase τὸ ἔτερον μόριον divides the compound period primarily or essentially into two parts, which stands for, and may be extended to, division in general. Cicero, as Vater

1 So Hermogn. περὶ εἰρωμένων τομ. δ', περὶ περιόδου (II 144 Rb. Gr. Spengel), of the κώλον. The period may consist of one, two, three or four, colonas. κώλον δὲ ἔστιν ἀπεργημένη διάνοια, a complete sense. Aristotle admits this only of the μονόκολος περιόδος.

AR. III.
μόριον ταύτης. ἀφέλη δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κόλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μνύφουσ' εἶναι observes, acknowledges the compound alone to be a true period. Τὸ δὲ κάλον Ἀριστοτελῆς ὡτός ὁρίζεται, "κάλον ἔτοι τὸ ἔτερον μέρος περιόδου" εἶτα ἐπιφέρει, "γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀπλὴ περίοδος." ὡτός ἀριστοκάμοις "τὸ ἔτερον μέρος" δίκωλον ἐβοῦλτο εἶναι τὴν περίοδον δηλονότη. ὃ δὲ Ἀρχέγονος συλλαβ. θάν τῷ δρόμῳ τοῦ Ἀρ., καὶ τὸ ἐπιφέρομεν τῷ δρόμῳ σαφέστερον καὶ τελεστέρον ὡτός ὁρίστατο, "κάλον ἔτοι ήτοι ἀπλή περίοδος, ἡ συνθέτου περιόδου μέρος." [Demetrius π. ἐρμηνείας, § 34]. Ον κόλα καὶ κόμματα in general, see Intro. pp. 312, 3, note I.

...

Τὸ 35, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (ὅθεν) ἵστη τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, one-sided, ill-balanced, like a man with one arm or leg; opposed to the Athenian, in se totus teres atque rotundus.

§ 6. 'The members or clauses and the periods themselves should be neither truncated (cut prematurely short), nor too long'. Constat ille ambitus et plena comprehensio ex quattuor fere paribus, quae membra dicimus, ut et aures impieat et ne brevior sit quam satis sit neque longior. Cic. Orat. § 221.

μνύφουραν] This word is variously written μυ- and μέ-ουρος, and so here the MSS. The Lexicons, including Stephens', regard them as two different words: Stephens only distinguishing the sense, μεῖουρος, κολόβουρος, bob-tailed, with a stunted tail; μύουρος, sharp-tailed, like a mouse: while Liddell and Scott, and Rost and Palm, deriving μύουρος from a mouse's tail, set the facts of the case at defiance by defining it nevertheless 'curtailed', 'abgestutzt oder abgestumpft'. This at all events is no doubt the meaning of it. It seems to me rather that the word is the same, and the variety only in the spelling. The meaning of it is always the same; bob-tailed, curtailed, originally; and thence blunted, truncated, docked, maimed, cut short where you would naturally expect a prolongation. Comp. Poet. c. XXVI 13, ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα τῶν μιθῶν ποιών χάνειν ἢ βραχία δεικνύμενον μύουρον φαίνεσθαι, unnaturally, unduly, curtailed. See Twining's note, p. 557. He refers to Hephæst. μεῖουρος στίχος, ὃ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἀπλώματα χρώμα, opposed to δολὶουρος, 'long-tailed', ὃ κατὰ τὸ τέλος πλεονάζων συλλαβ. Comp. de part. Anim. III I, 13, of blunt-nosed, as opposed to sharp-nosed, fishes: οἱ σαρκοφάγοι, fishes of prey, like the shark, are sharp-nosed, οἱ δὲ μὴ σαρκοφάγοι μύουροι (a bulldog's nose is particularly μύουροι). And again IV 13, 22, the same remark is repeated. Pausanias, x 16.1, describing one of Croesus' offerings at Delphi, σχῆμα δὲ τοῦ ὑπόθημας κατὰ πόργο χάλωστα ἐς μύουρον ἀνώτατα ἀπό εὐρυτόρα τοῦ κάτω, of a truncated cone or pyramid. Athenaeus (XIV 632 D, E, ter,) of three kinds of defective verses; ακέφαλος, at the beginning, as a verse beginning with ἑπτά; λαγαροῖ, prop. spider-shaped, contracted or weak in the flanks; hence of verses, faulty in the middle (claudicant in medio Schweighäuser ad loc.), where a short syllable occurs for a long one in the middle of the verse: illustrated by II. B [II] 731, and another hexameter which Schweighäuser can't find, and to him is inexplicable; and thirdly μεῖουρος, οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκβολῆς, at the end of the verse; of which three specimens are given, II. M [XII] 218, another which
μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίειν πολ-
λάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἄκρωστην· ἀνὰγκῃ γὰρ, όταν ἐτὶ
ορμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ
όρων, ἀντιστασθῇ πανσαμένου, οἶον προσπταίειν
γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. τὰ δὲ μακρά ἀπολεί-
πεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὡσπερ οἱ ἑξωτέρῳ ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ
tέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπερι-

is misquoted from II. Θ [VIII] 305, and a third from Od. ε [IX] 212. This
passage of Athenaeus is quoted at length by Hermann, El. doctr. metr.
μειόνωσι.

'For that (sc. the κόλων) which is too short often makes the listener
stumble (balks him by bringing him up short and abruptly); because
if, whilst he is still hurrying (eager) to get on (forward), and to the
(end or completion of the) measure (rhythm), of which he has already
a definition (i.e. a definite and preconceived notion) in himself, he be
suddenly pulled up (checked, lìs, pulled against) by a pause (a premature
cessation on the part of the speaker), there must necessarily follow (arise
γίγνεσθαι) a sort of stumble by reason of the check'.

προσπταίειν] must be regarded as a subst. in the accusative before γίγ-
νεσθαι, equivalent to τὸ προσπταίειν. The metaphor is from driving:
a sudden and unexpected check, or pulling against him, will often cause
a horse to stumble, or bring him on his knees. The abrupt cessation of
the onward motion, in the listener's mind, as in the horse's career, pro-
duces analogous effects—whence the metaphor—in the two cases.

'Those again which are too long produce a feeling of being left
behind, like those who (in a measured walk, as in the colonnade of a
gymnasium) turn back only after passing (not till they have passed) the
limit; for they too—like the speaker that uses too long periods—leave
behind their companions in the walk'.

The notion is that of a party walking backwards and forwards in
the portico of a gymnasium, the walk, like the period, being properly
limited, though the limit is capable of being passed. If one of the party
—suppose Aristotle himself in his daily περιπάτους in the Lyceum—
chanced to have thus outstripped his companions, the latter would be
left in the lurch, and be no longer able to hear him. Similarly the speaker
who makes his periods of undue length, leaves his hearers in the lurch:
they stop short, as it were, and lose the thread of his discourse. ἄνωκμη-
τειν is here not in its usual sense, but 'to turn away' in the sense of
'turning back', as ἀποδιδώσι, ἀπονέμειν, ἀπαιτεῖν.

On this subject comp. Cic. Orat. LIII 178, itaque et longiora et
breviora iudicat et perfecta ac modesta semper expectat; mutiis sentit
quaedam et quasi decurtata, quibus tanquam debito fraudetur offenditur,
productiora alia et quasi immoderatii in currentia, quae magis etiam
aspernantur aures, et seq.
πατούντας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὐσαι p. 125.
λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολὴ ὁμοίων. ἢστε γίνεται ὁ ἐσκωψε Δημόκριτος ὁ Χίος εἰς Μελαινπίδην ποιή-
σαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς,
οἱ τ᾽ αὐτῶ κακὰ τεῦχει ἀνήρ ἀλλῷ κακὰ τεῦχων,
ἡ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη.
ἀρμότει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκύλους

'And in like manner also the periods that are too long become so
many speeches, and like a dithyrambic prelude; that is, rambling and
incoherent, without unity or system.

αἱ περίοδοι...λόγος γίνεται] verb attracted from the plural to the singular,
as the nearer of the two: so ἐνφα, αἰ τε λιαν βραχίσκειλοι αὑ το περίοδοι γίνεται.
For δροιν cf. triste lupus stabulis, et sim. On ἀναβολή, see note 1,

'And therefore what Democritus of Chios quoted to taunt Melan-
ippides for writing (long, rambling) dithyrambic preludes instead of
the (compact and regular) stanzas, is realized (in these overgrown
periods). "A man works mischief to himself in working mischief to
another, and the long dithyrambic prelude is most mischievous to its
composer" (substituted for ἡ δὲ κακῇ βουλῇ τῷ Βοιλώσαντι κακίστη, of
the original, Hesiod. Op. et D. 263): for a taunt of the same kind may
also be appropriately applied to the long-membered gentry, (the dealers
in long-membered periods). The makers of the periods are themselves
called here μακροκύλοι. To scan the second verse of the quotation μα-
κραναβολή must be read as a crasis. "Democritus Chius Musicus,
Abderitae aequalis teste Diogene Laertio, ΙΧ 49 (γεγόνας δὲ Δημόκρητου
ὑπὸ πρῶτοι αὐτὸς ὠνος, δεύτερος Χίος μνημικός κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνων).
De hoc omnium optime egit Coraes εἰς Χιαξεῖς Ἀρχαιολογίας Υλῆ Ατακτ.

In the note on ἀναβολαί, Introd. p. 307, already referred to, may
be found some account of the two kinds of dithyramb here alluded to;
the earlier antistrophic form of that of Arion, Stesichorus, Pindar,
and the novel, relaxed, often incoherent, extravagances, of Melanippides
and his followers. Nevertheless, Melanippides is selected by Aristoc-
demus, in answer to Socrates' question, Xen. Mem. I 4. 3, as the most
distinguished representative of dithyrambic poetry, as Homer of epic,
Sophocles of tragedy, Polycletus of sculpture, and Zeuxis of painting.
This represents the popular judgment, as opposed to that of the critics.
On this subject, I have referred to Bode, Gesch. der Hell. Dichtk.
Vol. ΙΙ ΠΤ. ΙΙ p. ΙΙΙ seq. and 293 seq. and to Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XXX.
See also Arist. Probl. XIX 15. Of Melanippides of Melos, there is a life in

'Those which have their members too short make no period at all:
and so it (i.e. the period made up of these short κόμα) drags the hearer
with it headlong'. The audience is carried away by them, as by a
λέγειν. αἱ τε λίαιν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίγνεται
προπετὴ οὐν ἀγεί τὸν ἀκροατὴν.

7 τῆς δὲ ἐν κόλοις λέξεως ἢ μὲν διηρημένη ἔστων ἡ δὲ
ἀντικειμένη, διηρημένη μὲν οἶνον "πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα
τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεσιν συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων," ἀντικειμένη δὲ, ἐν ἡ
ἐκατέρῳ τῷ κόλῳ ἡ πρὸς ἐναντίω ἐναντίον σύγκειται
ἡ ταυτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἶνον "ἀμφοτέρους ὦ.
δ' ἀμησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθή-
σαντας τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλεῖω τῆς ὁικοὶ προσεκτή-
σαντο, τοῖς δὲ ἰκανὰν τῆν ὁικοὶ κατέλιπον." ἐναντία
ὑπομονὴ ἀκολουθήσις, ἰκανὸν πλείον. "ὡςτε καὶ τοῖς

horse, at a headlong, break-neck, pace. Specimens of this style are
given in Introd. p. 314, note 1.

§ 7. "The periodic style has two divisions, of which the one has its
clauses (simply) divided; the other opposed to one another; an instance
of simple division is, "I have often wondered that those who first
assembled these universal gatherings and established the athletic con-
tests..." διηρημένη λέξεως, "in qua membra periodi copula a se invicem
distinguitur." Ernest, Lex. Techn. Gr. διαφέρων. This is the opening
of Isocrates' Panegyric Speech, supposed or intended to be delivered
at the 'General Assembly' of the great Olympic games—whence the
name. It is remarkable, and shews that Ar. could not have looked
at the passage he was quoting, that the very next words to those at
which his quotation stops, long before the end of the sentence, contain
a regular antithesis or opposition of members, and the 'simple division'
is absolutely confined to the words cited. I should suppose that he
could not have been aware of this.

"(An instance) of the antithetic period, wherein in each of the two clauses
contrary by contrary are brought together, or (the same word is imposed
as a yoke, i.e. bracket, or vinculum, on both contraries) the two con-
traries are coupled together by one and the same word, is "Both they
served, them that remained, and them that followed; for the one they
acquired more land than they had at home in addition, and to the
others they left behind sufficient in what they had at home." ὑπομονὴ,
(staying behind) is contrary to ἀκολουθήσις (following), ἰκανὸν πλείον

It is unnecessary to say that the passage is quoted wrong: it runs
in the original, Paneg. § 35, 6, ἀμφ. δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀκολ. καὶ τοὺς ὑπομ.
ἐςώσαν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἰκανὴ τὴν οἰκοὶ χώραν κατέλισαν, τοῖς δὲ πλείω τῆς
ὑπαρχοῦσας ἐπώρουσαν. The first clause is an exemplification of ἐπίζευξις,
on which see note supra c. 5 § 7; the second, of the antithesis of con-
traries in two clauses balanced and opposed to one another.

In the quotation that follows, Paneg. § 41, the original is, διστε καὶ τοῖς
χρημάτων δεομένοι καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσαι βουλομένοις" ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἕτε "συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχείν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν." "εἰ δὲ μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἥξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὑστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀλαβον." "πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἤπειρον, πεζεύσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλησποντον καυχάς, τὸν δ' Ἀθω διορίζας." "καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμω τῆς πολέως στέρεσθαι." "οὐ μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων δεομένοι καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσαι τῶν ἀπαρχάντων ἐπιθυμοῦν ἄμορφοις ἄριστείων. Αρ. in his alteration has adorned Isocrates' text with an additional rhetorical figure, the ἀμοιβαλεων or rhyming terminations of δεομένοις and βουλομένοις. 'ἀπόλαυσις, (sensual) enjoyment, is opposed to κτήσει, acquisition', as the text has it. As these two can hardly be considered antithetical, and nothing corresponding to κτήσει occurs in Isocr., are we to suppose that Ar., meaning to write ἐνδιάσφ. carelessly substituted κτήσει? or rather, that κτήσει is a mistake of a copyist for δενήσει, which occurs twice in the sense of 'want' Π. 3 and 4: and also, in the same sense, Pseudo-Plato, Eryxias, 405 E δις.

Then follows a string of quotations from the same speech of Isocrates, illustrative of antithesis; § 48 (wrong), § 72 (right), § 89 (right again), § 105 (wrong), § 149 (right), § 181 (wrong), § 186 (wrong, ἥξιους for ἥξιου). The passage τῶν μὲν Ἑλλησποντον κτ. λ. occurs likewise in the funeral oration attributed to Lysias, § 29. This speech is marked as spurious by Baiter and Sauppe in their ed. of the Or. Att. If this be so, the figure is probably due to Isocrates, which is all the more likely as Lysias' style, λείπον καὶ ἀσκληπ., is usually free from these rhetorical artifices. Victorius refers to an imitation of this, Cic. de Fin. II 34. 112, Ut si Xerxes... Hellesponto incuncto, Athone perfesso, maria ambulavisset terramque navigasse. And Lucr. III 1042 (1029, Munro), ille quoque ipse (Xerxes) viam qui quondam per mare magnum stravit, et seq.

'And what some one (some advocate, in accusation, whose name Ar. either had never heard, or didn't recollect) said against Peitholous and Lycoophron in the law-court (at some trial: quære, theirs?), "And these fellows (οὕτω, apparently 'the accused' or 'opponents' as usual) who used to sell you when they were at home, now that they have come to you here, have bought you"'. Peitholous and Lycoophron were brothers of Thebe, the wife of Alexander of Pherae. At her instigation they murdered their brother-in-law and succeeded him in the dynasty. They maintained themselves long against the attacks of Philip by the aid of Onomarchus the Phocian commander, but at last were defeated, 353—352 B.C., and Onomarchus slain; upon which they "retired with their mercenaries, 2000 in number, into Phokis." Grote, Hist. Gr. from Diodorus, Vol. XI ch. LXXXVII pp. 366, 408, 9, 11, where Lycoophron alone is mentioned as 'the despot of Pherae': in p. 412,
RHETORIKHΣ 9 §§ 7, 8. 103

αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἳ δ' αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν." "ἰδία μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκήταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῆ δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας." "ἡ θύντας ἄγειν ἡ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν." καὶ δ' εἰς Πειθολαύν τις εἶπε καὶ Δυκόρρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστήρῳ, "οὖτοι δ' ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἔλθοντες δ' ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐφήνηται," ἀπαντά γὰρ ταῦτα 8 ποιεὶ τὸ εἰρημένον. ἡδεία δ' ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις,

Peitholaus and Lycephon are named together for the first time as joint commanders.

As the time, place, and circumstances, as well as the speaker, of what is here related, are alike utterly unknown, any attempt at interpreting it must be a mere guess. My conjecture is, (1) that the scene is a court of justice—where, no one can say; I will assume at Athens—(2) that oûtau are Peitholaus and Lycephon, as accused or defendants—this is suggested by ἐλις Π. τις εἶπε and the use of oûtau—and if so, this must have been after their downfall: and (3) that, to give the remark a point, ἐφήνητας must have a double sense. 'These fellows, says some one to the judges, used when they were at home, at Pherae, to sell you (as slaves)—ὑμᾶς maliciously identifies the Athenian judges with their fellow-countrymen, captives in Thessaly—now that they are come to you, the tables are turned, and they have to buy you' (i.e. to bribe the judges). Victorius, but utterly without point, Videtur contumeliosa vox in eos iacta, qui pecunia, quam comparassent in suis civibus hostibus emancipandis, eadem postea uterentur in illis ab iisdem emendatis, atque in servitudinem sibi adiudicandis.

'For all these (passages) do what has been mentioned'; i.e. give an antithetical structure to the several sentences.

§ 8. 'This kind of style is agreeable because contraries are best known (in themselves and by reason of their opposition), and still better when placed side by side (in juxtaposition, for the purpose of contrast and comparison); and also because it resembles a syllogism; for the Ἀλεξόμος (the refutative syllogism) is a bringing together (for the same purpose) of the two opposites (the two contradictory conclusions).'

This opposition of contraries in the antithesis, also reminds us of the Ἀλεξόμος, the conclusion of opposites, refutation by an opposite conclusion; this resemblance makes the former look like a proof, which is a source of pleasure.

Aristotle is constantly telling us—see Bonitz ad Metaph. B 2, 996 a 18—that contraries, which are the two extremes of things under the same genus, are also subject to the same science, τῶν ἐναρμ. μία, or ἡ αὐτή, ἐπιστήμη. And accordingly, inferences may be drawn from one contrary to another, Eth. N. v 1, 1129 a 14 seq. This appears to be the foundation of what is here said, that contraries are best known to us; they can be studied together, and one throws light upon the other. Comp. III 11. 9,
δή τάναντια γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον p. 126. γνώριμα, καὶ ὃτι ἐσκε συλλογισμῷ· ὸ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἑστίν.

9 ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑστίν, παρίσωσις δ’ ἐάν ἵσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δ’ ἐάν ὁμοια τὰ ἑσχατα ἐχὶ ἐκάτερυν τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐχειν. καὶ ἀρχῇ μὲν αἰὲ τὰ

ὁσοὶ...ἀντικειμένως λεξῆι τοσοῦτο εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ’ αὐτον ὃ ἦ ἐκεῖνο διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικείμενο μᾶλλον...καίνεται. II 23. 30 and III 17. 13, on ἔλεγχος, and the conclusion (implying learning) from opposites. In Probl. XIX 5, ἤδη τὸ μαθηματικός is assigned, as an acknowledged truth, in explanation of a musical fact. ‘Best known’ seems to mean that contraries, being under the same genus, are better known than any other things that have no such relation, or no relation at all, to one another.

On the pleasure derived from learning, which is here assumed to be the explanation of the agreeableness of this periodic style, see the notes on I 11. 21, 23; particularly the latter, in which it is fully illustrated from Aristotle’s writings. I will repeat here that the Metaphysics opens with a statement that all men have a natural longing for (strive after) knowledge, πάντες ἀνθρώποι τού εἶδον ἐρέγονται φύσις: and this of course implies pleasure in learning, which is the satisfaction of this natural appetite. The natural love of imitation or copying, which gives rise to all the imitative arts, is based in the same way upon the desire and pleasure of learning. And contrariwise therefore (this is additional), as we saw in c. 8. 2, ἀδῆς καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον, the infinite, or indefinite, is displeasing to us because it is unknowable. Comp. Ῥηγεία c. 10. 2, τὸ γὰρ μαθηματικὸν ῥῆμος ἤδη φύσις πάνιν ἐστί: the words that convey the most instruction to us are the most pleasing; hence the pleasure derived from metaphors, which is explained: γλώσσα on the contrary, which teach us nothing, are therefore disagreeable.

παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα] juxtaposition makes things more intelligible is a fact already more than once appealed to, as II 23. 30; compare the parallel passage, III 17. 13; II 2. 9; and again III 11. 9.

On the ἔλεγχος and its opposite conclusions, συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως see Introd. on II 22, and note 1, p. 262, and again, on II 25, p. 268.

§ 9. ‘Such then is antithesis; the equality of the members (or clauses) is παρίσωσις; παρομοίωσις is when each of the two members (the supposition that the period consists of only τῶο clauses is still carried on) has its extremities similar (i.e. in the letters, so that the terminations rhyme to one another). (The clauses) must have this either at the beginning or at the end. And when they (the similar sounding letters) are at the beginning (the figure is) always (expressed in) whole words (litt. the words, entire words, always are a beginning), but at the end (it admits of) either the (similarity of the) last syllables, or the same word with a changed termination (declension, adverbial, adjectival, termination, &c), or the same word. Similar sound (παρομοίωσις) at the com-
όνομα, ἡ δὲ τελευτη τάς ἐσχάτας συλλαβαῖς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα. ἐν ἄρχη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα "ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἄργον παρ' αὐτοῦ,"

δωρητὶ τ' ἐπέλουτο παράρρητοι τ' ἐπέεσσιν.

ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ "φηθείσαν αὐτοῦ παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ αἱτίων γεγονέναι," "ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν." πτώσις δὲ ταυτοῦ "ἀξίως δὲ σταθήναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὁν χαλκοῦ." ταυτὸ δ' ὄνομα "σὺ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ζωντα ἐλεγες κακώς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς." ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δὲ "τι ἀν

mencement (may be illustrated by) such examples as this; ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἄργον (fallow, uncultivated) παρ' αὐτοῦ. Victorius quotes a parallel example from Xen. Cyrop. VIII 3. 15, σὺ δυνάμενος τρέφειν ἄργον εἰς ἄγρον ἀλαγαγοῦ ἐκείνουν ἐργάζεσθαι. The ‘rhyme at the beginning’ of clauses is properly called ὁμοιοκάταρτον; at the end ὁμοιοτέλευτον and, ἀνάρρητο τ' ἐπέλουτο παράρρητοί τ' ἐπέεσσιν. II. I [IX] 526. ‘At the end, φηθείσαν αὐτοῦ παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ αἵτιων γεγονέναι (in this there appears to be neither rhyme nor reason [the assonance, or correspondence of vowel sounds, is however clearly marked in the two clauses]; it is most likely corrupt, says Buhle). ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσαι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσαι.

'And an inflexion (declension, change of termination from a root: see note on I 7. 27) of the same word (i.e. root) ἄξιος δὲ σταθήναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὁν χαλκοῦ, "worthy to be set up in brass (have a bronze statue erected in his honour, Dem. de F. L. § 296, Φιλίππων βασιλέως καὶ χαλκοῦ λιστά... I b. § 378, ζητών ὅτιν ὑμεῖς...χαλκόν στήσατ' ἐν ἄγορα; as a public benefactor), not being worth a brass farthing". (Supposed to deserve a brass statue—bronze in reality—when he doesn't deserve a brass farthing. This is in fact more in the nature of a παρονομασία, or play upon words, than of an ὁμοιοτέλευτον. Δι. however seems to class both under his παρομοιωσις).

'And the same word (repeated) ἔλεγες κακῶς...γράφεις κακῶς'. Demetrius, who repeats all this, following Arist. very closely, and sometimes borrowing his examples, supplies in his version a word which is wanting in our text, both to the sense and to the due balance of the sentence: οὐ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνατά ἐλεγες κακῶς, καὶ νῦν θαυμά τα γράφεις κακῶς. Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας § 26. Compare the three chapters, p. περιδοθ, p. παρομοιών κακῶν, p. ὁμοιοτέλευτον, Rhet. Gr. III 262—208, ed. Spengel. This sentence was applied by some rival orator to one who, after slandering some one all his life, after his death wrote a panegyric on him—which, the speaker says, was just as bad as his slander.¹

¹ This reminds us of Lord Lyndhurst's saying of Campbell's Lives of the
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ἐπαθεὶς δειόν, εἰ ἀνδρ' εἰδες ἀργόν;" ἐστι δὲ ἀμα

'And (a rhyming termination arising) from a single syllable: δειόν... ἀργόν. And the same clause may have all three at once, and the antithesis and balance of clauses, and similar termination may be the same' (included or exemplified in one or the same clause). An instance of this is given by Victorinus from a saying of Gorgias preserved by Plutarch, Cimon. c. 10, τὸν Κύμανα τὰ χρήματα κτάσας μὲν ὡς χρήμα, χρήσας δὲ ὡς τιμήμα. Gorg. Fragm. Sauppe, Or. Att. III p. 131, Fr. Inc. 6. This is not only antithesis and the rest, but a false antithesis to boot. Demetr., u.s. § 23, has supplied a much more elaborate example from Isocr. Helen. § 17. τῷ (τοῦ Isocr.) μὲν ἐπίστων καὶ φιλοκινδυνοῦν τὸν βιον κατιστής (Dem. has ἐποίησε), τῆς δὲ περίβλεπτον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησε (Dem. κατιστήσων). 'The commencement of periods (in this view of the artificial structure of the sentence) have been enumerated with tolerable (σχεδόν 'pretty nearly') completeness (ἐξ—'out', 'to the end or full') in the Theodecta. There are also false antitheses, as Epicharmus, besides others, (καί) wrote, τόκα μὲν κ.τ.λ.' This line of Epicharmus is also given by Demetr. u.s. § 24. He speaks of it as 'said in jest', πεπαγμένον—τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκρηγα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαντίον—to make fun of the rhetoricians, σκάπτων τοὺς ἱητορας, viz. Gorgias and his school, the inventors of antithesis and the rest of these rhetorical novelties.

For further details on the subject of these rhetorical figures introduced by Gorgias and his school, who carried them to a vicious excess, a style to which the term Γοργιάζειν was afterwards applied; which was thought to have attained its highest perfection in the measured and laboured, empty and monotonous, periods of Isocrates;—see the paper on Gorgias, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil., No. VII, Vol. III. p. 69 seq. where they are classified and arranged under three heads, representing parallelism in sense, structure, and sound, which is in fact Aristotle's division. Illustrative extracts from Gorgias' speeches are given at p. 67: and a collection of his fragments in Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. (appended to the Or. Att. Vol. III) p. 129 seq. [Compare Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, I pp. 60—62, and Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, Appendix, On the Fragments of Gorgias.]

Perhaps the most complete specimen of Isocrates' style in his Pangegic, from which I will select one or two illustrations, is § 76, οὐ γὰρ ὁλιγόφορον τῶν κοινῶν, οὐδ' ἀπέλανον μὲν ὡς ἰδίων, ἡμίλιον δὲ ὡς ἀλλοτριόν, ἀλλ' ἐκήρυκτο μὲν ὡς οἰκειόν, ἀπείχοντο δ' ὡσπερ χρή τῶν μηδὲν προσηκότων' and so on, in the same measured strain. Of παραμοίωσις, we have an example § 45, ἔτι δ' ἀγώνας ἰδεῖν μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ ραβμὰ, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης, κ.τ.λ. The rhyming terminations pervade §§ 185, 186, culminating in a sentence, in which for once the echo is really effective, φάσμα δὲ καὶ μακρόν καὶ δοξαν πόσην τίνα χρή νομίζειν ἢ ἑκατατείχειν τῆς τινος τοιοῦτος ἐργοῦ δριστευτάτης; (Aesch. c. Ctes. p. 65 § 78, at the close of a paragraph, οὐ γὰρ τῶν τρόπων ἀλλὰ τῶν τόπων μόνον μεθήλατεν. Ennius, ap. Cic. Orat. xxvii 23, Arce et urbe orba sum.) No better illustration could be found of the importance of Chancellors: that the prospect of having his life written by him added a new terror to death.
The precept so much insisted upon by Aristotle, that the art employed in composition should be carefully concealed, than the striking difference in point of interest between the studied, monotonous, wearisome periods of Isocrates, and the animated, vigorous, natural, yet rhythmical periods of Demosthenes, on which though at least as much pains and labour had been bestowed by the one as by the other—the critics said 'they smelt of the lamp'—in the one the study entirely escapes notice, in the other it is most painfully apparent.

On antithesis and the rest, there are also remarks in Introd. pp. 314, 5, and the note: and on the divisions of the period, κόμμα and κάλον, of which the last two are not distinguished by Ar., p. 312, note 1.

The meaning and authorship of the Theodectea has been already discussed at length, p. 55, seq. The conclusion arrived at is, that the work here referred to was an earlier treatise on Rhetoric by Aristotle, the result of his rhetorical teaching, which confined itself to the subjects dealt with in the extant third book. αἱ αρχαὶ τῶν περίδων, which is confined by the expression to ὁμοιοκάταρχον, may perhaps, as Victorius supposed, be intended to include by inference all the other figures described in this chapter.

This chapter offers a remarkable exception, at all events in the first six sections, to Aristotle's ordinary manner of writing; in that the thoughts are in some degree written out and the meaning fairly represented by the language: instead of being left, as usual, to the sagacity of the reader to fill up and interpret as best he can.

§ 1. 'Having discussed and settled the preceding subject we have next to describe the sources of lively, pointed, sprightly, witty, facetious, clever, and popular (εὐδοκιμώντα) sayings. Now to make them is the result either of natural ability (cleverness) or of long practice (exercise); the exhibition (or explanation) of them is the province of this study (or treatise). θεωρεῖν, note on 1 6.15. The Rhet. ad Alex. c. 22 (23) treats of δαστείων in style, apparently with much the same meaning as that of Aristotle. See the analysis of the chap. in Introd. p. 434. Brevity is at all events an element of τὸ δαστείων. Aristotle's τὸ δαστείων seems to correspond to Campbell's 'vivacity' of style, which is treated in the first three chapters of his third book.
§ 2. 'Let us then describe it by a complete (thorough or detailed) enumeration, and let this be our starting-point. Learning namely with ease (without trouble or labour) is naturally agreeable to every one, and names (nouns) are significant; and therefore all nouns or words from which we learn anything are most agreeable'. On this see note on c. 9 § 8, add c. 11. 9, and 11. 21, 23.

'Now words strange, foreign, archaic, are not known at all (and can therefore convey no information), and the proper, ordinary, names of things, we know already. It is the metaphor (the only remaining kind of single word) that does this in the highest degree: for when (the poet, Homer Od. ἄ [xiv] 214) calls old age a (dry, withered) stalk or stubble, he conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the genus, because both are withered; 'are fallen into the sere and yellow leaf'. ἅδι τοῦ γένους, because the metaphor brings remote members (species) of the same genus into a novel comparison, which teaches us something new of one or the other.

§ 3. 'Now the poets’ similes produce the same effect (give point, vivacity, or liveliness, to the narrative of an epic poem, in which they usually appear): and therefore if the simile be well (selected or executed, or both), it gives an air of liveliness, point, vividness to the composition. For the simile, as has been said before (not literally what is said here, but the substance of it, 3. 4. 1), 'is a metaphor, differing from it merely by the manner of setting forth (mode of statement): and therefore it is less agreeable because longer (μακρότερος, λεγομένη or πεποιημένη, iii. written in a longer form, at greater length), and (because) it does not say directly that (of the two things compared) one is the other; and accordingly (as the speaker’s tongue does not say this, so) neither does the (hearer’s) mind look out for it—and so loses the opportunity of learning.

μακρότερος] On this termination of the adv. comparative, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 141. 3, Donaldson’s Gr. Gr. § 282 b, [Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 158, 2]. Matthiae has omitted it.

The meaning of προθεσεί, by which the simile is said here to differ from
the metaphor, may be inferred from the previous passage referred to, III 4. 1, but is not there directly expressed. It means the 'mode of setting forth', of describing or stating the comparison which both of them make; just as in c. 13, 2, 3 (in Ar.'s division of the speech), and Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30) §§ 2, 21; 35 (36) § 1, πρόθεσις and προεκτίθεμαι are put for 'the statement of the case' or exposition of the facts. There are two distinguishable points in which the simile differs from the metaphor; the length, and (consequent) dilution of the force of its impression. The metaphor is concise, generally expressed in a single word, which suggests the comparison, and identifies the two things compared, λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο; so that the comparison is forced directly upon the hearer's mind, who thereby learns something: whereas the simile goes into detail, often to a considerable length, so that it loses the pointed brevity of the metaphor; and instead of identifying the two objects compared, like the other, by the introduction of the particle of comparison ὡς, so weakens its force that the hearer is apt to lose the lesson and the pleasure that should be derived from it.

§ 4. 'Accordingly in style and enthymemes, all those' (ταύτα, agreeing only with ἐνθυμήματα, stands for ταύτην καὶ ταύτα; including the former of the two) 'are pointed and lively, which convey to us instruction rapidly'. Then follows a note on the preceding. 'And this is the reason why neither superficial enthymemes are popular—by superficial (γάρ, videlicet) I mean those that (lie on the surface, and) are (therefore) plain to everybody (so that he who runs may read) and require no research or investigation—nor those which when stated are unintelligible (to a popular audience); but all those of which the knowledge is acquired at the moment of delivery—even though it did not exist previously—or (in which) the understanding is only a little in the rear (of the speaker). For in the one case knowledge as it were is acquired; in the other, neither the one nor the other', i.e. in either of these two ways there is a sort of learning, either immediate or nearly so: in the other case, that of superficial and unintelligible enthymemes or style in general, neither immediate nor quasi-immediate knowledge is attainable. Compare with this the second clause of II 23. 30.
§ 5. "Such is the approved (popular) kind of enthymemes in respect of the sense or meaning (in their intellectual aspect). In that of style or language, so far as regards the _figure_ (i.e. the _structure_ of the period and its clauses), the popularity is attained by the antithetical expression of them (the balance of opposite _clauses_ or _members_), as in the example, (Isocr. Phil. § 73), καὶ τὴν ἐφήμην τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν πόλεμον τοῖς αὐτῶν ἱδίους πόλεμον." _Antikeitai polémos eirímen._

§ 6. "and in the single words, by the metaphors they contain, and these neither foreign and strange", (compare III 11. 5, ἀν' ὁλείων, where reference is made to this place; so that ἀν' ὁλείων may be regarded as an interpretation of μὴ ἀλλοτριαί here: and this coincides with III 2. 9, metaphors should be 'appropriate', ἀφορμοῦσας, or ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον 'derived from a proportional or _kindred_ subject': and ibid. § 12, metaphors should not be 'far-fetched', οὐ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγεγεχόντων καὶ τῶν ὁμοιειδῶν,) 'for such it is difficult to take in at a glance; nor superficial, for these produce no impression. Further, (words are popular) if they vividly represent (things that they describe); for things should be _seen_ (in the orator's description of them) as if they were actually being done (going on, transacted, before the hearer's eyes) rather than as future. This is in fact the 'historic present', applied to future, instead of past, events. On πρὸ ὁμάτων, see note on II 8. 13. ἀλλοτριαί "alienam, duc tam a rebus parum propinquis et affinis," Victorius; who also, as a parallel case, refers to Cic. de Or. II 59. 241, est autem haec huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut nates eius de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimantur, ut ipsis qui audiant tum geri illa fierique videantur.

'These three things then are to be aimed at (in the attempt to give vivacity and pungency to style), metaphor, antithesis, and vivid representation'.

The meaning of _évērgesia_ is clearly shewn by a comparison with the statements of c. 11. It is there identified with πρὸ ὁμάτων _poiein_, § 2, and is principally shewn in _animation_, literally and metaphorically, in a vivid, vivacious, style, and in animating, vivifying, inanimate objects; investing them with life, motion, and personality.¹

¹ I may observe that this is one of the principal arts by which Mr Dickens attracts his readers, to which the remarkable vivacity of his writings is due.
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 10 §§ 6, 7α. 111

πόλαιον, ούτεν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἐτι εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὥραν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τρὶῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἑνήργειας.

τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. P. 1411.

§§ 2, 3, 4. κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζώντα ποιεῖ πάντα ἢ δὲ ζωὴ ἑνήργεια τις (Eth. N. X 4, 1175 a 12). This sense is borrowed from the metaphysical use of the term, to express ‘realization’, as opposed to δύναμις, the mere capacity or potentiality of life and action. I may add that ἑνήργεια is used in two distinct senses, representing two different forms of development, which may be distinguished as the metaphysical and moral applications of it; as will appear from a comparison of the form it assumes in the Nicom. Ethics, and the biology of the de Anima. It is sometimes identifiable with ἐνεργήμενα, expressing the actuality or actual realization of existence out of a mere undeveloped capacity of life: in the moral view, it is the realization of action, a realized activity, from the dormant capacity—implying existence—to the active exercise or energy of the bodily and mental functions. So happiness is an ἑνήργεια ψυχῆς, pleasure πελεωτὶ (completes and crowns) τὴν ἑνήργειαν, Eth. N. X 4, sub init. and again c. 4, ult. c. 5, sub init.: and the def. of pleasure in the seventh (Eudemian) book, ἑνήργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος. Sometimes three stages are distinguished (as frequently in the de Anima), illustrated by three degrees of knowledge in man: (1) the latent capacity, (2) knowledge acquired but not exercised, and (3) the active exercise of thought and knowledge by θεωρία, philosophical contemplation and speculation.

Quintilian on ἑνήργεια, VIII 3. 89, ἑνήργεια con�inis his (est enim ab agendo dicta) et cuitis proprias virtus, non esse quae dicuntur, otiota. Ib. 6. 11, Praeclausque ex his oritur sublimitas quae audaci et proxime periculum translatione tolluntur, quam rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus; quals est, pontem indignatus Araxes. From ἑνήργεια another quality of style is to be distinguished (in Quint) viz. ἑνήργεια, ‘clear, lively, graphic, narration,’ (evidentia), though near akin to the other. It is mentioned IV 2. 63, and distinguished from perspicuitas, VIII 3. 61. ἑνήργεια, quae a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere: et affectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis insimulam, sequetur [id. VI 2. 32]. See Ern. Lex. Tech. Gr. s. v. et ἑνήργεια.

§ 7. ‘Of the four kinds of metaphors, the proportional are the most popular’. On metaphor in general, and the proportional metaphor in particular, see Appendix B to Bk. III, Introd. p. 374.

Here follows a string of pointed, striking, sayings, exemplifying

1 At the conclusion of Mr Mill’s Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Phil. p. 559, we find the following remark. ‘In Aristotle’s case the assertion (of Sir W. H.) rests on a mistake of the meaning of the Aristotelian word ἑνήργεια, which did not signify energy, but fact as opposed to possibility, actus to potestia.” Had Mr Mill turned to the first two sentences of Aristotle’s Ethics, or to the chapters on Pleasure, X. 4, 5, he would have seen reason to alter this statement. By ‘energy’ I suppose active, vigorous, exercise to be intended.
μάλιστα αἱ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὡσπερ Περικλῆς ἐφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἡφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὡσπερ εἰ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἑναυτοῦ ἐξελοῦ. καὶ Δεστίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἔαν περιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας τὸ δοσεῖον in style; all of them metaphors, and most of these conveyed in single words. They do really, I think, deserve the character attributed to them. The passage, τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν—πειράζουν δοῦναι, is transcribed by Dionysius, Ep. 1 ad Amm. c. 8, in his enquiry into the date of the Rhetoric. The most important variation from the text of Ar. is the omission of the example from Leptines “by all the mss” (Spengel's Tract on Rhet. Munich 1851 p. 47), though it has been supplied in the printed copies; he begins the quotation with κατὰ λέξιν οὕτω γράφων. The only other difference of any importance is ἄγαγόντα for ἡχοντα, and διὸναι οὕτως for δοῦναι.

‘As Pericles said, that the youth that had perished in the war had vanished out of the city, as though one were to take the spring out of the year’. On this saying, and Pericles’ claim to it, see note on Ι 7.34.

And Leptines of the Lacedaemonians, (to the Athenian assembly,) that he would not let them look on whilst Greece became one-eyed (lost one of her eyes—the other being of course Athens; Athens, the eye of Greece, Milton, P. R. ίv 240). Victorius has produced similar expressions from Cic. pro leg. Manil. c. 5 § 11, de Nat. Deor. ΙΙΙ 38, Hi duos illos oculos orae maritimae effoderunt. "Similiter Cimon Atheniensiis suisit, μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χαλῆν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτέροις γεγενήμενην, Plut. Cim. 480 c, ὡς δὲ εἰπόν, μὴ ποιησῆς ἑτέροφθαλμὸν τὴν Ἑλλάδα (Plut. Polit. Praecept. 803 A),” Victorius. The Leptines here mentioned is no doubt the proposer of the law περὶ τῆς ἄνελεας against which Demosthenes delivered the speech c. Leptin. in b.c. 355. He may possibly be the same as the Leptines mentioned by Demosth. c. Androt. § 60, οὖ ἐκ Κολῆς. Wolf, Proleg. ad Dem. Leptin. p. 45, note 12 (Schäfer, Ἀρβαρ. ad Dem. p. 8), supposes that the author of this saying and the opponent of Demosthenes are the same person. The occasion on which Leptines produced his metaphor was the embassy sent by the Lacedaemonians to Athens in their extremity, after the defeat of Leuctra (371 B.C.), during the invasion of their country by the Thebans, B.C. 369; see Xen. Hellen. vi 5. 34, 35, Isocr. Archia § 64, seq. Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. X [ch. LXXVIII] p. 320 seq. Thirlw. Hist. Gr. ch. XXXIX (Vol. v. p. 106, 1st ed.). Isocrates, Areop. § 69, alludes to the same event, ὡστε Δακεδαιμονίους, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλγαιχίας ὀλίγου δεῖν καὶ ἐκάστην τὴν ἕμαραν προστατεύοντας ἢμιν (see the fragm. of Lysias, Or. 34, quoted in note on II 23. 19, on this Lacedaemonian ‘dictation’, 404 B.C.) ἐλθεῖν ἐπί τῆς δημοκρατίας (369 B.C.) ἱερεύσοντας και δεσμομένους μὴ περιδεῖν αὐτῶν ἀναστάτους γενομένους. [A. Schaefer’s Dem. u. s. Zeit, I p. 75, note.]

‘And the saying of Cephisodotus, in his indignation at Chares’ eager-
δούναι περὶ τῶν Ὀλυνθιακῶν πόλεμον ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πνίγμα τῶν δήμων ἔχοντα τὰς εὐθύνας πειράσθαι δούναι. καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθη-
ναίους εἰς Εὐβοιαν ἐπιστησαμένους ἔφη δεῖν ἐξεῖναι τὸ

1 ἀγανάκτει εἰς Διονύσιον. 2 δούναι αὐτῶς εἰς Διονύσιον. 3 ἐπιστησάμενος
ness for the scrutiny of the accounts (of his charge) in the conduct of the Olynthian war, "that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his (pertinacity in the) attempt to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way." He wanted to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them in the attempt. I have followed Dionysius' version of this extract, which is plainly preferable to the text of Aristotle. ἐγὼ εἰς πνίγμα is Greek and sense; ἔχειν εἰς πνίγμα neither one nor the other; and διδόναι αὐτῶς, at the end, has far more meaning than the simple δούναι of our text. With the vulgar reading, ἔχοντα must be taken with τὰς εὐθύνας, "with his accounts in his hands"—which is so far graphic, as it indicates the eagerness with which he was trying to force them upon the people—but then δούναι τῶν δήμων εἰς πνίγμα, for 'to drive them into a choking-fit', is surely indefensible.

Cephasodotus, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμίων, has been already quoted; see III 4.3 note (near the end of the section [p. 53]), where some account is given. Two more of his pungent sayings are quoted further on. Chares, with his mercenaries, was sent to take the command in the Olynthian war in 349 B.C. (Clinton, F. H.). Olynthus was taken by Philip, 347. This notice is cited by Max Schmidt in his tract On the date of Ar. 's Rhetoric, p. 15, as a piece of evidence on that question; but the limit of the period of publication can be brought much lower down. See Introd. On the date of the Rhetoric, p. 36 seq.

πνίγμα or πνίγμος, and its congener, is a medical term, used by Hippocrates, expressive of choking, stifling, suffocation.

'And the same (Cephasodotus) once in an exhortation to the Athenians said that they must march out (at once) to Euboea (to the aid of the Euboeans), and there provide themselves with provisions' (read by all means ἐπιστησάμενος, the future, with Spengel; Bekker retains the vulgata lectio ἐπιστησάμενος, which spoils the point), 'like Miltiades' decree' (with all the unhesitating haste prescribed by Miltiades' decree at the time of the first Median invasion). They were therefore not to lose any time in making provision at home, but to get to Euboea with all speed and there provide themselves: the future is necessary: Victorius, though he reads the aorist, translates it as the future. This hurried expedition to Euboea occurred in 358 B.C., Clinton, F. H., sub anno, Dem. c. Androt. § 14, ἵστη
ti πρὸς Εὐβοίαν ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἐβοηθήσατε κ.τ.λ. and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 85. It was made to assist the Euboeans against the Theban invaders; and in the archonship of Cephisodotus himself.

tὸ Μιλτιάδου ψῆφισμα] is explained by the Scholiast, quoted by Vater, ὁ ἐτὶ βουλεύσασθαι Μιλτιάδης μὴ Βουλευσάμενος ἐζήθεν κατὰ τὸν Ζέρβου: and more at length by Ulpian in Shilleto's note to Dem. de F. L. § 346, ἐπιστησών τῶν Μῆδων, ἔχερχε καὶ ὁ Μιλτιάδης δραματεύοχος εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τῶν Μακαθών ἐψηφίσατο καὶ μὴ δυνάμειν ἦσσυ συνελεύσοντοι συμμαχήσοντες. As to the grammatical construction of the accusative, it seems to be a substitution...
Miltiades' ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐτοῦς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρηρήσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν πάραλον ῥόπαλον τοῦ τοῦ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα for the proper cognate accusative ἐφόδια, to make an expedition, such as, on the principle of, Miltiades' decree, with all haste, and without deliberation.

'And Iphicrates, indignant at the truce that the Athenians had made with Epidaurus and the neighbouring coasts, said of them that "they had stripped themselves of their provisions (not 'for the way', but) for the war". ἐφόδια are viaatica, provisions for a journey; which in the absence of inns the traveller had to carry with him: here, provisions for the support and maintenance of war and its expeditions. Ἥδη writes ἔφοδια, Xen. ἐφόδιον (sing.). Arist., Pol. II. 5, 1263 a 37, uses it of provisions for hunting expeditions in Lacedaemon.

The small independent state of Epidaurus, bounded by the territories of Corinth, Argolis, Troezen, and the Saronic gulf, was at this time in alliance with Sparta, to which it supplied troops, in the great contest with the confederate Greeks, allied for the reduction of the Lacedaemonian power, terminating in the battle of Corinth, 394 B.C., see Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. IX [ch. LXXIV] p. 422, 425; and Xenophon's description of the battle, Helen. IV 2.9—23. It appears from this passage that the Athenians had made a truce with Epidaurus. Cephsidotus' indignation was aroused at the folly of making a truce with people who had a sea-board, which the Athenians with their naval superiority could have plundered with impunity, and so have supported the war.

'And Peitholaus (called) the Paralian (trireme) "the people's cudgel", and Sestos "the corn-stall of the Piraeus". Whether this Peitholaus is the same as the one already mentioned III 9.7, as associated with Lycochron in the government of Phæae, we have no means of precisely determining. The probability is that he is. For even Aristotle's carelessness could hardly have carried him so far as to neglect to mention the distinction between two persons named so nearly together, if there were any. This being so, it appears again, as from the former passage, that he lived at Athens after his downfall.

τὴν πάραλον] This vessel and its companion the Σαλαμίνα were two picked vessels, fast sailers, and with carefully chosen and highly paid crews, kept in reserve at the Piraeus for state purposes; such as sacred embassies, theoria, to carry the admiral of the fleet in a naval expedition, for ordinary embassies, 'for the transport of money and persons' (Böckh, Publ. Econ., Bk. II. c. 16, Lewis' Transl. p. 240), and for the pursuit and conveyance to Athens of state offenders who had made their escape; as Alcibiades after the mutilation of the Hermæ, Thuc. VI 53, 61 bis, of the Salaminia. As illustrating the use of the Paralus as a ῥόπαλον, Demosth. περὶ τῶν ἐν Χέρμονθα, § 29 is still more in point; ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς ἔθρους, οὐκ ὧν ἦσαν λαβεῖν ὡπὸ τοῖς νόμοις, καὶ στρατωτῶς τρέφειν καὶ τρυπήσεις ἔκτιμειν καὶ χρήματα ἐσφήμειν δεί καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν, ἐπὶ δ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ψήφισμα, ἔσοντα, Πάραλος, ταύτ' ἔστιν, i.e. the special decree,
impeachment, and the Paralus, were the three principal instruments of punishment of offenders amongst the Athenian citizens. The Πάραλος therefore is here compared to a ῥόπαλον or cudgel, because it is the instrument with which the state deals her heaviest blows, not only upon those that have escaped her justice, but upon all those who offend her. Πάραλος μία τῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὰς δημοσίας χρείας δυσεμπόμονων τριήμερον, Harpocr. s. v. He adds that the crews of the two vessels received four obols a day, and stayed at home the greater part of the year. Photius has four articles on the word, one of them borrowed from Harpocr., almost in the same words. The first of the four identifies the Salaminian and Paralian. There is an article upon this in Smith's Dict. of Ant. (s. v. Salaminia).

Sestos, on the Hellespont, seems from this passage to have been one of the emporia for the corn which was imported from the coasts of the Black Sea and the adjacent regions. It is mentioned with others by Isocr. αἰχ. § 107, as an important and well-situated town. Strabo, in writing of Troas, makes no mention of the corn-stores of Sestos. [Büchenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 421—430 (on the corn-trade between Greece and the Euxine). The present passage, which he does not quote, suggests a modification of his statement on p. 426 that Sestos and Abydos were less important emporia than Lampasacus.]

This corn-store or warehouse is compared to the 'shopboard' or 'stall' τηλία, the tray on which corn was exposed for sale in the shops. The word was used for a 'stand' or 'stage' of various kinds. A passage which illustrates the use of it referred to here (which does not appear in the Lexicons) is Arist. Hist. An. vi 24. 3, where there is an account of a wonderful mule, that lived to the age of 80; after it had been released from labour by reason of its age, it used to walk by the side of the teams which were dragging the stone for the building of the temple (doubtless the Parthenon), and not only urged them on to their work, but helped them itself to drag the load up the hill (how this was done by the animal is not explained); οὖν ἐφησαντο μὴ ἀπελάνειν αὐτῶν στοπάλους ἀπὸ τῶν τηλιῶν. This clearly explains the particular sense of τηλία in this passage. The τηλία is the tray or stand at the corn-dealer's door, in which the corn is exposed for sale. In Aristoph. Plut. 1038, it means 'a sieve', κοσκίνου κόκλος σίνε περιφέρεια, Schol. ad loc., Etym., Suidas and Hesychius.

'And Pericles bade (his countrymen) get Aegina out of the way (get rid of it, as a plague or obstacle to their enjoyment or happiness) "the eyesore of the Piraeus"'. This saying is quoted by Plutarch, Pol. Praec. 803 A, amongst the πολιτικά παραγγέλματα: and also μὴ πονηστῇ ἐπερ- ὀδημάλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, without the author's name. It is attributed to Demades by Athen. III 99 D, Δημάδης ὁ ῥήσας λέγει τὴν μὲν Ἀθηναῖών λήμνην εἶναι τοῦ Πειραιῶν. Comp. Plut. Apophth. Reg. et Duc. 186 c, and Wyttenbach note β' ad loc. It suggested to Casaubon an emendation of an apparently unmeaning word in Strabo IX p. 395, of the islet of Psyttalea,
between Salamis and the mainland, ἤσιον ἓρμην πετράδες (ὕσορμος Aesch. Pers. 450) ἤ τιες εἰς ἐπί ημένα (ἐγερήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς.

λήμα and λημῶν seem (from the Lexx.) to be almost confined to Aristophanes amongst the earlier writers. Arist. Lysistr. 301, with a pun upon λήμην πῦρ (on which see Schneidewin on Soph. Philoct. 799); Plut. 581, Κρονικίας λήμα (old-fashioned prejudices, dimmnesses of sight) ὅτε λήματις τὰς φρίνας ἀμφό. Nub. 327, λημῦν κολοκύνται. (They occur however as medical terms in Hippocrates.) They are not found, where they were to be most expected, in the Fragments of the other Comic writers. No instance of either is to be found in the very complete Index to Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr.

‘And Moerocles said that he was in no respect a greater knave than—one of the respectable (upper) classes that he named: for the other played the knave at the rate of 33 per cent., he (himself) only at ten’. The degree of knavery is compared to the rate of interest or profit which is made upon each: “a very respectable person indeed!” says Moerocles “and a very respectable interest he makes upon his respectability (or, rightly interpreted, roguery): why! I only get a third of that for mine.” Of Moerocles an account is given in Smith’s Biogr. Dict. s. v. Μοιροκλῆς, Σαλαμίνος τῶν παρ Ἀθηναίων ὑκ ἄφαντα πολιτευσαμένων. Harpocr. He was a contemporary of Demosthenes, who mentions him four times, see Sauppe’s Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. III 99, and an anti-Macedonian orator. He seems from the allusion, de F. L. § 293 (§ 335) to have been a greedy fellow, and inclined to exaction in money-matters. On the rates of interest at Athens, and the modes of computing it, see Böckh, Publ. Econ. Bk. i. c. 22, Lewis’ Tr. p. 130.

‘And Anaxandrides’ iambic verse about (not ‘on behalf of’, of which there is no evidence in the text) the daughters’ (so in the Scriptures, daughters of Jerusalem’, &c) ‘who were over long about marrying, “I find (μοι) the young ladies have passed the day for their marriage.”’

[“My daughters’ marriage-bonds have passed their date.”]

ὑπερήμερος, here metaphorically used by Anaxandrides, is properly a technical term of Attic law, signifying one who has failed to pay a fine, or to comply with any judgment or verdict imposed by the court on the day appointed: one who has passed the prescribed term or the day fixed. It takes the genit. here, as if it were ὑπέρ την ἡμεραν τῶν γάμων, like ἄξαλκος ἀσπίδων, ἄσπολος φαρεῖων, ἀγάφητος κοκυματών, &c. Anaxandrides was a poet of the Middle Comedy, Meineke, Fragm. Com. Att. Vol. i. p. 367 seq. The line here quoted is Fragm. Inc. xvii, Meineke iii 200. Anaxandrides is quoted again, c. 11. 8, an equally uncertain fragment, No. xvi, and probably again, 11. 10, also 12. 3, and Eth. N. vii 11.
καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτων εἷς ἀποπληκτικὸς τῶν Σπεύσιππων, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἥσυχαν ἀγείν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντεσύριγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφἰσοδότος τὰς

'And that of Polyceuctus to one Speusippus who was paralysed, “that he could not keep still (was as restless as ever), though bound (fettered, confined) by fate (or accident) in a pillory- (or stocks-) complaint”["bound in a perfect pillory of pain"]'.

Polyceuctus, probably of (the Ath. deme) Sphettus, an Attic orator, contemporary with Demosth. and of the same political party, viz. anti-Macedonian. See Plut. Vit. Demosth. 846 C, which connects him with Demosthenes. Also, Vit. Parallel. Demosth. c. 10, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος (Ariston of Chios) Πολυεύκτων ἰσοτείρη τῶν Σφήττων, ἐν τάς τότε πολιτείας Ἀθηνῶν, ἀποφαίνεσθαι μέγιστον μὲν εἶνας μήτορα Δημοσθένης κ.τ.λ. A short account of him is to be found in Smith’s Biogr. Dict. s. v. No. 2, (the writer says that “the orations (!) of P.” are here referred to). There are six of the name mentioned in the Orators—Saupe Index Nominum (ad Or. Att.) III 117.—It is uncertain whether the P., who appears in Dem. c. Mid. § 139 is the same as he of Sphettus. Saupe distinguishes them: Buttmann, ad loc. Mid. 560. 2, has this note: “Orator temporis illius, praeter hanc Midaeae defensionem, cum Demosthene coniunctissimous, si credemus Ruhnkenio, qui eundem putat ac Sphettium. Augerus non item;” nor, apparently, Saupe [nor Arnold Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, II. p. 100, who elsewhere quotes Dem. Phil. III. § 72, Πολυεύκτων ὁ βιελτιτος οὐτος (of the Sphettian). The speaker quoted by Ar. was doubtless the best known of them, the Sphettian. See the reff. in Westermann, Gesch. der Beredita. § 53, 5, 6.

ἀποπληκτικός, ἀποπληκτος, one who has received a shock or stroke (as of palsy), which has driven him away from (ἀπό) himself and his normal condition, and so disabled, paralysed, him: of an ‘apoplectic stroke’, but not here; also, like ἐκπληκτικος, to be startled out of one’s wits, or driven mad, atonitus. I have followed Victorius in the interpretation of the saying; that Speusippus, though his body was now paralysed, and motionless as if he had been fastened in the stocks or pillory—or worse, in an instrument that confined his head, hands, and feet—had his mind as restless and excitable as ever.

πεντεσύριγγος is a transfer from a wooden instrument with five ‘pipes’ or holes, kept in the prison for the punishment of refractory prisoners, which confined at once the head, hands, and feet, to a disorder which paralyses and deprives of motion. Arist. Eq. 1049, δήσας σ’ ἐκλείπει πεντεσυρίγγῳ ἡμέρᾳ. "πέντε ὅπας ἠκολούθη, δ’ ἄν οἱ τοὺς καὶ οἱ γεῖρες καὶ ὁ τράχαλος ἀνθήλλετο." Schol. ad loc. πεντεσυρίγγῳ ἡμέρᾳ, τῷ ποδοκάκη πέντε γάρ ὅπας ἠκολούθη, δ’ άν... (as before) ἐμβάλλονται (Suidas). Comp. Ib. s. v. ποδοκάκη (a later form of ποδοκάκη), Δημοσθένης κατά Τιμοκράτος (in a law, § 105), τῷ ἡμέρᾳ τῷ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ωτός ἐκλείθαει κ.τ.λ. To which Harpocr. adds, s. v. ποδοκάκη, Δυσίσκος δ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Θεομηνίτου, εἰ γνύσιος, ἐγγίνεται τοῦ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἤ ποδοκάκη αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ὁ νῦν καλεῖται ἐν τῷ ἡμέρᾳ δεδεσθαί (Lys. c. Theomn. α’ § 16. q. v.). On this, and the various other punishments in use at Athens, see Becker’s Charicles,
He says "Suidas is wrong in taking this (π. ξ.) to be synonymous with the ποδοκάθη, but does not tell us why, or upon what authority (probably on account of the name, ποδο-κάθη).

'And Cephisodotus called the triremes parti-coloured (gaily-painted) (mills i.e.) millstones' from their crushing and grinding (exactions and oppressions) the Athenian tributaries and others. Comp. on this expression III 6. I, as an instance of a "private epiteth, the note on that section, near the end. On ποικίλους, Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. IV 289, πικίλης ἀθηνάδης [cf. St John's Hellenes III 302]. On Cephisodotus, ὁ λεπτός, ὁ ἐκ Θερμίδου, see note on III 4. 4.

'And "the Dog" (Diogenes the Cynic) called the taverns (or wine-shops) "the Attic messes?"

Of Diogenes, ὁ Κών, see Grote's Plato III p. 507, seq. ch. 38. "Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under this title. Aristotle (l.c.) cites from him a witty comparison under that designation," u.s. p. 509. He receives this name from the little boys or the bystanders in several of Diogenes' (Laert.) stories about him. A long list of his sayings, often witty, but usually bitter and sarcastic, is to be found in Diogenes Laertius' Life. This does not appear amongst them.

τὰ καπνίσματα] retail shops (καπνίσμα), cook-shops, wine-shops and taverns. Comp. Isocr. Areop. § 49; speaking of the change of habits and manners in Athens in the author's time: ἐν καπνίσμαδε δὲ φαγεῖ τι πιεῖν οὐδεὶς ὠδὲ ἀν οἰκείῃς ἐπιείκ.ResultSet. "σειρᾶν ἑαυτὸν γὰρ ἐμπλῆκαν ἄλλοι οὐ βαμφύλη-χεινεῖσθαι. These scenes of riot, drunkenness, and licentiousness, says the satirical Diogenes, are what the Athenians call their σοφία; this is their substitute for (or representative of) the sober and orderly Spartan φιλίτις. See the description in Grote, H. G. II 513 [chap. vi], Müller, Dor. IV 3, on the meals of the Dorians. φιλίτις, or as it is usually written φιλιτις, is the name given by the S.'artans to what the Athenians and others called σωσία, the public tables or messes at which all the citizens dined in common. Müller, u. s. § 3, II 294 Lewis' Transl.), remarks, note 2, "It is very probable that this φιλιτις,

1 One Aristogeiton, an Athenian orator, also received this nickname, ἐπεκαλείτο κύων διὰ τὴν ἀναίδειαν αὐτοῦ. Suidas.

2 This passage of Isocr. Areopag. is cited by Athen. XIII 21, 566 F, on tavern-haunting, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς καπνίσμασι καὶ τοῖς παρδοκελοίς δὲ διάμαται, καθιστός τοῦ ρήτορον ἐν τῷ Ἀρεοπαγιτεῖ κρατητῷ—here follow the words quoted in this text. Atheneus continues "Τενέριδης ἐδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Παρθένολος...τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγιτεῖς φράσει ἀριστήματα τῶν ἐν καπνίσματος κυλούσα ἀνέθεντο εἰς Ἀρειόν πάγον. οὐ δὲ, ὅ οὖσα, ἐν τοῖς καπνίσμασι συναναφέρῃ οὐ μετα 'ἐταιρῶν, ἀλλὰ μετα 'ἐταιρῶν κ.τ.λ. Plut. Vit. X Orat. Demosth. 847 F, Διογένης δὲ κύων θεασάμενος αὐτὸν (Demosth.) τοὺς ἐν καπνίσμασι συναναφέρῃ καὶ ὑποχρεωθήσεται, εἰπεν, δὲν μᾶλλον φοινικῶς τοῦτον μᾶλλον ἐν καπνίσματι. These extracts descriptive of the character of these taverns will throw some light upon Diogenes' pleasantry.
(spare or scanty meals) was a ludicrous distortion of an ancient Spartan name φιλία, i.e. love-feasts." This is made still more probable by the fact that Ar. in his Politics always writes the word φιλία—tà συστία tà καλούμενα φιλία, II 9, 1271 a 27, Ib. 10, 1272 a 2, c. 11, 1272 b 34—and the constant interchange of a and o (δικρυ, lacrima, ὀδυσσεύς, Ulysses). They were originally called ὀδρεία, men's meals, both by Cretans and Spartans, the institution being common to both peoples, the Spartan being in this, as in other particulars, borrowed from the Cretan. Pol. II 10, 1272 a 2, καὶ συστία παρ' ἀμφότεροις ἐστιν καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκείνοι οἱ Δάκωνες οἱ φιλία τα ἄλλα ἄνδρα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἣ καὶ δήλω ὅτι ἐκείνο εὐλήθευεν. And of the Cretaghinic constitution, Ib. c. 11, 1272 b 34. ἔχει δέ παραπλήσια ἡ Ἀκα. πολιτεία τα μὲν συστία τῶν ἐταιρῶν τοῖς φιλίοις κ.τ.λ.

'And Aesion, that (the Athenians) had emptied (or drained) their entire city into Sicily'. Meaning, that the Athenian forces sent over for the invasion of Sicily in 415—413 B.C. were so enormous in proportion to the population of Athens, that they might be said to have completely drained it. 'For this is a metaphor, and sets the thing before our eyes'.

Aesion's name occurs, but only as the father of Euctemon, in Demosth. Mid. § 165. Also in a citation from Hermippus, in Plut. Vit. Demosth. (Vit. Parall.) c. 11, in which he compares Demosthenes' speeches, especially for reading, advantageously with those of his predecessors. The only other notice of him that I have been able to find is Suidas s. v. Δημοσθήνης: which is merely that he (Dem.) συνήθεισιν Ἀλήσσων τῷ 'Ἀθηναίῳ; which implies community of studies. He was therefore an Athenian orator, contemporary with Demosthenes.

'And'—Aesion again—"so that Greece cried aloud": this again is in some sense a metaphor, and a vivid expression. A metaphor no doubt (though Victorius says it is a mere hypallage), since it transfers the voice from an individual to a collective people, or country. It is πρὸ ὄμματον in that it animates an inanimate object, or abstraction; c. 11, 2, 3. Demosthenes has used this twice, de F. L. § 92, ἣ γὰρ δῆθεν καὶ τὰ πνευματικὰ αὐτὰ βοᾷ, and § 129, ταύτ' οὐχὶ βοᾷ καὶ λέγει ὅτι χρήματ' ἐλθεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρης: and a very near approach to it, Olynth. a. § 2, δὲ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καρπὸ...μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνῆν ὀψεῖς δι᾽ Κ.Τ.Λ. Aesch. Agam. 1106 (Dind.), πάσα γὰρ πόλις βοᾷ. Eur. Hippol. 877, βοᾷ βοᾷ δέλτος Δάτσα.

'And as Cephisodotus bade (the Athenians) take care not to convert many of their mobs into assemblies' (lit. their mobs, in any numbers). Cephisodotus we have had three times already as the author of pointed sayings, III 4, 3, and 10, 6, δις. The point of this saying seems to lie in the word συνθρημας, which is substituted for συγκλητος, ekklēsias. It implies that most of their ordinary assemblies are mere mobs, tumultuary gatherings, riotous and unruly, instead of συγκλητος, regularly convoked for special occasions in due form and order. It would certainly be
better without ἐκλησίας, as Wolf proposes. It would then mean "not to hold their—mobs too frequently." Both Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgata lectio: the latter with a comma between συνδρομᾶς and ἐκλησίας.

And Isocrates, "to those that flock together promiscuously (scramble, as it were) in the general festivals". This is an expression of precisely the same import as the preceding. It occurs in Isocr. Phil. § 12, and runs thus, οὕτως τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσι ἐνγκλήματι καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντάς λέγει τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐτάς πρὸς αὐτάς λέγει ἐὰν εἴστω, κ.τ.λ.

And the example in the Funeral Oration, that "Greece might well have her hair cut off (go into mourning) over the tomb of those that died at Salamis, for her freedom and their valour were buried in the same grave": for had he only said "that she might well weep for the virtue that lay buried with them", it would have been a metaphor and a graphic touch, but the (addition of) "freedom with the virtue" carries it with a kind of antithesis. This really affecting passage, which Aristotle has partially spoiled by omission and alteration, runs thus in the original—the funeral oration attributed to Lysias¹, Or. 2, in Baiter and Sauppe's Or. Att. 1 68, § 60: "and therefore Greece might well that day cut off her hair over yonder tomb (the orator is on the spot, and points to it) and mourn for those that lie buried here, seeing that her own (the text has αὐτῶν, their own, the collective Ἐλλάς being resolved into its component members) freedom and their valour are laid together in one grave". Aristotle has very much marred the simple beauty of the sentence (which if it be not Lysias', is at all events quite worthy of him) by his alterations;

¹ This speech is condemned as spurious by [Dobree and] Baiter and Sauppe [and also by Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, 1 p. 431, and Jebb, Attic Orators, 1 p. 208. It contains some close parallels to the Panegyric of Isocrates and would appear to have been written by one of the pupils of that rhetorician, from whom Ar. (it will be observed) takes the quotation just preceding the present passage]. Let us hear on the other side Mr Grote, Hist. Gr. vol. vi [chap. XLVIII] p. 191, note, "Of the funeral orations ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds (than that attributed to Demosth.)..... but this harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen." In this judgment I entirely agree; and it seems to derive some authority from the citation of this extract here, as a specimen of pointed style, which shews that it was at all events well known to Aristotle and the Athenian public, and well remembered, though the author's name is not given; perhaps for this very reason, that the authorship of it was so well known.
especially the substitution of the frigid, explanatory, τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖν, for the graphic τῷ καὶ τότε of the original (I here follow Victorius). [The context of the original passage shows that the substitution is really a blunder, as the reference is not to the Athenians who fought at Salamis but to those who died at Aegospotami and elsewhere towards the close of the Peloponnesian war.]

The metaphor lies of course in the word κείρασθαι, by which Greece is personified and compared to a woman who, according to the national custom, cuts off her hair as a sign of mourning—on this custom see Becker’s Charicles, p. 398; comp. Eur. Troad. 141, Orest. 458, Alc. 515, Suppl. 97, 974, Hel. 1060, πενθόμος, πενθήρης, κουρά, κουράι. Aesch. Choeph. 6 (Paley’s note ad loc.), Hom. II. XXIII. 142, &c. The last two passages shew that this custom was not absolutely confined to women, though it was especially characteristic of them. In Lysias the personification, which is most tastefully interrupted by the plural αὐτῶν, is resumed in the next clause, ὡς δυστυχής μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς τοιοῦτον ἀδράν ὀφθαλμομενή κ.τ.λ. Here Greece becomes a bereaved mother.

‘And as Iphicrates said, “the course of my argument cuts right through the middle of Chares’ acts”: a proportional metaphor; and the “right through the middle” sets the thing vividly before our eyes’. This was said by Iphicrates in the same case as that which is noticed in II 23.7 (see note), the prosecution, namely, of him and his colleagues Menestheus and Timotheus, together with Chares, who were all brought to trial by Aristophon the Azenian in 355 B.C. on the scrutiny of their accounts, for misconduct in their command during the Social war. Sauppe u. s. p. 191, commenting on this passage, says “Iphicrates se et collegas accusatos defendens exponit quam male Chares rem gesserit. Hoc facturus dixit, iter orationes suae ferre per medias Charetis res gestas, quasi de itinere per hostium fines faciundo diceret.” The proportion of the metaphor is this: As a road is carried, or an army or expedition marched, right into the heart of an enemy’s country, so Iphicrates in his defence carried hostility and destruction (exposure and censure) into Chares’ conduct during their joint command.

‘And the saying, “to invite dangers to the help (rescue, remedy) of dangers” is a vivid metaphor’. The author, and occasion, of this sentence are alike unknown. I have followed Schrader in the translation. To rid yourself of one danger another must often be invoked or invited, as a man saves himself from a shipwrecked vessel by throwing himself overboard and clinging to a plank. He also quotes Florus, i. 17, Fabius Maximus periculosissimum bellum bello explicavit. The metaphor lies in παρακάλεως and βοηθήσοντας, which are transferred from men to dangers, which are thereby ‘animated’; τὸ ἀφυκοῦν becomes ἐμφυκοῦν.
twv metafoorà. kai Δυκολέων υπερ Χαβρίου "ουδὲ την ικετηριαν αισχυνθεντες αυτου, την εικωνα την χαλκην" metafoorà γαρ εν τω παροντι, αλλ' ουκ αει, αλλα προ ομματων κυνυνευντος γαρ αυτου ικετευει η εικων, το αψυχον δη εμψυχον, το υπομημα

1 fortasse de

'And (what) Lycoleon (said) in his defence of Chabrias, "not even awed by that symbol of his supplication, the bronze image (yonder)". Of Lycoleon nothing seems to be known, beyond what may be gathered from this passage, that he was an Athenian orator, and defended Chabrias in his trial B.C. 366.

The circumstances referred to are briefly these. In 366 B.C. Chabrias was brought to trial with Callistratus, the orator, on a charge of misconduct leading to the loss of Oropus. See ante, note ad i 7.13. Grote, Hist. Gr. x [chap. LXXIX] pp. 392, 3, and note 3. Chabrias had greatly distinguished himself on a former occasion, described in Grote, Hist. Gr. x [chap. LXXVII] pp. 172, 3, in an action near Thebes fought against Agesilas and the Lacedaemonians, 378 B.C. Agesilas "was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protruded" (Diodorus, xv. 33, Cornelius Nepos, Chabr. c. i, obnixo genu scuto). "The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue in his honour, he made choice of this attitude for the design." Ib. 173, note 1. This is also referred to, the details being passed over, in Dem. c. Lept., in a long enumeration of all Chabrias' services to his country, §§ 75—78; προς διαπας Πελοποννησιου παρεταχαρο εν Θεβαις, § 76. See also Wolf, ad loc. p. 479.25 (Schafer, Appar. ad Dem. III 168). Lycoleon in his speech points to this statue which stood in the ευροδα in sight of the court, and taking advantage of the posture of it, which he interprets as that of a suppliant, appeals from it to the feelings of the judges, at the same time reminding them of the merits of the original. The effect no doubt must have been very striking. The metaphor resides in ιερηπας, which is transferred from the suppliant's olive-branch (iavaiw) to a suppliant attitude in general, implied in the posture of the kneeling figure. On the accusative of the object of awe with αισχυνθεντα, see note on II 2.22.

1 For it was a metaphor at the moment (whilst Lycoleon was speaking and Chabrias was in actual danger), but not for ever (i.e. so long, and no longer; not permanently), but yet perpetually (repeat aei, Schrader) before the eyes (vivid and graphic): for it is only while he (Chabrias) is in danger that the image seems to supplicate, but the inanimate is ever animated—"the monument of his deeds for the city".

This very obscure sentence seems intended as an explanatory com-

1 Diog. Laert., III 3. 24, says that Plato also was engaged in the defence of Chabrias, no one else daring to undertake it. See Grote's Plato, I 128, note i.
mentary on the preceding extract. It is truly obscurem per obscurius, a masterpiece of Aristotelian brevity, and a complete illustration of the Horatian brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. I follow Schrader and Victorius in the interpretation. First he says that there is a metaphor: this of course is in the word  

καὶ ὁ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν πώς εὐθυντείς τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὐξεῖν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς αὐξήσει ἐν τῇ πν. 129. πνεύμα ἀμφό τι δηλοῖ τι. "οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ' ἀναβαλλόμεθα." ἀμφὸ τι ἐστὶ μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ

And, "in every way practising (or studying) meanness of spirit", for studying is a kind of increasing or promoting: μελετῶν being a 'kind', eidos, of αὐξὲν, the metaphor is one ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδος ἐπὶ γένος, Poet. XXI 7, one of the four kinds of metaphor. 'To study' therefore, which is one kind of the genus 'promoting', is here put metaphorically for the general term 'to promote'. And the point of the metaphor lies in the unusual application of 'study': a man usually studies or takes pains to promote some worthy object, to cultivate some virtue: here the object is an unworthy one, a vice or defect. This is taken from Isocr. Paneg. § 151, in a note on which passage Coraes ingeniously proposed to read ἄκκατον for αὔξεν for αὐξὲν in Aristotle's comment on μελετῶν.

'And that God kindled (lit up) reason as a light in the soul': for both of them shew something (make things clear and visible). This is a proportional metaphor. As light to material, so reason to intellectual objects. Cuius haec verba sunt nondum reperti, says Victorius, and no subsequent commentator has supplied the deficiency.

'(The peace that we make are nugatory) for we do not put an end to
wars (do away with them altogether), but merely postpone them'. This also comes from Isocr. Paneg. § 172. 'For both of them look to the future (to future results), both actual postponement (in its proper sense and application) and a peace of that kind'. This therefore is a metaphor from ἑιδός to ἑιδος, from one kind of postponement, to another, analogous, kind.

'And to say "that the treaty is a far fairer trophy than those which are obtained in wars: for the one is for the sake of (to commemorate) a trifling success and a single chance, but this for (on behalf of, marking the issue of,) the entire war": for both of them are signs of victory'. Isocr. Paneg. § 180, quoted by Aristotle, as Mr Sandys says in his note, memoriter. μᾶς τυχής is explained by Isocr. Antid. § 128. It is 'a single stroke of fortune', a mere lucky accident, as opposed to a series of successes, which prove design, skill, and knowledge. (ὅτι, the mark of quotation). 'Again, "Cities pay a heavy reckoning (render a terrible account, for their misdeeds) to (or by?) the censure of mankind." For the "account" or "reckoning" is a legal damage or punishment'. The explanation shews, first, (as Bernays also remarks, Dialog. des Arist. p. 16,) that έιδους here expresses not merely the account itself that is rendered, but the penalty consequent upon it, if unsatisfactory: and secondly, that the metaphor is a transfer from the legal and particular scrutiny or account rendered by the officer on laying down his command, and extended from this to an account or scrutiny in general, the penalty paid by whole cities to the judgment and censure of mankind and posterity: consequently it is a metaphor from ἑιδος to γίνος, from species to genus. The passage referred to in Bernays' treatise will furnish a commentary on the use and signification of έιδους and λόγον or λόγους διδονα, pp. 15, 16.

έιδους This, according to some authorities, as Böckh and L. Dindorf, is the only true Attic form of the word, ευδονη belonging to the later Greek. G. Dindorf writes ευδονα, Dem. Olynth. a. 17. 15, and Böckh, Publ. Econ. Bk. 11, ch. 8, note 177, ευδονα, ευδονα (p. 190 Lewis' Transl.), Schäfer (App. Crit. p. 229) note on the passage of Dem. Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. § 19, not. crit., acknowledges both plurals, ευδονα and ευδονα: "ευδονα, quod nihil est..." The Zurich Editors have ευδονα. In Lysias κατά Θεομήτου β § 9, ευδονα is found without various reading. The parallel form ἀμονα, ultio, is cited by Phrynichus p. 23 (Lobeck) as forbidden; also by Moeris and Thomas Magister. It is however approved by Timaeus (p. 26 Ruhnken). Ruhnken in his note indignantly denies the use of the word in Plato, and refers it to the later Greek.
This chapter is in continuation of the subject of the preceding, ἀνεστίων; first as it is exemplified in πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν, and next in jokes, puns, plays upon words, and verbal pleasantries of all kinds, metaphors and similes; and lastly hyperboles, which are also a kind of metaphor. All these may be employed in imparting ‘vivacity’ to style. Whately, Rhet. c. 3, on Style, following Aristotle, calls πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν, ‘energy’. His remarks on this, partly from Aristotle, are worth comparing.

§ 1. ‘We must now state what we mean by πρὸ ὁμμάτων, and what must be done in order to give rise to this.’

§ 2. ‘I mean then that things are set before our eyes by all expressions that indicate realized activity. For instance; to say that a good man is ‘square’ (i.e. complete) is a metaphor; for both are complete, but still don’t signify a state of realized action (or activity). On the other hand, the phrase “with his vigour and prime in full bloom” (Isocr. Phil. § 10) does convey the notion of life and activity, as is also, “but thee, free to roam at large” (Ib. § 127); and again, in the verse, “so thereupon the Greeks (with a rush) darting forward with the spear” (dolp. Eur. Iph. Aul. 80: I believe the otiose ποσί to be a mere misquotation of Ar.), ‘the word ‘darting forward’ is at once life-like and metaphorical’.

ἐνεργοῦσα...ἐνεργείας] See ante, note on c. 10. 5. Comp. the explanation of πρὸ ὁμμάτων there given, ὀμμᾶν γὰρ δὲ τὰ πρατήρια μᾶλλον ἡ κράτος; the representation must be life-like, the action must seem to be actually carried on before us. Poet. xvii 1. Cic. de Or. III 53. 202. Auct. ad Heren. iv 55. 68. Demonstratio, quum ita verbi res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur: with examples. Cic. de Inv. I 54. 104. 55. 107; II 26. 78. Quint. VIII 3. 81. ἐνεργεία, Ib. § 89. Infra § 3, ἑμνυμα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦσα. φαινεται, § 4, κυνομένα καὶ ζώνα ποιεῖ. See Whately’s Rhetoric above referred to. This ‘energy’ includes Proso-ropoëtia or Personification; illustrated in Whately’s note †. Demetr. π. ἐφημείας §§ 81, 82, quotes ἐφημεία δὲ μάχῃ. Campbell, Phil. of Rhet., has a section, III 1. 4, on “Things animate for things lifeless.”

τετράγωνος comes from Simonides—or rather from the Pythagoreans, who by a square number or figure symbolized (or, as Aristotle tells us, Met. A, actually identified it) completeness, and perfect equality in

The second extract quoted from Isocr. Phil. § 127 requires the context to justify its selection as an example of animated style; with that, it becomes very striking. The orator is contrasting the entire freedom of view which Philip's commanding position allows him, as compared with the narrow patriotism enforced upon those who are 'fast bound' in the constitution and laws of their native cities; which he expresses by σὲ δ᾽ ὀστρέω ἀφετοῦ ἡγεμόνας ἀπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα παιδία νομίζεις κ.τ.λ.—a flight quite beyond Isocrates' ordinary range of imagination. The metaphor is of course derived from the sacred cattle which were devoted to the worship of some god, and left free from the ordinary labours of the plough and cart, to roam and graze at large in the sacred precincts, the τέμενος of his temple. See Plat. Protag. 320 A, Rep. vi 498 C, and the notes of the Comm.: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 666, 684 (Paley) and the note there (also Blomfield's Glossary, 687), Eur. Ion 822, ὅδε ἐν θεοῦ δόμοισαν ἄφετος, ὡς καλῶς, παιδεύεται.

The difference between the mere metaphor τετράγωνοι, and the metaphor which also vivifies and animates, is this: in a square there is neither life nor action; in 'blooming' we have the life of a plant, in ἀφετοῦ of an animal, in ἀξιον the vigour and impetuosity of living human beings.

§ 3. 'And Homer's frequent employment of the figure which invests inanimate objects with life and motion by the medium of the metaphor. But in all of them it is by representing (objects) as animated—setting them as it were in action—that he distinguishes himself (acquires his popularity, secures our approbation): in the following for instance: "again (this belongs to the preceding sentence: αὕθείς ἐπείτα πέδονε κυλίνδεται λᾶς ἄμαθες is the reading of Homer, Od. xi 598): then to the plain rolled the ruthless (remorseless) stone": ["Downward anon to the valley the boulder remorselessly bounded"]. The animating metaphor is of course in ἄμαθες, which attributes not only life, but also shamelessness, recklessness, remorselessness, want of mercy and proper feeling, to the stone. Whately, u.s., ingeniously, but not correctly: 'provoking', mocking Sisyphus' efforts, ἄμαθη, in the same sense, ruthless, pitiless, Soph.
καὶ ἑπτάτ' οἰστός,
καὶ ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,
καὶ ἐν γαίῃ ἱσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροδὸς ἄσαι,
καὶ αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοι διέσπυτο μαμώσα.

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἐμψυχα εἰναι ἑνεργοῦντα
φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαμάν καὶ τάλλα
ἐνεργεία, ταῦτα δὲ προσήψε διὰ τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν
μεταφοράς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ῥ. p. 130.

Oed. Col. 516. aïdos, clementia, misericordia, opposed to ἁρωσί, crudelis,
Elmsl. ad Med. 461. This line has always been quoted as an example
of "the sound an echo to the sense."

'And, "the arrow flew"—like a bird"—Hom. II. N [XIII] 587.
'And, "raging or yearning to fly to its mark"'. II. A [IV] 126. This
attributes human feelings and passions to the arrow, διατυπώσα. He might
have added ἠτέρδω in line 125.

'And, (sc. τὰ δυσάρεια ἁρωσίῶν ἀπὸ χειρῶν) "longing to taste blood"
(more lit. 'to take their fill of flesh'). II. A [XI] 574, paley ad loc.
'And "the spear-point panting, quivering in its eagerness, rushed
through his breast"'.

On these extracts, Whately, Rhet. u. s., note, well observes, "that
there is a peculiar aptitude in some of these expressions: an arrow or
dart from it flying with a spinning motion quivers violently when it is
fixed; thus suggesting the idea of one quivering with eagerness". This
is particularly applicable to the two last extracts. In the third, ἱσταντο
may help to convey this. The darts which fell short of their aim,
struck, were fixed, in the ground, and there stood quivering. "And
winged the shaft that quivered in his heart". Byron (of Kirke White),
in English Bards and Scotch Reviewers. Gaisford, in Variorum not.
p. 426, adds Od. ἑ 175, ἔμει, ἀγαλλόμεναι (exulting) ἄδει νηροφ. Eustath. ad
loc. καὶ ὅρο τὸ ἀγαλλόμεναι, ὡς ἐπὶ ἔμψυχοι τῶν ἑοῦ λεῖνιν. Soph. Aj. 581,
πρὸς τομῶν πῆματι, and this Schol., τομὴς ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅσπερ εἶ ἀλφτην ἐῴθεν.
Plut. on Pyth. 398 A. See also in Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Arist.
pp. 278, 9, some passages from the Schol. to Homer, and that of Plutarch,
On this peculiarity of Homer.

'For in all these by reason of the living character (with which they
are invested) they appear to be in action: for "shameless conduct",
and "quivering with eagerness" and the rest, all express forms of activity
(implying life). But these he has applied to them through the medium
of the proportional metaphor, for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is
the shameless actor to him who is shamelessly treated'.
§ 4. 'In his most approved similes too (as well as metaphors) he deals thus (employs this treatment) with inanimate things (ἐνὶ 'in the case of' upon, applying to): "(Waves) arched, foam-crested, some in front, others (tumbling) after them"; for he draws (depicts) them all as living and moving, and living activity is a kind of motion'. II. N [XIII] 799, ['the waves of the bellowing ocean; Bending their heads foam-crested, they sweep on, billow on billow']. The following verse will show where the ἐνέργεια lies: δὲ Τρόας πρὸ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀρηρότες, αὐτὰρ ἐπ᾿ ἄλλοι, χαλκῆ μαραμορῶτες ὑμί' ἠγεμόνεσθαι ἑπότοι.

I have followed Bekker (Ed. 3) and Spengel in reading κίνησις for μίμησις, from a conjecture of Bekker in his first ed. μίμησις will however make good sense.

§ 5. 'Metaphors should be drawn, as has been stated before, (III 2. 12, and 10. 5, also 11. 10; οἰκεῖων in the former, μὴ φανερῶν implied in the words μὴ ἐπισέλθων, in the latter,) from objects closely related, but not obvious to every one at first sight' (i.e. not so related, so clearly resembling one another, that no one can fail to see the resemblance at once: such metaphors do not pique the curiosity, and set people thinking; and from them you learn nothing, that you did not know before); 'just as in philosophy also, to observe the resemblances in widely distant things is characteristic of a sagacious penetrating intellect: like Archytas' saying, that arbitrator and altar were the same thing; because both are the refuge of the injured or wronged' (thing or person, animal or man, expressed by the neuter).

οἴον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Poet. XXII 17, μοῦν γὰρ τοῦτο οὐκε παρ' ἄλλων ἐστὶ λαβεῖν εὐφυίας τε σημεῖων ἔστιν (this is equivalent to εὐστόχον, 'requires quick wit, penetration, natural sagacity') τὸ γὰρ ἐδ' μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν. Rhet. 11 20. 7, of fables, used as arguments, ποίησαι γὰρ δει, ὡσπερ καὶ παραβολας, ἂν τις δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὃρμη, δὲ ποίησαι ὁμοίως.
the use of resemblances and differences in defining, distinguishing, and the formation of concepts, see Trendelenburg, ad Categ. § 59 p. 137, and Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. I p. 102, Lect. vi. This is the kind of 'philosophy' here referred to. Diotima's account, Pl. Symp. 211, of the formation of general conceptions or ideas will serve as an illustration.

On Archytas, the Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician of Tarentum, see Diog. Laert. VIII 4. 79—83.

'Or if one were to say that an anchor and a hook were the same: for they are both the same kind of thing, but differ in position' (lit. 'the above and below').

κρεμάστρα is defined by the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 218, and by Suidas, as a basket for remnants, εἰς τὸ περιτεύσοντα δύσα (the leavings of the dinner-table) εἰώθαμεν ἀποτίθεμα. This was usually 'hung up', κρεμάστρα δὲ εἰρηται διὰ τὸ δὲ κρεμαίμην μετέφερον εὑνα (Suidas). Hence the use of it for Socrates in the Clouds, u. s. But it is plain that that cannot be the meaning of it here, for it does not answer to the subsequent description of it, in respect either of the resemblance or the difference stated. Rost and Palm in their Lexicon translate it 'ankertau', the cable that holds the anchor; but this is open to precisely the same objection. It must be something in the nature of a hook, from which things may be suspended; and is literally 'a suspending instrument'. The resemblance to the anchor lies in its hooked form, and also in the intention or design of them both, which is to keep things where they are, preservation or security. The difference is that the anchor is applied to keep the vessel safe and steady at the bottom, the hook is above, and from it the thing suspended hangs. Liddell and Scott have κρεμάστρα (the reading of three inferior MSS) with this reference, and identify it with κρεμάστρα in the Nubes.

'And the re-equalisation of cities (in the respect of property, and powers, i.e. state offices, privileges, &c.) when the same principle is applied to (is the same for) things standing wide apart (very dissimilar), viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices, prerogatives &c.).' The widely dissimilar things which are here brought together for comparison, are the areas of properties, and the state offices and privileges, &c., which are to be alike equalised. The Scholiast quoted by Vater, explains the word and its application in the same way of the equalisation of the properties, fortunes or conditions, duties and rights of the citizens of a state. Victorius quotes Isocr. Phil. § 40, οἶδα γὰρ ἀπάσας ὀμαλίσκεια ἐπὶ τῶν...
ταυτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει τὸ ἱσον.

6 ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεία τὰ πλείστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσέξαπταν μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅτι ἐμαθὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἐοικε λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ “ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἦμαρτον.” καὶ

συμφορῶν, all the Greek cities have been alike levelled to one condition by their misfortunes.

Vahlen has again applied his perverted ingenuity to the emendation of this passage. The passage wants none: it is clear in sense and construction, and the reading of the text is retained by Bekker and Spengel. In the first place, ἃν in the compound verb is not a privative with ὑ inserted, as ἀνώνυμος, ἀνάδοσος, &c., but ἄν is re, of breaking υφ (ἀναλύειν, &c.) for redistribution, restoring to an original equality: so ἀναδίδονα ‘to distribute’ (ψηφους), ἀναδόσωσθαι ‘to redistribute’ Thuc. v 4, ἀνάδοστος, ἀναδόσωμος, de agra ex integro aequis partibus dividendo (Herod., Plat., see Ruhnken's Timaeus p. 33), ἀναφέρειν, et sim. ἀνωμαλίσθαι therefore does not denote inequality, but re-equilisation.

What the signification of the word is, appears from two passages of the Polit. 11 7, 1266 b 3 and c. 12, 1274 b 9. In the first of these the word is ὀμαλωθήναι, in the second, ἀνωμαλώσθαι, from verbs in -ισθαι and -οΰω respectively. They both refer to the same thing, viz. Phæleas of Chalcodon's scheme for the equalisation or re-equalisation of properties, and plainly, except perhaps so far as the ἄνα is concerned, have precisely the same signification: and this is perfectly applicable here. Vahlen proposes καὶ “ὀμαλωθήναι τὰς πόλεις” εν πολυ διέχουσι ταυτό. His objection to ἀνωμαλίσθαι seems to me to be entirely unfounded, and I can see no reason whatever for altering the text. There is another slight alteration proposed, which is not worth mentioning.

ἐπιφάνεια is a surface, here area; and in Euclid, a plane figure, which

§ 6. This introduces a new topic of ἀστεία, things pointed and lively, in the sense of witticisms, things amusing and laughable, such as jokes παρ’ ὑποψίαις, or παρὰ προσδοκίαις, repartees, puns, plays upon words, and the like.

‘Though it is true in general that most of these ‘vivacities’ are conveyed by (ἄν) metaphor, yet they are also derived from (a temporary, momentary) delusion (leading to a pleasing surprise at the unexpected supplement): for it becomes clearer (to the listener) that he has learnt something from (the conclusion of the sentence) being contrary’ to his expectation—or, as Victorius, from his own contrary, i.e. changed, state of mind, which has arisen between the beginning and end of the sentence—and the soul seems to say to herself, “Really, so it is; and I missed it (never found it out till now)”’. (This explanation of the pleasure derived from the unexpected surprise,—that the previous deception heightens the pleasure of the acquired knowledge—is due, I think, rather to the theory which had become habitual with Ar., that all intellectual pleasure is due to the natural desire of learning, than to
his sober judgment exercised upon this particular application of it.) Schrader has supplied two capital instances of this form of pleasantry: the first is from Cic. de Or. II 281, *Quid huic abest—nisi res et virtus?* Here the listener is misled by the opening of the sentence to expect a very good character of somebody, when unexpectedly, after a pause, two words are added as exceptions, which convert the expected eulogium into beggary and worthlessness: but is it the *learning*, the becoming acquainted with that fact, however unexpectedly, that constitutes the pleasure or amusement that the listener derives from his surprise? A still better from Quint. of a dandy advocate, *illud Afri "homo in agendis causis optime—vestitus,"* for the expected *versatus* 1, Quint. vi 3. 24 and 84. This topic he calls, *decipiendi opinionem.* He returns to it again in VIII 5. 15 under the name of *ex inopinato:* and gives two examples. Cic. de Or. II 63. 255; 70. 284, *locus praeter expectationem.* I have quoted two or three English ones in the note to *Introduct.* p. 319, note 3.

1 And the apophthegms that have point and vivacity derive this character from the *indirect* statement of the meaning (from the speaker's not directly expressing the intended meaning), as that of Stesichorus "that their cicadas will have to sing to themselves from the ground" all the trees being cut down and the land devastated; which is the real, direct, meaning; and *tavois,* that there will be no one else to listen to them. On *ἀποφθέγματα,* see II 21. 8, where this is also quoted, Stesichorus' apophthegm also appears in Demetr. n. ἐρμ. § 99 where it is attributed to Dionysius (the tyrant; as a threat); and § 243, as an example of *βραχυλογία* in the chapter on *δεικτός.* This is a *riddle* in the shape of an apophthegm: the next topic brings us to enigmas proper. The pleasure derived from these is traced, as usual, to that of *learning,* and against that explanation in the *present* instance I have no objection to make.

1 And for the same reason, riddles well wrapped up give pleasure: for not only is this (viz. the solution of them) a kind of *learning,* but they are also expressed in metaphor. And what *Theodorus* calls "novel phrases, expressions." This is effected (this *novelty, this surprise*) when (the sequel) is unexpected, and not, to use his own words, "according to previous opinion or expectation"; but, as is the custom of humorous,

1 What is learnt here is only that the man whom you expected (at the beginning of the sentence) to be an accomplished lawyer, turns out to be an empty coxcomb. It may be doubted again whether the knowledge of that fact would give much pleasure.
jocular writers, who alter the letters of words to make jokes'. I have given a free transl. of the last clause; with οί ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις understand ὅστες or διατριβούστες; and with τὰ παραπεποιημένα, ποιοῦσιν, or the like.

παραποιουείν is, as I have pointed out in Introd. p. 320, the general name for all falsification (παρά) or (illicit) changes of the letters of words, for the purpose of a jest, παρονομασία, τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα, περισσον, misapplication, of a word: all jokes that depend upon verbal or literal changes. Compare παρώνυμος and its congeners, in logic and grammar (Categ. init.), applied to πτώσεις or changes of termination. See further, Introd., u. s., note 1.

On Theodorus of Byzantium, see note on II 23. 28, ult. and the references there given.

'Which is the effect also of literal jokes (founded upon the letters and the changes of them); for these also cheat (the expectation, and so far mislead). (This kind of joke is not confined to prose: it appears) also in verses. For (the conclusion) is not as the hearer (the listener to the recitation of a rhapsodist) supposed: "and he trod with his—chilblains under his feet" (statelily stept he along, and under his feet were his—chilblains)—whereas the other thought he was going to say "sandals". This παρὰ γραμμά σκώμμα, which must be taken from some burlesque hexameter poem—author unknown—has its counterpart in Arist. Vesp. 1167, κακοδαίμων ἔγω: δοτις γ' ἐπὶ γῆρα χίμελων οὐδὲν λήψαταί. The Schol. ad h. l. (in Gaisford's Not. Var.) refers, as another instance, to Alcibiades' τραυμασίως, Arist. Vesp. 45, ὅλος Θέωλος τὴν κεφαλὴν κόλακος ἤχει. παρ' ἐν γράμμα, ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ῥ ἔστι τὸ σκώμμα. Hermogenes, περὶ μεθόδου διενόητος, c. 34 (Rh. Gr. II 453, Spengel) in a chap. peri τοῦ κομικοῦ λέγει, has illustrated this topic, which he calls παρφαία, by the same verse of Aristoph.; and also this and τὸ παρὰ προσδόκιαν from Dem. de Cor.

'Pleasantries arising from changes of letters (plays on words) are produced, not by a mere enunciation of a word in its direct meaning, but by something (a change) which gives a different turn to it, (converts or twists it into a different sense); as that of Theodorus (of Byzantium, the rhetorician: supra, II 23. 28), against Nicon the harper, δράτης: he pretends namely to say "it confounds you" (you are confounded), and cheats; for he means something else: and therefore it is amusing only after one has become acquainted with the meaning (or circumstances);
for if (the hearer) doesn’t know that he is a Thracian, he will see no point in it at all. —Victorius and Schrader have both missed the meaning of this pun. But in order to arrive at it, we must first remove from the text the first στ after θράττει which has been introduced from the second (where it is required) and spoils the pun. Nicon, it appears from the explanation, is, or is supposed to be, of foreign extraction; and not only that, but a Thracian, the most barbarous of all nations. The Thracian women were habitually slaves, in Athenian families: Arist. Thesm. 279, 280, 284, 293, Pac. 1138, Vesp. 828. This person is addressed by Theodorus with the word θράττει, which means apparently, “You are confounded”; this appears from the interpretation that follows, (τι) θράττει στ, which is of course convertible in meaning with the passive θράττει (and it follows also that the first στ must be an error of the transcriber, for θράττει στ would be no interpretation of θράττει στ; nor in that form would there be any pun). It really means, however, Θράττει εί, “You are a Thracian maid-servant,” not only an out-and-out barbarian, but effeminate to boot, and a menial. Schrader’s explanation is “Θράττει (sic) στ, hoc est, Thracia mulier te, intellige peperit;” at once impossible in respect of the Greek, and pointless. Victorius, to much the same effect.

The amusement derived from a pun is thus explained by Cicero, de Or. II 62. 254, Ambiguum (double-entendre) per se ipsum probatur id quidem, ut ante dixi, vel maxime; ingeniosi enim videtur vim verbi in alium atque ceteri accipient posse ducere; sed admirationem magis quam risum movet, nisi si quando incidit in alium genus ridiculii.

βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαν] No satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given of this pun. The point of the joke has been always supposed to lie in πέρσαν. Francisco dei Medici, a friend of Vettori, suggested to him a solution which he quotes at length, that the Persae a poem of Timotheus is referred to, and that we should read Πέρσας. But as Buhle justly remarks, “non video quidnam in hoc sit faceli.” Majoragius’ explanation, who supposes that there was a verb Περσαειν, of the same meaning as Μηδιειν, Persis favere, is equally out of the question. I have looked (for once) into Spengel’s commentary, and find that he has suggested an analogy with Horace’s vin tu curtis Iudaeis oppedere, Sat. I 9.70. The same thought once occurred to me, but I abandoned it, in consideration of the form of the word, πέρσας; which, though a possible aorist, is entirely without authority. πέρδομαι is a dep. and has παρδισομαι for its future, ἐπαρθὼν for the aorist. The solution I have finally arrived at is that the alteration of letters which makes the pun, resides in βούλει. This would probably be pronounced nearly, if not quite, like βουλῇ, and the word could be rendered ‘will you?’ or ‘the Council’: in the
§ 7. 'But both of them' (either the two last examples of παρὰ γράμμα; or that topic itself and the preceding, παρὰ προσδοκίαν: they all require the same precaution) 'must be properly pronounced' (or delivered—attention must be called to the παρὰ προσδοκίαν, by a slight pause, and to the double-entendre by heightening the tone or some similar expedient). The following words, ὀρτὸς δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεία, sadly want the end of the sentence to enable us to determine their meaning. Victorius understands it, "tanquam in σκώμμασιν et iociis amatoribus, ita in urbanis hisce sermonibus"; but Ar. makes no such distinction: all the jokes παρὰ γράμμα are alike ἀστεία. Vater fills it up thus; ὀρτὸς δὲ καὶ (ταῦτα δύνασαι ταῦτα) τὰ ἀστεία (ὅτι ὀμολογίας): ταῦτα being the before-mentioned ἄμφοτερα; so that this is to be referred to the ὀμολογία which follows, and begins a new topic: a most unnatural interpretation as it seems to me. In default of any thing better I propose the following:—

'And so likewise witticisms, pointed sayings in general (as distinguished from the two special varieties, or two particular instances preceding), (require the same attention to pronunciation), as to say that "to the Athenians the command of the sea was not the beginning (both expressed by the same word, ἀρχή) of their misfortunes"; for they derived benefit from it? (it was the source not of evil, but of good). Or, as Isocrates puts it, that "the command was to the city the beginning (or source) of her calamities." This, or something like it, occurs three times in Isocrates. The two similar places, one a mere repetition of the other, Phil. § 61, and de Pace § 101, are probably what Ar. had (very imperfectly) in his recollection: the third is, Paneg. § 119, which differs more widely from the quotation.

'For in both (these cases, or examples) that is said which one would not suppose likely to be said by any one, (lit. which one would not suppose that any one, τω, would say) and (yet, at the same time) is recognised as true (sound, in accordance with facts, Victorius, see III 7.9, infra § 10): for though it is true that there is nothing particularly clever in calling the command a beginning, (in calling ἀρχὴ ἀρχη, though in different senses), still he uses the term not in the same, but in different senses, (in the second example, Vahlen), and does not contradict (or deny) the use of ἁρχη (in the first example), only in a different sense. The second example, from Isocrates, may seem at first sight to
contradict the first, what is affirmed in the one being denied in the other. But if allowance be made for the double sense of ἀρχή, the apparent discrepancy between the two statements will disappear.

§ 8. 'But in all these cases, the merit (τὸ εὖ) consists in the proper application of the term (i.e. the appropriateness of it to the thing described), whether by (expressed in) ambiguity (the play on words) or metaphor. ἐνέγκῃ, sc. ὁ λέγων: and comp. III 4. 2, οἰστία…αἱ μεταφορᾶ.

'For instance "Intolerable Tolerable"—the contradiction lies only in the ambiguity; but this is appropriate if the owner of the name is a bore (or nuisance'). Read with Bekker and Spengel 'Ἀνάρχητος οὐκ ἀνάρχητος [not ἀνάρχητος, with Bekker's Oxford ed. of 1837]. The first is a proper name; as 'Tolerable' must be supposed to be in the English version. ομωσυνιων ἀπέφησεν 'the speaker contradicts the ambiguous word only'; not the thing itself: the application, not the fact. These contradictory, or privative, epithets of proper names—comp. the privative epithets of metaphors, III 6. 7 and note—may be exemplified in our own language by ruthless Ruth, helpless Help, fearless Peace, inconstant Constance, unpleasant Pleasure, ignoble Noble, Hotspur cold-spry, and the like. Significant Greek names are to be found in II 23. 29, III 15. 8; Latin in Quint. VI 3. 55. Others are "Ἀνέκτος (which is precisely parallel to 'Ἀνάρχητος in our text) and Νεκτήμα, Eustath. ad Hom. II. A p. 156—but in fact most Greek proper names are significant in themselves, though they may have lost the appropriateness of their personal application.

'And, "never make thyself as a stranger, more of a stranger than is required of thee", "not more than thou art bound to do"; the same thing (in different words'). As the words are not different, but the same, Vahlen very reasonably proposes to omit σε δει in the Iambic verse, οὐκ ἄν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ γένοιο ξένος 'more strange than a stranger'; so that οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δει is now differently expressed, and becomes what it is said to be, an explanation; or the expression of the same thing in different words. Victorius thinks that one of the two may mean 'host' or 'guest'; but as ξένος is not repeated in the alternative, Vahlen's explanation seems more probable. 'And, (in a third way) "a stranger must not be always a stranger" (or, strange): for that too is again of

1 Vahlen, in Trans. Vien. Acad., u. s. pp. 146, 7. He also would connect the sentence thus, which is a more doubtful improvement, ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δει. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ "οὐ δει" κ. τ. λ.
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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ ΙII §§ 8-10.

auto kai to 'Anaxandridou to epainoynouen,
kalon g' apothanein oin thanatou drav a'xion,
tau ton gar esti tw eitein a'xion g' apothanein mu'
'ent a'xion apothanein [Η a'xion g' apothanein mu' thana-
'g tou a'xion onta] µi poiouna thanatou a'xis. to
men oin eidos to auto this lexeos ton tw a'N
eis ἐλαττου κai antikeimenos lexyghi, tosoinw eiado-
kiem an telllon. to de a'tion oni h mattheia dia mev to
antikeidhia mallon, dia de to ev olignw thattou
10 ginetai. de' de aei proseinai n to pro s on legetai
h to orhos legethai, ei to legeomouen altheis kai mu
epitolaion esti gar taua charis exei, oion apos-
a different kind, or form', (foreign, alien, to the two others: diallterin belonging to something or somebody else; opposed to oikiein).

Of the same kind is also that so highly praised verse of Anaxandrides, "A noble thing it is to die ere doing aught worthy of death": for this is the same as saying, "It is worthy to die when one is not worthy to die," or "it is a worthy thing to die when one does not deserve death", or "doing nothing worthy of death". Anaxandrides is quoted III 10. 7 (see note) and infra 12. 3.

§ 9. 'Now of all these the kind of expression (language) is the same: but the more briefly (elattou, t' a'xei) and antithetically', (repeat mallon from the compar. elattou: I have represented the similar ellipse which our own language makes in the like case), 'so much the more are they popular (approved, applauded). The reason of this is, that to the antithesis is due the increase, and by the brevity (in a short time, charis, or space, compass, tonw,) the more rapid growth (or acquisition) of the learning (that arises from them). Comp. notes on I 11. 21, 23, and III 9. 8, also 10. 2.

§ 10. 'To make a phrase aitein) it should always have (attached to it, proseinai) some special personal application (to tina einai pro s on legetai), or propriety in the expression if what is said (is to) be true and not superficial' (supra c. 10.5).

altheis] i.e. sound, solid, substantial, genuine, comp. III 7. 9, sententiarm gravem et honestam, Victorius. Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est. Hor. Ep. I. 7, ult. also I 12. 23, "et saepe ap. Livium." Orelli ad loc. These two, the altheis and the µi epitolaion, do not always go together: when they are separated, the sentence loses its point and attraction. This separation is illustrated by two examples: the first, as a-sentiment, has truth, weight, and solidity; the second is well enough written, as far as the style goes; but neither of them is particularly attractive.

Because these two may be separated in a sentence: for instance, "a man should die free from all offence"—but there is no point
The worthy man should marry the worthy woman—but there is no point in that (this is superficial); but if they are both combined in the sentence (then only the sentence becomes pointed). "It is a worthy thing (or worth while) for a man to die when unworthy of death (when he has done nothing to deserve death)." Here we have the grave, sound, true doctrine, and the antithesis, which gives it point, and redeems it from superficiality. But the greater the proportion of these qualities, the more pointed and attractive it appears; if, for instance, the individual words also were to convey (εἰς) a metaphor, and a metaphor of a particular kind (the proportional met., for example), and antithesis, and balanced clauses, and to carry with them vividness and animation. On ἐνέργεια, see above § 1.

§ 11. "Similes too, as has been already said in the preceding (chapter, c. 4), are always in a certain sense popular metaphors. For they are always composed of (or, expressed in) two terms, just like the proportional metaphor; as for instance, the shield, we say, is Ares' goblet, (the shape of the φαλη is in reality more like an elongated saucer, or shield—whence the comparison), and a bow a stringless harp. When thus expressed, the phrase is not single (or simple; it has both terms expressed, the two terms viz. that are brought into comparison; and is therefore a simile); whereas to call the bow a harp or the shield a goblet is single (and therefore only a metaphor). [αἱ εὐδοκιμουσία. "in αἰ forasse latet aī." Spengel.]

The meaning seems to be this. The difference between a simile and a metaphor is—besides the greater detail of the former, the simile being a metaphor writ large—that it always distinctly expresses the two terms that are compared, bringing them into apparent contrast: the metaphor on the other hand, substituting by transfer the one notion for the other of the two compared, identifies them as it were in one image, and expresses both in a single word, leaving the comparison between

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1 This comes most likely from Anaxandrides again (note on § 8). The verse ran thus τὴν αἴξιων δὲ δὲι γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον. Spengel, Artium Scriptores p. 20, adds ὁ. Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. III 201.
the object illustrated, and the analogous notion which throws a new light upon it, to suggest itself from the manifest correspondence to the hearer.

On the φιάλη "Ἀρεσ, see note on III 4.4, and Introd. pp. 220—292, there referred to. This was due to Timotheus the dithyrambic poet. The φόρμυξ ἀχορδόσ for τόξον—the point of resemblance which brings the two together seems to be the common twang of the bowstring and harp-string produced in each case by the vibration of the string. The bow may therefore be called a stringless harp, as wanting the many strings of the musical instrument, or, in other words, an unmusical harp. On these privative epithets with metaphors, comp. III 6.7. The author of this last bit of δασείωση is a tragic poet named Theognis, mentioned with contempt and ridicule three times by Aristophanes, Acharm. 11, and 138, and Thesm. 168. He is said to have received the nickname of χιώ from his excessive ψυχρότης. Of all his writings only this one phrase has survived, preserved by Demetrius, π. ἑρμηνείας, p. metaforás, § 85. He gives the author's name, and cites this as a specimen of a κωδυνώδης metaforá, ό ó Θεόνευς παραθετέα το (τόξον) φόρμυγα ἀχορδόν ἐπὶ τοῦ τῷ τόξῳ βαλλοντος ἢ μὲν γὰρ φόρμυγξ κωδυνώδες ἐπὶ τοῦ τόξου, τῷ δὲ ἀχορῳ ἱσφάλισται. Out of this Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. III 100, and the writer of the article Theognis No. 11 in Biog. Dict., have made what they print as a verse, παραθέτεα το τόξον, φόρμυγγ' ἀχορδόν.

§ 12. 'The simile is made in this way, by comparing for instance a flute-player to an ape'—Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia nobis [Ennius, ap. Cic. de Nat. Deor. i § 97]: besides this general resemblance of the two natures, there is also a special resemblance between the two, thus described by Victorius, "quod tibicines quoque ut simiae contracto corpore, manibusque ad os appositis, cum tibias infanti, ut bestia illa sedent." The resemblance is quite sufficient to justify the simile.

In the next example we must (with Bekker and Spengel) read, after MS A, λύχυς [not λύξ], and omit εἰς.

'And a short-sighted man to a lamp with water dropping upon it'. The involuntary contraction, the convulsive winking, of the half-closed eyes of the short-sighted man is compared to the fizzing, spitting, and sputtering of the lamp when water is dropped on it: 'because both are contracted'. μύοψ (μύει) is one that keeps his eyes half shut, Probl. XXXI 16, διὰ τί οἱ μύοπες βλέπα τενάγοντες ὀρέων; Arist. makes the point of the comparison lie in the contraction of both, the eyelids and the flame. ψακάς or ψεκας 'a drop'; ψακάζειν 'to drop, fall in drops', Ar. Nub. 580 of the clouds, ἢ ψακαζόμεν, 'we drizzle'; ψακάζεσθαι (pass.) 'to be sprinkled with drops.' Xen. Symp. II 26, ἢ δὲ ἢμιν οἱ παιδεῖς μικραὶ κύληλα πυκνά ἐπεφεκτῶσιν: opposed to ἄθροον πίνειν, to drink all at
once, in large measures. The other is to distribute your potations in ‘drops’, as it were, in very small glasses; and so to make up for what you lose in the magnitude of the draught by the frequent repetition of the little one.

§ 13. ‘Excellence is attained in them when they contain (involve) metaphor (comp. c. 10 § 3): for the shield may be compared to “Ares’ goblet”, and a ruin to the “rag of a house”; [conversely we have rags described as ἐφίσια χλαδίνων, Soph. Fragm. (Niobe) 400, comp. Eur. Troad. 1025.]

‘And Niceratus may be said to be “a Niceratus stung by Pratys”—according to Thrasymachus’ simile, when he saw Niceratus after his defeat by Pratys in the rhapsodical contest, and still all dishevelled and dirty (squalid)’; with the marks of the long and laborious struggle still fresh upon him; before he had had time to shave and dress. κομμῆς is here used in the unusual sense of long hair as a sign of neglect, incommittis capillis, uncombed, unkempt: in the ordinary acceptance long hair is a sign of foppery, or the distinctive mark of a young man of fashion, Arist. Eq. 580, except at Sparta, Rhet. I 9.26, where it was a national distinction, ἐν Δακεδαιμονι κομμῆς καλῶν: as it was likewise in the Homeric ages, when the Achaeans were καρποκόρωντες.

Of the many Niceratuses whose names appear in Sauppe’s Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. p. 102, there are two better known to us than the rest, (1) the son of the distinguished Athenian general, who appears as one of the guests in Xenophon’s banquet, in Lysias, &c., and was put to death by the Thirty tyrants. If the Thrasymachus who made the remark upon him be—as he doubtless is—the famous Sophist, this must be the Niceratus who is here meant. The second, mentioned in Dem. c. Mid. § 165, and afterwards in a list of witnesses with the name of his deme Ἀχρεδώσιος, § 168, was probably the grandson of the other; for the names of Nicias and Niceratus seem to have alternated in successive generations in this family, as they did in that of Callias and Hipponicus. These two are habitually confounded by Taylor, Reiske (see his Ind. ad Dem.) and others; and the confusion still exists in Smith’s Biographical Dictionary, although Buttman proved their diversity (in Exc. viii ad Dem. c. Mid.). Sauppe likewise, in his Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. p. 102, distinguishes them. Several other Niciases and Niceratues appear in Sauppe’s Index, u.s.

Niceratus had engaged in a contest with one Pratys, a professional rhapsodist, and, being in all probability an amateur, had been defeated. In this state, and still bearing all the marks of it on his person, he is
encountered by Thrasymachus, who thereupon compares him to "a Philoctetes bitten or stung by Pratys." Schneider on Xen. Sympos. III 5 supposes that "the subject of the recitation in which Niceratus was beaten was the account in Lesches' 'little Iliad' of the story of Philoctetes in which was related the calamity arising from the serpent's bite; alluded to by Homer, II. B 721"; and by Soph. Phil. 267, πληγιν' ἔχιδνης ἄγραφον χαράγματι, and 632.

'Wherein the poets are most condemned when they fail, and applauded when they succeed'. ἐκπίστευσι is properly said of an actor who is hissed off the stage, and hence of condemnation, disapprobation, in general. Poet. XVIII 15, ἐπεί καὶ 'Ἀγάδων ἐξίπτευσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ, Dem. de Cor. § 265, ἐξίπτευσε (Aeschines) ἐγώ δ' ἐσώφρων. Metaphorically, Plat. Gorg. 517 A, οὗ γὰρ ἀν ἐξίπτεσον (ἐκπίστευον omnino dicuntur ea quae reiiciuntur et repudiuntur; Stallbaum). explodi, exactus, Ter. Prol. (2) Hec. 4 et 7. The opposite of the agent is ἐξέβαλλεν 'to hiss off the stage'; Dem. de F. L. § 389 (of Aeschines again, as acting Thyestes), ἐξεβάλλετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεστράτευτε ἐκ τῶν θεάτων.

'I mean when they make (the two members) correspond (bring into comparison, note on ἀποδιδώναι 1 1.7). "He wears his legs as curly as parsley." (οἴλος, Buttmann Lexil. No. 44 and 88). "Like Philammon, at close quarters with the sack"." Philammon, a famous Athenian athlete, gained the prize at the Olympic games, Dem. de Cor. § 319.

Harpocr. Φ. τῶν Ἀθηναίων πύκτης. Eustath. ad Hom. II. ψ p. 1324, quoted in Dissen's note on Dem. I. c.

τῷ κρυκῷ καρυκός, θυλακός. Suidas. θυλάκιον. ἤτοι δὲ δερμάτων ἀγγείοι, ὄμοιον ὁσκό. Hesychius. 'A sack filled with bran and olive husks for the young, and sand for the more robust, and then suspended at a certain height, and swung backwards and forwards by the players.' Dict. Ant. art. 'Baths,' p. 144 b. It is evident that this describes only one use of it, namely for amusement or exercise at the baths: this game was called καρυκομαξία. The other purpose for which it was employed was plainly from this passage that of boxers, who practised upon it. [Compare Plautus, Rudens 722, follem fugilatorium faciam et pendentem incursabo fugitis, and see K. F. Hermann's Privatalterthümer, § 37. 17.]

These two iambic lines, from unknown authors, are clearly selected not for the failure, but the success, of the poet or poets who composed them.

'(These) and the like are all similes. That all similes are (a kind of, or involve) metaphors, has been stated already many times'.

μάλιστα ἐκπίστευσιν οἱ ποιηταί, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. λέγω δ' ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν, ἀσπερ σέλινοι οὐλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ, ἀσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κρύκῳ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντες εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ' εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοράι, εἰρήται πολλάκις.
§ 14. ‘Proverbs too are metaphors from species to species: as for instance, if a man has of his own accord invited the aid of (lit. called in to help him) another in the expectation of deriving benefit (from his assistance), and then incurs harm and loss instead, as the Carpathian says of the hare: for each of them is a case of the accident (or result) above mentioned. Carpathus, an island lying between Crete and Rhodes, from which the neighbouring sea took the name of Carpathian (Hor. Carm. I 35. 8): now called Skarpanto. The proverb is thus explained by Buhle. “Cum Carpathi incolae leporibus carerent, unus eorum par leporum introduxit” (rabbits, doubtless), “unde tanta eorum multitudo propter faecunditatem exorsa est, ut omnes fructus absumerentur.” Erasmus, Adag. Chil. II Cent. I 81, p. 1250.

A similar result follows from similar conduct in Stesichorus’ fable of the stag, the horse, and the man, II 20. 5. These are both species of the same genus of disappointed expectation, or disastrous result: and the proverb is a transfer, a tralatio of the one to the other. On the four kinds of metaphor, see Poet. XXI 7.

‘So the sources of witticisms and pointed, pungent, vivid things in general, and the reason why (they are such; their raison d’être), have been pretty well explained’. I have omitted τὸ αἰτίον as a mere tautological repetition of διότι. On the three senses of διότι see note on § 1.11. Here the sense of “why” is proved by the explanatory τὸ αἰτίον.

§ 15. ‘All approved hyperboles are also metaphors’, i.e. a mere hyperbola, without metaphor, will not be approved. On the hyperbole, Auct. ad Heren. IV 33. 44, superlatio est oratio superans veritatem alienius augendi minuendae causa, et seq. Cic. Topic. c. x § 45, aut aliquid quod fieri nullo modo possit augendi esse gratia dicitur, aut minuendae, quae hyperbole dicitur. Quint. VIII 6. 67—76, Hyperbole audactoris ornatus summo loco posui. Est haec decens veri superiectio. Virtus eius ex diverso par augendi atqueminuendi. Then follow the description and illustration of its several varieties. In Ernesti, Lex. Techn. (both Greek and Latin), hyperbole is omitted. ὑπερβολὴ is in fact ‘exaggeration’. ‘For instance (what was said) to (or against, for the purpose of exaggeration, making the most of it) the man with the black eye, “you’d have taken him for a basket of mulberries”. For the black eye¹ is something red’ (and so is the mulberry; the colour is similar; and

¹ τὸ υπέρσιον, which stands here for ‘a black eye’, is originally nothing but the seat of that, the part that is under the eye. It is thence transferred to the signification of the discoloured surface that results from a blow under the eye (ὑπερβολὴ).
therefore so far it is a metaphor from one red thing—purple is nearer to the true colour—to another, \textit{eldos pro\textit{o} eldos}; ‘but the hyperbole or exaggeration’ (\textit{σφόδρα}, which distinguishes it from metaphor) ‘lies in the excessive quantity’, (i. e. in the absurdly exaggerated number of black spots represented by a whole basket of mulberries. Victorius). According to Theophrastus, de Caus. Plant. VI 6. 4, there are two kinds of mulberries, red and white, \textit{ἐρυθρὸν καὶ λευκὸν}. This is an instance of Quintilian’s first variety of hyperbole; \textit{qui n\textit{um plus facto dicimus, direct exaggeration}; of which two examples are given. Victorius refers to the saying of an Athenian wag about Sulla, \textit{συκάμων ἐσσὸς ὁ Σύλλας ἀλφίτῳ πεπασμένος}, “Sulla (i. e. his face) is like a mulberry powdered with flour”, in Plutarch [\textit{Sulla}, c. 2, p. 451 F].

‘And another (kind of phrase) like so and so’ (comp. \textit{tā kā tā, infra} c. 17. 11; this seems to mean the two preceding examples, which are here repeated, and others like them) ‘is a hyperbole, differing from it merely by the form of the expression (it becomes a hyperbole by dropping the particle of comparison, \textit{ώσπερ}). Thus “like Philammon at close quarters with the sack”, (may be thrown into the form of a hyperbole, thus,) “you would have taken him for Philammon fighting the sack”. Again, “to wear his legs curly like parsley”, becomes “you’d have thought his legs not legs, but parsley, so crooked are they”. This is Quintilian’s second variety of hyperbole, u. s. § 68, \textit{superiectio per similitudinem, aut per comparationem}: illustrated by Credas innare revulsas \textit{Cycladas}, Virg. Aen. viii 691.

§ 16. ‘The hyperbole has a \textit{juvenilie character, signifying vehemence; and therefore they are most used by people when they are angry; “No, not if he were to offer me gifts as the sand or dust for multitude” (or gifts in number like the sand or dust). “And the daughter of Agamemnon ἔστησα) the special for the general—\textit{ὑπωπτίζων being to ‘strike, or inflict a blow under the eye’, and ὑπωπτεύομεν here ‘one so struck’, including the resulting discolouration. See for exemplifications of all three, Arist. Pax 541, Acharn. 551, Vesp. 1386. Fragm. Apolloph. 1. Vol. II 880, Meineke, \textit{Fr. Com. Gr.}, κύαθων (a cupping-glass) τοῖς ὑπωπτοῖς, Antiph. 13. 5, Vol. III 139. Ib., στάσει σταθεί, μάχη μάχιν ὑπωπτοῖ δὲ πίετην (ἐξελάμψειν). Eubul. Semele s. Dionysus. Fr. 1. 8, ἐκτὸς δὲ (κρατήρ) κόμων’ ἔβδομος δ’ ὑπωπτίων. Meineke u.s. 14. Vol. II. 29.
RHTORIKHE Γ 11 § 16; 12 § 1. 143

dηλούσιν. διό οργιζόμενοι λέγουσι μάλιστα·
oü' ε' μοι τόσα δοιη όσα υ'μαθός τε κόνις τε.
kόρην δ' ου γαμέω Αγαμέμνονος Ατρείδαο,
oü' ε' χρυσείη Αφροδίτη κάλλος ερίκοι,
ἐργα δ' Αθηναίη.

χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτω οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες. διὸ δ' ῥ. 1413δ
προσβυτέρω λέγειν ἀπρεπές.

I. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἀλλη ἐκάστῳ γένει ἀρ- chap. xii.
μόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ γραφική καὶ ἀγω-
νιστική, οὔτε δημηγορική καὶ δικαίων, ἀμφῶ ὃ
don of Atreus will I not wed, no, not though she vied in beauty with
golden Aphrodite, and in accomplishments [deftness of handiwork] with
Athene9, comp. III 7. 11. II. 1 [IX] 385 (the angry Achilles indignantly;
refusing Agamemnon's offered presents). μειρακιάδες is here meant
to convey the fire, vigour, spirit, impetuosity, proneness to passion and
excitement; or in general 'vehemence', as he tells us; which are
characteristic of early youth. It is used by Plato [Rep. 466 B, and 498 B] in
the sense of 'puerile'. The latter usually represents this by νεανικὸς,
which he uses in two opposite senses, of the good and bad qualities
of youth; either gallant, spirited, generous, noble, splendid and such
like, or rash, wanton, insolent: also νεανίας and νεανισεβαί.
‘This figure is an especial favourite with the Attic orators’.
‘And this is why the use of it is unbecoming to an elderly man’—
not because, as might be supposed from the arrangement of the sen-
tences, it was such a favourite with the Attic orators but—because it
is a juvenile trait of character, and as such must be inappropriate to
the opposite.

[It may be doubted whether the awkward remark, χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα
τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες, which is a parenthetical note immediately suc-
cceeding another parenthesis and breaking the connexion between the
beginning and the end of the section, was really written by Aristotle at
all. The phrase of Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες, which is not found elsewhere in
Aristotle (though we have ῥ. Ἀθηναίηι ῥήτορες, infra 17 § 10), is peculiarly
open to suspicion, and may perhaps be ascribed to the pen of some
Alexandrine critic familiar with the canon of the Ten ‘Attic Orators’.]

CHAP. XII.

We now return for the last time to the subject of propriety of style,
on which in this chapter we have some concluding observations. Rhetor-
ical propriety must shew itself in the due adaptation of style to
matter; and consequently the three branches of Rhetoric must be treated
each in its appropriate style. We therefore distinguish two kinds of
speeches, and two styles appropriate to them; (1) ‘debate’, speaking
in the actual strife or contest of the assembly and the law-court,
ανάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασκηνών, ἀν τι
νοτικὴ λέξις, and (2) γραφική, written compositions, which are confined to the third or epideictic branch: and the first is again subdivided into (a) public speaking, popular harangues addressed to the assembly, and (b) forensic. This is only true in theory: in practice speeches were often written by the orators, as Demosthenes and Isocrates, for the use of those who were incompetent or unwilling to write and plead for themselves.

Under the head of γραφικὴ λέξις are included all compositions which are intended to be read, and consequently the whole range of literature, with the exception of speeches which are intended to be delivered or acted, deliberative and forensic, public and private orations—such as those of Demosthenes. Thus the third branch of Rhetoric, the ἐπίδεικτική, is made to embrace all poetry, philosophy, history, and indeed any writing on any subject whatsoever. The distinction coincides with that of Hermogenes, ἐπὶ διδάσκων τοὺς β. ἐπὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου (see Rhet. Gr. II. p. 401 seq. Spengel), who divides composition into λόγους συμβουλευτικοῖς, δικαίοι, and πανηγυρικοί, the last including the works of Homer and Plato, the most distinguished of poets and prose writers.

The declarations delivered at the Olympic Games and other great public festivals or assemblies πανηγύρεις, whence the name πανηγυρικοί λόγοι—such as Isocrates' Panegyric and Panathenaic orations, and Lysias' celebrated 'Ολυμπιακὸς, of which a short fragment is preserved, (Or. 33, Baiter et Sauppe, Or. Att. I 146)—were intermediate between the public or agonistic and the epideictic or graphic speeches, partaking of the character of both; being declaimed in public and sometimes with a political object (as Lysias' speech, and some of Isocrates'), but that object was subordinate, the main consideration being always the display. Isocrates is always anxious to impress his readers with the conviction that his speeches are not mere empty declarations, ἐπιδείκτικαι, but genuine πολιτικοί λόγοι—are indeed a branch of Philosophy, which with him is pretty nearly convertible with Rhetoric, see κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν §§ 1, 11, 21, and Mr Sandys' note on Paneg. § 10. [* Isocrates means by “Philosophy” a combination of the accomplishments of the ρήτωρ and the πολιτικός. Thompson's Phaedrus, p. 172.]

Isocrates, writing from his point of view, δυτικ. §§ 46—50, contrasts himself and his own declarations, which he calls 'Ελληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικοὺς, with δικαιούς λόγους, forensic pleading and pleaders, whom, probably in consequence of his own failure in that branch of Rhetoric, he attacks and vituperates upon intellectual, social, and moral grounds. Writing before the establishment of Aristotle's threefold division of the art, he evidently recognises only two branches, public or political speaking, in which national interests are concerned—and at the head of these he places his own πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι, the true philosophy (§ 50)—and judicial or forensic, in which private interests

1 See on this, Mr Sandys' Introduction to Isocrates Panegyricus, p. xl seq.
between man and man are debated and decided. In respect of style, he of course gives the preference to his own kind of composition, §§ 46, 7.

On this adaptation of style to the different kinds of oratory, see Quint. viii 3. 11—14. The opening observation, at all events, looks like a reference to this chapter, though Spalding in his note is silent on the subject.

Whately also, in his Rhet. c. iv 'on Elocution', (Encycl. Metrop. p. 299 b, 300 a, 301 b,) has some good observations, partly derived from Aristotle, upon the contrast of the agnostic and graphic styles. On the contrast of the two, see by all means Isocr. Phil. §§ 25, 26: all the main points of interest in public and forensic, or agnostic, speeches are there enumerated, and the comparatively lifeless speeches to be read, forcibly contrasted with them. [Comp. also Alcidamas, περί τῶν τῶν γραπτῶν λέγων γραφῶνων, (against Isocrates).]

§ 1. 'It must not be forgotten (lost sight of) that a different kind of language is appropriate to each different kind (of Rhetoric). For the same style is not suitable to written composition (that which is intended to be read) and that which is used in debate (in the contests, the actual struggle, of real life; nor again in (the two divisions of the latter) public and forensic speaking. The orator must be acquainted with both: for the one (debate) implies the knowledge and power of clear expression in pure Greek, and the other freedom from the necessity (lit. the not being obliged to) of suppressing in silence (κατα, keeping down) anything that one may want to communicate to the rest of the world; which is the case with those who have no knowledge (or skill) of writing (i.e. composition).’ Comp. iii 1. 7. Cicero, de Or. ii 82. 337, gives a brief description of the 'grand' and dignified style appropriate to the exalted subjects of public speaking.

The meaning of this seems to be—the orator must be acquainted with the written as well as the debating style; the latter implies and requires only the correct use of one's native language, so that one may be able to make oneself clearly intelligible: this (debate alone) does not require the minute accuracy of studied composition, which can be examined at leisure and criticized: but since one who can only speak, and not write, is incapable of communicating his opinions to the rest of the world (τοῖς ἄλλοις, all others besides the members of the assembly or law-court that he is actually addressing), it is necessary for a statesman to acquire the power of writing well, and therefore to study in some degree the art of exact composition. Victorius, who renders τό μὴ ἀναγκάζοντας—τοίς ἄλλοις of actual writing, that is of letters to absent friends, seems to narrow the meaning of 'writing' in such a way as to produce a somewhat ridiculous result. Surely any educated man, whether he be an orator and statesman or not, requires and possesses the knowledge of writing in that sense. On τό μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλληριξιν ἐπιστάσθαι, Thuc. ii 60, 5—6 may serve as a commentary; Pericles, in his defence, describing his qualifications for a statesman, says οὐδενὸς οἷμαι ἡσσων εἶναι γνῶναι τοῦ δέοντα
§ 2. 'The written style is the most exact' (or finished: on ἀκριβεία and its various senses, see Grant ad Eth. Nic. I 7. 18, and the references in Introd. ad h. l. p. 334, note 4), 'that of debate lends itself most to acting' (or delivery: is the 'most capable of being acted'). Comp. III 1. 4. The reason of this as far as declamation is concerned, viz. why the graphic style admits of more ornament and artificial arrangement than the other, is thus stated by Cicero, Orat. I X I 208. After the invention of the period, &c., he says, nemo qui aliquo esset in numero scripsit orationem generis eius, quod esset ad delectionem comparatum remotumque a iudiciis forensiis certamine, quin redigeret omnes fere in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam quum is est auditor, qui non vereatur ne compositae orationis insidiis sua fides attempatur, gratiam quoque habet orator voluptati aurium servienti.

'Of this (ἀγωνιστική) there are two kinds; one that (includes, conveys), represents character, the other emotion (in the speech)'. That is, not that ἀγωνιστική is a genus, containing two species under it, moral and emotional: for this is not the fact, and also any speech may have both: but that these two elements belong specially, not exclusively, to the two debating branches of Rhetoric, of which they are very prominent ingredients: the reality of the interests at stake giving more room for the play of passion and the assumption of character than the cold unimpassioned, deliberate written compositions. The ethical part is of two kinds, the ἡθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, I 2. 4, II 1. 4, and the characters ἡθῆ of the several ages and conditions, II 12. 17. The emotional is of course that which is partially described I 2. 5, and treated at length in II 2. 16. Of these 'appeals to the feelings', δύνασθαι and ἔλεος, the earlier rhetorical treatises were full, I 1. 3, of which Thrasymachus' ἔλεος (III 1. 7) described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 c, was a well-known specimen. Quint. III 8. 12, (In concionibus deliberatio) affectus, ut quae maxima, postulat, seq. Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas (this is principally due to ἡθος) plurimum, seq. See III 7. 1, 3, 6, where the two are described. The ἡθος is there confined to those of age, nation, station, &c. Compare with all this, Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας § 193, ἐναγώνιες μὲν οὖν οἷος μέλλων ἢ διαλειμμένη λέξις, αὕτη καὶ ὑποκριτικὴ καλεῖται κινεῖ γὰρ ὑπόκρισιν ἢ λύσιν. γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις ἢ εὐανείγωστος. αὕτη δὲ ἐστιν ἢ συνηρμηνευμένη καὶ οἷον ήσαλκωμένη τοῖς συνεδρίοις. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Μινανδρὸν ὑποκρίνονται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς πλεῖστοις, Φιλίμων δὲ ἀναγωνισκότους.

'And this is why actors also (as well as debaters) hunt after (διάκονοι) plays of this kind (that is, plays of which the subjects give scope for the exhibitions of passion and character), and the poets after persons (whether actors to represent the πάθη, or characters in the dramas to be represented with them) of the same kind. At the same time, the poets
that can be read (that write to be read as well as acted or rhapsodised)
become pocket-companions, or favourites'.

\textit{βαστάζωσι} is said of anything that is carried about in the hand or
arms, fondled, cherished, fondly and familiarly treated, like a baby or
pet lapdog; and hence when applied to a book naturally means one that
people are fond of, and carry about with them in their pockets. There
are several instances in Sophocles—see Ellendt's \textit{Lex}.—that illustrate
this sense of \textit{βαστάζωσι}, as Philoct. 655 of the \textit{favourite} bow and 657,
(Neopt.) \textit{έτων άντε...καὶ βαστάσαν \ με (be allowed to nurse it), προσκύναται
θ' \ ἀδερ θεών; Aesch. Agam. 34, εὐφιλή χήρα ἄνακτος τήδε βαστάσα (to
press and caress) χήρα (Blomfield's Glos. ad loc.). Quint. \textit{VIII} 3. 12, of any
striking sentiment or expression, \textit{intuendum} (to be narrowly looked into)
et \textit{paene} pertractandum.

'Chaeremon for instance who is as exact (highly finished) as a pro-
fessional speech-writer (such as Isocrates), and Licynnius amongst the
dithyrambic poets'. On Chaeremon, see note \textit{II} 23. 29, ult. [The \textit{ἀκριβεία}
of Chaeremon may be illustrated by his partiality for minute details, such as
enumerating the flowers of a garland, e.g. Athenaeus \textit{XV} p. 679 \textit{F},
\textit{κίσσῳ τε παρακατοικώτα τε τριμήλικα κύκλῳ στεφάνων ἀλκτών.} On \textit{λογογράφος,
see \textit{II} 11. 7; Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. \textit{§} 274. Licynnius is mentioned
above, \textit{III} 2. 13, where reference is made to \textit{Camb. Journ. of Cl. and
Sacred Phil.} \textit{No. IX. Vol. III} pp. 255—7, for an account of what is known
of him; and again \textit{III} 13. 5.

'And upon comparison the (speeches, \textit{λέγοι}) of the \textit{writers} when
delivered in actual contests have a narrow, confined, contracted (i.e.
poor, mean, paltry) appearance, whilst those of the orators (meaning
particularly the \textit{public} speakers, in the assembly), which by their skilful
delivery succeed or pass muster' (none of this is \textit{expressed} but 'well
delivered'), 'when taken in the hands (to read) look like the work of mere
bungsiers or novices'. \textit{στενός} is the Latin \textit{tenuis}, and the English \textit{slight}
and \textit{slender}, in a contemptuous and depreciatory sense. In its primary
sense of \textit{narrow} it stands in opposition, in respect of style, to the wider
range, and the broader, \textit{larger}, freer, bolder, tone required by the loftier
and more comprehensive subjects, and also by the larger audiences, of
public speakers; the high finish and minute artifices of structure, as well
as the subtler and finer shades of intonation and expression, are lost in
a crowd and in the open air. So Whately, \textit{Rhet. ch. IV (Encycl. Metrop.
p. 301 a)}, describes the \textit{agonistic} style, as "a style somewhat more blunt
(than the \textit{graphic}) and homely, more simple and, apparently, unstudied
in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic." \textit{στενόι} then

1 [So in \textit{Introd. p. 325}, after Victorius and Majoragius, but compare Mr Cope's
second thoughts as given in the \textit{note} on the same page: "\textit{κύρια λεγομένα can mean
nothing but 'well spoken of', \textit{πήροψ} being understood."]
represents the comparative _narrowness_ or confined character of the graphic style, with its studied artificial graces, careful composition, and other such 'paltrinesses', 'things mean and trifling'—a sense in which it occurs in a parallel passage of Pl. Gorg. 497 c, where _σμικρά_ καὶ _στενά_ are contemptuously applied by Callicles to Socrates' dialectics. This is actually said of _Isocrates_, in the passage of Dionysius, _de Isocr._ Iud. c. 13, by Hieronymus, the philosopher of Rhodes; _ἀναγώνια_ μὲν ἂν τινα διυψηθήσαι τὸν _λόγον_ αὐτοῦ (_Isocr._) _καλῶς_ ἀδυρογήσας δὲ τῆν τε _φωνὴν_ καὶ τὸν _τόνον_ ἑπάραστα, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ _κατασκευῇ_ μετὰ τῆς _ἀρμοτούσης_ _υποκρίσεως_ εἰπεῖν, οὐ _παντελῶς._

_ιδιωτικοῖ_ such as have only the _capacity_ (_κόσο_ of unprofessional persons, or _laymen_ in art, &c. as opposed to _clerks_, when all science and learning were in the hands of the clergy. _ιδιωτικός_ is opposed to _δημογύς_, a practitioner of _any_ art, science, profession, or pursuit: and especially to philosophy and its professors, as in the adage, _ιδιωτικός_ εὗ _φιλοσοφός_, _φιλόσοφος_ ἐν _ιδιωτικοῖς_.

Spengel follows MS A (or A) in reading ἡ τῶν λεχθέντων for εὗ λεχθέντες. But I confess that I do not see who could be intended by τῶν λεχθέντων besides the orators. Certainly not the preceding _ἀναγωνιστοι_.

_ιδιωτικοῖ εὗ τάς χερσίν._ This must have been the case with Cicero's rival, Hortensius. Quintilian [XI 3.8], after telling us that Hortensius was, during his lifetime, first thought to be chief of all orators, secondly Cicero's rival, and thirdly second to him alone, adds, _ut appareat placuisse aliquid eo dicente quod legentes non invenimus_ (the same may be said of many sermons). Isocrates' _Phil._ §§ 25, 26, an excellent commentary on this, is unfortunately too long to quote.

'The reason is that their appropriate place is in an actual contest or debate' (with _ἀρμόται_ supply, if you please, _ταῦτα_ as the nomin.—it means at all events the subject of the immediately preceding clause): 'and this also is why things (speeches) intended to be _acted_ or delivered (_lit._ proper to be, or capable of being, _κόσο_), when the delivery is withdrawn don't produce their own proper effect (or perform their _special function_, _ἐργον_), and so appear silly: for instance _asynedeta_, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, _graphic_ style'—with which the agonistic divested of its acting or delivery is now (surreptitiously) associated—'are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators _do_ employ them, because they are proper for acting.' Aquila c. 30 (ap. Gaisford, _Not. Var._), _Ideoque et Aristotelis et iteratio ipsa verborum ac nominum et repetitio frequentior, et omnis huinis modi motus actioni magis et certaminis quam stilo videtur convenire._
§ 3. What follows is a note, a passing observation suggested by the subject, but not immediately connected with it. 'In this repetition of the same thing, some change must be made in the mode of expression of each member of it': (the repetition should be made in different words, to avoid monotony. See on the interpretation of this, and the figure μεταβολή, to which μεταβάλλειν points, a full explanation, Introd. p. 326, and note 1:) 'which paves the way as it were for the delivery' (on προδοσιαί, see note on i. 1.2). 'This is he that stole from you, this is he that cheated you, this is he that last of all attempted to betray you.' (From an unknown rhetorician; most probably not the author's own.) 'And again, as another instance, what Philemon the actor (not to be confounded with the Comic poet) used to do in Anaxandrides' Old men's madness, where (lit. when, ὅτα) he says (uses the words in playing his part) "Rhadamthys and Palamedes," and also, in the prologue of the Devotees, the word ἐγώ: for if such things (phrases, sentences, or words) as these be not (varied) in the delivery, they become like "the man that carries the beam," in the proverb (ῥήπι), i.e. stiff and awkward, like one that has "swallowed a poker", as our proverb has it.

Anaxandrides, quoted before, III 10.7. The first citation from his comedy, the γεροντομανία, has the rest of the verse supplied in Athen. XIV 614 C, καὶ τοι πολὺ γε πονοῦμεν. τῶν ἀσύμβολων ἑδρέ γελοία λέγειν Ραδάμανθυς καὶ Παλαμήδης. On the passage of Aristotle, which he quotes, Meineke, Fr. Comic. Gr. III 166, has the following remark: "Philemon autem quid fecerit in recitandis verbis P. καὶ Π., non satis apparat." I don't suppose the repetition to have been confined to these words; all that Aristotle means to say seems to be, when Philemon had come to that point, thereabouts, the repetition took place. "Num forte eadem verba in pluribus deinceps versibus recitabantur et alio atque alio vocis flexu et sono ab histrione recitabantur? (This follows Victorius' interpretation of μεταβάλλειν.) Ita sane videtur, neque alia alterius loci fuerit ratio, in quo identidem repetebatur pronomen ἐγώ." At all events, these were two notorious and well-remembered points made by Philemon in this varied repetition in acting the character which he sustained in these two comedies. There is, or was, a similar tradition (which I heard from Dr Butler, the late Bp of Lichfield, and Master of Shrewsbury School) of the effect produced by Garrick's rendering of Pray you undo this button:—thank you, sir,—of Lear, choking in his agony, at the point of death [V. III. 309].
§ 4. 'And of asyndeta the same may be said, "I came, I met, I implored".' I have translated this upon the supposition that there is no intention of distinguishing here the aorist and imperfect: 'for (here again) delivery (i.e. intonation) must come into play, and it must not be spoken as if it were all one, with the same character and accent'. Of σύνδεσμος or λύσις, the disconnected style, in which σύνδεσμος 'connecting particles' are absent, comp. Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας § 194, ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικὸν ἡ λύσις παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθω τίδε, ἐδεξάμην, ἔτικτον, ἐκτρέφον, φίλε (Menander, Fr. Inc. 230, Meineke, u.s. I 284). οὕτως γὰρ λειτυκόν ἀναγκαίον καὶ τὸν μὴ βλέποντα ὑποκρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν λύσιν ἐν δὲ συνδέσμος εἰσίος, ἐδεξάμην καὶ ἔτικτον καὶ ἐκτρέφοι, πολλὴν ἀπάθειαν τοὺς συνδέσμους ἐμβαλεῖ. Of asyndeton two examples are given from Demosthenes by Hermogenes π. μεθὸδον δεινότητος, § 11, Ῥητ. Gr. II 435, Spengel.

A good example of asyndeton, illustrating the rapidity and vivacity which it imparts to style, is supplied by Victorius from Demosth. c. Androt. § 68, ὅμοι μετοίκως, Ἀθηναίους, διόν, ἀπάγων, βιών ἐν ταῖς ἔκκλησιας, ἐπὶ τοῦ βησικὸς. Add Cicero's abitit, excessit, evasit, erupit.

The imparting style to asyndeton and the opposite (the employment of connecting particles) is admirably explained and illustrated by Campbell, Phil. of Rhet. Bk. III sect. 2, near the end (2nd ed. Vol. II pp. 287—293.)

'Further asyndeta have a certain special property; that (by their aid) many things seem to be said in the same time' (as one thing would be, if they had been employed); 'because the connecting particle (or connexion) converts several things into one, (Harris, Hermes, II 2, p. 240.) and therefore if it be withdrawn (extracted), plainly the contrary will take place; one will become many. Accordingly (the asyndeton) exaggerates (or amplifies: or multiplies, increases the number): 'I came, I conversed, I supplicated': (the hearer or reader) seems to overlook or survey a number of things that he (the speaker) said'. (I have followed Bekker, Ed. 3, πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπερῴειν ὅσα εἶπεν. Spengel has, πολλὰ δοκεῖ,
Nireus αὖ Σύμμηθεν,
Nireus Ἄγλαϊς,
Nireus ὁς κάλλιστος.

περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρήσθαι· εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὡστε 
νῦξισεν ἀπαξ μησθεῖς διὰ τῶν παραλογισμῶν, καὶ 
μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ύστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον 
pοιησάμενος.

5 ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἐοικε τῇ 
ὑπερείπειν δὸς εἶπον, which is not agree with MS A*, and is also ob-
scure. Bekker, Ed. 1, has πολλά δοκεῖ δὲ ὑπερείπειν δοσα εἶπον, δοσα φημι).

'And this is Homer's intention also in writing Nireus at the 
commencement of three lines running'. II. 11 671. On this Demetrius, π. ἐρ-
μηνεῖα §§ 61, 62, τὸν δὲ Νιρέα, αὐτὸν τε ὀντα μικρὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῦ 
μικρότερα—all this is raised to magnitude and importance by ἐπαναφόρα, 
repetition, and ἀναληπτικόν. He then quotes the three lines; and, 
§ 62, continues, καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπαξ τοῦ Νιρέας ὀνομασθέντος ἐν τῷ 
δράματι (dramatic poetry) μεμημέθη αὐτοῖν ἦττον ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως, καὶ τοῦ 
κατ᾽ ἔπος ἐκατόν καλουμένων σχεδὸν κ.κ.λ. concluding with an ingenious 
simile; ὄσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐσταθεὶς τὰ ὀλίγα διασταθέντα ποισ (a few meats 
by a certain disposition or arrangement) πολλὰ φαίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς 
λόγοις. Comp. also Hermogenes, περὶ ἐπαναληψιών, de repetitione, 
π. μεθὸδον 

dιανόησιν, § 9 (Rhet. Gr. II 433, Spengel), who gives this example of 
Nireus, with others from Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. Illustra-
tions of this emphatic repetition, and especially of that of the pro-
noun αὐτός, occur in a fragm. of Aeschyl., Fragm. Inc. 266, quoted at 
length in Plat. Rep. II 383 B, the most forcible of them all: κλεά (Thetis) 
τὸ 

Φαῖδον 

θεὸν ἔφευξε στῶμα ἥλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικὴ βρῶν τέχνη. 

ὁ δὲ 

αὐτός ὄμων, αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς παρὼν, αὐτός ταῖς εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ παῖσα 

τῶν 

εἰμόν. After this it will be unnecessary to quote inferior speci-

cmens; such as Xen. Anab. III 2. 4, Aesch. Eumen. 765, with Paley's 

note, and Blomfield's note on 745, in Linwood's ed. p. 188, where several 

references are given.

For a person (or thing) of which many things are said must neces-
sarily be often mentioned; and therefore (this is a fallacy) they think it 
follows (καὶ, that it is also true) that if the name is often repeated, there 
must be a great deal to say about its owner: so that by this fallacy (the 
poet) magnifies (Nireus) by mentioning him only once (i.e. in one place), 
and makes him famous though he nowhere afterwards speaks of him 
again'. This is the fallacy of illicit conversion of antecedent and conse-
cquent, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 δ 1, ὁ δὲ παρεπόμενον ἔλεγχοι διὰ τὸ ὁμοθε 

ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθουσαν κ.κ.λ. and Rhet. I 7. 5. Analogous to this is 
the fallacy exposed in III 7. 4.

§ 5. It seems as if in the following section Aristotle had, probably 
unconsciously misled by the ambiguous term, used ἀκριβῆς and its πτωχοlogos running.
σκιαγραφία: ὁσφ. γὰρ ἄν πλείων ἡ ὁ ὀχλος, πορρωτέρω ἡ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἄκριβη περίεργα καὶ χειρω φαινεῖσθαι in two distinct senses: exactness and high finish in style and reasoning. The general subject and connexion of the chapter will oblige us to refer the first clause, with its comparison of public speaking to a rough sketch in black and white, without details, and producing no effect on close inspection, to the style of the speech—which indeed is the subject of the whole book as well as this chapter—though it may possibly include also minute details of reasoning. The same thing may be said of ἡ δική ἀκριβεστρον: in this the style and the argument may be minuter, exacter and more detailed in proportion to the diminished size of the audience, and the increased probability of their paying attention to such things (see note ad loc.). But when we come to the third degree, the single judge, it seems to be false and absurd to say that exactness and high finish of style is more suited to speeches addressed to him: no man would endeavour to attract or impose upon an arbitrator by such artifices. The exactness in this case seems therefore to be confined to exactness of reasoning and minute detail, as of evidence and the like. A single judge—as in our own courts—would always be more patient, more inclined to listen to, and more influenced by, exact reasoning and circumstantial evidence than either of the two preceding: the mob of the assembly would not hear them, nor follow them, nor listen to them at all: the large body of dicasts would be more ready to do so: but most of all the single judge. The last clause of the section brings us back to the point from which it started, viz. differences of style, and seems to apply this exclusively to what has been said of ἀκριβεστρον in forensic pleading.

'Now the style of public-speaking is exactly like scene-painting; for the greater the crowd, the more distant the point of view, and consequently' (in these crowded assemblies; held too in the open air—which should be added in respect of the style required, though this does not distinguish it from forensic rhetoric,) 'all exactness, minute and delicate touches, and high finish in general appear to be superfluous and for the worse (deviating from the true standard of public speaking) in both'. Compare with this Whately's remarks, partly borrowed from Ar., Rhet. c. IV (Encycl. Metrop. p. 299), on the "bolder, as well as less accurate, kind of language allowable and advisable in speaking to a considerable number": he quotes Ar.'s comparison of scene-painting, and then proceeds "to account for these phenomena"—which Ar. has omitted to do. His explanation is derived from the various sympathies which are especially awakened in a great crowd.

σκιαγραφία is a painting in outline and chiaroscuro, or light and shade, without colour, and intended to produce its effect only at a distance—herein lies the analogy to public speaking—consequently rough and unfinished, because from the distance all niceties and refinements in style and finish would be entirely thrown away (περίεργα). This point is well brought out in a parallel passage of Plat. Theaet. 208 ε, νῦν δήσα, ἄ Θ., παντάπαρι γε ἔγγειο ἐπείδῃ ἐγγένε ὡσπερ σκιαγράφημας γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαινότα μοι τι λέγεσθαι
HEINDORF, note ad loc.): "as long as he was at a distance he seemed to understand the meaning of what was said; on a nearer approach all the apparent clearness vanished, and it became confused and indistinct." In Phædo, 69 B, σκαλαφία is a mere rough sketch or outline; a daub, without any distinct features (see Wytenbach ad loc.). Parmen. 165 C, οἶον ἐσκαλαφημένα, ἀποστάτη μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα,... προσελθόντι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἐτέρα. Rep. X 602 D. Ib. 11 365 C, where it has the same sense as in the Phædo. Ast ad loc. Comm. p. 410. And in several other passages of Plato. As the point of comparison here is solely the difference between the near and distant effects, I have translated it 'scene-painting' (as also Whately) which represents this better to us: the proper and literal meaning of the word is "the outline of a shadow", the supposed origin of painting. See further in Mr Wornum's art. on 'painting', in Dict. Ant. p. 680 b. With πορρωτύρῳ ἡ θείâ, comp. de Soph. El. i 164 b 27, where the 'appearance' as opposed to the 'reality', is compared to this distant view, φαίνεται δὲ δὲ ἀπειραν' οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροὶ ὡσπερ ἐν ἀπεχώρεις πόρρωτει θεοροῦν.

Whereas justice (forensic pleading) admits of more exactness and finish'. The audience is less numerous, and nearer, literally and metaphorically, to the speaker; they are nearer to him locally, so they can hear better what he says, and also nearer to him in respect of the knowledge of persons and circumstances, which permits him to enter into more minute detail. Also they are not personally interested in the dispute, and can afford to bestow more attention upon minutiae of style, action, intonation, and such like, and being comparatively unoccupied are more likely to notice and criticize such things. All these are reasons why ἡ δική αὐτὰβοιτα in various senses. See Quint. III 8.62 seq. After speaking of the declamatory style, he continues, Alius veris consiliiis ratio est; ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime renuntium ab omni affectatione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem: seculis in hoc auctoritate praecessor sui; quamquam dissertare ab eo non timide solet. Namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrat, proximamque ab ea iudicalem putavit et seq.

And still further (in respect of the reduction of the number of hearers, and the consequent admissibility of accuracy and finish in the speech) that (subaudi δική, the pleading) before a single judge: for he is least of all subject to (liable to be imposed on by) rhetorical artifices (appeals to the feelings and the like): for he takes a more comprehensive view of what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it (this seems to define the kind of ἀπειρία that is here intended) and the contest is absent (there is no room for partisanship and prejudice) and his judgment clear or pure (i.e. free and unbiased; sincerum, pure of all alloy, such as the preceding). And this is why the
same orators don't succeed (become popular, distinguish themselves) in all these at once: but where action or delivery is most required, there is least of exact finish to be found. [With ὁ ἄγων ἀπεστὶν comp. Cic. ad Att. i. 16. 8 remoto illo studio contentionis quem āgōna vos apPELLATIS.]

With μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως something must be supplied: whether we should understand διὰ or the like; or simply εἰς, 'when it (the speech, or the thing in general,) belongs to, is concerned with, when it is a question of, delivery.' 'And this where voice is required, and especially loud voice' (to reach a larger assembly).

φωνὴ, voice in general, means the various qualities of voice, flexibility, sweetness, power, &c.; out of which a powerful voice is especially distinguished as the most important. It seems that Aeschines was very proud of his sonorous voice. Demosth. alludes to this, de F. L. § 388, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλλος ἐνταῦθ᾿ ἐπάρει τὴν φωνήν καὶ περιφονασκηκαί ἐσται. And § 389, καὶ τοῦ καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς οἰων ἐπειτὰ ἀνάγκῃ πάντω γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φωνῶν αὐτῶν ἀκοίνα. And elsewhere.

§ 6. 'So now, as I was saying, the demonstrative, declamatory, branch of Rhetoric is the best adapted for writing; for its special function (the purpose which it was made to serve, its ἔργον) is reading; and in the second degree the dictastic branch' (and its pleadings). Comp. supra III 1.4 and 7. Cic. Orat. LXI 208 (already referred to). Quint. u. s. (III 8.63) referring to this place, Namque Ar. idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstratvam, proximamque ab ea iudicialem putavit: vide licet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis; haec secunda egeret artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas; consilia fide prudentiaque constarent. It is very manifest, and had already been pointed out by Victorius and Spalding, ad loc. Arist. et Quint., that this is not Aristotle's meaning.

'To make the further distinction, that the language must be sweet and magnificent is superfluous'—the author of this 'distinction' is Theodectes, in his 'Art.' Quint. iv 2.63, Theodectes...non magnificammodo vult esse, verum etiam in usum expositionem—'for why that more

1 The ἔργον of a thing is always directed to its τῆλος. If the end of a knife and of a horse be respectively to cut and to run, their ἔργον will be fulfilled in sharpness and fleetness. So here the end of one of these compositions is to be read, its ἔργον or appropriate function is exercised in reading, fulfilled in being pleasant to read.
than continent (or perhaps discreet) and liberal, or any other virtue of character (the moral virtues, of which μεγάλοπρέπεια is one. Eth. Nic. II and IV)? For προσδιαιρείσθαι, Brandis' Anonymus, quoted in Schneidewin's Philologus [IV. i.] p. 45, has προσδιαιρεῖσθαι.

4 For plainly the sweetness will be produced by all that has been enumerated (purity, propriety, rhythm, vivacity, and the rest) if we have rightly defined what excellence of the language consists in: for why (else, subaudī ἄλλον) must it be (as we have described it) clear, and not low (mean and common-place), but appropriate (ch. 2 § 2, μη ταπεινήν ἄλλα κεκοσμημένην, συμμετέχαν, § 3 ξένην)? For if it be verbose, it is not clear; nor if it be too concise (brief). Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. ἀδολεσχεῖν, said of idle chatter: here of verbosity, vain repetition, tautology. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχήσας τὸν προδιαιρέαμον τούτο δὲ ἐστι τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι·(by the opponent) ταῦτα λέγειν. Comp. supra c. 3, 3, τὸ ἄσφας διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν, and II 21, 3, where it is applied to unnecessary accumulation of steps of proof in reasoning, or drawing inferences.

4 But (on the contrary) it is quite plain (of itself, and without rule or precept) that the mean is the appropriate style. Of this the preceding example is an illustration: clearness or perspicuity is the mean between the excess of garrulity, verbosity, and the defect overconscienceness, in the amount of words. Also the rules (ingredients) already stated will produce sweetness of language if they be well mixed, viz. the familiar (these are the ὀνόματα κύρια, the customary), and the foreign (γλώσσα, ἐξάλλαγμα, ξένη τὴν διάλεκτον, c. 2 § 3, c. 3 § 3, sub init. ἕνωκεν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξην), and the rhythm, and the plausibility that arises out of (the due observation of) propriety (supra c. 7).

4 We have now finished our remarks upon style or language, of all (the three branches of Rhetoric) in common (cc. 2—11), and of each kind individually (c. 12): it now remains to speak of the order (division and arrangement) of the parts of the speech.
Of the two divisions of this third book, proposed at the conclusion of Bk. II, and the opening of Bk. III, peri λέξεως καὶ τάξεως, πῶς χρῆ τάξαν τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, the first having been dispatched in the preceding chapters 2—12, we now proceed to the second, on the arrangement of the parts of the speech: this will include a criticism of the anterior, and the current, divisions, with a new classification in c. 13: and an explanation and discussion of the proper contents of each. A full account of the various divisions which prevailed before and after Aristotle has been already given in the Intro. p. 331, 332, and the notes, and need not be here repeated. It will be sufficient to say that Aristotle in this chapter takes the fourfold division, adopted by Isocrates, and accepted by his followers, as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex., viz. προόμων, διηγήσεως, ποίησεως, ἐπιλογεως, criticizes it, and reduces it to two, πρὸβοσις and ποίησις, as the only two parts necessary to the speech; adding notices of some superfluous distinctions introduced by Theodorus (of Byzantium) and Liciamnus. [See Rössler’s pamphlet, Rhetorum antiquorum de dispositione doctrina, pp. 30, Budissin, 1866; and Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 38.]

On the importance attached to the arrangement of the topics of these divisions, and especially to the order of the proofs, Whately has some good remarks, Rhet. c. 1 (Encycl. Metrop. p. 256). This is illustrated by the contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines. "Aeschines strongly urged the judges (in the celebrated contest for the Crown) to confine his adversary to the same order in his reply to the charges brought which he himself had observed in bringing them forward. Demosthenes however was far too skilful to be thus entrapped; and so much importance does he attach to the point, that he opens his speech with a most solemn appeal to the judges for an impartial hearing; which implies, he says, not only a rejection of prejudice, but no less also a permission for each speaker to adopt whatever arrangement he should think fit. And accordingly he proceeds to adopt one very different from that which his antagonist had laid down; for he was no less sensible than his rival that the same arrangement which is the most favourable to one side, is likely to be least favourable to the other."

§ 1. 'Of the speech there are (only) two parts: for it is only necessary first to state the subject, and then to prove (your side of) it. It follows from this necessary relation between them (διά), that it is impossible (if the speech is to be complete) either to state your case without going on to prove it, or to prove it without having first stated it; (the impossibility lies in the absurdity of the supposition: it is a moral
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2 λέγει. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ πίστις,


impossibility): 'for proving implies something to prove, and a preliminary statement is made in order to be proved'. All this implies that the speaker has some object in view, some case to make out. It would not apply to all declamations; though it is true that, as a general rule, even they try to prove something, however absurd it may be.

§ 2. 'Of these the one is the statement of the case (the setting forth of all its circumstances, as a foundation for judgment and argument), the other the (rhetorical) arguments in support of it, just as if the division were (the dialectical one) the problem (alternative question proposed or stated) and its demonstration'. πρόθεσις, propositio: Rhet. ad Al. c. 29 (30). 2, προεκθέτων τὸ πράγμα. Ib. § 21, τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐκδήλωσεν. c. 35 (36). 1, φοιμιστοῦν...πρῶτον προβεβλήτου τὰς πρόθεσις: πίστις confirmatio. "πράβλημα διαλεκτικῶν θεώρημα, Τοπ. A 11, 104 b 1, quod in disputando quaestione bipartita efferita solebat, ex. gr. voluptas estne expetenda, an non? mundus estne aeternus, an non?" Trendenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 42, p. 118.

§ 3. 'The present' (current, Isocrates) 'division is absurd; for surely narrative (διήγησις narratio, the detailed description of the circumstances of the case) belongs only to the forensic speech, but in a demonstrative or public speech how can there be a narrative such as they describe, or a reply to the opponent; or an epilogue (peroration) in argumentative or demonstrative speeches?' On this Quint. says, III 9. 5. Tamen nec ipsis assentior qui detractus refutationem (sc. τὰ πρὸς τῶν ἀντικών) lanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles: haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat. Hoc quoque idem aliquatenus novat, quod proemio non narrationem subjungit, sed propositionem. (This is one of Quintilian's ordinary misrepresentations of writers whom he quotes. Ar. says nothing here of the proemium, theoretically disallowing it: though in compliance with the received custom he afterwards gives an account of it and its contents.) Verum id factit quia propositio genus, narratio species videtur: et haec non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse. The last clause very well explains Ar.'s substitution of πρόθεσις for (προαιμίον and) διήγησις.

In Introd. p. 333, I have given at length from Cic. de Inv. 1 19. 27, the distinction of διήγησις in its ordinary sense and πρόθεσις. It is here said that the narrative or statement of the case, strictly speaking, belongs (he means necessarily belongs) only to the forensic branch of Rhetoric: there there is always a case to state: in the declamatory, panegyrical branch, not a regular systematic narrative or detailed statement as of a case; in this the διήγησις is dispersed over the whole speech, infra 16. 1: and, in δημηγορία equally, there is not universally or necessarily, as in the law-speech, a διήγησις, because
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The time is the future, and a narrative of things future is impossible: when it is used, it is to recall the memory of past facts for the purpose of comparison—which is a very different thing from the forensic διήγησις. Comp. c. 16. 11. The author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 30 (31) includes διήγησις in the deliberative branch, δημηγορικῶν γένους; no doubt following Isocrates. On διήγησις see Dionysius Hal., Ars Rhet. c. x § 14.

The same argument applies to the refutatio, τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, and with more force than to the preceding, for in the epideictic branch there is no adversary, and therefore can be no refutation of his arguments, at least such as those who lay down this division intend: though it is true that a panegyrist may have to meet adverse statements or imputations on the object of his panegyric, real or supposed. In fact, it is only in the forensic branch that there is necessarily an opponent. On this division, see III 17. 14, 15.

ἡ ἐπιλογὸς τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν] This is understood by Victorius, Majoragius, and Schrader of the demonstrativum genus, ἀποδ. being supposed to be put here for ἀποδεικτικῶν. This in Aristotle I hold to be impossible. Nor have I found any example of it elsewhere, though Victorius says that Isocrates uses ἀποδεικτικὰς for ἐπιδεικτικὰς more than once in the Panath. speech. I have supposed (in note on p. 335 Intro.) that his text of Isocrates may have exhibited this interchange from the uncorrected carelessness of transcribers. What is true is, that Isocrates, twice in the Paneg. §§ 18 and 65, does use ἐπιδεικτικὰς in a sense nearly approaching, if not absolutely identical with, that of ἀποδεικτικὰς. The words can only mean, as I have translated them, that there may be some speeches which consist entirely of proof or arguments, and that a summary of these would not correspond to the ἐπιλογὸς in its ordinary sense—described c. 19. 1—of which only a small part is a recapitulation.

And again προοίμιον (preface, opening or introduction), and comparison (setting over against one another side by side) of opposing (views, statements, arguments), and review, are found in public speeches then only when there is a dispute (between two opponents): as in Demosthenes' Speech for the Crown, of which the προοίμιον has been before referred to. ἐπάνως, 'a going over again' = ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, summary recapitulation of the foregoing topics of the speech, appears also in Plato Phaedr. 267 D, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἑποχῶν ἄριστον ἰδεῶν ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, αὐτὸς τὸν ἔργον ἄνοιξεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, οὐκ ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἔργα ἔργα. οὗτος ἄνοιξεν ἐπίλογος. It is properly a subdivision of the ἐπιλογός, and as such is here condemned as superfluous.

ὁ ἐπιλογὸς ἡ] "The object of the prooemium is to conciliate the audience, and invite their attention, and briefly intimate the subject of the ensuing speech. In recommending this or that measure to the assembly, unless there is an adversary who has poisoned the hearers'
minds against it and its author, or some other special reason, there is no occasion for this: and also, the audience is usually well acquainted with the subject. See further on this, c. 14, 11. Comparison of argument, and review, can only be required when there is an opposition." Introd. pp. 335, 6. The Rhet. ad Alex. expressly tells us, c. 28 (29) ult., that the _prooimon_ is "common to all the seven species, and will be appropriate to every kind of (rhetorical) business."

The following argument καὶ γὰρ—πολλᾶς is a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the preceding. You say that _prooimon_, _antiparabolē_ and _épánodos_ are essential parts of the public speech—"Why at that rate (is the reply) so are accusation and defence, for they are frequently there"—this involves the absurdity of introducing the whole contents of the forensic genus into the _dēnagorikōn génos_ as a mere part of the latter—"but not _qua_ deliberation": not in the sense or character of deliberation, which is _essential_ to the deliberative branch, but as mere accidents.

There can be no question that we should read ἢ for ὅ _symβουλή_. So Victorius, Schrader, Buhle, Spengel. Bekker alone retains ὅ. The following clause requires an alteration of punctuation to make it intelligible; suggested long ago by Victorius, Majoragius, Vater, and adopted by Spengel; _not_ so by Bekker. Spengel also rejects ἢ [delendum aut in eōn miulandum]. With the altered reading, ἢ ὁ ἐπίλογος ἢ ὁ ὄφει δικαιοκός κ.κ.Α. it is certainly out of place. I am by no means persuaded of the certainty of this alteration—perhaps Bekker had the same reason for withholding his consent to the two alterations—I think it quite as likely that a word or two has dropped out after _ἐπίλογος_.

'But further' (if _ἐπ_ be _retained_ 'neither does the peroration belong to every forensic speech; as for instance if it be short, or the matter of it easy to recollect; for what happens (in an ordinary epilogue) is a subtraction from the length'—not the brevity, of a speech: i. e. an epilogue is appropriate to a long speech, not a short one. This is Victorius' explanation, and no doubt right (that which I gave in the Introd. is wrong, and also _not_ Victorius', as stated in the note).

'Consequently the (only) necessary parts are the statement of the case, and the proof'.

§ 4. 'Now these two are peculiar to, and characteristic of, speeches in general'.

It is possible that _ὅω_ here may be the _proprium_ of logic, one of the predicables: that which characterizes a thing, without being absolutely
essential to it, as the genus and differentia are. The prοριον is a necessary accident or property, though it is not of the essence itself: "but flowing from, or a consequence of, the essence, is inseparably attached to the species" (J. S. Mill, Logic, 1 p. 148). All this would apply very well to these two parts. They are not of the essence of the speech, and do not enter into the definition: the speech could exist without them. At the same time they are immediate consequences of that essence, and inseparably attached to all species of speeches, according to the view put forward here.

We might therefore be satisfied with these. ‘If we add more’ (following the authorities on the subject), ‘they must be at the most, preface, statement of case, confirmatory arguments, conclusion: for the refutation of the adversary belongs to the proofs’ (Quint. u.s. III 9. 5, Tamen nec sis assentior qui detrahunt refutationem, tantum probationi subjectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constitut, illa quae destruat), ‘and counter-comparison, (a comparative statement of your own views and arguments placed in juxtaposition with them to bring them into contrast,) which, being as it is a magnifying (making the most) of one’s own case, must be a part of the confirmatory arguments, or general proof: for one who does this proves something: but not so the prologue; nor the epilogue, which merely recalls to mind’.

§ 5. ‘Such divisions, if any one choose to make them, will be pretty much the same as the inventions of Theodorus and his school, that is, to distinguish narration from after-narration and fore-narration, and refutation and per-re-refutation.’ In this compound word ενι ‘in addition’ is represented by re, and ες, ‘out and out’, ‘outright’, ‘thoroughly’, ‘completely’ by per. δια and per in composition are the more usual and direct exponents of ‘thoroughness’ or ‘complete carrying through’, of a thing. On ενιστηγησις, repetita narratio, see Quint. IV 2. 128, res declamatoria magis quam foresensis. He accepts it as a division, but thinks it should be rarely used. Plato, Phaedr. 266 d seq., in speaking of these same superfluous divisions of Theodorus, leaves out ενι- and προ-διηγησις, and introduces πιστωσις και ἐπιπιστωσις in their place. These plainly correspond to the other pair ἔλεγχος and ἐπιἐλεγχος, the one being confirmatory, the other refutatory arguments. See Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III p. 285, and Thompson’s notes on the Phaedrus.

The general drift of the last clause is this; if you introduce such divisions at all, you may go on dividing and subdividing for ever, as Theodorus does in his τεξη. This is followed by the statement of the true
principle of division: the foundation of my own twofold division, hints Ar. ‘But a name (like one of these, the class-name, or, as here, the name of a division) should be given to mark a kind and a specific difference’. It is the genus ποίος the specific (εἰδοποιοῦς, species-making) difference that constitutes the distinct species of kind. Now these names, though supposed to mark distinct kinds, have no specific differences which thus distinguish them. A special name demands a real distinction of kinds. Waitz ad Categ. 1 b 17. Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 59.

‘Otherwise they become empty and frivolous, such as Licymnus’ inventions in his art, the names which he coins, ἐπουρόφωςις, ἀποτίασις and δζοί’. On Licymnus and his productions, see Heindorf ad Phaedr. u. s. p. 242, and Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255–7; where an attempt is made to explain these three obscure names. Licymnus was a dithyrambic poet, supra III 12. 2, as well as a rhetorician, and his prose style seems to have participated in the dithyrambic character. ἐπουρόφωςις I take to be a word coined by Licymnus for his own purposes: it is a ἀταξις λεγόμενον. It seems to be formed from ἐπουροῖς, a synonym of ἐπουρίζεως, ‘to speed onward by a fair gale’, also συνεπουρίζεως, Hist. Anim. VIII 13. 9, de Caelo, III 2. 17: Polybius has ἐπουροῦν Π 10. 6, and κατουροῦν, I 44. 3, 61. 7, both as neut. The Schol. quoted by Spengel, Artium Scriptores p. 89, defines ἐπόρωσις (ἐπουρόφωςις) τα συνεπουρίζεται καὶ βοηθοῦντα τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι, καὶ ἀπλῶς δαφα λέγονται βοηθοῦται τῇ ἀποδιέξει. All which seems to favour the notion that the figurative rhetorician represented ‘subsidiary’ or ‘confirmatory arguments’, Theodorus’ πιστοίωσις and εὑριστοιωσις, under the image of ‘a fair wind astern’. ἀποτίασις is no doubt, as in Plato Polit. 263 C, ‘a digression’, wandering off from the main subject, Schol. τα ἐξου τοι πράγματος; and δζοί, ‘branches’, most likely means places in which the discourse ‘branches off’ in different directions, ‘ramifications’: unless the same Scholiast’s explanation be preferred, τα ἀκρα, ἰτωι τα προοίμια καὶ του ἐπιλόγους. This would mean the ‘branches’ opposed to the stock or trunk, as something extraneous, or at all events non-essential. (I think this is preferable.)

CHAP. XIV.

Having considered the divisions of the speech in general we now come to the details, to the enumeration and examination of the ordinary contents of each of the four. These in each case are discussed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric. The treatment of the προοίμιον occupies the 14th chapter, to which is appended a second, c. xv, which analyses the topics of διάβολη, the art of ‘setting a man against his neighbour’, infusing suspicion and hostile feeling against him in the minds of others, raising a prejudice against him—especially of course in the minds of judges against your opponent. One would be sorry to be
obliged to call this 'calumniating'. Διήγησις is treated in c. xvi, πίστει in xvii: to which is attached in xviii a digression on ἐρώτησις, the mode of putting questions—this includes the 'answer', repartee: and the 19th chapter, appropriately enough, concludes the work with the conclusion (ἐπίλογος, peroration) of the speech.

The prooemium is thus defined by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30). I, ἀκροατῶν παρασκευῆ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν κεφαλαίῳ μὴ εἴδοσι δήλωσι, ἵνα γνωρίσωσι περὶ ὅν ὁ λόγος παρακολουθῶσι τῇ ύπόθεσι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ προειχείν παρακλίσει, καὶ καθ' δοσι τῷ λόγῳ δυνατόν εὖν εἴη ἢ μὴν αὐτοῖς ποιήσαι. These rules seem to be chiefly derived from the actual practice of the Orators. Some of the arts to which public speakers had recourse in the topics of their prooemium are mentioned by Isocrates, Paneg. § 13. Compare Cic. de Orat. II 19. 80; de Invent. I 15. 20; where it is defined: it has two parts, principium (the object of this is to make the hearer benevolum aut docilem aut attentum,) and insinuatio, oratio quadam dissimulatione et circuizione obscura subiens auditoris animum. Quint. IV. c. 1, seq. principium exordium. He agrees with the preceding; see § 5. On the prooimion as a hymn, see Stallbaum ad Phaed. 60 D. On the prooemium in Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. II 78, 79, principia dicendi. [See also Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer § 12, die Einleitung.]

§ 1. 'Now the prooemium is the beginning of a speech and stands in the place of the prologue in poetry (i.e. tragedy, and specially of Euripides' tragedy), and of the prelude in flute music'.

[prooimion] an introduction, ornamental, and preparatory to, not an essential part of, the theme or subject of the composition; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving of the way (preparation, pioneering of the road) for what follows (ὁδοποίησις, note on 1 1. 2).

'Now the flute-prelude is like the prooemium of the epideictic branch: that is to say, as the flute-players first open their performance with whatever they can play best (in order to gain attention and favour of the audience) which they then join on to the ἐνδόσιμον (the actual opening, preliminary notes, of the subject which gives the tone, or cue, to the rest), so in the epideictic speeches the writing (of the prooi-μον) ought to be of this kind: for (in these the speaker) may say first (εἰσέλθα) anything he pleases, and then should at once sound the note of preparation, and join on (the rest)'.

This represents the epideictic prooemium, like the flute-prelude, as hardly at all connected with what follows; it is a preliminary flourish, anything that he knows to be likely to be most successful, as already observed, to conciliate the audience and put them in good humour. "For here, as there is no real interest at stake, the author is allowed a much greater liberty in his choice of topics for amusing (and gaining
μοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν. ὁ τι γὰρ ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάγα. ὁ περ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἐλένης προοίμιον οὐθὲν γὰρ ὀικεῖον over) an audience; a license which would be intolerable in a case of life and death, or in the suggestion of a course of action which may involve the safety or ruin of the state. Here the audience are too eager to come to the point to admit of any trifling with their anxiety." Introd. pp. 337, 8. Cic. de Or. II 80. 325, Connexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non tamquam citharoedi prooemium affectum aliquid, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur (Victorius). Quint. II 8. 8 in demonstrativis (Arist.) prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.

The ἐνδοσίμων (subaudī ásigma or κρόσια, Bos, Ellíphis, s. v.) occurs again Pol. v (VIII) 5 init. apparently in the same sense as here, 'introduction'; also Pseudo-Arist. de Mundo, c. 6 § 20, where we have καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδοσίμων ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνίμου ἀν καρπαίου προσεγγορευόντος κυνίται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα κ.τ.λ. 'for according to the law above, by him who might rightly be called leader of the chorus, the stars are set in motion, &c.' I have given this in full because it throws some light upon the meaning of ἐνδοσίμων, and explains its metaphorical application, God is here represented as the leader of a chorus who gives the time, the key-note, and the mode or tune, to the rest, and thus acts as a guide to be followed, or (in a similar sense) as an introduction, or preparatory transition to something else. It thus has the effect of the 'key-note', and takes the secondary sense of a 'guide', 'preparation for', 'introduction to', anything. So Plut. de disc. adul. ab amico, c. 55, 73 B, ὄσπερ ἐνδοσίμων ἔξει πρὸς τὰ μείζονα τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ubi Wytenbach, occasio, incitamentum; similarly Ib. c. 30, 70 B, καὶ ψυχός. ὃ ἑσπερὸν ὄσπερ ἐνδοσίμων εἰς παράθεσιν ἔστω, 'gives the tone, the cue, i. e. the occasion or incitement, to freedom (taking liberties).' See other passages from Plutarch and others in Wytenbach's note on 73 B. Gaisford and Wytenbach refer to Gataker ad Anton. XI 20, p. 336 (σ), XI 26 (w), "ἐνδ. usurpatur pro modulationis exordio, quo praecensor sive chori praeventus cantandi reliquis auspicium facit. Hesychius, ἐνδόσιμον, τὸ πρὸ τῆς φάσης κινάρια." ap. Gaisford Not. Var. Wytenbach describes ἐνδόσιμον as "signum et adhortatio in certaminibus et musicis et gymniscis: tum ad alias res translatum." Lastly Athen. XIII 2, 556 A, of certain authors, εἰς τὸ ἐνδόσιμον Ἀριστοτέλης ἐδωκεν ἰστοροῖν τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πέρι ἐυγενείας, 'gave the tone, i. e. hint', furnished the occasion for their statement. Schweighäuser, ad loc. says, "Dalecampius verit quo ad id scribendum pro vocavit Ar. Dicitur autem propriæ praecentus praefulum, exordium melodiae quod praest chorodiscalus cui dein accinos operet chorum. H. Stephanus' Thesaurus. Budaeus in Comm. Gr. Ling. p. 874 sq. ἐνδόσιμον οἰδόναι or παρέχεις is expressed in one word ἐνδοδώναι XII 520 D," as it is here by Aristotle.

'And this is done by all. An example is the prooemium of Isocrates' Helen: for there is nothing in common between the disputatious dia-
lecticians, and Helen'. The prooemium, which occupies the first thirteen sections of the speech, includes many other subjects besides the ἐριστικοῖ, and is certainly an excellent illustration of the want of connexion between proem and the rest in an epideictic speech. Quint. III 8, 8. In demonstrativis vero proemia esse maxime libera existimat (Ar.). Nam et longe a materia duci hoc, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari.

'And at the same time also (it has this further recommendation) that if (the speaker thus) migrate into a foreign region, there is this propriety in it, that the entire speech is not of the same kind' (it removes the wearisome monotony which is characteristic of this branch of Rhetoric).

ἐκτοπίζειν is to 'change one's residence', and applied especially to migratory birds and animals. It is always neuter in Aristotel. Hist. Anim. VIII 12, 3 and 8, IX 10, 1, IV 8, 23, ἐκτοπισμῶν ποιοῦνται, VIII 13, 14, ἐκτοπιστικὰ ἔφα, I 1. 26. In the primary sense of absence from one's proper or ordinary place, Pol. VIII (v) 11, 1314 δ 9, τοῖς ἐκτοπιζομενοῖς τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας, and so ἐκτόπος, ἐκτόπιος, ἐκτόπως 'out of their proper place'.

§ 2. 'The introductions in the epideictic branch are derived from praise and blame (naturally: see I 3 §§ 3, 4); as, for instance, Gorgias' opening of his Olympic oration (a πανγυγρικὸς λόγος, delivered at the Olympic games), "By many' (or ὑπέρ, 'for many things'; which seems more in accordance with what followed) 'are ye worthy to be admired, O men of Hellas"; that is to say (γὰρ videlicet) he praises those who first brought together the general assemblies'. Comp. Quint. III 8, 9, (continuation of the preceding quotation) et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos qui prīmī tales instituerunt conventus (translated from Ar.). Another short fragment of this oration is preserved by Philostr. Vit. Soph. I 9. 'Ο δὲ Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος, says Philostratus, ὑπέρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτοῦ (Gorgiae) ἐκπολιτευθῆ ἦσαν κατά τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὀρῶν ὁμοιαὶ ξύμβολοι αὐτοῦ ἐγκείστη τρέπων ἐπὶ τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ πειθών ἄλλα τῶν ἐπιλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις ἀλλὰ τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν. The rest of his fragments, genuine and spurious, are collected by Sauppe Or. Att. III 129, seq. [See also Appendix to Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias.] Hieronymus adv. Iovin. (quoted by Wytenbach on Plut. 144 B), "Gorgias rhetor librum pulcerrimum de concordia, Graecis tunc inter se dissidentibus, recitavit Olympiae." Isocr., Panegyr. § 3, after stating the nature of the contents of his own speech, adds, in allusion to this,
δωρεαίς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς δ' εὐ φρονοῦσιν οὐθὲν ἀθλον
3 ἐποίησαν. καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς, οἶνον ὅτι δεὶ τοὺς
ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ
τοὺς τοιούτους οἳ μήτε εὐδοκίμουσι μήτε φαίλοι,
αλλ' ὅσιοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἀδήλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ο
4 Πριάμου ὦτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει. ἐτὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν

dikaiikwv proumion touto d' estin ek twn pro's ton
with others, oik agnoi oti polloi twn prospoumionen einai sofistai ep

toston to logon armpasan.

'But Isocrates blames them for that bodily excellences they rewarded
with gifts, whilst to intellectual excellence they awarded no prize'. This
is the substance of the two first sections of Isocr. Paneg. Mr Sandys,
in his note ad locum, gives a summary of the whole exordium §§ 1—14.
Victorius points out this as one of the places in which Aristotle's hostility
to Isocrates appears! The problem here proposed by Isocr.—the omis-
sion of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition—is solved
by Arist., Prob. XXX I.

§ 3. 'A second topic for an epideictic proemium) is derived from
advice (the deliberative branch); for instance "men are bound to pay
honour to the good", and therefore he, the speaker, himself is going
to praise Aristides' (avrous is obliqua oratio: the directa oratio would
have been eyo: it is a sort of semi-quotations: where it comes from
no one seems to know); 'or, to all such as though not distinguished are
yet not bad, only their merits are buried in obscurity, as Alexander
(Paris), Priam's son. For one who speaks thus offers advice'. The
encomium Alexandri here referred is doubtless the same as that which
has been already mentioned in II 23, 5, 8, 12 and II 27, 7, 9; the author
is unknown.

§ 4. 'Further (a third kind) they may be borrowed from the forensic
introductions; that is to say, from the appeals to the audience, or as
an apology to them, (comp. infra § 7)—when the subject of the speech
happens to be either paradoxical (contrary to ordinary opinion or ex-
pectation, and therefore incredible), or painful', or trite and worn-out,
and therefore tiresome (tebrulhmenon that which is in everyone's mouth,
decantatum, note on II 21. 11)—for the purpose of obtaining indulgence
(with an apologetic object); as Choréolis says, for instance, "But now
1 χαλεπώς, Victorius, Majoragius, ardua; Vet. Transl. et Riccobon difficultis.
Is it 'hard to do' or 'hard to bear'? χαλεπώς has both senses. If the former,
it may mean, either, difficult, to the speaker to handle, or to the hearer to
understand, or the recommendation of some scheme, undertaking, or policy,
difficult to encounter or execute, (but this belongs to the deliberative rather than
the epideictic branch); if the latter—which seems equally probable—it is simply
painful, unpleasant. So Pind. Fragm. 96 (Böckh, Fragm. P. II p. 621) v. 9,
tepwv eftrwoun χαλεπων te kranv. Pl. Protag. 344 D, χαλεπα ὥρα 'a
So in Latin durus.
When all is spent" (lit. has been distributed among others; and nothing is left for me). [Compare Virgil’s *omnia iam vulgata* in the Exordium of the third Georgic.]

Of the four Choeriluses distinguished by Näke, this is the Epic poet of Samos, born, according to Näke, in B.C. 470. His principal work, from which this fragment is taken, was a poetical narrative of the Persian wars with Greece under Darius and Xerxes—“all that was left him” by his predecessors—very much applauded, as Suidas tell us, and “declared to be read with Homer.” Aristotle (Top. Θ i, ult. παραδειγμα...οία ὸμηρος, μη οία Χοιριλος) thinks less favourably of it; and it was afterwards excluded from the Alexandrian Canon in favour of the poem of Antimachus. An earlier Choerilus was the Athenian tragic poet, contemporary with Phrynichus, Pratinas, and Aeschylus in early life; the third a slave of the Comic poet Ephantides, whom he is said to have assisted in the composition of his plays; and the fourth, Horace’s Choerilus, Ep. ii 1 232, Ars Poet. 357, a later and contemptible epic poet who attended Alexander on his expedition, and according to Horace, *incultis qui versibus et male natis retullit acceptos, regale nomisma, Philippos*. Suidas tells this story of the Samian Choerilus, an evident mistake. The fragments of the Choerilus of our text are all collected and commented on by Näke in his volume on Choerilus. This fragment is given on p. 104. See also Düntzer *Epic. Gr. Fragm.* p. 96 seq. where five lines of the poem, from which our extract is made are given: and the four articles in *Biogr. Dict.* The context is supplied by the Schol. on this passage—see in Spengel’s ed., *Scholia Graeca*, p. 160: printed also in Näke and Düntzer—and runs thus: ἀ μάκαρ, ὡσις ἦν κεῖται κρόνον ἱδρυς άοιδῆς, Μουσαόν θεράπων ὅτε ἀκήρατος ἦν ἄταλμην νός ὅτε πάντα δέδοσιν, ἔχων δὲ πείρατα τέχναι, ὡστοι δέος ἄταμον καταλευκόμεθ', οὐδὲ πη ἀφε γάρ πάντη παπταιονον νεογενεῖς όρμα πελάσαν. καὶ τα ἐξής.

Which are certainly pretty lines enough: perhaps the rest was not equal to them. Compare with λειμῶν Μουσαῶν, and the whole passage, Lucr. 1 925 seq. *avía Pieridum peragro loca, nullius ante tira solo*, et seq., which might possibly have been suggested by this of Choerilus. An apology of the same kind is introduced by Isocrates in the middle of his Panegyr. § 74; and another in his *Antidosis*, § 55. In the latter the word ψιταπτηλημένου occurs.

1 On these Scholia, see Spengel, Praef. ad Rhet., p. viii.

2 Näke, *Choerilus* p. 105, thinks that this, and not the second fragm. in § 6— as Buhle, Wolf, Vater, agree in supposing—was the opening of the poem. This is rendered probable by the λόγων ἀλλοίον in v. 1, of the other.
So the introductions of the epideictic speeches are derived from the following topics; from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer: and these "introductions" (see the note on § 1: ἐνδοσίμα is used here for προοίμια in general, instead of the more limited sense of the preceding passage) ‘must be either foreign or closely connected with the speeches (to which they are prefixed)’.

ἕνως, a stranger or foreigner, is properly opposed to ὀικείως, domesticus, one of one’s own household. This last clause, δὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ. is, as Vater remarks, introduced as a transition to the next topic, the forensic prooemia.

§ 5. ‘The introduction of the forensic speech must be understood as having the same force (or value, or signification) as the prologue of a drama (τοῦ, the drama to which it belongs), or the introduction to an epic poem: for to the epideictic exordia the preludes (introductions, ἀναθολαι) of the dithyrambs bear resemblance, “for thee and thy gifts, or spoils’’. On the ἀναθολαι, the openings or introductions of dithyrambs, and their loose, incoherent, flighty character, see note on III 9. 1. Introd. p. 307, note 1. It is this which makes them comparable to the epideictic exordia, as above described.

The dramatic, i.e. tragic, prologue, and the introduction of the epic, are compared to the exordium of the dicastic speech, in that all three contain ‘statements of the case’; the last, literally; the tragic and epic, virtually. The prologue of Euripides (who of the three extant tragedians can be the only one whose prologues are referred to) actually states all the preceding circumstances of the story of the drama, which it is necessary that the spectator should be acquainted with in order to enter into the plot. The introduction of the Epic poem is neither so long nor so regular. That of the Iliad occupies only seven lines, and states the subject very simply and in few words. That of the Odyssey is concluded in ten, and little or nothing of the story told. The Aeneid, and Pharsalia have seven apiece.

§ 6. Having hinted at the points of resemblance between the dithyrambic ἀναθολαι and the epideictic prooemia, he now proceeds to explain further the resemblance of the dicastic proem to the prologue of tragedy and prelude of the Epic poem.

‘In the prose speeches as well as the poetry’ (Victorius understands
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 14 § 6.

διάνοια: τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ. Ὺ δοὺς οὖν ἄσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τῆν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἔχομενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο

μήνιν ἀείδε θεά.

ἀνδρὰ μοι ἔννεπε μοῦσα.

ηγεῖο μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὡς Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαῖης ἠλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.

καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δράμα, κἀν μὴ εὐθὺς ἄσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γε ποὺ [ἡλοί], ἄσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἐμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος.

t. λόγοι, fabulae poetarum, meaning the dramas as contrasted with the Epics: the other contrast of prose and verse is more natural as well as more suitable here. "these prooemia are (present, offer) a specimen or sample of the subject (of the speech or poem) in order that they may have some previous acquaintance with the intention of it’ (if ἦν, ‘about what it was to be’, as in τὸ τί ἦν εἴμαι; the object, purpose, or design), ‘and the mind not be kept in suspense; for all that is vague and indefinite keeps the mind wandering (in doubt and uncertainty): accordingly, (the speaker or writer) that puts the beginning into his hand supplies him with a clue, as it were, by which he may hold, so as to enable him to follow the story (or argument). This is why (Homer in the Iliad and Odyssey, began the two poems with the lines quoted; and Choerilus—if Näke u. s. is right about the order of the two fragments in our text—did not begin his poem with ἦν οἱκομενον κτλ., but introduced it in his exordium)—here the quotations from the three poems are introduced, and the sentence remains unfinished.

‘Similarly the tragic poets explain the subject of their play, if not immediately at the opening, as Euripides, at any rate somewhere or other the poet explains it in his prologue or introduction), as even Sophocles (who does not usually employ it; in the Oedip. Tyr. 774 seq.) “Polybus of Corinth was my father, &c.,” and the following.’

“The Commentators object to προλόγῳ here because the passage that it indicates occurs not at the beginning, but in the middle of the play. But, it seems that Aristotle has here used προλόγοι in a more compe-

1 Spengel puts λόγοι καὶ ἦν in brackets, as spurious or doubtful: Bekker retains ἦν. MS A* has ἦ. By rejecting the words Spengel seems to shew that he thinks that λόγοι alone cannot mean ‘stories’ in the sense of dramas. I think it is doubtful. Otherwise, this interpretation is certainly more suitable to the general connexion and what follows. On the other hand, our author here seems to be rather digressive, and not to observe any very regular order of succession in his remarks. So that perhaps upon the whole, we may let the other consideration have its due weight in deciding the point.
hensive sense than that which it usually bears, for an ‘explanatory introduction’ in general, wherever it may occur: and that it has much the same relation here to its ordinary signification, as ἀρκοῦν has to διηγήσεις in c. 13. Also the analogous προοίμιον is applied twice in § 10 infra to introductory speeches anywhere in a play.” Introd. p. 339 note.

‘And comedy in like manner’: that is, wherever an introductory explanation is required, there it is introduced. Victorius notes that this appears in Terence, the Latin representative of the New Comedy, and Plautus. Simo in the Andria, Menenides in the Heautontimoroumenos, Mici in the Adelphi, perform this office. And similarly, Strepsiades in Aristoph. Nubes, Demothenes in the Equites, 40 seq., Dionysius in the Ranae—Victorius says “tum maxime cum Servo narrat, &c.” but the conversation referred to is with Hercules, not Xanthias, lines 64 seq. There is another explanatory introduction, preparatory to the dramatic contest between Aeacus and Xanthias, 759 seq.

‘So then (to resume) the most necessary function of the prooemium, and that peculiar to it, is to make it clear what is the end and object of the speech or story’ (the former is the λόγος in Rhetoric, the latter in the Epic and the drama). Compare Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 1, def. of προοιμίον. ‘And therefore if the subject (the thing, the matter in hand) be already clear and short (or, of trifling importance) the prooemium is not to be employed,’ Comp. Cic. de Or. II 79. 320, in puris atque infrequentibus causis ab ipsa re est exordiri sacre commodius: Victorius, who writes frequentibus: repeated in Gaisford, Not. Var.

§ 7. ‘The other kinds (of prooemia) which are employed are mere cures (remedies [specifics] for the infirmities or defects of the hearers—διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροῦτον μοχθηρίαν, III 1. 5—such as inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like), and common’, to all parts of the speech. κοινά is opposed to the special office, peculiar to the προοιμίον, καί ἕνων τούτου supra: all these other kinds may be introduced in the exordium—and also anywhere else, wherever they are required.

‘These may be derived from the speaker himself, from the hearer, the subject, and the adversary’ (‘the opposite’). Cic. de Or. II 79. 321, seq. Sed quum erit utendam principio, quod plurumque erit, aut ex reo, aut ex adversario, aut ex re, aut ex eis apud quos agitur (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκρούτου), sententias duci licebit. Ex reo—reos appello, quarum res est—quae significant bonum virum seq. followed by the illustration of
the remaining three. Cicero, who is certainly following Arist., seems here to translate τοῦ λέγοντος by reus, in the sense which he explains, of both parties in the case. Quintilian, iv 1.6, seems to charge Aristotle—if he includes him in the plicique who have been guilty of the omission—with having neglected to include the 'auctor causae' amongst the sources of topics for prooemia. Victorius defends him against this, by pointing out, as Cicero, that 'o λέγων includes both parties in a suit or prosecution, actor as well as reus (in its ordinary sense). See the passage of Quint., with Spalding's note.

'The topics derivable from the speaker himself and the opponent, are all such as relate to allaying (lit. 'refuting') and exciting prejudice and ill-feeling (after ποιήσαι understand αὐτῆν): but with this difference: that in defending oneself all that relates to διαβολή (i.e. the removal of prejudice and ill-will from ourselves, and exciting them against the opponent) must be put first (subaudī lektōn, viz. in the exordium), but in the accusation of another reserved for the peroration. The reason of this is not difficult to see; that is, that the defendant, when he is about to introduce his own case, must necessarily begin by doing away with all hindrances (sc. to the establishment of it; all prepossessions against him on the part of the judge); and therefore must make the removal or refutation of all calumnies or prejudices against him his first point; whereas the accuser (the speaker whose office it is to 'set' the defendant 'against' the judges, conciliate their ill-will to him) must reserve all that tends to prejudice his antagonist for the epilogue (peroration, conclusion), that they may better remember it (that his accusations may 'leave their sting behind them' in the judges' minds).

Both Spengel and Bekker write αὐτῶν after ekáçen for the vulgata lectio αὐτών; which as far as appears to the contrary is the reading of all MSS. I think αὐτῶν for 'his own case', lit. himself, is defensible. We often say 'him' for 'himself', leaving the reflexive part to be understood, in our own language. See note on 1 7. 35, and Waitz on Organ. 54 a 14, Vol. 1. p. 486, there referred to.

'The topics of the προϊμον which are addressed to the hearer (i.e. in the dicastic branch now under consideration, the judges,) are derived from (subaudī γίνεται, or as before, λέγεται) the conciliation of his good will (towards ourselves) and irritating him (exciting his indignation against the adversary, δίωματος), and sometimes too (dé), (but only when it is required,) from engaging his attention or the reverse: for it is not always
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ. Γ 14 § 7.

ἀκροατὴν ἐκ τοῦ εὐνοοῦ ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προσεκτικοῦ ἢ τοῦναντίον οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικὸν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειράνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ expedient to make him attentive, and this is why many (speakers) try to move or provoke him to laughter'. Προάγειν εἰς γέλωτα', to move, or provoke to'. Herod. II 121. 4, σκώψαι μν καὶ εἰς γέλωτα προαγάγωσι. Rhet. I 1. 5, εἰς ὀργὴν προάγαγον ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἐλεον. I 2. 5, εἰς πάθος, et sim. 'to carry forward, i.e. stimulate, excite, provoke'.

εὐνοοῦ ποιῆσαι] "The three requisites in the disposition of the audience, according to the later writers on the subject, are that they should be benevoli, dociles, attenti. Cic. de Inv. I 15. 20, Quint. IV I. 5: and frequently elsewhere. Ar. includes the two latter under one head προσεκτικοῖ: and in fact if a man is inclined to attend, he shews that he is already inclined to or desirous of learning. The two are closely connected, Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23." Introd. p. 340, note 1.

Causa principii nulla est alia, quam ut audiorem, quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodatio, praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus, inter auctores plurimos constat si benevolum, attentum, docilem fecerimus; non quia ista non per totam actionem sint custodienda, sed quia initiis praecipue necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis, ut procedere ultra possimur, advitamur. (Quint. IV I. 5).

οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Or. II 79. 323. He begins by saying that neither of these topics is to be confined to the proemium § 322, nam et attentum moment Graeci ut principio faciamus iudicem et docilem (this is included in προσεκτικοῖ): quae sunt utilia, sed non principii magis propria quam reliquarum partium; faciliora etiam in principii, quod et attenti tum maxime sunt, quum omnia expectant, et dociles magis initiis esse possunt. Quint., IV I. 37, 38, criticizes Aristotle's remark on this point: Nec me quamquam magni auctores in hoc dixerint ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim: non quia nesciam, id quod ab ills dicitur, esse pro mala causa qualis ea sit non intelligi: verum quia istud non negligentar iudicis contingit, sed errore. Dixit enim adversarius, et fortasse persusus: nobis opus est eius diversa opinione: quae mutari non potest nisi illum fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docilem et attentum, seq. That is, the judge's inattention often arises not from negligence, but from a mistaken supposition that the adversary is right and we are wrong: in order to set him right we must rouse his attention. The supposition implied here in explanation of οὐδὲ αἰτει συμφ. κ.τ.λ., which Quint. refers to and criticizes, is that inattention on the judge's part is sometimes expedient when our cause is bad. Quint.'s reply is, it is not his inattention that would be of use to us in such a case, but his attention to the arguments which we are about to use in order to convince him to the contrary. Another disadvantage that may arise from over-attention on the judge's part, occurs when we want to slurr over an unfavourable point in our case. In illustration of the following did πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Gaisford very appositely quotes Arist. Vesp., 56, Οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μῶθος ἡμῖν, οἱ δὲ Αἰσχύνοι γελοιοῖν οἱ δὲ σκωπτοῦντος, οἱ υἱοί γελοιοῖν.
The Scholiast on this place (see in Spengel's Ed. p. 158), tells, ἀφρός of this, the story from Demosth. de Cor. §§ 51, 52, with additions. The Scholiast, Ulpian on the passage of Dem., and a scholiast on Ar. Anal. Pr. 1 24 b 20 (in Brandis' collection, Arist. Op. Bekker's 4to. vol. iv. p. 147 b 43 of Bekker's quarto ed. of Aristotle), all agree that Demosthenes' joke consisted in an intentional mispronunciation of the word μουσῶτος, which he applied to Aeschines, pronouncing it μίσθωτος, in order to divert the attention of the audience: he appealed to them to say whether the word was not well applied: they burst into a roar of laughter, accepted the application, and shouted λυξίνος μουσῶτος, λυξίνος μισθωτος, with the pronunciation corrected. I entirely agree with Dissen that this is a foolish and improbable story, absurd in itself, and receiving no countenance from the text of Demosthenes. All that he did say is found in the existing text, viz. that he interpreted Aeschines' ξενίαν Ἀλεξάνδρου—which Aesch. claimed—as meaning that he was not a ξένος, a guest and friend, but a μουσώτος (a hireling) Ἀλεξάνδρου and nothing more, and that the people accepted this version. See Dissen's note on § 52.

(ευμάθεια, docilitas, need not be made a separate topic, because) 'any speaker may refer to this (carry back, i.e. apply) any thing he pleases (any of the topics of the προοίμιον), even the appearance of worth and respectability; for to these (τοῖς εἰτεκίσιοι) the audience is always more inclined to attend'. (This is in fact the ἀρετή which the speaker must always assume by his speech, in order that his hearers may have confidence in him, that he may have weight and authority with them; one of the three ingredients in the ἱδος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, 11 1. 5. Introd. on ἱδος, p. 108 seq.) In short, εὐμάθεια need not be made a separate topic, provided only the speaker treats the other topics of the προοίμιον with the view of making the audience dociles, that is, ready to receive the information which he is prepared to communicate to them.

'The things to which the audience is most inclined to listen are things great (momentous, important), things of special interest (to the hearers themselves), things wonderful (surprising), and things pleasant (to hear; either in themselves, or in their associations); and therefore the speaker should always try to produce the impression (ἐν in his hearers' minds) that things of such kinds are his subject. If he wish to make them inattentive (he must try to convey the impression, ἐν μη, subaudī pōvīn ἐδήλη tis—προσεκτικοῦ) that his subject is trifling, has no reference to them and their interests (that is, is unimportant in general, or to them in particular: the opposite of the τὰ ὑδα in this preceding topic) or that it is unpleasant.'
§ 8. 'However it must not be forgotten that all such things as these (all these ordinary contents of the προοίμιον) are foreign to (outside; extra, not secundum, artem) the speech (and its real object, which is the proof of the case, and that alone, αἱ δὲ πίστεις ἐνεχθέντος ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα προσδέχεται, 1 1. 3): it is only because the audience is bad, and ready to listen to things beside the real question, (that these are addressed to them); for if he be not such, there is no occasion for an exordium (to flatter him into a good humour, and the rest), except just so far as to state the case in a summary way, that, like a body, it may have a head on it. There is probably a reference in this to σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, as the enthymemes, or direct logical proofs, are called 1 1. 3.

προόιμιον, as applied to the audience or judges, means here not morally bad, but only defective in intellect and patience, too ignorant and frivolous to attend long to sound and serious reasoning: they require to be relieved and diverted occasionally. So Schrader. Comp. what is said of the 'single judge' in 12. 5. Of the summary προοίμιον, the Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 2, gives two examples.

§ 9. 'Besides, this making the hearers disposed to listen (keep up
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ § 9, 10

πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνάσι μᾶλλον ἦ ἀρχόμενοι. διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὦτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται. ὄστε ὅπου ἂν ἦ καίρος, λεκτέων "καί μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἦ ὑμέτερον" καὶ ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅπου οὐδεπώποτε ἀκηκόατε δεινῶν,

ἡ δὲ οὕτω θαυμαστῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡσπερ ἐφι Πρόδικος, ὁτὲ νυστάξουν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν ἑτέρος πεντηκονταδέκατος αὐτοῖς, ὁτι δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἀκροατῆν οὐκ ἦπερ δ' ἀκροατής, δῆλον· πάντες γὰρ ἦν

οἷς ἂν

their attention), is common to all the parts of the speech alike, wherever it is required: for they are more inclined to relax it anywhere rather than at the opening. It is absurd therefore to fix its place (post it) at the beginning, a time when everybody listens with the greatest attention. Cic. de Or. II 79. 323 quoted on § 7, οὐ γὰρ δὲλ συμφέρει. Also Quint. iv. 1. 73, who follows Arist. in quoting Prodicus' artifice. ‘And therefore, (not only at the beginning, but) wherever there is occasion, such phrases as this must be used, “And now attend to what I say, for it is no more my affair than yours”; or, “I'll tell such a strange thing—or a thing so marvellous—as you have never yet heard before.” And this is like what Prodicus said, “whenever his audience were inclined to be drowsy, he would slip them in a taste of the fifty drachm”’. παρεμβάλλειν. throw them in by the side of the rest, on the sly, (παραδογκοῦσθαι, infra 16. 1). The ‘fifty drachm’ was Prodicus' most famous, and interesting, and expensive lecture. Plat. Crat. 384 B, Ἀσκρ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ ἦδη ἂσκησις παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκονταδέκατον ἐπίδειξιν, ἦν ἀκούσας ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαυδεύσθαι, ὃς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἄν ἐκώλυτο σε αὐτίκα μᾶλλα εἶδεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὕμνων ὄρθιτον· νῦν δὲ οὖκ ἂσκησις, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμάιαν.

§ 10. ‘But (that all this is beside the point, and extra artem;) that it is not addressed to the hearer as a hearer (read by all means ἂν ἁκροατῆς sc. ἂστι: i.e., that it is addressed to him as a hearer and something more, as a man liable to all the defects and infirmities and feelings above mentioned) is plain: for speakers invariably employ their exordia either in prejudicing (the audience against the adversary), or in the endeavour to remove similar apprehensions (of the like suspicions and prejudices) from themselves'. If the audience were mere impartial listeners, met there to hear and judge the case, and nothing more; there would be no occasion for all this accusation and defence with which the orators always fill their προοεμία.

The first example referred to, the excuse of the φιλαξ for his lack of speed and his unwelcome message, Soph. Antig. 223 seq., is a case
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 14 §§ 10, 11.

\[\text{diabállovs} \ \& \ \text{phóbous} \ \text{apollónntai} \ \text{en} \ \text{tòis} \ \text{prooimíois}.\]

\[\text{ánax}, \ \text{érho} \ \text{mén} \ \text{ou} \ \text{ótpws} \ \text{stouđhûs} \ \text{ýpo.}\]

\[\text{tí} \ \text{phoimáξh};\]

καὶ οἱ ποιηρὸν τὸ πράγμα ἔχοντες ἡ δοκοῦντες

πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἡ ἐν τῷ πράγματι.

διὸ οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ

κύκλῳ, καὶ προοιμίαζονται. πόθεν δὲ εὖνοι δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιοῦτων. ἐπεὶ δὲ εὖ λέγεται

δός μὲ Ἐφίκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἥδι ἔλεειν,

of ἀπολογίασαν φόβους, 'to remove the threatened danger, or postpone it as long as he can, by a defence': and the application is, that if he had not been afraid of Creon, if he had been quite sure that Creon was an altogether impartial hearer, he would not have indulged in such a long preface. The second is an example of the same kind from Eur. Iph. Taur. 1162, Thoas to Iphigenia, τί φροιμάζετε νεοχών; ἔξαίδα σαφῶς. The actual defence is confined to one line (1161), but Thoas suspects her of entering upon a long apology. Buhle, who could not have looked at the passage, says "Iphig. longo exordio utentem." The Scholiast (Spengel's Ed. p. 161) here gives a long paraphrase of the watchman's speech. After this, incredible as it may appear, he adds τὸ δὲ τί φροιμάζῃ τοῦ Κρέωτος ἐστὶ λέγοντος, as if this had been a continuation of the line from the Antigone.

'And those who have, or suppose themselves to have, a bad case (lit. their case bad) are apt to indulge in long prooemia: for it is better for them to dwell upon anything rather than upon their case'.—This also is illustrated by the speech of the φύλαξ in the Antigone: and perhaps was suggested by it; for it is not very consecutive—'And this is why slaves (when charged with a fault, and excusing themselves to their masters) never answer the questions directly, but (state) the attending (surrounding) circumstances, and make a long (roundabout) preface (before they come to the point)'. On τὰ κύκλῳ see 19, 33. Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. II 45, Non hic te carmine ficto Atque per ambages et longa exorsa tenebo.

§ 11. 'The topics for conciliating good will have been already stated' (φύλα II 14, ἔλεος II 8, especially, from the quotation following. II 1, 7, περὶ δὲ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας εν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτίν νῦν. Cic. de Inv. I 16. 22, benevolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur, seq.) 'as well as (for exciting) any feeling of the same kind in general (any of the πάθη in Bk. II 2—11). And since the saying is true, seeing that it is well said "Grant that I may come to the Phaeacians an object of love and pity."—Hom. Od. η [VII] 327,—it follows that these two (to make ourselves loveable and pitiable) are what we ought to aim at (for this purpose)'.
In the epideictic *prooemia* the hearer must be made to suppose that he is a sharer in the praise, either personally, or by his family, or his studies and pursuits, or at any rate somehow or other: for what Socrates (i.e. Plato, Menex. 235 D, supra 1.9.30) says in his funeral oration is quite true, that it is easy enough to praise Athenians at (friendly) Athens; the difficulty lies in doing it at Sparta (amongst rivals and enemies). The old adj. ἄμως, 'some', survives in several forms found in most Greek authors; ἄμως (γε πως) and ἁμά (γε πη), sc. ὁδός, ἡμοῦ, ἡμόθεν, and the compounds οὐδαμός, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαιμός, οὐδαιμη (or μη), οὐδαιμόνες, οὐδαιμώς, and the same with μη.

§ 12. 'The *exordia* of the public oration are borrowed from those of the forensic speech, but are naturally very rare in it: for in fact the subject of it is one with which they are already well acquainted, and therefore the facts of the case require no preface (no preparatory explanation) except—if at all—on his own account or that of the adversary (δὲ αὐτῷ to put himself right with the audience, the ἦδος ἐν τῷ λέγοντα; ἡ τοῖς ἀντιλέγοντας to meet the adversary's charges, combat the prejudices the other has raised against him: both of these therefore are accidental), or in case the subject (this is essential) is not considered by them of the precise degree of importance which you wish, but rated either too high or too low.' As to τοῖς ἀντιλέγοντας, we had been told before, c. 13.3, προοίμιον δὲ...ἐν τοῖς δημογραφίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ἦ: as in Demosth. de Corona, and de Falsa Legatione. Comp. Quint. III 8.8, who borrows this from Aristotle, Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et
And hence the necessity of either raising or doing away with prejudice (διό, because when there is an adversary, as there always is in dicastic practice, the same treatment in deliberative speaking is necessarily required) and (the topics) of amplification and diminution (to meet the other requirement, εάν μη διωκομείνει βουλητα, ὑπολογίζοντος, κ.τ.λ.)

On the κώνος τότος (or τότα) αὔξησις and μείωσις, see ΠΠ 26. 1. Ib. 18. 4.

'These are the circumstances in which a preface is required (δείται, ὃ λόγος, or ὃ λίγων); either these, or for mere ornament's sake, because, without it, the speech has an off-hand, slovenly (impromptu, extemporaneous) air (note on ΠΠ 7. 1). For such is Gorgias' encomium on the Eleans; without any preliminary sparring (flourish) or preparatory stirring up he starts abruptly (rushes at once, in medias res; without any previous warning or preparation) with "Elis, blessed city."


προεξαγωγώσις] is a metaphor from boxing, and denotes a preliminary exercise of the boxer, a swinging, and thrusting to and fro of the arms (lit. elbows), as a preparation for the actual blow, "ex athletarum disciplina ... qui braccis sublatis et vibratis pugnae produnt; I think this is not quite exact: the exercise is not so much to prepare for the encounter with the antagonist, though this of course may be included, as to give weight and impetus to the actual blow." Hinc ab Ar. ad oratorem traductum, qui prooemio quodam utitur priusquam ad rem ipsam deveniat." Spanheim ad Callim. Hymn. Del. line 322. This word is a ἔσαξ λεγόμενον.

προανακινών expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor; the rousing, stirring up, excitement of emotion or interest, as a preparation (πρό) for what is to follow. This is illustrated by Plato, Legg. IV 722 D, λόγων πάντων καὶ δυν. φωνὴ κεκουμηκὴ προοιμία τ' ἐστι καὶ σχέδου οὐν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχοντα τινα ἐνσέχεσιν ἐπιχειρήσεως χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαιόθασι. Ib. VII 789 C, of the inspiring, animating, exciting process—'quo validiores atque animosiores ad certamina fierent,' Stallbaum ad locum—which is the object of the training of fighting cocks and quails, (πώνοι) ἐν οἷς αὐτὰ ἀνακινοῦσι γυμνάζοντες. Meno, 85 C,
The following chapter is a continuation of the preceding on the ordinary contents of the προοίμιον, two of which, as we have seen c. 14 § 12, are διαβάλλειν and ἀπολύεσθαι: and on these two the orator is supplied with topics.

The same subject is treated in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30), at even greater length than by Aristotle: and a summary of its contents, with some remarks on its moral character, and its connexion with Isocrates, may be found in Introd. pp. 441—443. A comparison of this with Aristotle’s treatment of the subject is altogether in favour of the latter. He had already told us that he disapproves of the προοίμιον, as distinct from the πρόθεσις, altogether: but he is obliged, by the practice of his predecessors, and the evident importance of the subject, which in spite of its unscientific character cannot be altogether passed over in a complete treatise on Rhetoric, to give it a place in his system; but it will be observed that in dealing with it he occupies at least three-fourths of the chapter with the topics of the defensive use of it, confining his observations on the aggressive side to two topics in a single section. See also especially § 10, τοὺον νῦν δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι κ.τ.λ. The reckless and unscrupulous precepts of the other treatise present διαβολή in its very worst character: it is truly here the ‘devil’s art’, of διαβάλλων τίχνη, the art of insinuating by whatever means prejudice and ill-will against your opponent—merely because he happens to be such, and for no other reason—and so prejudicing his case. There is something further on this in c. 36 (37). 46, 47. There is an invective against διαβολή in Isocr. antid. § 18. “διαβάλλειν is ‘to set at variance’, ‘to make hostile’; and so to inspire ill-will, insinuate suspicions, or prejudice a person against another. It applies as a technical term to all insinuations and accusations by which one of the parties in a case endeavours to raise a prejudice against the other, which are to be reflected upon, but do not directly help to prove, the main charge or point at issue; and are therefore extra a term, ἐνος τοῦ πράγματος. See III 15. 9; and comp. the example, infra § 3. ἀπολύεσθαι is to clear oneself of such insinuated charges, to remove evil suspicions. Aristotle begins with this, because, as he told us before (c. 14. 7), it is more appropriate to the exordium, as the opposite (in accusation) is to the peroration.” Introd. p. 344.
§ I. "With respect to διαβολή, (intentional and malicious) calumny or (accidental, undesigned) prejudice, one (the first) topic is anything from which arguments may be derived for removing offensive (unpleasant, injurious) suspicion: for it makes no difference whether (the charge or insinuation) has been actually spoken (expressed, in the shape of a direct personal calumny) or not (i.e. has merely been conceived, not openly stated; ὑπόθεσις as a mere conception or supposition—against us by inference, from our words, actions, or manners, or altogether accidentally, when people have a bad opinion of us: in either case the prejudice requires to be removed); 'and therefore this is a general rule'; includes everything, every kind of argument which tends to remove any bad opinion or prejudice which for whatever reason may be entertained against us: and this, whether the charge we have to meet be a direct statement, or merely an uncertified suspicion. This is illustrated by Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 8, 9.

In Benseler's Isocrates, II 276, a ref. is given upon διαβολή to Isocr. τέχνη, Fragm. τέχνη. No. 2 (from Anon. et Maxim. Planud. V 551. 10, Waitz), which runs thus: ἐν γὰρ ταῖς καταστάσεις τὰ τῆς οἰκείας συνιστώμεν (establish) καὶ τὰ τῶν ἕναστῶν διαβάλλομεν πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον σύμφερον ἐγραζομένων τὰς καταστάσεις, ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔδειξεν.  

§ 2. 'Another way (of clearing oneself) is to meet the charge on any of these issues' (στάσεις or ἀμφισβητήσεις, status, the turning-point of the case, on which issue is joined: on these see Appendix E to Book III in Introd. p. 397 seq. where the various classifications of them are given;) 'either by denying the fact (τὸ δὲ, status coniecturalis); or admitting that, and asserting that the alleged act was not injurious (ab utili, Victorius); or at any rate not to him (the complainant); or that the amount of injury is overstated; or that it was either no wrong at all (not unjust: not a legal crime), or a slight one; or, (taking the other view of morality, supposing it to be strictly speaking unjust, at any rate) not disgraceful, or a mere trifle, of no importance at all'. οὐ μέγα differs in this from οὐκ ἔχων μέγαθος: the former qualifies merely the wrong of the ἀδικων, the latter is "no great matter"; of greatness, in the sense of magnitude or importance in general. 'For these are the points upon which the issue (of a case) turns, as in that between Iphicrates and Nausicrates: for he admitted the fact and the injury, but said it was no wrong'. Nausicrates or (always in the Latin Rhetoricians) Naucrates, is mentioned by Cicero, Orat. L 172, de Orat. II 23. 94, and III 44. 173, as a pupil of Isocrates. Quint., III 6. 3, stating the same fact, tells us also that some attributed to him the first systematic division of these στάσεις or status. See Art. in Biogr. Dict. s.v. Westermann's Gesch. der Gr. ü. Röm. Beredtsamkeit, 30, 5, comp. 83. 10.

Or (in justifying oneself), admitting a wrong done, to balance (or compensate) it (by something else which may be taken as a set-off, or drawback, in diminution of the wrong); for instance you say, what I did was injurious no doubt, but honourable; or painful, but serviceable; or anything else of the same sort. The comparison of a few passages will best illustrate the meaning of ἀντικαταλάττεσθαι. Ar. de part. Anim. 1 5. 3, 644 b 22. The author is comparing the interest and value in natural philosophy of the objects of sense, things that we can see and touch and handle, and so examine and satisfy our curiosity about, with those that are beyond the reach of our senses, οὕτως ἀγενής καὶ ἀφθάρης τῶν ἀπαντά αἰῶνα. Though the latter are in themselves higher and more excellent, 'yet by their greater nearness to us, and more immediate connexion with our nature, there is a sort of compensation, ἀντικαταλάττεται τι, when they are compared with the things divine as objects of study.' Dem. de Cor. § 138, τῆς ἐκ ταῖς λοιδορίας ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος τὸ τῆς πάθεως συμφέρον ἀντικαταλάττεται, 'bartering, exchanging for, compensating by.' Plat. Phaedo 69 A, ἡδονᾶς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλάττεσθαι...ἀντὶ πολλὰ: and other passages collected by Wytenbe. ad loc. Dinarch. adv. Dem. § 2, μὴ δὲ τὴν κοίνην σωτηρίαν ἀντικαταλάττεσθαι τῶν τοῦ κριμοῦν τοῖς αἰῶνα. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 92, ἰχθὺς μόνον ἀντικαταλαβόμενος ἀντὶ τοῦτων. Isocr. Phil. § 135, ὑπὲρ ἄλλου μὲν ὀφθαλὼν ἂν τὸ ἐμὸν ἀντικαταλαβαμένου. (Ernesti Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v., excusare reum.)
(RHOTORIKHΣ Γ 15 §§ 3, 4. 181)

οίον Σοφόκλης ἐφὶ τρέμειν ὦχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλλων ἐφὶ, ἶνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἄλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ γὰρ ἐκόντι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἔτη ὀφθαλμοκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ ὦν ἔνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβοῦλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο ὁ διεβάλλετο ποίησαι, συνεβη δὲ βλαβῆναι: "δίκαιον δὲ μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν."
4 ἄλλος, εἶ ἐμπερείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἥ νῦν ἥ πρὸ-

Terms), (to say) that it is a mistake, or an accident, or compulsory', done under compulsion; βία, see I 10. 14, and Appendix C to Bk. I., Introd. p. 225, and the references there. ἀνάγκη or βία, 'overpowering force', forsa mag-giore, force majeure, absolves from responsibility. Four degrees of cri-minality are thus distinguished in Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 b 11, (1) ἀνάγκη, a mere accident, an injury done unintentionally without knowledge of the special circumstances of the case: (2) ἀνάγκη, an error or mistake, where the act is intentional but the injury unintentional (the case of killing a friend with a gun supposed not to be loaded); this does not include the case of moral ignorance, ignorance of right and wrong, for which a man is responsible: (3) ἀδικία, a wrong, intentional in a sense, but without deliberation or mala fide prepense, as a deadly blow dealt in a fit of passion, when the judgment is for the moment overpowered; (this is, I believe, the only place in which this degree is distinguished from the following: at all events the ordinary division is threefold.) All these are short of actual guilt or crime. The last stage, of actual crime, is (4) ἀδικία, a wrong act committed with full knowledge of the circumstances, and deliberate purpose, ὅταν ἐκ προσαρέσεως ἄδικος καὶ μαχαίριτος. With this compare III 2, on the intentional and unintentional. Comp. also Rhet, ad Alex. 4 (5). 8, 9.

'As for instance Sophocles said that his trembling was not, as his accuser (or traducer) said, assumed to convey the appearance of old age, (and thereby obtain the sympathy and compassion of the judges) but compulsory (and therefore he was not responsible for it); for his eighty years were quite unintentional'. On Sophocles—not the poet—see note on I 14. 3. The same Sophocles is mentioned again III 18. 6.

'And again, by a balance (compensatory interchange or substitution) of motives; (for instance) that you had no intention of injuring him; what you really intended to do was so and so, and not that which was falsely laid to your charge; the injury was an accident (not of the essence of what you did: a mere συμβεβηκός). "I should deserve to be hated if that were my intention in doing it"'. This seems to be introduced as a specimen of what might be said on such an occasion; and contrary to his usual practice, Aristotle's own manufacture.

§ 4. 'Another (way or topic) is recrimination, when the accuser is involved in the same charge, either at the present time or on some previous occasion; either himself or any of those near to him (relatives, connexions, intimate friends)'. If you can shew that your adversary or any one very near to him is liable to the same charge as that of
5. τερον, ἡ αὐτὸς ἡ τῶν ἐγγύς. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπερι-
λαμβάνονται, οὐς ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ δια-
βολῇ, οἷον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος ὁ μοιχὸς, καὶ ὁ δεινὰ ἄρα.
6. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους διέβαλεν, ἡ ἄλλος αὐτοῦς, ἡ ἄνευ δια-
βολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἱ πεφηνασιν
1. *fortasse transponendum aut prorsus omittendum.*

which he accuses you, though the charge may not therefore fall to the
ground, at any rate you can silence him by saying, that he at all events
was not the person to make it. Majoragius cites Cic. pro Ligar. § 2.
Habes igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatoris maxime optandum, confitentem
reum, sed tamen ita confitente, se in ea parte suisse, qua te, Tubero,
qua virum omni laude dignum, patrem tuum. Iaque prius de vestro
delicto confiteamini necesse est, quam Ligarii ullam culpam reprehendatis.
He adds that the whole of the exordium of the fifth action against Verres
is to prove, neminem debere alterum accusare de ea re qua ipse sit
infectus.

§ 5. 'Again, if others are included in the charge who are admitted
not to be liable to the accusation; for instance if (it be argued) that so
and so is an adulterer because he is a smart dresser, (the reply is) why
in that case so must Smith and Jones be adulterers'—although it is
perfectly well known that Smith and Jones are entirely free from that
vice. Bekker and Spengel accept Riccoboni's, and Bekker's own, sug-
gestion καθάριος for vulgata lectio καθαρός: but they retain the article ὅ in
its old position ὅτι καθάριος ὁ μοιχὸς. With this reading the only
translation can be, "that all adulterers dress smartly", which is not to the
point. The converse is required by the argument—which is, to free your-
self from a suspicion which has arisen from some accidental association,
by shewing that, if the two things were really associated, others would
be liable to the same suspicion, who are known not to be obnoxious to it:
"if, as is alleged, all smart dressers were adulterers, then so and so,
who are known not to be liable to the charge, would be involved in it": and besides this, the following passages on the same subject shew that
this was the argument that was used. καθάριος, II. 4. 15, for ‘neatness
and cleanliness in dress’ and attention to personal appearance: the
argument from this appears II 24. 7, ἵνα καλλωπισθῇ, καὶ νῦκτωρ πλανάται,
μοιχὸς ταυτός γὰρ; and de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9, βουλόμενοι γὰρ διεξαῖ
ὅτι μοιχὸς, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπισθῇ ἡ ὅτι νῦκτωρ ὀρᾶται πλα-
νάτωμεν. It is necessary therefore, besides the alteration of καθάριος
into καθαρός, either to change the position of the article, ἐὰν ὅτι ὁ καθάριος
μοιχὸς or to omit the article altogether ἐὰν ὅτι καθαρός μοιχὸς. If such a
mistaken inference has been drawn, you infer from this example by
analogy to a like case.

§ 6. 'Again, if (your accuser) ever brought against others (the same)
charges (which he is now bringing against you); or if, without a direct
accusation, these same were ever subjected to the same suspicions as
you yourself are now; who have been shewn to be entirely innocent
of them'—you may infer by analogy that a similar mistake is likely to
have been made in the present case.
§ 7. 'Or again, (another topic may be derived) from recrimination, by a retort upon the accuser: (the inference being, that) it is strange that where (in what, διά) a man himself is not to be trusted, his statements should be trustworthy'. MSS δ αὐτὸς, Bekker Ed. 3, and Spengel (apparently from Bekker) δε. I read δ as nearer to the text, 'in what'.

§ 8. 'Another is, the appeal to a previous decision; an instance of which is Euripides' reply to Hygiaenon, in the exchange case, in which the latter accused him of impiety for the verse that he wrote in recommendation of perjury, "the tongue hath sworn; but the mind is unsworn". His reply was that the other had no right to bring cases (decisions) out of the Dionysiac contest into the courts of law: for he had already given an account (stood his trial) of them (his words, αὐτῶν, included in the verse), or was prepared to do so, if the other chose to accuse him. This celebrated verse, Hippol. 608, probably owes a good deal of its notoriety to Aristophanes' parody of it near the end of the Frogs. Seldom has so "much ado about nothing" been made as about this unlucky line. The charge of recommending perjury is at any rate a gross exaggeration. Not does it necessarily imply even mental reservation. Cicero, de Off. iii 29.107 (quoted by Monk ad loc.), puts the case very clearly. Quod ita iuratum est ut mens conciperet fieri opor-
tere, id servandum est: quod aliter, id si non feceris nullum est periiurium. Non enim falsum iurare periiurare est; sed quod ex animi tui sententia iuraris, sicut verbis concepitur more nostro, id non facere periiurium est. Scire enim Euripides, Iuravi lingua, mentem iuriatam gero. See the whole of Monk's note. Paley in his note follows Cicero. Of course the deceit, if there be any, lies in the intention and not in the word; and this is all that Hippolytus seems to say. He never intended that his oath should be kept in that sense: and his ignorance of the circumstances absolves him from the responsibility, or obligation of the oath. See above in note on § 3.

We learn from this passage that Euripides (the tragic poet) was

1 I find this note in one of my copies of the Hippolytus. "I don't think the principle implied in this (the verse of Eurip.) can be defended. Hippolytus says that he swore to keep the secret in ignorance of the nature of it: now that he knows that, he is freed from the obligation of keeping it. Has a man a right to lay himself under an obligation, of the nature of which he is ignorant?" However the question still remains, if the oath has been taken in ignorance, is he still bound to keep it? The last sentence was added when this Commentary was written.
capable of pleading a cause in public. Another public speech, in an embassy to Syracuse, is attributed to him in II 6. 20 ult., where see note.

On the ἀντιδοτις, the compulsory ‘exchange of property’, in the case of an unfair assignment of a liturgy at Athens, see Böckh Publ. Econ. Bk. IV. ch. 16. It does not appear from the text which of the two parties it was that proposed the exchange.

Valckenaer ad Hippol. 612, p. 232, would change the name in the text to 'Ὑγαινεῖν', as more agreeable to the analogy of Greek proper names. The name is right. Harpocr. quotes twice the speech of Hyperides πρὸς Ὑγαινεῖνα, sub vv. ἦν καὶ κύανθα.

§ 9. ‘Another (may be borrowed) from the accusation of calumny and malicious insinuation itself, (shewing) its enormity (magnitude, how great it is)—and this in particular that it raises extraneous points for decision’ (ἄλλος different from, foreign to, the question at issue; like Higianon’s quotation in the last section, which may perhaps have suggested this topic. This seems to fix the meaning of ἄλλος and so Victorius: otherwise it might be “gives rise to other trials,” one trial generated out of another ad infinitum; ‘and because it places no reliance on the facts of the real matter at issue’. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 12, and Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδοτίων § 18, who διαβαλλει διαβολής—and in good round terms.

‘Common to both (τῷ διαβαλλοντι καὶ ἀπολογομένῳ) is the topic of signs and tokens: as, for example, in (Sophocles’9) Teucer, Ulysses charges him with being closely connected with Priam (i.e. with the enemy: closely connected in a double sense: it is an inference from his connexion by blood to his political connexion, to his favouring the cause of Priam); for Hesione (Teucer’s mother) was his (Priam’s) sister! the other (Teucer) replies (in the same topic) that his father’ (a still nearer relation. See Apollo’s speech in Aesch. Eumen. 657—673 and in many other places, on the nearer connexion, and higher obligation, of the son to the father than to the mother) ‘Telamon, was Priam’s enemy, and also that he did not betray (inform against) the spies to him’. This play of Sophocles has already been named before—in II 23.7. There are only two short fragments of it remaining (Dind., Wagn. Soph. Fragm.), from

1 On this connexion, Victorius refers to Virg. Aen. viii 157, Nam memini Hesiones visentem regna sororis Laomedontiadem Priamum seq.; and Soph. Aj. 1299 seq., where Teucer in answer to Agamemnon, boasting of his descent, says, ἰδὲ ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν εἰμι Ἕλληνος...δεῖται...τηκτική ἔλευθεν μητέρι, ἡ φύσις μὲν ἡν βασιλευτης, Δαμοδόντως.
which absolutely nothing is to be learned as to the plot of the play. It is clear from this passage, that Ulysses' accusation was that Teucer had betrayed the Greek cause, and had dealings with the enemy. The charge is supported by the sign of Teucer's connexion—in the double sense above explained—with Priam; and met by the other with two signs or tokens leading to the opposite inference. Wagner, Soph. Fragm. (Fr. Trag. Gr. 1, 385—391, Teukros), supposing that Pacuvius "Soph. fabulam imitazione expressisse", collects a number of his fragments from various Latin writers, from which he derives an interpretation of the story of the play, totally different—as.a candidly admits—from that which we shall gather from this passage. But as the interpretation of this passage is perfectly clear, and his hypothesis altogether the reverse, uncertain in every particular, there is little doubt which of the two is to be preferred for the elucidation of Ar.'s text—provided we confess our entire ignorance of all else in and about the play in question.

§ 10. 'Another, for the accuser, is to praise some trifles at great length, and then (under cover of that) to introduce in concise (and pregnant) terms a censure of something that is of real importance; or after a preliminary enumeration of a number of advantages (virtues and accomplishments, which have little or nothing to do with the point at issue) hold up that one thing to censure which has a direct and real bearing on the question'. προφέρειν, to promote (carry forward), aid, assist, further. Hes. Op. et D. 579, ἕν τοι προφέρει μὲν άδοι, προφέρει δὲ καὶ γρογ. Thuc. i 93, καὶ αυτῶν καυτικῶν γεγενημένου μέγα προφέρεω εἴ τὸ καταστάθην δύναμιν.

Victorius illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. i 4. 94 seq. and the following well-known passage from Cic. pro L. Flacco, iv 9. Verumtamen hoc dico de toto generi Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras: do multarum artium disciplinam: non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniiorum acumen, dicendi copiam: denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno: testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit: totiusque huius rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant.

'(Topics) such as these are at the same time most artful and most unfair: for they endeavour to do harm with what is good (to convert the good into an instrument of mischief) by mixing it with the bad: like one who mixes poison with wholesome food. 'Another topic common to both accuser and excuser is, that since the same act may always be attri-
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 15 § 10; 16 § 1.

ἀπολυμένω, ἑπεὶ ὅ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα πραξῆσαι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοθυστείτο ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυμένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βελτίων οἶον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τῶν Ὄδυσσεών προεύφρετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνει τῶν Ὄδυσσεών, τῷ δὲ ὅτι οὗ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαύλον.

καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα, διήγησις CHAP. XVI.


'For instance, (to say) that Diomede preferred Ulysses (to be his companion in the nocturnal adventure), on the one side because he supposed Ulysses to be the best (i.e. the most valiant) of men (or the best companion, for such an occasion), on the other, not for that reason, but because, from his worthlessness, he was the only (one of the heroes) of whose rivalry he (Diom.) was not afraid.' Supra II 23. 20, 24: where the same case is given, and the two sides opposed, in illustration of two different topics. See Hom. II. K [X] 242 seq.

'And so much for the treatment of διαβολή.'

CHAP. XVI.

On the various divisions of the parts of the speech, including διηγησις, the special subject of the following chapter, see the introductory remarks to c. 13, Introd. p. 331 seq., and in the Commentary.

'Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ φιλιάς ὡς ἐν τῇ διηγήσει λεκτέος τὸ τε πράγμα καὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὸ πράγμα καὶ τὰ διανοιαί, αἰσ ἐκάντερος τῶν σύστασιν· κρίμαν, τὸ τε πράγματος ἢ μέλλει πράττειν, καὶ τούτων τοῖς συμβαλλόμενοι ἡμῶν φροστιόν (from Syrianus, Sopater, and Anon. ap. Walz, Benseler Isocr. II 276, διηγησις. No. 3); Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37).
In the epideictic branch of Rhetoric narration is not consecutive but fragmentary. *οὐκ ἑβεβήγη, not continuous, one part of it following the other in a regular series or succession, but broken up into parts, piece-meal, καθαρὰ μέρος, to aid the memory by giving opportunity for proving each point of laudation as it arises. 'For we have to go through' *(narrate, or enumerate in detail; there must be a narration;) 'all the actions which form the subject of the panegyric' *(lit. out of which the speech, i.e. the praise conferred by the speech, is made to arise: the special topics of ἐπάνως are 'moral action,' πράξεως; see on this Appendix B to Bk. I c. 9, Introd. p. 212 seq.): 'for the speech is constructed with (or from) one element with which art is not concerned—because the speaker is not the author of the actions he praises' *(art is productive, Eth. Nic. vi 4. The speaker has not made his materials himself: he finds them ready to his hand, and uses them. These are the ἄρχειν πίστεις of I 15)—and another which is derived from the (rhetorical) art (these are the ἐπειδὴ πίστεις, the inferences which are derived from the materials); and this (the latter) is to prove either the fact, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain quality, or quantity (amount, magnitude, importance), or all three'.

And it is this character of an epideictic speech (this necessary admixture of inference with statement of facts) that sometimes obliges the speaker not to relate everything seriatim (one after another, in continuous, uninterrupted order), because a proof of this kind (a long series of statements followed by a still longer series of proofs, which after the first two or three topics would be difficult to recollect in their proper connexion, so as to fit them together,) would be difficult to retain in the memory. From this set of topics he (the hero) is to be shown to be brave, from the others to be wise or just, (and the proofs of these would get intermixed and confounded in the hearer's memory). And the speech by this arrangement of topics (οὖν) is simpler; by the other it is made puzzling (prop. parti-coloured, and so by the variety, perplexing) and not smooth' *(i.e. plain and easy—like a smooth surface to walk or drive over).
connected with λισός and λέος. The metaphor is from a smooth and easily travelled road; like the road to vice, smooth and easy, λείη μὲν ὄδος, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει, in Hesiod’s often-quoted lines, Op. et D. 287—292: and Euripides’ style, in Archimedes’ epigram, Anthol. II 64, λείη μὲν γὰρ ἑδεῖν καὶ ἐπικροτοσ——“it seems indeed to the eye a smooth and well-beaten track”—εἰ δὲ τις αὐτὴν εἰσβαίνει χαλεπὸς τρη-χνιρὰς σκόλοπος. It is applied frequently by Dionysius to style in the sense of ἀπλοῖς, εὐταλῆς (Hesych.). In de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 2 init., the terms λιγὴ καὶ ἀφελὴς are applied to a style like that of Lysias, plain, smooth, simple, easy, opposed to the rough, rugged, contortions of that of Thucydides. In de vet. script. cens. c. 2 § 11, it is opposed to υψηλὸς, ‘low or mean’, δ’ Εὐριπίδης οὖν ὑψηλὸς ἢστεν οὐκέ μὴν λίτος: de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, it is ‘simple and unadorned’, λέειν λιγήν καὶ ἀκόσμμων καὶ μὴν ἔχονταν περίτων: and in de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 34, it is again opposed to υψηλὸς, ‘low’, τὴν λίγην καὶ ἰσχυρὰν (thin, lenis,) καὶ ἀπερίττων (without any striking points or features, ‘flat’).

§ 3. Of well-known actions the hearer should merely be reminded (they should merely be suggested, by a brief allusion, not dwelt upon); and therefore most people¹ (i.e. men of ordinary education) in such cases don’t require a regular narrative of them—everybody at once remembers that Achilles conquered Hector; people only need to be reminded of that—as for instance, if you want to praise Achilles: for his actions are known to everybody, they only require to be employed (that is, to be enlarged upon, and commented, for the purpose of enhancing their glory). If Critias is to be praised (or censured), he does want one: for not many people know anything about him’. Critias too—one of the Thirty—was a famous man in his day: one wonders that he should have been so entirely forgotten in Aristotle’s time. Pericles and Alcibiades still lived, fresh in men’s memories; though I don’t mean that the three were absolutely on a level in contemporary reputation.

It appears that between ἵσαυν and νῦν δὲ γελοῖος there has been a gap in the mss, including A*, which has been filled up with an extract from I 9, on ἵσαυν, §§ 33—97. Comp. Spengel, in a paper on the Rhet. ad Alex. in Zeitschrift für Alt. Wiss. 1840, p. 1226. Bekker’s Variae Lectiones include A* with the rest, as having the interpolated passage: Buhle, ad h. I., says “in nearly all the Edd. except that of Victorius and his followers,” the interpolation is found.

The abrupt transition from the epideictic to the dicastic branch had already made Vettori (for once I will give him his proper name) suspect

¹ There is a temptation here to understand of πολλῷ as ‘the heroes of the declamation’; ‘those who have their actions narrated’—which is to be resisted. It is not true in this sense.
§ 4. Something is here lost. But as it is, it is absurd to say (as the writers on Rhetoric do in their treatises; and especially Isocrates) that the narration ought to be rapid. This precept is suggested in Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 3, in the word βραχυλωγία; and 30 (31). 4, it is further recommended that the narrative of ἀ δημηγορία should be βραχεία and σύντομος. See Spengel’s note on ed. of Anaximenes’ Ars Rhet., pp. 214, 5; and 219. Cic. de Orat. ii 80. 326. Quint. iv 2. 31, 32, (Narrationem) plerique scriplores, maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate, volunt esse lucidam, brevem, verisimilem....Eadem nobis placet divisio; quamquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate in parte una discesserit, praeceptum brevitatibus irradiat, tantum necesse sit longam aut brevem esse expositionem, nec liceat ire per medium. From Plato Phaedr. 267 A, it appears that this precept appeared in rhetorical treatises as early as those of Tisias and Gorgias; and a remark of Prodicus, to precisely the same effect as that of the customer to the baker here, is quoted, 267 B. The precept, that it should be σύντομον, is found also in Dionysius de Lys. Iud. c. 18, (p. 402 R): probably taken from Isocrates. (Spengel’s Artium Scriptores, p. 158).

The extract from Isocrates, on this quality of the διήγησις, is quoted at the commencement of this chapter. This is one of Vettori’s evidences (perhaps the best) of Aristotle’s dislike of Isocrates. This subject is discussed in Introd. pp. 41—45, and the probability of the hypothesis reduced to a minimum. If they ever were enemies—as is likely enough in Ar.’s early life—after the death of Isocrates, by the time that this work was completed and published, all trace of hostility (γελοίως φασίν can at the worst hardly imply hostility) must have long vanished from Aristotle’s mind.

*And yet—just as the man replied to the baker when he asked him whether he should knead his dough (τὴν μάξαν) hard or soft, “what”, said he, “is it impossible to do it well?”—so here in like manner: that is to say (γάρ), the narration should be no more over long than the prose-

1 Spengel, Art. Script. 169 note, has discovered here some fragments of a comic verse: which he thus restores: σκληρῶν δὴ...μαλακὴν μάξα; τί δε; ἀδόσατον εἰς μάστιον σε. [The addition of πόσερον would fill the blank left in the first line.]

* It would be difficult to assign any sufficient reason (in point of the sense) for making the distinction of μὴ and oúde here; though we may say, grammatically, of course, that the μὴ is joined immediately with the inf. mood, whereas the two oúde-s following require δει to be supplied after them in each case.
You may slip into your narrative (bring in by a side wind, on the sly, παρεμβάλειν, sub. c. 14. 9) anything that tells to the advantage of your own character—as for instance, “and I always admonished him to do what was right, not to leave his children behind him in the lurch” (in distress and difficulty), or to the disadvantage of your opponent's; “but he made answer to me, that wheresoever he was himself, there would he find other children.” the answer, as Herodotus tells us, of the revolted Egyptians (to the king who was inviting them to return). The story of the latter part of the alternative is told by Herodotus II 30, with the addition of certain circumstances, which add indeed to its graphic character, but cannot be here repeated. Aristotle seems to have tacked on the first part of the alternative—out of his own head—to make a little “imaginary conversation.” 'Or (to slip in) anything else that is likely to be agreeable to the judges'.

In defence—when you have to narrate circumstances in order to correct an opponent's statement of the facts—'the recital may be shorter (because most of the story has been already told by the other), and as the issues (ἀμφιβολίας is Arist.'s term for what were afterwards called κρίσεις, status) are (on the defensive side) the denial either of the fact, or the injury, or the wrong, or the degree (the estimated amount of the crime and penalty), we must therefore waste no time upon proving what is already admitted, unless it (the proofs of any of the facts) chance
to contribute to the establishment of the issue (on which we do rest our case); for instance, when we admit the fact, but deny the wrong. Though on the other hand, it may be necessary, whilst we admit the facts of our opponent's case, still to go over that ground, in order to clear up points which have a bearing upon the justice of the act which is acknowledged to have been done.

§ 7. 'Events should generally be recited as past and gone—except those which by being acted' (represented as actually done, passing before the eyes, πρὸ ὁμμάτων, note on III 11. 2.) 'may afford an opportunity for exciting either commiseration or indignation'. δείνωσις, and έλεος, οἴκτος, σχέσις, and μείωσις, are two ordinary 'common topics', (subordinate varieties of αἴσθησις and μείωσις) of appeals to the feelings in use amongst rhetoricians. See notes on II 21. 10, and 24. 4. Of Thrasymachus, and his use of these in his Rhetoric, Pl. Phaedr. 267 c, d, and of the early rhetoricians in general, Ib. 272 A, where βραχυλογία is joined with the other two.

'An example of this is "the story of Alcinous," (it is an example) because it is told (πεποιηταί, composed, written) to Penelope in sixty verses', i.e. the long story of Ulysses' wanderings, which occupies in the narration of it to the Phaeacians four whole books of the Odyssey, IX—xii, is condensed by Ulysses, when he repeats it to Penelope, Od. ψ [XXIII] 264—284, 310—343, into a summary of 55 verses—which here (with the characteristic inaccuracy of the ancient writers in calculations and descriptions of all kinds) are called in round numbers sixty—and thus furnishes a good example of the summary treatment required in an ordinary narrative. Vater, who explains all this in his note, understates the actual number by two. "Hi versus quinquaginta et tres numero rotundo recte (correctly enough for the occasion, I suppose) έξήκοντα η εἴς nominatur."

'And as Phayllus reduced (condensed: εποίησε, I suppose, must be understood from πεποιηταί, 'composed') the Epic cycle: and Euripides' prologue to the Oeneus'. These three cases are appealed to as well-known instances of concise summaries. The 'Αλκίνου άπολογος, in its original form, when given at length with all its details, became proverbial for 'a long story.' Erasmus Chil. 'Άπολογος Αλκίνου ἐπί τῶν φιλαρωτῶν καὶ μακρὸν ἀποτελωτῶν λόγων, Suidas s.v. Plato, Rep. x 614 b, uses it in the same proverbial application. See Ast and Stallbaum ad locum. The 'Αλκίνου άπολογος appears in Aelian's list of ἡμὶν into which the Homeric poems were divided for recitation (Var. Hist. xiii 13, π. 'Ομῆρου έπίνων καὶ ποιήσεων, quoted by Paley, Pref. to Hom. II. p. xlvi). It is quoted again to supply an instance of ἀναγραφώσει, Poet. xvi.

Of Phayllus nothing whatever is known. It seems that this is the
only place in which his name occurs; neither is it to be found in Smith's
Biogr. Dict. We gather from the notice of him here, that whether poet
or rhapsodist, he attempted to reduce the whole of the Epic Cycle into
a brief summary. F. A. Wolf is so staggered by the overwhelming
labour of such a task that he prefers to read Κύκλωπα, from a correction
in one of the MSS; overlooking the fact that τῶν Κύκλωπα is not in point
here; τῶν κύκλων, which gives a second instance of a summary, is.

The third example is the prologue to Euripides' Oeneus. Four lines
and a half of this are to be found in Wagner's collection, Fragm. Eurip.
p. 290, Oen. Fr. 1. and Dindorf, Eur. Fr. Oeneus. They are written with
Euripidean compactness, and seem to justify their citation for this
purpose.

§ 8. 'The narrative should have an ethical cast: this will be effected
when (if) we know what imparts this ethical character. One thing in
particular that does so, is any indication of a moral purpose (II 21.16,
III 17.9, Poet. vi 24): it is by (the quality of) this that a moral quality is
given to character: and the quality (good or bad) of the moral purpose
is determined by the end'. On προαίρεσις, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, vi 2.
'Consequently Mathematics (mathematical calculations or reasonings,
λόγοι) can have no moral character, because they have no moral purpose:
for they have no (moral or practical) end in view'. (Their end is the
intellectual one, truth.) 'But the "Socratic dialogues" have a moral pur-
pose, and an ethical and practical end, for they treat of such (ethical)
subjects'. On this class of works, called collectively 'Socratic dialogues',
see Grote, Plato III 469; also Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Ar., die dial. des
Arist. pp. 140—144. By 'Socratic dialogues' are meant dialogues on
moral philosophy, after the manner of Socrates, and therefore bearing
his name, whether (as in Plato and Xenophon) he was an interlocutor,
or not; the compositions of Socrates' friends and followers, the Socratic
'family', Xenophon, Plato, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Phaedo, (Socraticam
Ars Poet. 310. Socraticae chartae, all meaning moral philosophy). On
Socrates' philosophical pursuits and studies see Arist. de part. Anim.
Athen. XI 505 C, 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν ὀνόματι γράφει, "Οὐκ ὄνε
οὐδὲ ἐμέτρον τοῦς καλομένους Σάφρωνος μίμοις ...μὴ φάμεν...η τοῦ "Αλεξ-
atemala τοῦ Τιάν τους πρώτους γραφέναι τοὺς Σωκρατικῶς διαλόγων," ἀντι-
κρόνες φάκοιν ὁ πολυμαθήτατος 'Αρ. πρὸ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους γεγραφέναι τῶν
"Αλεξάμενον. This extract will serve as a corrective to Poet. I 8, from
which it might seem that the 'Socratic dialogues' were in verse. See
§ 9. "Another, different, kind of ethical drawing or representation (άλλα; no longer confined to moral qualities, but the representation of character in general) are the characteristic peculiarities that accompany each individual character: for instance, "so and so walked on as he was talking"—an indication of audacity and rudeness of character. The rudeness and insolence are shewn in not stopping to speak to the other; it is a sign of slight esteem and contempt, δισφωμα. The characters here spoken of differ in one point from the dramatic characters of III 7.6,—though they belong to the same family, the third kind of ἥθη. Introd. p. 112—in that these are the characteristic peculiarities of individuals, the others those of classes. A good specimen of this ethical description occurs in Demosth. de F. L. § 361, a portrait of Aeschines; and two similar traits in c. Steph. α' § 63, οὖν γάρ, ἣνικα μὲν συνίβαινεν ὑπνοίᾳ Ἀριστολόχῳ τῷ τραπεζητῇ, ἵσα βαινών ἐβαίδιζεν ὑποπεπτωκός αὐτῷ...ἔσειδη δ' ἀπάλετε ἑκεῖνος κ.τ.λ. and § 77, ἐγὼ δ'...τὴς μὲν ὄντως τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ ταχέως βαδίζειν καὶ λαλεῖν μέγα (signs apparently of ill-breding) οἷς τῶν εὐτυχῶν περιφυλῶν ἐμακρύν κρίνω. The ἵσα βαινών in the former passage, is 'to keep pace with,' 'to walk on a level,' 'place oneself on equal terms with' another. See Shilleto ad loc. de F. L. (His reference to the passage of c. Steph. should be § 63, not 77.)

And again, in speaking, let your words seem to proceed, not from the intellect (as the effect of calculation, deliberation), but as it were from a moral purpose or intention (the will; or, as we should say, the heart). Let your style bear the impress, not so much of intellectual subtlety and vigour, as of good feeling and sound moral purpose: the one may be the mark of a wise man, the other is that of a good—and, what is more to the purpose in Rhetoric, a popular—character." Introd. (slightly altered). "And I wished this to take place; in fact such was my purpose and intention: it is true that I gained nothing by it; but even so it is better." The one is characteristic of a wise or prudent man, the other of a good one: for prudence (worldly, practical, wisdom) shews itself in the pursuit of one's interest, goodness in that of the fair, high, noble, right.'

If any (trait of character that you introduce) seem incredible, then add the statement (or explanation) of the cause or reason, as (in) the example that Sophocles gives, the passage of (from) his Antigone "that
The same answer is put into the mouth of the wife of Intaphernes, when Darius, having condemned her husband and the whole of his family to death, allows her to choose one of the number whose life is to be spared. She chooses her brother, and when Darius expresses his surprise and demands the reason, replies thus: "Ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἀνηρ μὲν μοι ἄν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἰ ταύτα ἀποβάλομεν, πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκ ἔτι μεν ἔνωτων, ἀδελφὸς ἄν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τρόπῳ γένοιτο. ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ χρεωμένῃ ἔλεξα ταύτα. The comparison of these two passages of the poet and historian, and another equally close correspondence of Herod. II 35 with Soph. Oed. Col. 337, have led to the inference that there was some connexion or acquaintance between the two. When or where they met, if they ever did meet, cannot now be ascertained: Samos (which has been suggested) is out of the question; for Herodotus was at Thurium before Sophocles was appointed to his command in the expedition under Pericles against that island. The Antigone was produced in 440 B.C. It is probable that some parts of Herodotus’ history had been published before the final completion of the work at Thurium, and Sophocles may have thus obtained access to them. That he was the borrower, there can be no reasonable doubt. At all events that Sophocles was an admirer of Herodotus we know from Plutarch, who gives us the first line and a half of an epigram by Sophocles in his honour; φίλην Ἡροδότον τεῦξεν Σοφοκλῆς ἐτέων ἄν πεῦτ' ἐπὶ πεντήκοντα; adding that it was ὀμολογουμένως Σοφοκλέους.

If you have no reason to give, at any rate you may say that “you know that what you say will convince nobody, but such is your nature (you can’t help being virtuous and disinterested, do what you will)—for

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1 There is a doubtful story of a recitation at Olympia.
people never believe in disinterested motives. (Lit. people always disbelieve that any one does anything intentionally except what is for his own interest.) Even such a reason is better than none at all.

§ 10. 'Further, besides the ἰδος, topics may be also derived from the expression of emotion of various kinds, by introducing in your narration both the usual accompaniments of these emotions (the outward expressions, attitudes, and other external indications), which everybody is acquainted with, and also any special peculiarities by which you yourself or the adversary may be distinguished (which may be attached to, belong to, προσώπα). These special touches and traits in the expression of individual emotion will lend a lifelike character to the descriptions of your narrative, and impart fidelity to your own impersonations of feelings, and your representation of them as they manifest themselves in others. How true and lifelike all that is, the audience will say: that can be no counterfeit: the man is evidently in earnest. Again, the same popular fallacy as before; the illicit inference from the faithfulness of the imitation to the sincerity of the feeling and truth of the fact.

'Such indications are "and he went away with a scowl at me from under his eyebrows" (so ταρμμύδων νοσθήσεις of 'an angry glance', Pl. Phaed. 117 B; three other examples in Ast's Lex., where it is joined in the same sense with ὅς καταφρονοῦσα, Symp. 220 B, ὅσπερ τι ἀδυκούμενος, Eryx. 395 A, νοσθὴσειςα in διαφθορὰ ἠπούμενον, Crit. 53 B. ὅπο represents an 'underlook'. Comp. the Homeric ὑποδρα ἑδών): 'and as Aeschines says of Cratylus "furiously hissing and shaking his fists"' (ὅδι in both participles is intensive, 'thorough, thoroughly'; here 'violently': Aeschines and Cratylus are supposed by Victorius to be, the one Socrates' intimate, the other Plato's instructor in the Heraclitean philosophy, and the Eponymus of one of his dialogues: but nobody really knows: 'these are persuasive, because these things (indications of passion) which they do know are made (by the speaker) signs or tokens of those that they don't know (in the manner above explained). A great number of these (indications of

1 Comp. Rhet. ad Al. 7 (8). 10, περὶ δὲ ἀνοφαίνεσαι καὶ ὅλη λυστελός ἢν αὐτὸς ταῦτα ταῦτα· οἱ γὰρ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῖς τὸ λυστελές μαλακτὸς προστίμωτε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νομίζουσι ἐνακά τοῦτον τὰῦτα πράπτειν.
feeling) may be obtained from Homer: “Thus then he spake; and the aged dame (Euryclea, Ulysses’ old nurse) held fast (clapped) her face with her hands” (Hom. Od. r [xix] 361)—for people, when they are beginning to cry, are apt to lay hold of their eyes. Introduce yourself at once (to the audience) in a particular character (in that, namely, which you wish to bear in their eyes) that they may regard you as such: and the adversary in the same way (mutatis mutandis): only take care that the design isn’t detected. That there is no difficulty in this—in conveying these impressions to the audience, how readily they seize, and draw inferences from, these indications of emotion, expression of features, action and the like—must needs be seen’ (retaining δει with Bekker, Spengel omits it) ‘from the case of messengers: of things that we know nothing whatever about, we nevertheless (instantly) conceive a notion or suspicion’ (from the face, expression, gestures, general appearance of the messenger; as if he is hot and tired, and so on).

*See what a ready tongue suspicion hath! He that but fears the thing he would not know, hath by instinct knowledge from others’ eyes, that what he feared is chanced.* Northumb. Henry IV. Act 1, Sc. 1, 84. Victorius refers to Soph. Trach. 869 (Dind.) as an instance of this, the suspicions of the Chorus gathered from the old woman’s face.

‘The narrative should be (not confined to one place and continuous, but) distributed over the speech (πολλαχώς ‘in many places’), and sometimes not at the beginning’ In saying οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ, Ar. is referring to his own division of the speech, which excludes the προοίμιον and commences at once with the πρὸθεσις, c. 13. The narrative, he says, should sometimes even be entirely out of its proper place, which is at the beginning.

§ 11. ‘In public speaking there is least occasion for narrative, because no one ever gives a narrative of things future’ (the only province of deliberative Rhetoric, from which all its materials are derived; οὐκ ἐνος ἐπιθείν): ‘but if there be a narrative, it must be of things past, in order that these in their recollection they may be better able to deliberate about things to come’. Gaisford refers to Dionys. Ars Rhet. Χ 14, ἕξη μὲν ἴδεᾳ συμβουλευτικὴ διηγήσεως οὐ δεῖται ἵππαι γὰρ οἱ βουλευόμενοι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦνται, καὶ δεόνται μαθεῖν τὸ πρακτὸν ἔστιν, οὐχ ὅπερ βουλευτέον.

‘Or it may be employed in the way of accusation or of praise’, διηγοῦσται, εἰ διηγοῦνται, to be understood from the preceding. ‘But in
that case, (the speaker who thus employs it) does not fulfil the proper function of the adviser' (whose office is to exhort and dissuade).

The following sentence to the end of the chapter I have done what I can to elucidate in the Introd. p. 354. No commentator, except Victorious, whose explanation I have there criticized, has bestowed a single word upon it; not even Spengel in his recent edition: I suppose he has given it up as hopeless. What it seems to me to mean is something of this kind—but I think there is most likely some latent corruption. "If there be anything incredible in your narrative, you may promise your audience (omit τέ) to add a reason (i.e. explanation, to account for it), and a full, detailed, explanation of it as long as they please". 

*diaτάττειν* is one of the chief difficulties of the passage. The only appropriate meaning that occurs to me is to 'set out in order, i.e. set forth in full and clear detail': *ὅς βούλονται* 'with what, with as many details as, they please'. "As Carcinus' Jocasta, in his Oedipus, is perpetually promising, in answer to the inquiries of the man who is looking for her son—(something or other, which is left to be supplied by the hearer's knowledge of the context: probably, to satisfy him). And Sophocles' Haemon'. This last example must be given up as hopeless: there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as is required here. And what Carcinus' Jocasta has to do with the topic to be illustrated, is not easy to see. Carcinus' Medea has been already quoted 11 23.28, where an account is given of him in the note. His Thyestes is referred to, Poet. XVI 2, and a fault pointed out, XVII 2. And as if to aggravate the difficulties which surround the interpretation of this passage, Wagner, in his collection of the Tragic Fragments, has chosen to omit this reference to Carcinus.

**CHAP. XVII.**

Of the various kinds of proof, the various ways in which facts and statements may be made to appear probable, πίστεις, some are direct and logical, and appeal exclusively to the reasoning faculty; others indirect, which by appealing to the moral sense ἰθήκας, or to the emotions πάθος, support the logical arguments by the favourable impressions they produce upon the hearts and feelings of the listeners, who are ever ready to

1 καὶ αἰτίαν a reason in addition, besides the mere statement.
draw inferences from what they feel to be the truth of what is said; and
further the adventitious and external aids, which are not invented by the
speaker but found ready for use and applied by him in evidence of the
facts of his case: of these three the first only have any pretension to the
character of αποδεικτικα. But not even these are entitled to the name in
its strict and proper sense, αποδεικτικα ‘demonstration’ implying conclu-
sions universal and necessary and a rigorous exact syllogistic method.
This belongs, strictly speaking, exclusively to the domain of Science and
to the sphere of certainty, to which no conclusion of Rhetoric can ever
attain. When it is said therefore in § 1, that “the proofs of preceding
statements, and refutation of those of the adversary”—which from the
third division of the speech—“must be demonstrative”,—no more is
meant than that they must be demonstrated, so far as the nature and
limits of rhetorical proof permit, that is, that they must be such, so far
consistent with sound reasoning and the rules of logic, as will induce
those who hear them to believe what they seek to establish. We have
very frequently had to remark the language of strict Logic applied to the
laxer methods of Rhetoric, here it is done a little more formally than
usual.

‘The point to which this proof must be directed (addressed) of the
four questions on which the issue may turn, is the particular point on
which the issue is actually joined between the two contending parties:
for example, if the issue is the question of fact, was the thing done or
not? in the trial this is the point that he must most aim at establishing;
if of harm or loss, injury, at that; or if—these two being admitted—the
question is one of the degree or amount of the injury; or of the justice of
the action—admitting the fact and the injury and even the amount
charged—of that; just as much (in the three last cases) as if the issue
had been one of that same thing as a fact’. Spalding, ad Quint. III 6. 60,
seems to understand περι του γενόσθαι τούτο of a distinct issue, the στάσις
ἀρκη, or status finitivus.

§ 2. ‘But let it not be forgotten that this issue (of fact) is the only
one in which it may happen that one of the two parties must necessarily
be a rogue: for in such cases, ignorance (which exempts from respon-
dibility, see note on c. 15. 3) cannot be pleaded (cannot be assigned as the
cause or reason), as it may when the issue is the justice (or injustice) of
the act—and the same of the injury, and alleged degree or amount of
the offence—‘and therefore in this issue alone the topic may be dwelt
§ 3. 'In the epideictic branch, in its ordinary topic, amplification is mostly employed in shewing that things are fair (fine) or useful'—the other, μετώπις, 'detraction' employed in censure, is omitted as less usual—'the facts must be taken on trust: declaimers seldom adduce proofs of these; only when they seem incredible, or some one else has got the credit of them (been charged with them; made responsible for them). Bekker and Spengel have both adopted ἀλλος without manuscript authority, from a conjecture of the former in his 4to ed. I think they must have overlooked the natural interpretation of ἀλλος given in the translation. πιστεύεσθαι belongs to the family of irregular passives, of which an account, and a list, are given in Appendix (B) [Vol. I p. 297].

§ 4. 'In public, deliberative, speaking (the four forensic issues may be applied to its special subjects), it may be contended (against an opponent), (1) that the future facts alleged will not be (i.e. that the consequences which are assumed to result from the policy recommended will not take place); or admitting that, (2) that it will be unjust; or (3) inexpedient; or (4) that the amount and importance of them will not be so
great as the other anticipates. (The principal attention of the speaker is of course to be directed to the point immediately in question,) but he must also be on the look out for any lurking fallacy or misstatement outside the main point or issue: for the one may be shewn necessarily to imply the other. τεκμήριον, a necessary sign, or indication, I 2. 17. The construction is, ταύτα φαίνεται τεκμήρια τῶν ἄλλων, ὡστ' ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἢ δὲ περὶ ὀντῶν ἢ μὴ ὀντων, οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξις ἐστι καὶ ἀνάγκη: ἔχει γὰρ 6 τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην. οὐ δεὶ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ

§ 5. ‘Examples are most appropriate to public speaking, enthymemes more so to forensic’. Pleading gives more occasion to the employment of logical reasoning; it admits of closer and subtler argumentation; for the reasons stated in III 12. 5. Comp. I 9. 40, where the facts are the same, but the reason assigned for the latter different.

‘For the one’, (understand δημηγορία, from δημηγορεύωντα. Victorius understands συμβουλή, and Vater πίστις),1 dealing as it does with the future, is forced consequently to derive examples from past events (from which the analogous events future are inferred), whilst the other2 (understand in like manner δίκη from δικαιωτέρα; not πίστις as Vater)4 deals with matters of fact, true or false, which admit to a greater extent (than deliberative speaking) of demonstrative reason and necessary conclusions (not to the full extent, which is found only in science): for past facts involve a kind of necessity1. Past events are beyond recall, fixed and definite, and thus have a sort of necessary character about them; and they can be argued about, and their relations deduced, with some approach to certainty: about things future no exact calculation is possible, anticipation and inference from the past is all that nature allows: uncertainty is the characteristic of the future.

§ 6. ‘The enthymemes, or argumentative inferences, should not be all brought forward one after another, in a continuous connected series, but mixed ὑπ' ἄνδα with other topics: otherwise they injure one another by destroying κατά the effect1. (And this is not all,) for there is also a

1 This is, “to relieve the weariness, and assist the intelligence of the uncultivated audience. A long and connected chain of arguments not only puzzles and confounds a listener unaccustomed to continuous reasoning, but also wearies and overwhms him: so that, one argument coming upon another before he has perceived the force of the preceding, they clash together, come into conflict, as it were, and the force and effect of the whole is weakened or destroyed. Comp. I 2. 12, 13, II 22. 3, alibi.” From Introd. p. 357.
limit of quantity; (as Homer says, Od. iv 204, Menelaus to Nestorides Pisisstratos.) “Dear boy, seeing that thou hast said as much as a prudent man would” (speak and utter, εἰς οὖν καὶ ἔξεσθε)—τόσα he says, not τοιαῦτα, shewing thereby that it is the quantity and not the quality of the words that he had in view.

§ 7. “(Another topic is) not to look for arguments about every thing (see again ii 22. 3): otherwise, you will do like some philosophers, who draw conclusions better known and more to be trusted (easier to believe, more self-evident or evident at first sight) than the premisses from which they deduce them. Quint. v 12. 8, Nec tamen omnibus semper quae invenerimus argumentis onerandus est iudex: quia et taedium afferunt et fidem detrahunt... In rebus vero aptitis argumentari tam sit stultum quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen (a lamp, or other artificial light, made by human agency) inferre.

§ 8. “Also, when you are trying to excite emotion (appealing to the feelings) use no logical argument: for either it will knock out (drive out, expel) the emotion, or (the emotion will get the better of it and) the argument will have been stated in vain: all simultaneous motions mutually drive out one another, and are either obliterated altogether (by the co-existence) or (the less powerful) is (still further) weakened; overpowered by the stronger. Comp. Poet. xxiv 22, νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφαιρεῖ ήδύων τὸ ἄτοπον, and again § 23, ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λαμπρὰ λέξιν τὰ τε θέσι καὶ τίς διανοίας. Long. de Subl. § 15, φύσεις δὲ πῶς, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπόσαω, ἀεὶ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούομεν ἀδει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ περιελκόμεθα εἰς τό κατά φαντασιὰν ἐρπληκτικόν, ὡς τὸ πραγματικόν ἐγκρυπτεῖται περιλαµὰTroγον. And again § 17 ult. τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ὑψή, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγυτέρω κείμενα διὰ την ψυχικὴν των συγγένειας καὶ διὰ λαμπρότητα, ἀεὶ τῶν σχημάτων προεμφανίζεται, καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἀποσκαίζει καὶ οἷον ἐν κατακαλύψει τηρεῖ. Twining ad Poet. p. 424, note 227.

“Nor again, when you would give the speech an ethical cast, should there be any attempt to combine enthymeme with it; for proof has no
moral character nor moral purpose'. When the hearer’s mind, says Schrader (in substance), is occupied with the impression of the moral and intellectual good qualities which the speaker is endeavouring to convey to them, of his intelligence and good intentions, he has neither time nor inclination to attend to the proof of anything else.

§ 9. ‘Still, general maxims are to be employed both in narrative and in proof, by reason of the ethical character which belongs to them’. (See II 21. 16, III 16. 8.) This is illustrated by a γνώμη that “it is folly to trust” any one, in the instance of a deposit which has not been returned (Victorius). The maxim is expressed by Epicharmus in the well-known verse, Νάψε, καὶ μέμνα’ ἀποστείν ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν, quoted by Polybius, Dio Chrysostom, and Cic. ad Att. I 19. 6. Müller, Fragm. Phil. Gr. p. 144. Epicharm. Fr. 255.

‘And I have given it, and that, knowing all the while “that trust is folly”. If your object is to appeal to the feelings (τὸ λεος is the πάθος here appealed to), (express it thus) “And I don’t regret it, though I have been wronged : for he (the opponent) it is true has the advantage in profit, but I in justice”’. Compare the first example in c. 16. 9.

§ 10. ‘(Here again, as in general) public speaking is more difficult than pleading (see I 1. 10); and naturally1 [so, because it is concerned with the future.]

[On the ‘times’ with which the three classes of speeches, λόγοι δικαικοί, συμβουλευτικοί and ἐπιδικτικοί are concerned, see I 3. 4, τῷ μὲν συμβουλευτικῷ ὁ μέλλων...τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.

ἐκεῖ δὲ—ἀδήλων δὲ] ‘whereas in the former case (forensic oratory) the speaker is concerned with the past, which, as Epimenides the Cretan said, is already known even to diviners ; for he himself was not in the habit of divining the future, but only (interpreting) the obscurities of the past.’

καὶ τοῖς μᾶντεσιν] as has been noticed elsewhere, “was doubtless meant by Epimenides as a sarcasm upon his prophetic brethren, who pretended to see into futurity. ‘Even diviners’, said he, ‘impostors as they are, can prophesy what is past’”. Introd. p. 358, note.

1 At this point the manuscript of Mr cope’s Commentary comes to an end; the rest of the notes have accordingly been supplied by Mr Sandys.
The statement that Epimenides specially devoted himself as a soothsayer to solving the riddles of the past, is exemplified by his being invited by the Athenians to advise them as to the purification of the city from the pestilence which arose in consequence of the crime of Cylon (Plutarch, reipubl. ger. pr. 27, Pausanias, I 14.4, Diogenes Laert. I 10: Grote, H. G. chap. x sub fineum). Plato, who calls him a θεός ἀνφ, speaks of his foretelling the future (Legg. 642 D), and the very gift which in the text he appears to disclaim is similarly ascribed to him by Cicero, who after saying est enim ars in iis qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt, classes Epimenides among those who are destitute of this art; qui non ratione aut coniectura, observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitans quodam animi, aut soluto liberoque motu, futura praesentieunt (de divin. I 18. 34). But the office of the prophet, or intermediary interpreter between God and man, was not necessarily confined to the prediction of the future, but also included the expounding of the will of heaven respecting the present and the past. Spengel observes: "dicit ἐμαυτεύετο, non ἐμαυτεύεσαι, i.e. plerumque, non semper."

καὶ ὁ νόμος—ἀπόδειξις] 'Besides, in forensic pleadings, the law supplies a subject; and when you once have your starting-point, it is easier to find your proof'.

'And it (namely, public speaking) does not admit of many digressions, such as references to one's opponent or to oneself; or again, appeals to the emotions'. The subject of οὐκ ἔχει is τὸ δημογορεῖν, all the intervening clauses from ἐκκὶ δὲ down to ἀπόδειξις being parenthetical.

By διατριβαὶ are meant 'landing-places', where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expatriate into a passing digression. This use of the word, which is not noticed in Liddell and Scott, is defined in Ernesti's Lex. Techn. Gr. as commoratio, excursio et quodam εἰποσίδον, quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia. Comp. Menander, διαφρεῖσις ἐπιδιεικτικῶν (Spengel's Rhet. Gr. III 338), ἔπαινα (τὰς διατριβὰς) εἶναι τὸ ποιητὴ μὲν ἄλλα (ἄλλως Wautz) προσφέρουσιν ή γὰρ ἔξωνια καὶ τὸν κατὰ σχολὴν λέγειν, καὶ τὸ περισταλλὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κόσμων καὶ τὰς κατακεναίς οὐτὲ κόρων οὔτε ἄνδρας παρίστασιν, (καίτοι οὐκ ἄγνοις ἄσαυτως δ' εἴναι τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τὰς ἀκαίρους διατριβὰς) συγγαφεῖσι δὲ ἢ λογοποιοὺς ἐλαχίστη ἔξωνια.

ἀλλ' ἕκιστα—ἐξίστησι] 'On the contrary, there is less room (for digression) in this than in either of the other branches of Rhetoric, unless the speaker quits his proper subject'. With ἐξίστησι, compare supra 14. 1, εἰς ἐκτοπίαν.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 17 §§ 10, 11.

έξιστηται. δει οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνης ρήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἴον δικαδιαμοίρων μὲν ἐν 11 τῷ πανηγυρικῷ. Χάρητος δ' ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδοὺς ἐπαινεῖ, οἴον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀδὶ γὰρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὃ ἐλεγεῖ Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος,

οἱ Ἀθήνης ρήτορες]. This does not imply that Aristotle himself was absent from Athens while writing the Rhetoric; here and elsewhere he simply uses the phrase which would be most intelligible to his readers, whether at a distance from Athens or not. Poet. v 6, 1449 b 7, τῶν Ἀθήνων (κωμωδικῶν) Κράτης πρῶτος ἦρξεν κ. τ. λ. καὶ συρὰς II 23. 11 Ἀθήνης Μαντίς τῷ ρήτορι. This usage is rather different from the suspicious phrase in c. 11 ad fin., οἱ Ἀττικοί ρήτορες.

ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ. The Panegyric of Isocrates is strictly speaking a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a λόγος ἐπιδικτικός, in so far as it eulogizes the public services of Athens (§§ 21—98), while it also digresses into the region of λόγος δικαίωμα when it attacks (κατηγορεῖ) the conduct of Sparta and her partisans (§§ 110—114).

ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ. By this is meant the pamphlet generally known as Isocratis de Pace, where the policy of the Athenian general Chares in the conduct of the Social war is criticised, though his name is not mentioned, § 27, ἀνάγισε τὸν ἡγεῖ τῶν εἰθωμένων ἐπιχειροῦσα δημηγορεῖν... τὰ μὲν ἀναμνήσθαι τῶν δὲ κατηγορηθῆναι.

§ 11. 'In speeches of display you must introduce laudations into your speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does; for he is always bringing in some character'. The reference to Isocr. is explained by his laudatory episode on Theseus in the Helen §§ 22—38; on Agamemnon in the Panathenaicus §§ 72—84; and on Timotheus in the ἀντίδοσις § 107 seq. Spengel, who gives the first two references, also cites some less striking instances, the episode on Paris in Hel. §§ 41—48, on Pythagoras and the Egyptian priests in Busiris §§ 21—29, and on poets ib. §§ 38—40. Comp. Dionys. Halic. de Isocr. lud. c. 4, where, among the points in which Isocrates appears superior to Lysias, special mention is made of τὸ διαλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοιοὶς ἰδίαις μεταβολῆς καὶ ξίνως ἐπεισοδίως.

ἐπεισοδίων. Poet. XVII 7, ὑποδέχεται τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδίων, ὅπως δὲ ἦσται οἰκεῖα τὰ ἐπεισόδια σκοπεῖν. ib. XXIV 7, (of epic poetry) τούτῳ ἐχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρεπεῖαν καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τῶν ἀκούσαντα καὶ ἐπεισοδίων ἀναφορικός ἐπεισοδίως. Quintil. III 9. 4, egressio vero vel...excessus, sive est extra causam, non polet esse pars causae; sive est in causa, aedium interum vel ornamentum partium est earum ex quibus aedificatur.

And this is what Gorgias meant when he remarked that he was never at a loss for something to say; for if (for instance) he speaks of
τούτο ἔστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει, Πηλέα ἐπανεῖ, 
εἰτα Αἰακόν, εἰτα τὸν θεὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδριάν ἦ 
12 τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ· ὅ τοιοῦτo ἐστίν. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν 
ἀποδείξεις καὶ θηλικῶς λεκτέων καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν 
δὲ μὴ ἔχεις ἐνθυμήματα, θηλικῶς· καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐπιεῖ·— 
P. 1418 b. 
κεῖ ἀρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἦ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

Achilles, he (naturally) praises Peleus, next Aeacus, then Zeus himself (the father of Aeacus); and similarly valour also (the special virtue of Achilles), and so and so (so ad infinitum); and this is just what I have been describing.

From this passage of Gorgias the existence of a panegyric oration ('in praise of Achilles'), is inferred by Dr Thompson (on p. 178 of his ed. of the Gorgias), who also suggests that "a fragment preserved by the Scholiast on Iliad iv 450 may have belonged to this speech: 
ἀνεμλύσοντο δὲ λίτας ἀπειλαὶ καὶ εὐχάρις ὁμωγαλί"

The unfailing resource of complimentary episodes on which Gorgias appears to have prided himself, may be paralleled by Pindar's favourite device of leading up by easy transitions to the praises of the Aeacidae (Isthm. iv (V) 20, τὸ δ' ἐμὸν οὖν ἀτριν Ἀλκιδόν κεῖρ ἄνων γείτνταί; and also by the artifice adopted by the rhetorician Lyceophon, de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 30, as explained by Alexander Aphrodisiensis: — "the sophist Lyceophon, when he was compelled by some persons to write an encomium upon the lyre, and found that he hadn't very much to say about it, first very briefly touched upon the praises of the sensible lyre, which we have here on earth, and then mounted up to that in heaven...the constellation called the Lyre, upon which he composed a long and beautiful and excellent discourse" (from Cope's translation in Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. Ii, No. V, p. 141).

ἡ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ] In Vol. iii, No. vii, p. 75 of the Journal above mentioned, Mr Cope has the following note: "The sentence hangs so ill together, and the ἡ has so little meaning, that I think we ought to change it into the relative pronoun ἧ: and then the sentence will run 'and in like manner valour, which performs such and such feats,' i.e. he first praises valour generally, and then proceeds to enumerate different acts of prowess; which may be multiplied ad infinitum." This suggestion, it may be remarked, harmonizes fairly with the reading of ms A* ἡ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἥ (not ὅ) τοιοῦτo ἐστίν. It has been anticipated by Foss (de Gorgia p. 77 ap. Spengel) who proposes ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδριάν ἦ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ δ τοιῶν γε ἐστίν.

Spengel's own suggestion is εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων (Α*, Q, Z*) Πηλέα ἐπανεῖ...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδριάν ἦ τὰ καὶ τὰ, ποιεῖ δ τοιῶν ἐστίν.

§ 12. ‘If you have proofs to produce, you may express yourself both in the ethical style, and in that of proof besides; but if you are at a loss for enthymemes, then in the ethical style alone. In fact, it better befits a man of worth to appear in his true character than that his speech be elaborately reasoned’. The change of subject in the last clause would have been more sharply marked by αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι χρηστὸν ἦ τὸν λόγον
§ 13. 'Of enthymemes, those that refute are more popular than those that prove; because a syllogistic conclusion is more clearly drawn (thereby); for opposites are more readily recognised when set beside one another.' Comp. II 23. 30, εὐδοκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἑνθυμιμάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀνοδικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγῆς μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι εἰν μικρὸ τὸ ἐλεγκτικῶν ἑνθύμου, παράλληλα δὲ ἕνα καὶ τὸ ἅρμα τῆς μᾶλλον. The Ἄγγελος which is described in Anal. Pr. II 20, 66 b 10, as ἀντιφάσεως συναγωγισμός, meets the opponent's conclusion with a counter-syllogism drawing a conclusion contrary to that of the opponent, while the ἐνστάσησις checks the opponent's argument at an early point by attacking one of his premisses (see Introd. pp. 264, 5).

§ 14. 'The refutation of your opponent is not a distinct division of the speech; on the contrary, it is part of the proofs to refute the opponent's positions either by contrary proposition or by counter-syllogism' (i.e. by Ἀγγέλως).

Quint. III 9. 5. Tamen nec his assentior, qui detrahren refutacionem, tangquam probationi subjictam, ut Aristoteles, haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat.

'Now both in public deliberation and in forensic pleading it is necessary, when you are the opening speaker, to state your own proofs first, and then to meet the arguments on the other side, by direct refutation and by pulling them to pieces beforehand.'

For ἀπαντᾷ, comp. Apsines Rhet. peri λύσεως c. 7 (Spengel's Rhet. Gr. II 366), εὖ δὲ καὶ ἀπείρον ἀπαντήσῃς κατὰ πληκτότητα ἡ ποσοτήτα ἡ ἅλλο τι τῶν ἀδελφάτων ἡ κατὰ ἀντιπαράστασιν.

For προδιασώστον ("cutting up by anticipation") comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 13, προδιασώστε λέγον, ib. § 12, προκατελθεῖ...προδιασώστε...διαστᾶσιν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τούτου, ib. 33 (34). 11, προκαταλημμένον διαστᾶσιν. Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 199, διαστᾶσιν (τῆς παιδείας) ὑπὸ σκότους ἀφελεῖν δυναμέναι (ib. § 300); Dem. Or. 13 § 12, διασώστε τὰ παρὰ καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ προγονῶς ἐπιρρέει.

'But if there is much variety in the opposition, you should begin with the points opposed to you.' For πολύχος (manifold, complex, diversified,
διασύροντα. ἤν δὲ πολύχως ἢ ἢ ἐναντίως, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἶον ἐποίησε Καλλήστρατος ἐν τῇ Ἔμπο συμπληρωματική ἔκκλησια: ἄ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελών ύστερον τὸτε αὐτὸς εἶπεν. ύστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον ταῖς πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντι-

συλλογικὸμεν, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτὸ εὐδοκιμοκότα ἢ· ὡσπερ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἢ

ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὑ ἡ δική εἰρηκέναι. δεὶ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ

ἀκροτῆ 

τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ ἐσται δεὶ ἄν ἀνέλησι. 

dio ὅ πρὸς 

πάντα ἢ 

τὰ μέγιστα 

ἡ 

τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ

πολυμικής), comp. de Part. Anim. II 10, 656 a 5, πολυχοντερὰ ἰδέα, where it is combined with πολυμορφοτέρα.

On Callistratus, see note on 17. 13. The reference is probably to the embassy on which Callistratus was sent into the Peloponnesus, shortly before the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. ἡ Μεσσηνιακή ἐκκλησια can hardly mean anything else than 'the public assembly of the Messenians', and not 'the assembly held (at Athens) respecting the Messenians', (which last appears to be the view of Sauppe, Or. Att. II 218, note 1; A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit I p. 113, rightly understands it die Volksgemeinde der Messenier). It was on this embassy that Epaminondas, cum in conventum venisset Arcadam petens ut societatem cum Thebanis et Argyvis facerent, was confronted by Callistratus, Atheniensium legatus qui eloquentia omnes eo praestabat tempore, who urged them to ally themselves with Athens (Nepos, Epam. 6, quoted by A. Schaefer).

προανελών κ.τ.λ.] i.e. It was not until after he had by anticipation got rid of the arguments of his opponents that he stated his own arguments. οὕτω, 'accordingly'; similarly used after the participle μαχεσάμενον, at the end of the next section.

§ 15. 'When you are speaking in reply, you should first mention the arguments against the statement on the other side, by refuting that statement and drawing up counter-syllogisms, and especially if the arguments on the opposite side are well received; for just as the mind refuses to open itself favourably to one who has been made the victim of prejudice, the same applies to oratory also, if your opponent is held to have made a good speech'.

'You must therefore as it were make room in the hearer's mind for the speech that is about to be made, and this will be effected by getting out of the way your opponent's speech' (with which the minds of your audience are pre-occupied).

'Hence you should establish the credibility of your own case, by first contending either against all or the most important or the most popular or the most easily refuted of the adverse arguments'. As an instance, Aristotle refers to the lines in the Troades of Euripides, beginning with
969, the first line of Hecuba's lengthy reply to Helen's speech in her own defence; then follows a line καὶ τίνης δεῖξαι μὴ λέγουσαν ένδικα. After this, in a passage beginning with the lines εὖ γὰρ Ἦραν παρθένον τε Πολλὰδα οὕτως εἰς τοσοῦτον ἄμβας ἐπίθεσιν δοκο, she disposes of Helen's weakest argument first, an argument which Euripides, like a skilful rhetorician, has placed in the middle of Helen's speech, lines 932—5, μνῆ Κύπρεσ θεά, καὶ τοσοῦθεν οὕμοι γάμοι οὖν ένησαν 'Ελλάδ', οὐ κρατείσθ' τε βαρβάρως.

§ 16. 'As regards ethical proof, since there are some things, which, if you say them of yourself, are either invidious or tedious or provoke contradiction, or which, if said of another, involve slander or rudeness, you must ascribe them to some one else instead.'

The reference to the Philippus of Isocrates points (according to Victorius) to p. 96 D §§ 72—78, where the writer gets rid of the indelicacy of himself reminding Philip of the current imputation that his growing power οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς 'Ελλάδος ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταύτην αὐξάνεται, by attributing it to others in the words, αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ σε διαβαλλόμενον υπὸ τῶν σοφὸν φιλονότων in § 73, and by describing it in § 78 as τοιαύτην φήμην σαφῶς περιφρομένην, ἢ οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ περιθείναι σοι ζητοῦσι. This, however, seems to be open to the objection pointed out by Spengel, that Isocrates can hardly be regarded as putting what are really his own views as a friend of Philip into the mouth of that monarch's enemies ("at vix Isocrates ipse haec animo probans vera putabat"). Spengel accordingly prefers taking it as a reference to §§ 4—7, where, instead of expressing his own satisfaction with one of his compositions, he states that his friends who have heard it recited had been struck by its truthful statement of facts, § 4, and had expected that, if published, it would have led to the establishment of peace; it so happened, however, that Philip had concluded peace, before the fastidious rhetorician had elaborated his pamphlet to a sufficient degree to think it deserving of publication. Perhaps a still more apposite passage, which is omitted by Victorius and Spengel, is that in p. 87 B, § 23, where the writer, after describing himself as deterred by his friends from addressing Philip, adds that finally ἐσπευσίων μᾶλλον ἤγερ πεμφθήναι σοι τῶν λόγων τούτων, ἔλεγον δ' ὦς ἐλπίζοψιν οὐ μόνον σε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξείν μοι χάριν ὑπὲρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας ἀπαντας.
κράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὥς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει: ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ

χρημάτων δ' ἀελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐθ' ἀπώμοτον,
καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.

καὶ ὃς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμωνα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης

ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει] §§ 141—149, ἀκρωμένος δὲ τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐτολμηθεὶς εἰσίν κ.τ.λ. In the course of the passage referred to, the rhetorician makes his imaginary friend compliment him on his writings as ὃς μέρισσω ἀλλὰ χάρις τῆς μεγίστης ἄλοιως ὡστε, an expression which would have been open to the imputation of indelicacy (περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγων ἐπίθεθον), had not the writer ingeniously placed it in another man's mouth. The device is sufficiently transparent, even if it were not for the candid confession in § 8, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπανείρε τραϊ αὐτὸν ἐπικρίνῃ, ἐὼρον οὔτε...ἐπικρίνῃς οὐθ' ἀνεπιθέθονε εἰσίν περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναφορά. The same device, in a less refined form, may be noticed in the modern parallel from Martin Chuzzlewit, which will occur to every reader (chap. xxv).

Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει...ἰάμβῳ] Hor. A. P. 79, Archilochum proprius rables armavit iambo. Comp. note on 11 23. 11. Archilochus (Lycambae spretus infido gener, Epod. vi 13), instead of directly attacking Neobule, the daughter of Lycambes, puts his lampoon into the mouth of her own father, thereby ostensibly refraining from a coarseness of invective, which would imply ἄφορκία on his own part, but really intensifying its bitterness; as the reader will naturally argue, 'If her own father can say nothing better of her, what will the rest of the world say?' Comp. Bergk, Gr. Lyr., p. 542, ed. 2, Archil. fragm., οὖν Δυκάμβεο παίδα τῆς ὑπερτίμη. Stobaeus (CX 10, Bergk u.s. p. 552) has preserved nine trochaic lines beginning with the first of the two quotations given by Aristotle, but there is nothing in the passage, so far as there quoted, which illustrates Aristotle's object in here referring to it. There is a rendering of the lines by J. H. Merivale in Wellesley's Anthologia Polyglotta p. 220, beginning Never man again may swear, things shall be as erst they were.

οὗ μοι τὰ Γύγεω] τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει. The four lines of which this is the first are preserved by Plutarch de tranquill. an. c. 10 (Bergk Gr. Lyr. p. 541) and are thus rendered by Milman, No care have I of Gyges' golden store, Unevivious I for sought the gods implore; I have no love of wide and kingly sway But turn from pride my reckless eyes away. On Gyges, the wealthy king of Lydia, compare Herod. 1 12, τοῦ (sc. Γύγεω) καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος δ' Πάριον κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον γενόμενον ἐν ἰάμβῳ τριμέτρῳ ἐπι- μηθή. Archilochus is inveighing against the vice of envy and the vanity of riches, and with a dramatic skill that is one of his characteristics, gives expression to his own feelings by ascribing them to Charon the contented carpenter (comp. Mure, H. G. L. III 167).

Σοφοκλῆς] Antig. 688—700, where Haemon quotes the talk of the AR. III.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 17 § 17; 18 § 1.

Πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὦς λεγόντων ἐτέρων. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλει τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἰον “χρῆ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐνυχοῦντας ὡστὶ γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῦν.” Ἐνθυμηματικὸς δὲ, “εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὡφελιμῶται ὡσι καὶ πλεονεκτικῶται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐνυχοῦντας δὲι καταλλάττεσθαι.”

Περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὐκαιρὸν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἐτέρον εἰρηκὼς ἦ, ὥστε ἐνὸς τοῦ μία ταὐτῆς τούτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας πολίσ..., 700, τοιὸν ἐρωτῆσθαι ἐπέρχεται φάσις. 


Aristotle’s example of a γνώμη seems to be a general reminiscence of a passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρῆ δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰ τοῦτος τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν εἰ τοῦτο γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλείον ἂν τὸν χρόνον τὰ παρόντα διαφυλάξειν τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τὸ πολέμῳ προσέχει τὸν νοῦν ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ τῆς κανονικίας δάντων ἄν μεταβολὴς τόχοις. Spengel gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, δει τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας μὲ περιμένειν ὅσον πέσωσι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing the γνώμη in the form of an ἐνθυμημα, Ar. alters διαλλαγὰς into its synonym καταλλαγαί, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration of similar sounds in δεὶ...διαλλαγαὶ...καταλλάττεσθαι, and the harsh collocation δεὶ διαλλάττεσθαι.

CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of ‘Interrogation’ of one’s opponent (§§ 1—4), and of ‘Reply’ to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few remarks on the use of ‘ridicule’, as an accessory to argument. These may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, πίστεις, dealt with in the previous chapter, to which the present is an appendix.

“A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some similar advantage.” Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the headings περὶ ἐρωτήσεως and περὶ ἀποκρίσεως, which owes its interest
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 18 § 1.

προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει το ἀτοπον ὄνον Περικλης Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας
mainly to the rareness of such commentaries on the Rhetoric, was edited in 1838 by Seguer from a MS in the library in Paris, and is reprinted in Spengel's Rhetores Graeci I pp. 163–8, and also in his edition of the Rhetoric, Vol. I pp. 147–152. It is a puerile piece of composition, but one or two extracts from it will be given where the writer's language really illustrates the text of Aristotle.

On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by Athenian Law either party to a suit might put questions to the other, and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (ἀνκρωπία) but also at the trial itself (Plato, Apol. 25 D, ἀπόκρωμαι ἢ γαθεί καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρώμασθαι). In the former instance, the answers were taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter, the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court, who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part of his opponent, but only by the enquiries of the jury, which were sometimes even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy's Demosthenes IV Appendix VII On Interrogatories).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: Isaeus Or. 10 (π. τοῦ Ἀγνίου κλήρου) §§ 4, 5, ὅτι ἀνάβησθαι δεύτερο... ὕποτηνος σφ. ἀδελφὸς οὗ τοῦ παῖς Ἀγνίου, ἀδελφὸς δὲ ἡ ἡ ἀδελφῆς γεγονός, ἢ ἀνεφόροις ἢ ἢ ἀνεμφοροῦ ἑπεῖρο διὰ τῆς ἄχριστεος, οὗ τοῦ παῖς Ἀγνίου προσῆκε, τὸ γένος εἰπεῖν. φράσαν οὐς τοντοιο.—ἀνασάσθησθε δι' ὧν ἔχει τινα συγγενέαν αὐτίκην, ἢλ' ἀποκρύνεται πάντα μάλλον ἢ δὲ μαθεῖν υμᾶς. καὶ τοῦ γε πράγματον τι δικαίων οὐ προσήκεν ἀπορείν ἢλ' εὐθὺς λέγειν.

Lysias Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν συντόμων) § 5, (α) μετοίκους εἰ; (β) ναι. (α) μετοικεῖ δι' ἔτερον ὡς πεισόμενος τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τῆς πόλεως, ἢ ἡ ποιήσων ὃ τι ἤπι θεύλη; (β) ἢς πεισόμενος. (α) Ἀλλα τι οὖν ἄξιοις ἢ ἀποθανεῖν εἰ τί πεποίηκα παρὰ τούς νόμους, ἐφ' οἷς θάνατος ἢ ζημία; (β) ἔγγον. (α) ἀπόκρωμαι δὴ μοι, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς πλέον αὐτὸν συμπιέσατι πεντήκοντα φορὰν, ἢν ὁ νόμος ἐξείναι κελεύει; (β) ἐγὼ τῶν ἀρχώντων (not the Archons but the συντόμων of § 7) κελεύωντων συνεπιμάχην. ib. Or. 13 (κατὰ Ἀγαθάνου) §§ 30—33, ἐπ' ἀυτοφορίᾳ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἐξελέγη. ἀπόκρωμαι δὴ μοι κ.λ. ib. Or. 12 (κατὰ Εραστοθένους) § 25, set forth at length in Introtr. p. 364, note. Spengel also gives a reference to Dem. de Cor. § 52.

The subject of questioning and replying in sophistical debate is treated by Aristotle himself in the Sophistici Elenchi, esp. c. xv and xvi, (Grote's Aristotle II pp. 109—115; see also Top. Θ). Some of the more striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. 'As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when your opponent has said the opposite, so that as soon as one more
212 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 18 § 2.

ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἶον τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἥρετο εἰ οἴδειν αὐτὸς, φάσκοντος δὲ, "καὶ πῶς ἀτελεστὸς ὡς;" δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ἢ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δὴλον ἢ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἶον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεούς νομίζειν εἰρήκεν εἰ δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι, ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ ἥρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαιμόνες ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶν ἢ θεῖον τι, φήσαντος δὲ, "ἐστιν οὖν" ἔφη "슨 τις θεῶν μὲν παῖδες οἶεται εἶναι, θεοῦς

question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues', i.e. the result is a reductio ad absurdum.

This Topic is exemplified by Pericles' retort to Lampon, the soothsayer, who is mentioned in Arist. An. 521, Λάμπων δ' ὅμως' έτι καὶ νυν τῶν χρών δόν έξασπάτρι, and Plut. Pericles c. vi, Λάμπωνα τὸν μάχην. 

On ἐρήμη, see note on ΠΠ 24. 2.

The fragment περὶ ἐρωτήσεως (as Spengel points out), besides having ἥρετο and ἄνηρετο instead of ἕρηστο and ἥρετο respectively, closes with the paraphrase συμφήσατος δὲ τοῦ Λάμπωνος, καὶ πῶς εἶπεν ἀτέλεστον ὡς.

§ 2. 'Or, secondly, (you may employ interrogation) when one point is self-evident, and it is clear that the person interrogated will grant you the other as soon as you put the question. For, when you have obtained your first premiss by asking your opponent to admit it, you must not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question, but simply state the conclusion yourself'. Soph. El. 15, 174 ὅ 38, οὐ δὲ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικός ἐρωτῶν ἕνα δ' οὐδ' ἐρωτήσαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν χρηστῶν. Ὑπω. Θ 2, 154 a 7, οὐ δὲ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρωτήματι ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνυπόθαντος, οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέαν συλλογισμός.

The illustration is taken from the Apologia of Socrates. 'Socrates, when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of the gods, asked (νυκτ. lect. said), if there was anything which he called divine, and on his admitting this, he enquired whether the divine beings (δαιμόνες) were not either children of the gods or of godlike nature, and on his answering "Yes", "Is there any one" he said "who believes in the existence of the children of the gods and yet denies that of the gods themselves?" This corresponds only partially to the well-known passage in Plat. Apol. p. 27, already commented on in the note on ΠΠ 23. 8. There is probably some corruption in the word εἰρήκεν where we should expect ἥρετο or ἔρετο. Spengel, following A, and the vetus translatio, reads εἰρήκεν ὡς δὲ δαιμόνιον τι λέγων, ἥρετο. "Illum omologyassavon de sensui et consilio Aristotelis repugnat, neque εἰρήκεν εἰ significat: quaesivit ex Meleto num daemonion guid crederet. Sed Meletus de Socrate εἰρήκεν ὡς δὲ δαιμόνιον τι λέγων." After quoting part of the passage of Plato, he says in conclusion, "Vides Socratem id quod Meletus dixit, non interrogare, sed affirmare."
§ 3. ‘Further, (interrogation is appropriate) when the speaker is intending to shew up his opponent either in a self-contradiction or a paradox.’

§ 4. ‘Fourthly, when it is impossible (for the opponent) to meet the question, without giving a sophistical answer’. For the examples of this topic, ἄττι μὲν ἄττι δ’ οὖ, κ.κ.λ., comp. Soph. Elench. 19, 177 a 21, ‘the proper way for the respondent to deal with questions involving equivocation of terms or amphiboly of propositions is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the double meaning’: δισερ τὸ σιγώτα λέγων ὅτι ἢτων ὡς, ἢτα δ’ ὡς, καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτόν ἢτων ὃ, ἢτα δ’ ὃ οὖ (Grote’s Ar. II 114), where the interrogation is characterized as sophistical, while here the same invidious epithet is applied to the answer. Comp. Top. Θ 7, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσαφῶς καὶ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενων...τὸ μὲν πρᾶσος τὸ δ’ ἀληθές. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; Ar. Ach. 396, ἔδωκα ἄττι Εὐριπίδης; οὐ δὲ ἔδωκα, οὐδὲν τ’ ἢτων, έπει δὲν, έχεις.

θορύβον] This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any ‘sensation’ in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see Riddell’s note on its application to δικαστά, Introd. to Plato’s Apology, p. IX). Isocr. ἀντιδίκα, § 20, μετὰ θορύβον καὶ χαλεπτήγας ἄκρωται τῶν ἀπολογουμένων. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

ἂν ἄποροντες] It is not the audience that is perplexed; on the contrary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character of the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the person who gives a ‘sophistical’ answer, who is apparently perplexed; hence we should accept the correction ἄποροντες proposed by Spengel and Schneidein. The Paris ms A actually has ἄποροντας, which suggested to Spengel the alternative emendation ἄροντα. Similarly the fragment πρὸς ἑστῶτες has, πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς οὕτω ἀποκρινόμενοι οἱ ἀκρωμένοι θορύβοντι αὐτὶ ἄποροντας καὶ οὖν ἐγγοντας αὐτεῖστιν.

‘But otherwise’ (i.e. except under the above limitations), ‘the speaker must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an objection, the questioner is considered beaten’. ἑντύτη is here used of giving a check by interposing an ‘instance’ or ἔνθατης. See Introd. p. 269.

ἄττι μάλιστα συντρέφειν] ‘to pack into as small a compass as possible’.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 17 §§ 13, 14.

13 τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὦτι ὅσα ἐλεγχοὺς ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δῆλον ὦτι συνελεγκτικά, παρ’ ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τάναντια γνωρίζεται.

14 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντιδίκον οὐκ ἔτερον τι εἴδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συνελεγκτικοὶ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγεις τὰς ἐναντίον πίστεις πρότερον, ὑστερον δὲ πρὸς τάναντια ἀπαντάν λύσει καὶ πρὸ- p. 145.

ἀκριβῆ. Spengel asks with some reason, “nonne nexus flagitat χρηστῶν τῶν λόγων φαινεσθαι ἢ ἀκριβῆ? magis enim convenit probo viro, ut ἰδιώς quam ut ἐπιδεικτικὸς loquatur.”

§ 13. ‘Of enthymemes, those that refute are more popular than those that prove; because a syllogistic conclusion is more clearly drawn (thereby); for opposites are more readily recognised when set beside one another’. Comp. II 23, 30, εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἔναντιον εἶναι εἰ μικρὸ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνδύμα, παράλληλα δὲ φαίνεται εἰς τὰ ἀκρωτήτα μᾶλλον. The ἡλεγχος which is described in Anal. Pr. II 20, 66 ὁ 10, as ἀντιφάσεως συνελεγκτικός, meets the opponent’s conclusion with a counter-syllogism drawing a conclusion contrary to that of the opponent, while the ἐνστάσει checks the opponent’s argument at an early point by attacking one of his premisses (see Introduct. pp. 264, 5).

§ 14. ‘The refutation of your opponent is not a distinct division of the speech; on the contrary, it is part of the proofs to refute the opponent’s positions either by contrary proposition or by counter-syllogism’ (i.e. by ἡλεγχος).

Quint. III 9, 5. Tamen nec his assentior, qui detrahunt refutationem, tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles, haec enim est quae constitut, illa quae desinitat.

‘Now both in public deliberation and in forensic pleading it is necessary, when you are the opening speaker, to state your own proofs first, and then to meet the arguments on the other side, by direct refutation and by pulling them to pieces beforehand.’

For ἀπαντῶν, comp. Apsines Rhet. peri λύσεως c. 7 (Spengel’s Rhet. Gr. II 366), σο δὲ κατα’ αὐξήσαιν ἀπαντήσῃς κατὰ πῃκικτήτα καὶ ποσύνης ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀπειροτῶν ἢ κατὰ ἀντίπαραστάσιν.

For προδιασφάρων (‘cutting up by anticipation’) comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 13, προδίστυρε λέγων, ib. § 12, προκατέλαβε...προδιάβαλε...διασφάρειν πρῶτερον ὑπὸ τοῦτο, ib. 33 (34). 1, προκαταλαμβάνων διασφάρειν. Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 199, διασφάρων (τὴν παιδίαν) ἃς οὐδὲν ἀφελεῖν δυναίμην (ib. § 300); Dem. Or. 13 § 12, διέστυρε τὰ παρόντα καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἔπιστησε.

‘But if there is much variety in the opposition, you should begin with the points opposed to you’. For πολύχως (manifold, complex, diversified,


On Callistratus, see note on 1 7. 13. The reference is probably to the embassy on which Callistratus was sent into the Peloponnesus, shortly before the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. Ἡ Μεσσηνική ἐκκλησία can hardly mean anything else than 'the public assembly of the Messenians', and not 'the assembly held (at Athens) respecting the Messenians', (which last appears to be the view of Sauppe, Or. Att. II 218, note 1; A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit I p. 113, rightly understands it die Volksgemeinde der Messenier). It was on this embassy that Epaminondas, cum in conventum venisset Arcadum petens ut societatem cum Thebanis et Argivis facerent, was confronted by Callistratus, Atheniensium legatus qui eloquentia omnes eo praestabat tempore, who urged them to ally themselves with Athens (Nepos, Epam. 6, quoted by A. Schaefer).

προανελῶν κ.λ.] i.e. It was not until after he had by anticipation got rid of the arguments of his opponents that he stated his own arguments. οὖν, 'accordingly'; similarly used after the participle μαχισόμενον, at the end of the next section.

§ 15. 'When you are speaking in reply, you should first mention the arguments against the statement on the other side, by refuting that statement and drawing up counter-syllogisms, and especially if the arguments on the opposite side are well received; for just as the mind refuses to open itself favourably to one who has been made the victim of prejudice, the same applies to oratory also, if your opponent is held to have made a good speech'.

'You must therefore as it were make room in the hearer's mind for the speech that is about to be made, and this will be effected by getting out of the way your opponent's speech' (with which the minds of your audience are pre-occupied).

'Hence you should establish the credibility of your own case, by first contending either against all or the most important or the most popular or the most easily refuted of the adverse arguments'. As an instance, Aristotle refers to the lines in the Troades of Euripides, beginning with
§ 16. ‘As regards ethical proof, since there are some things, which, if you say them of yourself, are either invidious or tedious or provoke contradiction, or which, if said of another, involve slander or rudeness, you must ascribe them to some one else instead’.

The reference to the Philippus of Isocrates points (according to Victorius) to p. 96 D §§ 72—78, where the writer gets rid of the indelicacy of himself reminding Philip of the current imputation that his growing power αὖχ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἄλλ’ εἶπα ταύτῃ οὐκέτας, by attributing it to others in the words, αλοιθάνοι γὰρ σε διαβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοὶ φθονοῦντων in § 73, and by describing it in § 78 as τοιαύτῃ φήμῃ σαυτῆς περιφρομήνη, ἵνα μὲν ἔχθροι περιθείναι σοὶ ζητοῦν. This, however, seems to be open to the objection pointed out by Spengel, that Isocrates can hardly be regarded as putting what are really his own views as a friend of Philip into the mouth of that monarch’s enemies (“at vix Isocrates ipse haec animo probans vera putabat”). Spengel accordingly prefers taking it as a reference to §§ 4—7, where, instead of expressing his own satisfaction with one of his compositions, he states that his friends who have heard it recited had been struck by its truthful statement of facts, § 4, and had expected that, if published, it would have led to the establishment of peace; it so happened, however, that Philip had concluded peace, before the fastidious rhetorician had elaborated his pamphlet to a sufficient degree to think it deserving of publication. Perhaps a still more apposite passage, which is omitted by Victorius and Spengel, is that in p. 87 B, § 23, where the writer, after describing himself as deterred by his friends from addressing Philip, adds that finally ἐσπευδὸν μᾶλλον γὰρ πεμφθῆναι σοι τὸν λόγον τούτον, ἔλεγον δ’ ὡς ἔλεπίζουσιν οὐ μόνος σὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξείθεν μοι χάριν ὑπὲρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἀπαντᾷ.
κράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ὕψει: ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ

χρημάτων δὲ ἀελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἀπώμοτον,
καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ὁμοιόμορος ταῦτα·
οὐ μοι τὰ Γάγεω.

καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης

ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει] §§ 141—149, άκροβόμους δὲ τις τῶν ἐπιτίθεντος ἐτόλμησεν εἴπειν κ.τ.λ. In the course of the passage referred to, the rhetorician makes his imaginary friend compliment him on his writings as οὐ μέρισθι ἀλλὰ χάρως τῆς μεγίστης ἄξιους ὄστα, an expression which would have been open to the imputation of indelicacy (περὶ αὐτῶν λέγοις ἐπίθεθον), had not the writer ingeniously placed it in another man's mouth. The device is sufficiently transparent, even if it were not for the candid confession in § 8, εἴ μὲν οὖν ἐπαινεῖ ἐρωτότον ἐπιχειρήμα, ἑώρων ούτε...ἐπιχειρίσθην οὐθὲ ἀνεπιθέθος εἰςεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν δυναμόνος.

The same device, in a less refined form, may be noticed in the modern parallel from Martin Chuzzlewit, which will occur to every reader (chap. xxv).

Ἀρχιλοχος ψέγει...ἵμβῳ] Hor. A. P. 79, Archilochum proprius rabies armavit iambo. Comp. note on 11 23. 11. Archilochus (Lykambai spretus infido gener, Epod. vi 13), instead of directly attacking Neobule, the daughter of Lycambes, puts his lampoon into the mouth of her own father, thereby ostensibly refraining from a coarseness of invective, which would imply ἄγονκα on his own part, but only intensifying its bitterness; as the reader will naturally argue, 'If her own father can say nothing better of her, what will the rest of the world say?' Comp. Bergk, Gr. Lyr., p. 542, ed. 2, Archil. fragm., οὕτω δικάμβεω παῖδα τῆς ὑπερήφανος. Stobaeus (CX 10, Bergk u. s. p. 552) has preserved nine trochaic lines beginning with the first of the two quotations given by Aristotle, but there is nothing in the passage, so far as there quoted, which illustrates Aristotles's object in here referring to it. There is a rendering of the lines by J. H. Merivale in Wellesley's Anthologia Polyglotta p. 220, beginning Never man again may swear, things shall be as erst they were.

οὗ μοι τὰ Γάγεω] τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει. The four lines of which this is the first are preserved by Plutarch de tranquill. an. c. 10 (Bergk Gr. Lyr. p. 541) and are thus rendered by Milman, No care have I of Gyges' golden store, Uneven I for nought the gods implore; I have no love of wide and kingly sway But turn from pride my reckless eyes away. On Gyges, the wealthy king of Lydia, compare Herod. I 12, τοῦ (SC. Γάγεω) καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος ὁ Πάρος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον γενόμενον ἐν ἱάμβῳ τριμέστῳ ἐπε- μήνηση. Archilochus is inveighing against the vice of envy and the vanity of riches, and with a dramatic skill that is one of his characteristics, gives expression to his own feelings by ascribing them to Charon the contented carpenter (comp. Mure, H. G. L. III 167).

Σοφοκλῆς] Antig. 688—700, where Haemon quotes the talk of the

AR. III.
17 πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὁς λεγόντων ἑτέρων. δεὶ δὲ καὶ 
µεταβαλλεῖν τὰ ἐνθυµήµατα καὶ γνώµας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε,
οἶνον "χρῆ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας
ἐνυποκόντας οὕτω γὰρ ἂν µέγιστα πλεονεκτούµεν."
ἐνθυµηµατικῶς δὲ, "εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὁφελµάταται
ὡς καὶ πλεονεκτικῶταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε
καταλλάττεσθαι, ἐνυποκόντας δεὶ καταλλάττεσθαι.

περὶ δὲ ἐρωτῆσεως, εὐκαιρὸν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι µά-
λιστα µὲν ὅταν τὸ ἑτέρων εἰρηκῶς ἡ, ὡστε ἔνος
town about Creon’s treatment of Antigone, instead of himself directly
attacking him. 693, τὴν παιδα ταύτην οἶον ὄψεται πόλις..., 700, τοιῶθ
ἐρεµωθησθαι ἐπέργεται φάτη.

§ 17. ‘Further, you should occasionally transform your enthymemes
and express them as general maxims’. Comp. II 21, 1, 2, with the notes
d’Aristote, Vol. II pp. 345—376; and Jebb’s Attic Orators, II 289.

Aristotle’s example of a γνώµη seems to be a general reminiscence of a
passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρῆ δὲ τοὺς µὲν εἰ ἐπάρτοτος
τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθύµειν ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλεῖστον ἄν τις θρόνον τὰ
παρόντα διαφόραζειν τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τὸ πολέµιον προσέχεις τῶν νοῶν ἐκ
γὰρ τῆς παραχῆς καὶ τῆς καυσορίας βάστων ἄν µεταβαλήη τύχων. Spengel
gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, δεὶ τοὺς νοῶν ἔχοντας µὴ περι-
µένειν ἔως ἃν πείσωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing
the γνώµη in the form of an ἐνθύµηµα, Ar. alters διαλλαγάς into its syn-
onym καταλλαγαῖ, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration
of similar sounds in δεὶ...διαλλαγαί...διαλλαττεσθαι, and the harsh
collocation δεὶ διαλλαττεσθαι.

CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of ‘Interrogation’ of one’s opponent (§§ 1—4),
and of ‘Reply’ to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few
remarks on the use of ‘ridicule’, as an accessory to argument. These
may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, πίστεις,
dealt with in the previous chapter, to which the present is an appendix.

“A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public
assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The
object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary
by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place
him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way
that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist
wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence
to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some
similar advantage.” Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the
headings περὶ ἐρωτήσεως and περὶ ἀποκρίσεως, which owes its interest
On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by Athenian Law either party to a suit might put questions to the other, and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (ἀνάκρισις) but also at the trial itself (Plato, Apol. 25 D, ἀνάκρισις δ' γαθεὶ καὶ γαθρὸν ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι). In the former instance, the answers were taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter, the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court, who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part of his opponent, but only by the enquiries of the jury, which were sometimes even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy's Demosthenes IV Appendix VII On Interrogatories).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: Isaeus Or. 10 (π. του Ἀγνίου κλήρου) §§ 4, 5, οὐ δ' ἀνάβηθι δεύτερο ... ἐρωτήσω σε. ἄδελφος ἐστιν ο παῖς Ἀγνίου, ἄδελφιδος ἐστιν ἐδέλφου ἢ ἐξ ἄδελφου γεγονὼς, ἢ ἀνέγερσις, ἢ ἐξ ἀνέγερσις πρὸς μητέρας ή πρὸς πατέρας; ... δεί δ' σε τῇ ἀρχαιαίᾳ δ' τι το παῖς Ἀγνία προσήκει το γένους εἰπεῖν, φράζειν οὖν τουτούς—ἀλλὰ ἀποφαίητο δι' οὐκ ἔχει τὴν συναγίνεται εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀποφαίηται πάντα μάλλον ἢ δ' δεῖ μαθεῖν υἱόν. καίτοι τον γε πράττοντα τι δικαίων οὐ προσήκει ἀποφαίηται ἀλλ' εὐθὺς λέγειν.

Lysias Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν συστατῶν) § 5, (a) μέτοικοι εἰ; (b) μεν. (a) μετοικεῖ τι πότερον ὁ πεισόμενος τοὺς νόμους τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ἢ ὁς ποιήσαντος τι τὸν θυγατέρα τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὃ χεῖρας ὑπαίτιος εἰ καὶ ποιητής ὑπαίτιος τοίς νόμοις, ἢ μή ἐπειδὴ ὁ παῖς ἐπηρεάστηκεν παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις, ἢ μή ἐπηρεάστηκεν. (b) ἄλλο τι αὐτών εἰς ἀκούσια εἰ τοι πεποίηκεν παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις, ἢ μή ἀκούστηκεν ἢ ἡμέρᾳ; (b) ἡγησόμεθα. (a) ἄποκρισις δη μοι, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς πλέον σιγῶ συμπεράνθεις παντελῶς φορμά, ὅντως δ' ἕξειν τὸν κελεύει; (b) ἐγὼ τῶν ἀρχαῖων (not the Archons but the στοιχεῖοι of § 7) κελεύσοντων συνεπράξῃ. ib. Or. 13 (κατὰ Ἀγορᾶδον) §§ 30—33, ἐν' αὐτοφάρφῳ ἐγὼ αὐτῶν ἐξελέξω. ἀπόκρισις δη μοι τ.λ. ib. Or. 12 (κατ' Ἐπαφροδίτου) § 25, set forth at length in Introduct. p. 364, note. Spengel also gives a reference to Dem. de Cor. § 52.

The subject of questioning and replying in sophistical debate is treated by Aristotle himself in the Sophistici Elenchi, esp. c. XV and XVI, (Grote's Aristotle II pp. 109—115; see also Top. Θ). Some of the more striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. 'As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when your opponent has said the opposite, so that as soon as one more
iērōn, eipōntos de ὤν ὅθεν οὐχ ὁδὲν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἢρητο εἰ οἴδεν αὐτὸς, φάσκοντος δέ, "καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστον ὄν;" δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ἢ, τὸ δὲ ἑρωτήσαντα δῆλον ἢ ὅταν δῶσει πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μιᾶν πρώτασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης Μελίτου οὖν φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ θεοὺς νομίζειν εἰρήκεν εἰ δαίμονον τι λέγοι, ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ ἢρητο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παίδες εἰεν ἡ θείον τι, φήσαντος δὲ, "ἐστιν οὖν" ἐφη "ὁς τις θεῶν μὲν παίδας οἷσται εἶναι, θεοὺς question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues', i.e. the result is a reductio ad absurdum.

This Topic is exemplified by Pericles' retort to Lampon, the soothsayer, who is mentioned in Arist. An. 521, Δάμων οἱ δ' ὁμοῦ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀπὸ τὸν χρήσαι ὅταν ἐξασθή τι, and Plut. Pericles c. vi, Δάμωνα τὸν μάρτιν. On τελεθή, see note on II 24. 2.

The fragment περὶ ἐρωτήσεως (as Spengel points out), besides having ἢρητο and ἀνῆρητο instead of ἐπὶ ἢρητο and ἢρητο respectively, closes with the paraphrase συμπέρασμα δὲ τοῦ Δάμωνος, καὶ πῶς εἰπεὶν ἀτέλεστον ὄν; § 2. 'Or, secondly, (you may employ interrogation) when one point is self-evident, and it is clear that the person interrogated will grant you the other as soon as you put the question. For, when you have obtained your first premis by asking your opponent to admit it, you must not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question, but simply state the conclusion yourself'. Soph. El. 15, 174 ὡς 38, οὐ δει δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτασικῶς ἔρωτών ἐνα δ' ὁδῇ ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ' οὐς ὁμολογούμενως χρηστῶν. Τοπ. Θ 2, 154 a 7, οὐ δεὶ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρωτήμα ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνανεοῦσαντος, οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι συλλογισμός.

The illustration is taken from the Apologia of Socrates. 'Socrates, when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of the gods, asked (vulg. lect. said), if there was anything which he called divine, and on his admitting this, he enquired whether the divine beings (daimones) were not either children of the gods or of godlike nature, and on his answering "Yes", "Is there any one" he said "who believes in the existence of the children of the gods and yet denies that of the gods themselves?" This corresponds only partially to the well-known passage in Plat. Apol. p. 27, already commented on in the note on II 23. 8. There is probably some corruption in the word εἰρήκεν where we should expect ἢρωτά ἢρητο or ἢρητο. Spengel, following A' and the vetus translatio, reads εἰρήκεν ὡς ἐν δαιμονίων τι λέγοι, ἢρητο. "Ille omologavit esse sensui et consilio Aristotelis repugnat, neque εἰρήκεν ei significat : quae evisit ex Meleto num daemonion quid eredet. Sed Meletus de Socrate εἰρήκεν ὡς ἐν δαίμονων τι λέγοι." After quoting part of the passage of Plato, he says in conclusion, "Vides Socratem id quod Meletus dixit, non interrogare, sed affirmare."
3 de ou;" eti etan melly n enantia legontata deixein n
4 paraadoxon. tetapron de etan meh enh alla n sofistikos apokrinamenon lysai ein ghar ouwos
apokrinetai, eti esti mev esti di ou, n ta mev ta
di ou, n phei men phei di ou, thoriadoi vos aporointes.
Allas de meh engeirein ein ghar ensthe, kekrathosai
dokei ou ghar oion te pollla erwtan dia twn asbeneian
to akroatoi. di id kai ta enenvymata eti malista
svstrfein dei.

§ 3. Further, (interrogation is appropriate) when the speaker is inten-
tending to shew up his opponent either in a self-contradiction or a paradox'.

§ 4. Fourthly, when it is impossible (for the opponent) to meet the
question, without giving a sophistical answer. For the examples of this
topic, esti mev esti di ou, kpl., comp. Soph. Elench. 19, 177 a 21, 'the
proper way for the respondent to deal with questions involving equivoca-
tion of terms or amphiboly of propositions is to answer them, at the
outset, with a reserve for the double meaning': aspep to sigynta legis
etin ou, esti ou ou etin. Kai ta dekon prakton etin a, esti a ou
(Grote's Ar. II 114), where the interrogation is characterized as sophisti-
cal, while here the same invidious epithet is applied to the answer.
Comp. Top. 7, epi twn asafos kai pleonaxias legomwn...to mev pseudos
to a dehesis. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the
subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the
enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; Ar. Ach. 396,
(Enon est' Eufetides) ouk Enon, Enon te estin, ei gnwmn exesis.

thoriadoin] This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of
either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any 'sensa-
tion' in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see
Kiddell's note on its application to diasktai, Introd. to Plato's Apology,
p. IX). Isocr. antithesis, § 20, meti thoriadoi kai xalasstas akroasthai tov
apologymwn. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in Rhet. ad Alex.
18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

os aporointes] It is not the audience that is perplexed; on the con-
trary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character
of the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the
person who gives a 'sophistical' answer, who is apparently perplexed;
hence we should accept the correction os aporointes proposed by Spengel
and Schneidewin. The Paris MS A actually has aporointas, which sug-
gested to Spengel the alternative emendation aporonta. Similarly the
fragment peri erwtoseis has, prods ghar tous ouwos apokrivanemous os akroemous
thoriadoi vos aporintaos kai oux exostas antesthein.

'But otherwise' (i.e. except under the above limitations), 'the speaker
must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an
objection, the questioner is considered beaten'. enosthe is here used of
giving a check by interposing an 'instance' or enostas. See Introd. p. 269.

etie malista svstrfein] 'to pack into as small a compass as possible'.
5 ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα. διαιροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτησαι τὸ ἐπὶ ἅ ἑλλογίσασθαι: οὖ γὰρ χαλεπῶν προσορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος. φανερὸν δ’ ἦμιν ἐστώ 6 ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τούτο καὶ οἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμπεραινόμενον, εὰν ἐρώτημα ποιῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν

II 24.2, τὸ συνετραμμένον καὶ ἀνυκεμίας εἰς τίνα φαινεῖ τὴν ἐνδύμα. Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 6, ἡ συντρέφουσα τὰ νοηματα καὶ στρογγυλὸς ἐκφέρουσα λέεις. The verb is used metaphorically to express conciseness and condensation of style; in its literal meaning it might be applied to any squeezing and compacting process like that (for instance) of making a snowball. Comp. note on II 7. 5, συντριβάζεσθαι.

§ 5. ‘In answering, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing a distinction, and not expressing yourself too concisely’. Top. Θ 7, 156 a 26, ἐὰν (τὸ ἐσχατία) ἐπὶ τί μὲν ψεύδος ἢ, ἐπὶ τί δ’ ἀλήθει, ἔκτυπῳ μετά τι ἀπελευθερώσει λέγεται καὶ διότι τὸ μὲν ψεύδος τὸ δ’ ἀλήθεις’ ὑστερον γὰρ διαιρούμενον ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεῖρα τὸ ἀμφίβολον. In the fragment περὶ ἀποκρίσεως (as Spengel notices) the latter part is paraphrased in such a manner as to show that the writer read διαιρούντα λόγῳ (omitting καί μὴ) συντόμως.

‘In answering questions that appear to involve you in a contradiction, you must give your explanation immediately in your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion’. This corresponds to what in the old style of our legal pleading would have been termed ‘confession and avoidance’.

ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] namely in Top. lib. VIII (6), in the opening words of which ποῦ δεὶ ἐσχάτα is mentioned as one of the subjects of the book; περὶ ἀποκρίσεως is treated from c. 4 to c. 10; (Grote’s Ar. Vol. II 47–54). Spengel somewhat questionably remarks: “notandum imperativus ἐστο, hoc enim ut εἰρήσθω, librum illum nondum compositum esse indicare videtur;” (on the perfect imperative, see note on Η 11. 29). He adds, “neque ἐστω, quod deteriores exhibet, placet, praesens expectamus, aut intelligendum potius verbum in hac formula.”

§ 6. A second precept for ‘answering’. ‘When a conclusion is being drawn, if your opponent puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you must add the ‘cause of your conduct’. συμπεραινόμενον is a neuter accusative absolute. It is here passive, not middle, though the vetustraeferrenderitconcludentem, which is contrary to the sense required and to the general use of the verb, which is rarely found in the middle. Spengel even asserts non dicitur media forma, but this assertion (unless I misunderstand his meaning) is refuted by Top. Η 5, 150 a 33, ἤδειν γὰρ ἐν συμπεράνσασθαι ἢ πολλά, and by Eth. Nic. I 1, 1004 b 22, ἐγγυτήν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς...ταλήθεις ἐνδεικνυθείς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεράνσασθαι (which cannot be taken as any other than the middle voice).
RHTORIKHS Γ 18 §§ 6, 7.


7 περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι, καὶ δείν ἐφ᾽ Γοργίας τὴν μὲν

Σοφοκλῆς] On this statesman and orator (not the poet), and on the ten προβοῦλοι of whom he was one, see note on I 14. 3.

εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας] 'called to account for his administration of the office of ephor'. The ephors are charged with being liable to venality in Pol. II 9, 1270 b 10, ἐν τῷ ἀριστοτάτῳ. The ephor in the present instance repudiates the charge, and insists that he had not acted on the prompting of bribery, but 'on principle' (γνώμην).

οὔτε ἐπερωτάτεν—ἀληθῶς] 'hence (to avoid being thus foiled), you should neither put a further question after drawing the conclusion nor express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth of the facts is superabundantly clear'. Comp. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, already quoted on § 2.

§ 7 treats very briefly of 'jests', as a useful accessory in debate; Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res (Hor. Sat. I 10. 14). The subject of ridiculum is treated by Cicero de Oratore, II 58. 236 seq., Quintil. VI 3. 22—112, haec tota disputatio a Graecis periγελοίου inscribatur (§ 22)...usus autem maxime triplex, aut enim ex aliis risum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis (§ 23). For other references see note on I 11. 29.

δείν ἐφ᾽ Γοργίας—ἀρβασι λέγων] 'Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness'. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 E, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελάς; ἄλλο αὐτοῦ εἶδος ἐμάχησεν ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τί τι εὕρη, καταγελᾶ, ἐκλέγειν δὲ μὴ, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεῖ) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν
town about Creon's treatment of Antigone, instead of himself directly attacking him. 693, τὴν παίδα ταύτην οί ἄδικαι πόλεις..., 700, τοιάδ' ἐφισίθη αὐτῷ ἐπέρχεται φάνη.

§ 17. 'Further, you should occasionally transform your enthymemes and express them as general maxims'. Comp. II 21, 1, 2, with the notes in Vol. II p. 206. On the 'enthymeme', see Saint-Hilaire's *Rhétorique d'Aristote*, Vol. II pp. 345—376; and Jebb's *Attic Orators*, II 289.

Aristotle's example of a γραφή seems to be a general reminiscence of a passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰ πράττοντες τῆς εἰρήνης επιθυμεῖν ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλείον ἄν τας χρόνων τὰ πάροντα διαφυλάξειν τοὺς δὲ δυστυχόντας τῷ πολέμῳ προσέχειν τῶν νοῶν ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ τῆς καινουργίας δήσειν ἄν μεταβαλλόν τῶν καθ. Spengel gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, δεῖ τοὺς νοῶν ἐχοντας μὴ περι-μένειν ἐν πίστει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing the γραφή in the form of an ἐνθύμημα, Ar. alters διαλλαγάς into its synonym καταλλαγαί, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration of similar sounds in διαλλαγαί...διαλλάττεσθαι, and the harsh collocation δέι διαλλάττεσθαι.

CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of 'Interrogation' of one's opponent (§§ 1—4), and of 'Reply' to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few remarks on the use of 'ridicule', as an accessory to argument. These may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, πίστεις, dealt with in the previous chapter, to which the present is an appendix.

"A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some similar advantage." Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the headings περὶ ἐρωτήσεως and περὶ ἀπαντήσεως, which owes its interest
προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἀτοπον ὁδὸν Περικλῆς
Δάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτεῖρας
mainly to the rareness of such commentaries on the Rhetoric, was edited
in 1838 by Seguer from a ms in the library in Paris, and is reprinted
in Spengel's Rhetores Graeci I pp. 163—8, and also in his edition of
the Rhetoric, Vol. I pp. 147—152. It is a puerile piece of composition,
bout one or two extracts from it will be given where the writer's language
really illustrates the text of Aristotle.

On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by
Athenian Law either to a suit might put questions to the other,
and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (ἀνάκρισις)
but also at the trial itself (Plato, Apol. 25 D, ἀπόκρισιν ὁ γαθε' καὶ γάρ
ὁ νόμος κελεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι). In the former instance, the answers were
taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter,
the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court,
who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part
of his opponent, but only by the enquires of the jury, which were some-
times even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy's Demosthenes
IV Appendix VII On Interrogatories).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come
down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number
and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members
of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or
the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and
protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: Isaeus Or. 10 (π. τοῦ
'Ἀγνίαν κλήρου') §§ 4, 5, σὺ δ' ἀνάβησθι δεύτερο...φρονησό σε. ἀδελφός ὡθ' ὁ
παῖς 'Ἀγνίαν, ἀδελφάδων ἐξ ἀδελφοῦ ἐξ ἀδελφῆς γεγονός, ἢ ἄνειός,
ἢ ἐξ ἀνευμένος πρὸς μητρός ἢ πρὸς πατρός... δεὶ δ' ἐν τῆς ἀγωνίας, ὃ τ' ἐν
ὁ παῖς 'Ἀγνία προστείκει, τὸ γένος εἰπεῖν. φράσον οὖν τουτούτη—αἰσθάνεσθε
ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν συγγενείαν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνεται πάντα μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἐν
μαθεῖ υἱός. καίτοι τὸν γε πράττοντα τε δίκαιον οὐ προσήκει ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ'
euthus λέγειν.

Lysias Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν στιτούλων) § 5, (α') μέτοικος εἰ; (β') ναὶ.
(α') μετοικεῖσθαι δὲ ποτὲνν νόλετον τοίς νόμοις τοίς τῆς πόλεως,
ὅποιος τι θείαι ἢ συμβολὴ; (β') ἀπ' πολίτες. (α') ἄλογοι τι οὖν ἡ
ἀποθεωθεῖν εἰ τι πολίτης πάρα τοῖς νόμοις, ἢ' ἡ σωτείρα ἤ ζημία; (β') ἐγὼν,
(α') ἀπόκρισις δὴ μου, εἰ ὁμολογείς πλείον σιόν συμπεριέλθην πειτακάνον φρομάν,
ὅν ὁ νόμος ἐξείλα κελεύει; (β') ἐγὼ τῶν ἀρχῶν (not the Archons but the
στιτούλακες § 7) κελεύοντας συνεπειμά. ib. Or. 13 (κατὰ 'Λυροῦ)
§§ 30—33, ἐν' αὐτοφάροι ἐγὼ αὐτῶν ἐξελέγχειν. ἀπόκρισις δὴ μοι κ.κ.λ. ib.
Or. 12 (κατὰ 'Ερατοσθένους) § 25, set forth at length in Introd. p. 364, note.
Spengel also gives a reference to Dem. de Cor. § 52.

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treated by Aristotle himself in the Sophistici Elenchi, esp. c. xv and xvi,
(Grote's Aristotle II pp. 109—115; see also Top. 6). Some of the more
striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. 'As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when
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ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 18 § 2.

ιέρων, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἶνον τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκοῦειν, ἦρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δὲ, "καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστος ὤν;" δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ἦ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ἦ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἶνον Σωκράτης Μελέτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν εἰρήκεν εἰ δαίμονον τι λέγοι, ὤμολογήσαντος δὲ ἦρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶναι θείον τι, φήσαντος δὲ, "ἐστιν οὖν" ἐφ' ὃς τις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues', i.e. the result is a reductio ad absurdum.

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Comp. Top. Θ 7, ἐπὶ τῶν ἄσαφως καὶ πλαναχῶς λεγομένων…τὸ μὲν ἰσόπος τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; Ar. Ach. 396, (ἐνδον ἢ ἢν Ἐυριπίδης;) οὐκ ἐνδον, ἐνδον τ’ ἢν, εἰ γνώμην ἑκεῖς.

θυροβοθρόνοις This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any ‘sensation’ in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see Riddell’s note on its application to ὀδικαστής, Introd. to Plato’s Apology, p. ix). Isocr. ἀνίδιος, § 20, μετὰ θυροβοθρόνοι καὶ χαλεπότητος ἀκροασία ἀντιλογομένων. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

ὡς ἀποροῦντες] It is not the audience that is perplexed; on the contrary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character of the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the person who gives a ‘sophistical’ answer, who is apparently perplexed; hence we should accept the correction ὡς ἀποροῦντος as suggested by Spengel and Schneidewin. The Paris MS A* actually has ἀποροῦντας, which suggested to Spengel the alternative emendation ἀποροῦντα. Similarly the fragment περὶ ἐρωτήσεως has, πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ὡς ἀποκρινμένον οἱ ἄκροαμενοὶ θυροβοθροῦν ὡς ἀποροῦντες καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντας ἀντιλογίαν.

‘But otherwise’ (i.e. except under the above limitations), ‘the speaker must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an objection, the questioner is considered beaten’. ἐνστῇ is here used of giving a check by interposing an ‘instance’ or ἐνστασις. See Introd. p. 269.

ὅτι μάλιστα συντρέφειν] ‘to pack into as small a compass as possible’.
§ 5. 'In answering, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing a distinction, and not expressing yourself too concisely'. Top. Θ 7, 156 α 26, ἐὰν (τὸ ἐρωτηθέν) ἐπὶ τί μὲν ψεύδος ἢ, ἐπὶ τί δ’ ἀλήθεια, ἐπισημαντέων ὅτι πλεονάξως λέγεται καὶ διότι τί μὲν ψεύδος τί δ’ ἀλήθεια ὑπερον γάρ διαφορετικὸν ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεφάρα τὸ ἀμφίβολον. In the fragment περὶ ἀποκρίσεως (as Spengel notices) the latter part is paraphrased in such a manner as to shew that the writer read διαφορικὰ λόγῳ (omitting καὶ μὴ) συντόμως.

'*In answering questions that appear to involve you in a contradiction, you must give your explanation immediately in your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion'. This corresponds to what in the old style of our legal pleading would have been termed 'confession and avoidance'.

ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] namely in Top. lib. VIII (Θ), in the opening words of which πῶς δει ἐρωτᾶν is mentioned as one of the subjects of the book; περὶ ἀποκρίσεως is treated from c. 4 to c. 10; (Grote's Ar. Vol. II 47—54). Spengel somewhat questionably remarks: 'notandum imperativus est οὕτω, hoc enim ut ἐστιν ὥσπερ, librum illum nondum compositum esse indicare videtur;' (on the perfect imperative, see note on I 11. 29). He adds, 'quae γινομίαι, quod deteriores exhibent, placet, praesens expectamus, aut intelligendum potius verbum in hac formula.'

§ 6. A second precept for ‘answering’. 'When a conclusion is being drawn, if your opponent puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you must add the cause of your conduct.' συμπεραινόμενων is a neuter accusative absolute. It is here passive, not middle, though the vetus translatio renders it concludentem, which is contrary to the sense required and to the general use of the verb, which is rarely found in the middle. Spengel even asserts non dicitur media forma, but this assertion (unless I misunderstand his meaning) is refuted by Top. H 5, 150 a 33, ῥόν γὰρ ἐν συμπεραινασθαι ἢ πολλά, and by Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 22, ἀγαπητοί περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγωνται παχυλῶς...ταληθεὶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὸ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγουσας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραινασθαι (which cannot be taken as any other than the middle voice).
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 18 §§ 6, 7.


7 περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσων ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι, καὶ δεῖν ἐφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν

Σοφοκλῆς] On this statesman and orator (not the poet), and on the ten προβούλων of whom he was one, see note on i. 14. 3.

εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας] 'called to account for his administration of the office of ephor'. The ephors are charged with being liable to venality in Pol. ii 9, 1270 b 10, διὰ τὴν ἀπολογίαν δνοι. The ephor in the present instance repudiates the charge, and insists that he had not acted on the prompting of bribery, but 'on principle' (γνώμη).

οὐτ' ἐπερωτᾶν—ἀληθῶς] 'hence (to avoid being thus foiled), you should neither put a further question after drawing the conclusion nor express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth of the facts is superabundantly clear'. Comp. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, already quoted on § 2.

§ 7 treats very briefly of ' jests', as a useful accessory in debate; Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res (Hor. Sat. i 10. 14). The subject of ridiculum is treated by Cicero de Oratore, ii 58, 236 seq., Quintil. vi 3. 22—112, haec tota disputatio a Graecis per γελοιοὺς inscribitur (§ 22)...usus autem maxime triplex, aut enim ex aliis risum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis (§ 23). For other references see note on i. 11. 29.

δεῖν ἐφη Γοργίας—ὁρθῶς λέγων] ' Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness'. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 ε, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελᾶσι; ἄλαν αὐτὸν εἰδος ἑλέγχου ἐστιν, ἐπειδῆ τις τι εἰπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἑλέγχους δὲ μή, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεῖ) τὰς στουδᾶς τῶν
The reference to the Philippus of Isocrates points (according to Victorius) to p. 96 of §§ 72—78, where the writer gets rid of the indelicacy of himself reminding Philip of the current imputation that his growing power over the 'Ελλάδας ἄλλα ἕπι ταὐτήν αὐξάνεται, by attributing it to others in the words, ἀλοθάνωμεν γάρ σε διαβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοὶ φθονούντων in § 73, and by describing it in § 78 as ταὐτήν φήμην σαῦρον περιφυμένην, ἵνα μὲν ἐχθρὸι περιβείναι σοι ζητοῦν. This, however, seems to be open to the objection pointed out by Spengel, that Isocrates can hardly be regarded as putting what are really his own views as a friend of Philip into the mouth of that monarch’s enemies (“at vix Isocrates ipse haec animo probans vera putabat”). Spengel accordingly prefers taking it as a reference to §§ 4—7, where, instead of expressing his own satisfaction with one of his compositions, he states that his friends who have heard it recited had been struck by its truthful statement of facts, § 4, and had expected that, if published, it would have led to the establishment of peace; it so happened, however, that Philip had concluded peace, before the fastidious rhetorician who elaborated his pamphlet to a sufficient degree to think it deserving of publication. Perhaps a still more appropriate passage, which is omitted by Victorius and Spengel, is that in p. 87 B, § 23, where the writer, after describing himself as deterred by his friends from addressing Philip, adds that finally ἔσπευδον μᾶλλον γὰρ πεμφθῆναι σοι τῶν λόγων τοῦτον, ἔγειρον δ’ ὅσ’ ἐλπίζουσιν ὑπὸ μάνον οὐ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξειν μοι χαρὰν υπὲρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἅπαντας.
κράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὥς Ἀρχιλόχος ψέγει: ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ
χρημάτων δ᾽ ἀελπτον οὐθὲν ἐστὶν οὐδ᾽ ἀπώμοτον, καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ
οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.
καὶ ὥς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμονα ύπέρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης
ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει] §§ 141—149, ἀκροβύμνοι δὲ τὶς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων εὐλογοῦν εἰσεῖν κ.τ.λ. In the course of the passage referred to, the rhetorician makes his imaginary friend compliment him on his writings as οὐ μείψεως ἀλλὰ χάρισα τής μεγίστης δόξους δόντας, an expression which would have been open to the imputation of delicacy (περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγεις ἐπίθεον), had not the writer ingeniously placed it in another man's mouth. The device is sufficiently transparent, even if it were not for the candid confession in § 8, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπανεῖ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιχειρήσει, ἑώρων οὖν...ἐπιχειρήσει οὐθ᾽ ἐνεπιθέον τῶν εἰσεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν δυνάμεοις.

The same device, in a less refined form, may be noticed in the modern parallel from Martin Chuzzlewit, which will occur to every reader (chap. xxv).

Ἀρχιλόχος ψέγει...ίάμβῳ] Hor. A. P. 79, Archilochum proprio rables armavit tambō. Comp. note on II 23.11. Archilochus (Lycambae spretus infido gener, Epod. vi 13), instead of directly attacking Neobule, the daughter of Lycombes, puts his lampoon into the mouth of her own father, thereby ostensibly refraining from a coarseness of invective, which would imply ἰφροκία on his own part, but really intensifying its bitterness; as the reader will naturally argue, 'If her own father can say nothing better of her, what will the rest of the world say?' Comp. Bergk, Gr. Lyr., p. 542 ed. 2, Archil. fragm., οὖν Λυκάμβω παῖδα τὴν ὑπερήφιν. Stobaeus (CK 10, Bergk u. s. p. 552) has preserved nine trochaic lines beginning with the first of the two quotations given by Aristotle, but there is nothing in the passage, so far as there quoted, which illustrates Aristotle's object in here referring to it. There is a rendering of the lines by J. H. Merivale in Wellesley's Anthologia Polyglotta p. 220, beginning Never man again may swear, things shall be as erst they were.

οὐ μαί τὰ Γύγεω] τοῦ πολυχρίσου μέλει. The four lines of which this is the first are preserved by Plutarch de tranquill. an. c. 10 (Bergk Gr. Lyr. p. 541) and are thus rendered by Milman, No care have I of Gyges' golden store, Unenvious I for nought the gods implore; I have no love of wide and kingly sway But turn from pride my reckless eyes away. On Gyges, the wealthy king of Lydia, compare Herod. 1 12, τοῦ (sc. Γύγεω) καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος ὁ Πάρων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρῶνον γενόμενος εν λάμβῳ τριμήτρῳ ἐπιμνήσθη. Archilochus is inveighing against the vice of envy and the vanity of riches, and with a dramatic skill that is one of his characteristics, gives expression to his own feelings by ascribing them to Charon the contented carpenter (comp. Mure, H. G. L. III 167).

Σοφοκλῆς] Antig. 688—700, where Haemon quotes the talk of the

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town about Creon's treatment of Antigone, instead of himself directly attacking him. 693, τὴν παιδα ταυτὴν οἱ ἄδηρετα ποιλὶς..., 700, τούθεν ἀρεμψα ὅτι ἐπέρχετα φάρις.

§ 17. ‘Further, you should occasionally transform your enthymemes and express them as general maxims’. Comp. II 11. 1, 2, with the notes in Vol. II p. 206. On the ‘enthymeme’, see Saint-Hilaire’s Rhétorique d’Aristote, Vol. II pp. 345—376; and Jebb’s Attic Orators, II 289.

Aristotle's example of a γνώμη seems to be a general reminiscence of a passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρῆ δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐν ταὐτῇ γὰρ τῇ καταστασίᾳ πλεῖστον ἂν τις χρῶν τὰ παρόντα διαφυλάξειν τὸν δυνάμεις προσέχειν τῶν νοῦν ἐὰν γὰρ τῆς παραχθῆ καὶ τῆς κανονικῆς διάτας ἂν μεταβολής τόγον. Spengel gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, διε τοὺς νοῦς ἔχοντας μὴ περιμένειν ἂς ἀν πέσων, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖν τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing the γνώμη in the form of an ἐνθύμημα, Ar. alters διαλλαγάς into its synonym καταλλαγαί, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration of similar sounds in διε...διαλλαγαί...διαλλάττεσθαι, and the harsh collocation διε...διαλλάττεσθαι.

CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of ‘Interrogation’ of one’s opponent (§§ 1—4), and of ‘Reply’ to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few remarks on the use of ‘ridicule’, as an accessory to argument. These may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, πίστεις, dealt with in the previous chapter, to which the present is an appendix.

“A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some similar advantage.” Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the headings περὶ ἐρωτήσεως and περὶ ἀποκρίσεως, which owes its interest
mainly to the rareness of such commentaries on the Rhetoric, was edited in 1838 by Seguer from a ms in the library in Paris, and is reprinted in Spengel's *Rhetores Graeci* I pp. 163—8, and also in his edition of the *Rhetoric*, Vol. I pp. 147—152. It is a puerile piece of composition, but one or two extracts from it will be given where the writer's language really illustrates the text of Aristotle.

On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by Athenian Law either party to a suit might put questions to the other, and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (αδόκως) but also at the trial itself (Plato, Apol. 25 D, ἀπόκριμαι ὁ 'γερή καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνασθαι). In the former instance, the answers were taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter, the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court, who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part of his opponent, but only by the enquiries of the jury, which were sometimes even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy's *Demosthenes* IV Appendix VII *On Interrogatories*).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: *Isaeus* Or. 10 (π. τοῦ Ἀγνίου κλήρου) §§ 4, 5, σὺ δὲ ἀκαθαρθείς δεύτερο ... ἐρωτηθείς σε. ἀδέλφος εὖθετο παῖς Ἀγνίου, ἀδελφίδοις ἐξ ἀδελφοὺς ἐκεῖ ἀδελφῆς γεγονός, ἐν οὖσι, ἐκ ἀνεφθεῖς πρὸς μητρός ἢ πρὸς πατρός ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀγωστίας, τοῦ παῖ Αγνίος προσκείμενοι, τοῦ γώνου εἰπών. ἑόρασαν δὲν τούτων—ἀπάγαγετε διὸ οὐκ ἔχεις τὴν συγκέντρωσίν εἰπέν; ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνεται πάντα μᾶλλον ὅ ὅ δει μαθὲν ὑπάρχει. καὶ τοι τὸν γε πράττοντα τι δίκαιον οὐ προσφέρει ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' εὐθύς λέγειν.

*Lysias* Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν στιπάλων) § 5, (a) μετοκεύει δὲ πότερον ὁς πεισόμενος τοῖς νομοῖς τοῖς τῆς πόλεως, ἢ ὁς ποίησαν ὅ τι ἄν βουλή; (b) ὁς πεισόμενος. (a) Ἀλλ' τι οὖν ἀξίως ἢ ἀποθανεῖν εἰ τε πεποίηκας παρά τοὺς νόμους, ἐφ' οἷς δάνασεν ἢ ζημία; (b) ἐγώ. (a) ἀπόκριμαι δὴ μοι, εἰ μολογεῖς πλεῖον σίδην συμπεράνθηνε πεντηκόσια φοράμ, ἢν τοὺς νόμους εξείναι κελεύει; (b) ἐγὼ τῶν ἀρχώνων (not the Archons but the στιοφύλακες of § 7) κελευόντων συνεπράματι. ib. Or. 13 (κατὰ 'Αγορᾶνον) §§ 30—33, ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ ἐγώ αὐτῶν ἐξελέγω, ἀπόκριμαι δὴ μοι κ.τ.λ. ib. Or. 12 (κατ' 'Ερατοσθένους) § 25, set forth at length in Intro. p. 364, note. Spengel also gives a reference to Dem. de Cor. § 52.

The subject of questioning and replying in sophistical debate is treated by Aristotle himself in the Sophistici Elenchi, esp. c. xv and xvi, (Grote's *Aristotle* II pp. 109—115; see also Top. 9). Some of the more striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. 'As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when your opponent has said the opposite, so that as soon as one more
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ιερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἶνον τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἦρετο εἰ οἴδειν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δὲ, "καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστος ὁν;" δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ἦ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δήλου ἦ ὅτι δώσει πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μιᾶν πρώτασιν μη προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν εἰρήκεν εἰ δαίμονὸς τι λέγων, ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ ἦρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παίδες εἰν ἣ θεῶν τι, φήσαντος δὲ, "ἐστιν οὖν" ἐφη "ός τις θεῶν μὲν παίδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοῦς question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues', i.e. the result is a reductio ad absurdum.

This Topic is exemplified by Pericles' retort to Lampon, the soothsayer, who is mentioned in Arist. An. 521, Λάμπων δ' ὄμων' ἐτί καὶ νυνὶ τῶν χρῆ ὅταν ἐξήκασα τι, and Plut. Pericles c. vi, Λάμπωνα τὸν μάντην. On τελείη, see note on Π 24. 2.

The fragment περι ἐρωτήσεως (as Spengel points out), besides having ἦρετο and ἀνήρετο instead of ἐπήρετο and ἦρετο respectively, closes with the paraphrase συμψήφαστος δὲ τοῦ Λάμπωνος, καὶ πῶς εἴπεν ἀτέλεστος ὁν. § 2. 'Or, secondly, (you may employ interrogation) when one point is self-evident, and it is clear that the person interrogated will grant you the other as soon as you put the question. For, when you have obtained your first premmiss by asking your opponent to admit it, you must not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question, but simply state the conclusion yourself'. Soph. El. 15, 174 δ 38, οὐ δὲ δὲ τῷ συμπέρασμα προτασικός ἐρωτάς ἐνα δ' οὖν' ἐρωτήσεων, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμολογούμενῳ χρηστόν. Tor. Θ 2, 154 a 7, οὐ δὲ δὲ τῷ συμπέρασμα ἐρωτήμα ποιεῖν. εἶ δὲ μή, ἀνανείσαντος, οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι συναλλαγμάτων.

The illustration is taken from the Apologia of Socrates. 'Socrates, when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of the gods, asked (vulg. lect. said), if there was anything which he called divine, and on his admitting this, he enquired whether the divine beings (daemonones) were not either children of the gods or of godlike nature, and on his answering "Yes", "Is there any one" he said "who believes in the existence of the children of the gods and yet denies that of the gods themselves?" This corresponds only partially to the well-known passage in Plat. Apol. p. 27, already commented on in the note on Π 23. 8. There is probably some corruption in the word εἰρήκεν where we should expect ἔρωτα or ἦρετο. Spengel, following Αε and the vetus translatio, reads εἰρήκεν ὡς ἐν δαίμονοι τι λέγων, ἦρετο. "Illud ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ sensui et consilio Aristotelis repugnatur, neque εἰρήκεν εἰ significat: quae sit ax Meleto num daemonion quid crederet. Sed Meletus de Socrate εἰρήκεν ὡς ἐν δαίμονον τι λέγων." After quoting part of the passage of Plato, he says in conclusion, "Vides Socratem id quod Meletus dixit, non interrogare, sed affirmare."
§ 3. ‘Further, (interrogation is appropriate) when the speaker is intending to shew up his opponent either in a self-contradiction or a paradox.’

§ 4. ‘Fourthly, when it is impossible (for the opponent) to meet the question, without giving a sophistical answer’. For the examples of this topic, ἦτι μὲν ἦτι δ' οὐ, κ.τ.λ., comp. Soph. Elench. 19, 177 a 21, ‘the proper way for the respondent to deal with questions involving equivocation of terms or amphiboly of propositions is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the double meaning’: ἀνατέλλεται σεισμὸν λέγειν ἦτι ἦτι οὗτος, ἦτι δ' ὁ οὐ. καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτικῶν ἦτιν ἄ, ἦτι δ' ἂν οὐ (Grote’s Λ. II 114), where the interrogation is characterized as sophistical, while here the same invidious epithet is applied to the answer. Comp. Top. Θ 7, ἦτι τῶν ἁσαφῶν καὶ πλεονασμῶν λέγομεν...τὸ μὲν ψεύδος τὸ δ' ἄληθες. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; Ar. Ach. 396, (ἐνδοὺ ἦτα Εὐριπίδης) οὖχ ἐνδοὺ, ἐνδοὺ τ' ἦτιν, εἰ γνώμην εἰςιν.

ثورυβούσιν] This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any ‘sensation’ in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see Riddell’s note on its application to δικασταί, Introd. to Plato’s Apology, p. ix). Isocr. ἀντίλογος, § 20, μετὰ θορυβόν καὶ χαλκιστής ἀκροάσθαι τῶν ἀπολογομένων. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

ὁς ἄποροντες] It is not the audience that is perplexed; on the contrary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character of the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the person who gives a ‘sophistical’ answer, who is apparently perplexed; hence we should accept the correction ὁς ἄποροντος proposed by Spengel and Schneidewin. The Paris MS A actually has ἄποροντας, which suggested to Spengel the alternative emendation ἄποροντα. Similarly the fragment περὶ ἔρατῆς οἱ has, πρὸς γὰρ τούς οὖν ἄποροι καταβαίνουσιν οἱ ἄκροφοι καὶ ἄσπονται καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ Άττικοι εἰσαίγεσθαι.

‘But otherwise’ (i.e. except under the above limitations), ‘the speaker must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an objection, the questioner is considered beaten’. ἐνστάτη is here used of giving a check by interposing an ‘instance’ of ἔνστασις. See Introd. p. 269.

ὅτι μάλιστα συντρέφειν] ‘to pack into as small a compass as possible’.
ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα. διαιρήσεις λόγω καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν ὁλην καὶ ἔλεος συνιστά, πρὶν ἐπερωτηθῆται τὸ ἐπὶ ὑπὲρ ἢ συνειδητοῦ οὐ γὰρ χάλεπον προορᾶν ἐν τῷ ὁ λόγῳ. φανερὸν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω 6 ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμπεραινόμενον, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα ποίη τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν

II 24.2, τὸ συντριμμένον καὶ ἀντικειμένον εἰσεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα. Dionysius, de Lys. Jud. c. 6, ἡ συντριφωσα τὰ νοηματα καὶ στρογγυλον ἐκφέρωσα λέγει. The verb is used metaphorically to express conciseness and condensation of style; in its literal meaning it might be applied to any squeezing and compacting process like that (or instance) of making a snowball. Comp. note on II 7. 5, συνεφαιδόθησαν.

§ 5. "In answering, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing a distinction, and not expressing yourself too concisely." Top. Θ 7, 156 a 26, ἐὰν (τὸ ἐρωτθέν) ἐπὶ τὸ μὲν θεόδος ἐπὶ τὸ δὲ ἄλλης, ἐπισημαντῶν ὅτι πλεονασμὸς λέγεται καὶ διὸ τὸ μὲν θεόδος τὸ δὲ ἄλλης· ὅστε τῶν γὰρ διαρρήκτων ἐνσυνία ἡ ἄμφιβολον. In the fragment περὶ ἀποκρίσεως (as Spengel notices) the latter part is paraphrased in such a manner as to show that the writer read διαρρήκτη λόγῳ (omitting καὶ μὴ) συντόμως.

"In answering questions that appear to involve you in a contradiction, you must give your explanation immediately in your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion." This corresponds to what in the old style of our legal pleading would have been termed 'confession and avoidance'.

ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] namely in Top. lib. VIII (θ), in the opening words of which πῶς δεὶ ἐρωταὶ is mentioned as one of the subjects of the book; περὶ ἀποκρίσεως is treated from c. 4 to c. 10; (Grote's Ar. Vol. II 47—54). Spengel somewhat questionably remarks: "notandum imperativus εἶσται, hoc enim ut εἰρήσθαι, librum illum nondum compositum esse indicare videtur;" (on the perfect imperative, see note on I 11. 29). He adds, "neque εἶσται, quod deteriores exhibent, placet, praesens expectamus, aut intelligendum potius verbum in hac formula."

§ 6. A second precept for 'answering': 'When a conclusion is being drawn, if your opponent puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you must add the cause of your conduct'. συμπεραινόμενον is a neuter accusative absolute. It is here passive, not middle, though the vetus translatio renders it conclusiorem, which is contrary to the sense required and to the general use of the verb, which is rarely found in the middle. Spengel even asserts non dicitur media forma, but this assertion (unless I misunderstand his meaning) is refuted by Top. Π 5, 150 a 33, ὅρον γὰρ ἐν συμπεράνθησαι ή πολλά, and by Eth. Nic. 1 I, 1094 b 22, ἵππαρτον περὶ τοιοῦτων καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτων λέγοντας παχυλῶν...τάλθηκεν εἰς ἀκροβατίᾳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἔν τὸ πολλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτον λέγοντας τοιοῦτα καὶ συμπεραινόμενοι (which cannot be taken as any other than the middle voice)."

7. περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοιῶν, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρήσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Τοργίας τὴν μὲν

Σοφοκλῆς] On this statesman and orator (not the poet), and on the ten προβούλοις of whom he was one, see note on I 14. 3.

εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας] 'called to account for his administration of the office of ephor'. The ephors are charged with being liable to venality in Pol. II 9, 1270 b 10, διὰ τῶν ἐπορίαν ἄνων. The ephor in the present instance repudiates the charge, and insists that he had not acted on the prompting of bribery, but 'on principle' (γνώμῃ).

οὔτε ἐπερωτῶν—διήθεν] 'hence (to avoid being thus foiled), you should neither put further a question after drawing the conclusion nor express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth of the facts is superabundantly clear'. Comp. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, already quoted on § 2.

§ 7 treats very briefly of 'jests', as a useful accessory in debate; Ridiculum acrī Fortius et melius magnis plerumque secat res (Hor. Sat. I 10. 14). The subject of ridiculum is treated by Cicero de Oratore, I 58. 236 seq., Quintil. VI 3. 22—112, haec tota disputatio a Graecis περὶ γελοιοῦ inscribitur (§ 22)....usus autem maxime triplex, aut enim ex alius risum pétimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis (§ 23). For other references see note on I 11. 29.

δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας—ὁρᾶσας λέγων] 'Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness'. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 B, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελάς; ἀλλὰ αὐτοῦ εἶδος ἑλέγχου ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι εἰπη, καταγελάς, ἑλέγχειν δὲ μὴ, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεί) τὰς στόμαθα τῶν

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σπουδήν διαφθέιειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδήν, ὅρθως λέγων, εἰρθαὶ πόσα εἰδὴ γελοίων ἐστὶν. ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἔλευθερο τὸ δ’ οὖ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λέγωται. ἐστι δ’ ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθερώτερον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἑνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοίον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἔτέρου.

dιατίκων γέλωτι ἐκλώ, τὰ δὲ γελοία ταῖς σπουδαίς ἐκφράζει (Plato, ed. Baiter and Orelli, p. 910 b 20; Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. III 131). The only material variation between the two forms of quotation is Aristotle's probably intentional alteration of τῶν ἀριστίκων, which would apply to the forensic branch alone, into τῶν ἐναντίων, which extends the applicability of the remark to all the three branches of Oratory. Dr Thompson observes that "the remark is one which could not have been made by an ordinary man, and the sentence is too nicely balanced for a mere colloquial dictum" (Gorgias, p. 178). The first half of Gorgias' precept may be exemplified by the familiar line, And coxcomb vanquish Berkeley by a grin (Dr Brown's Essay on Satire II 224).

One of the best classical instances of the effective use of pleasantry to neutralize over-strictness on the part of one's opponent is Cicero's good-humoured banter of his friends Sulpicius and Cato, in the speech pro Miurenà (§§ 19—30 and §§ 61—65). We may also compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13 and (as an illustration of meeting jest by earnest) 20, εἰτα γελάσατε ὑμεῖς ἀφῇστε; οὐ γὰρ ἐν γέλωσι ὑμῶν ἐλαβεν υἱόνα, ἐπὶ παρὰν ἐπύγχαναν κ.κ.λ. Comp. Or. 23 § 206, ἐν ἡ δ’ ἀστεία εἰσώνι...ἀφίετε, Aristotle. Vesp. 566, οἱ δὲ λέγωναν μίθους ἦμιν οἱ δ’ Ἀισιότου τί γέλων; οἱ δὲ σκόμπτους ἵν’ ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τοῦ θυμὸν κατάθωμαι. See also Vollmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 29, Ueber Lachen und Witz.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] See note on I 11. 29, διώρισται περὶ γελοίων χαρᾶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

ἀρμόττει ἔλευθερο] Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 17, τοῦ ἐπιδειξιον ἐστὶν τοιαύτα λέγει καὶ ἄκουεν οὰ τῷ ἐπίεικει καὶ ἐλευθερῳ ἀρμόττει. Cic. de Off. I 29. 103, ἕπειν γένους ἡκάντινον ὑπηκούς ἡμών ἀποκεῖται καὶ ἐλευθεροφόρος. Cic. de Orator, § 88, ridiculo sic usurum oratorum, ut nec nimis frequenti, ne scurrile sit...neque aut sua persona aut indicium aut tempore alienum. There is a kind of quiet irony observable in Aristotle's hint that the orator is to select his special line of pleasantry according as he happens to be a gentleman or the reverse.

εἰρωνεία—ἐτέρου] 1 Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery: one who resorts to irony makes his joke for his own amusement only, whereas the buffoon does so for an ulterior object. On βωμολοχία, comp. Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 4, οἱ γελοίοι υπερβάλλουσι βωμολοχοί δοκούσι εἶναι καὶ φοροκικοί, γλυκάμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλατα πούσα ἴ τοῦ λέγων εὐδοχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπέσαι τῶν σκοπτόμενον, ib. line 34, οἱ βωμολο-
The book appropriately closes with a chapter on the Peroration: the contents of that portion of the speech are distributed under four heads: (1) to inspire the audience with a favourable opinion of yourself and an unfavourable one of your opponents, (2) amplification and extenuation, (3) the excitement of the emotions of your audience, (4) refreshing their memory by recapitulation.

Cornificius, II 30.47, gives three divisions, (1) enumeratio, (2) amplificatio, (3) commiseratio. Cic. de Inv. I 52.98, (1) enumeratio, (2) indignatio, (3) conquestio. Apsines 12 p. 384, (1) anâmphiour, (2) Æstes, (3) dei-novos (βι δε δεινωσις κατα την αφετης) theoriteitai. Amplificatio and commiseratio are sometimes brought under one head, thus reducing the divisions to two, as in Cic. part. orat. 15.52, (1) amplificatio, (2) enumeratio (Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 29).

In spite of what is here said about αφετης, the student of ancient eloquence cannot fail to be struck by the quiet character of most of the perorations of the Attic orators. Perhaps the tamest of all (to our modern taste) is the closing sentence of Lysias Or. 22 (κατα των αυτοποιων) § 22, οικ οιδ’ ο τι δε πλεον λεγειν περι μεν γαρ των δελων των δικαιων, ιτε δικαζεται, δει παρα των κατηγορων πυθεθαι, την δε των τουρων απαντης επιστασθε. Αν ουκ αυτων καταψηφισετε, τα τε δικαια πυθετε και αξιωτερον των ειτον ἀνήσουσετε ει δε μη, τιμιωτερον. It is well remarked by Brougham that “the perorations, if by this we mean the concluding sentences of all, in the Greek orations, are calm and tame, compared with the rest of their texture, and especially with their penultimate
portions, which rise to the highest pitch of animation' (vol. vii, Rhetorical Dissertations, pp. 25, 184; see also especially Jebb's Attic Orators i p. ciii).

πέψατε—ἐπιχαλκεύειν] 'For the natural order is first to prove your own case to be true and your opponent's to be false; and after that, to use praise and blame, and to elaborate these topics'. These words give the reason for giving the first place in the four heads to inspiring in the audience a favourable opinion towards yourself.

ἐπιχαλκεύειν] is a difficult word to translate satisfactorily in the present context. Victorius dubiously explains it: "expolire et quod factum iam est cursum festinanterque eo consilio ut concinnes, iterare ac recterete.' It is metaphorically used in Arist. Nub. 422, where Strepsiades offers himself (not his son, as Ernesti says Lex. Techn. s.v.) to Socrates, as sturdy and tough material for him to hammer upon and forge to his purpose, ἀλλ' ἐνεκέν γε ψυχῆς στερρᾶ...διέλει βαρρῶν, οὖνκα τούτων ἐπιχαλκεύειν παρέχομαι δὲν (for a Latin metaphor from the anvil, comp. Horace, A. P. 441, male tornatos incudi reddere versus). At first sight the word might be supposed to refer to ἀνάμψεις, which is subsequently explained in the words πολλάκις εἰπεῖν, in which case it would mean 'to hammer your subject down', 'drive it home'; but μετὰ τοῦτο in § 2 shews that in the present section Ar. is only dwelling on the first of the four heads of the epilogue, and does not at present touch on ἀνάμψεις, which is reserved for § 4. Consequently we must understand it to mean 'to elaborate', 'to finish off', the topics belonging to the first head. It may also mean to mould the audience to one's purpose. Brandis in Schneide-win's Philologus iv 1, p. 45, points out that his Anonymus read the clause as follows: καὶ μετὰ (not οὕτω) τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν τὸ (not καὶ) ἐπιχαλκεύειν, in which case the last word corresponds to the third head, εἰσ τὰ πάθη καταστήσας τὸν ἄκρατην.

'Now (in this) you must aim at one of two objects; to represent yourself as either relatively or absolutely good, and your opponent as either relatively or absolutely bad'. As is remarked in the Introd. p. 368, 'the virtue assumed may be either virtue per se, and independent of all other considerations, as times, places, and persons—or in default of this, at any rate good to the judges or audience; as it may be, useful, or well-disposed'. On ἀπλάς, see note on 1 2. 4.

εἰρηναίοι οἱ τόποι] See i 9. 1.

§ 2. δεδειγμένων—ἐστιν] 'The next point in the natural order is to proceed to amplify what has already been proved (δεδειγμένων), or again to depreciate (what has been proved by your opponent); for the facts must be
§ 2—4

The remaining branch of the peroration is the recapitulation of the previous parts of the speech. At this point you may appropriately do what some, absurdly enough, advise one to do in the exordium. They recommend you to to state your points again and again that they may be distinctly understood. In the exordium, however, you should simply state the subject of the speech, that the point at issue may be clearly seen; in the peroration you have to state summarily the means whereby your case has been proved.
§ 5. 'The first point (in the recapitulation) is (to state) that you have performed all that you have promised'. Isocr. ἀντίδοτος § 75, ὅμως γὰρ ἀποδεδωκέναι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

'The recapitulation' may also consist of a comparison (of the opponent's case with your own); you may either compare what both said on the same point, or else (you may do so) without setting each point over against the other.

ἡ ἐκ παραβολῆς] as ἀντιπαραβολῇ is actually the subject of all the preceding part of the section, ἐκ παραβολῆς cannot be contrasted with ὅτι ὅτι, but must be identical with it. Hence we should either strike out this clause, or at any rate (with Victorius and Spengel), put ἡ into brackets, in which case ἡ δὴ ὅτι ὅτι will be explained if necessary by ἐκ παραβολῆς. Possibly, however, the clause is due to the intrusion into the text of a marginal explanation of ὅτι such as an abbreviated form of ἴγαν (the scholiast's common equivalent for scilicet) ἐκ παραβολῆς.

κατὰ φύσιν] i.e. your recapitulation may follow and contrast your own points in the natural order, as they were spoken; and then, if you please, separately, what has been said by your opponent.

tελευτή—λόγος ἕγερ 'As a conclusion (to a speech) the most suitable style is that which has no conjunctions, to make it a true peroration, and not an actual oration'.

tελευτή is with much plausibility conjectured by Victorius, and the conjecture is supported by F. A. Wolf. The nominative is possibly due to the copyist being misled by the apparent parallelism above, ἄρχῃ δὲ διότι κ.τ.λ.—τῆς λέξεως is constructed with ἵ διότι; on this kind of 'attractio', comp. note on III 9.3, ἢ εἰρωμένη τῆς λέξεως.

ἐπιλογος...λόγος] Quint. VI 1.2, nam si morabimus, non iam enumeratio sed quasi altera ciet oratio. Supra III 9.6, al periodoi al μακραί οὖσαι λόγοι γίνεται.

ἐπηρκα, ἀκριβεστε, ἔκτετο, κρίνατε] 'I must now close; you have heard all; the facts are in your hands; I ask for your verdict'. Considering the carelessness of style which characterizes many portions of the Rhetoric, it is all the more striking to find its close marked by a sentence so happily chosen,—a sentence which at once illustrates the point under
6 ἐναντίον λόγου. τελευτὴν δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἄλλα μὴ λόγος ἢ ἑιρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.”

consideration and also serves as an appropriate farewell to the subject of the treatise; as though Aristotle had added at the conclusion of his course: ‘I have said all that I had to say; my lectures are now finished; I leave the subject in your hands, and trust it to your judgment’. The closing words of the Sophistici Elenchi are at least equally effective, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ύμων ἢ τῶν ἡκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὐρημένοις πολλὴν ἐχειν χάριν.

The illustration is doubtless a reminiscence of the closing words of one of the best-known speeches of Lysias, Or. 12 (κατ’ Ἐρασισθένους), πάνυσομεν κατηγορῶν ἀκηκοάτε, ἀκράκατε, πεπόνθατε ἔχετε, δικάζετε, a passage which may perhaps find its modern equivalent in some such words as these:

‘The speech for the prosecution must now close; I have appealed to your ears, to your eyes, to your hearts: the case is in your hands; I ask for your verdict.’
APPENDIX (E)

Shilleto's Adversaria on the Rhetoric of Aristotle.

[Among the books belonging to the late Mr Shilleto which have been recently acquired by the University Library, are two interleaved copies of the edition of the Rhetoric printed at the Oxford University Press in 1826. One of these, which is in bad condition owing to many years of use, contains a large number of annotations of very unequal value, written in various hands; in the other, which bears on the title-page the name Richard Shilleto with the date Dec. 15, 1863, apparently all the notes on which his matures judgment set any value, are copied out by himself in a hand rivalling that of Richard Porson for clearness and beauty. All these notes, and a few selections from the older book, with some trifling omissions, (parallel passages, for instance, already quoted at large in these volumes,) I have transcribed in full by permission of the Syndics of the University Library, and I append them here as an epilogue to Mr Cope's Commentary.]

BOOK I.

Α 1. 12, ἀναγεί δὲ αὐτῶν ἤττάσθαι] δι' αὐτῶν ἢ εἰς τὰ ῥητορικάν. Plat. Meno. 87 E, σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ ἑκαστὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποιά ἐστιν ἡ ἧμαι ὀρθεία. ὑγεία, φαμέν, καὶ ἴσιον καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ὀρθεία...ὑπατὰ δὲ ταυτά φαμέν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν.

1. [Ζ, σοφιστής μέν] Intellige; σοφιστής μέν (σοφιστής ἐστι), ...διαλεκτικὸς ἐ& 0; (σοφιστής ἐστι) κ.τ.λ.

2. 12, ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔγερσθαι ἢ ἕχειν] ἕχειν: Plat. Theaet. 183 A, 204 A, 1 Rep. 351 c inter ἔστων et ἕχει lis est in Codd. Editt.)


3. i, ἢ ἔφαρον εἶναι ἢ κρίθην κ.τ.λ.] Cicero Orat. Part. 3. 10, Quid habes igitur de causa dicere? Cicero Pater: Auditorum eam genere distinguui. Nam aut auscultato est modo qui audit, aut discipulo, id est rei sententiaeque moderator: ita, ut aut deletetur, aut statuat aliquid. Stā-
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tuit autem aut de praeteritis, ut iudex, aut de futuris, ut senatus. Sic
tria sunt genera, judicium, deliberationis, exornationes: quae quia in lau-
dationes maxime conferunt, proprium habetiam ex eo nomen. I de Ora-
tore 31. 141, (non negabo me didicisse) causarum...partim in judicis
versari, partim in deliberationibus: esse etiam genus tertium, quod in
laudandis aut vituperandis hominiibus poneretur. de invent. II 4. 12,
omnis et demonstrativa et deliberativa et judicialis causa...Aliud enim
laus aut vituperatio, aliud sententiae dictio, aliud accusatio aut recusatio
conscire debet. In iudicis quid aequum sit quaeritur, in demonstrationibus
quid honestum, in deliberationibus, ut nos arbitramur, quid honestum sit
et quid utile.

3. 8, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσόμενα οὐχ οἷον τοις κ.τ.λ.] alia collegit
Dem. Androt. 603, Mid. 532; Plat. Rep. IV 426 B, Dem. ἐν δός Φνομνον
907, i Aphob. 834, Aesch. Choeph. 64, 470, Plat. Symp. 204 A; Lucian,
I p. 22, Somnium 17; Bremi ad Aeschin. adv. Ctesiph. § 78; Lysis of
olea 108 St=264 R, Theomnset. 116 St=344 R et 117 St=350 R; Herod.

οὖθε...οὐ qv. [Rhet.] I § 5. 15; (ἀλλ’ οὐ, I II. 9.

4. 6, λήσεται] Anal. Pr. II 19, τούτω δ’ ἡμᾶς οὐ λήσεται διὰ τὸ εἰςδείναι πῶς
ὑπόκημεν τῶν λόγων. Τὸ λήσω, λήσομαι, disputavit Cobet Nov. Lect.
p. 265, 266.

5. 3, κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] dead and live stock, thing-chattles, man-
chattles.—Num Plat. Gorg. 511 D idem sibi vult? τὴν κυβηρυκηκήν, ἢ οὐ
μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει, ἀλλά καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

5. 11, ἢν τὸ γῆρας λαβότα] ἢν τῶν ἄνω (nominativus).

5. 13, τοιούτῳ μείζον δοτε μή...ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Transl. 'by an amount
just so far larger as not to render'. Si voluisset Ar. 'so that we make
our movements not more tardily', scripturus fuit poetius.

5. 15, οὔθε ἄλλος καὶ πολυχρώμος' οὔθ' ἄνεν] Quid si οὔθε άλλος καὶ
πολυχρώμος οὐκ ἄνεν...? Si vera lectio est, ἀλ. καὶ πολ. idem fere valet
quod πολυχρώμοις ἄλπος, ut in Tac. x. Ann. 5, continus inde et saevus
accusandis reis Suillus.—[οὔθ'] Bekk. st. De οὔθε...οὐ vid. ad I 3. 8.

6. 24, Κορυθίου δ’ οὐ μέμφεται τὸ "Ἰλιον" Schneidewin Simonides
de καὶ Σμυρνίδες διέτειν' Κορυθίοισι δ’ οὐ μανίς τὸ "Ἰλιον" οὐδὲ Δασάος
ἄμφιτρόπος γὰρ σύμμαχοι ἐγένοτο. Codex Korithioun οὐ μανίς, omissis τὸ
"Ἰλιον, tum Δασάοις, quae omnia restituit Boeckhlius. Numeri dissoluti.
Plutarch. Dion. I. Vox μερίων interpretationi cessit apud Aristot.
Rhet. I 6."

7. 14, δριστον μὲν ὅδιον] "So then I will conclude with the saying of
Pindaros ωτίμα res aqua; not for the excellency but for the common
MDCCXXX.

"το πολλάκις τού δυνάμις ὑπέρχει"] "degrees of well-doing there could

7. 21, δ’ κρισιν ἂν ἢ (vel) κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ παλλοί
(sapientes sive omnes sive quam plurimi; cf. II 23. 12) ἢ (aut) οἱ πλείουσ
ἡ (aut) οἱ κράτεσοι.
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9.41, ἕχομενοι] Cf. II 22.11, 16.

11.10, πεπόθαι] εἰσωθεία, II 20.6. ["Lobeck. ad Phrynich. p. 31" u.s.]

11.23, "Not only what is great strange or beautiful, but anything that is disagreeable when looked upon, please us in an apt description... for this reason therefore the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the imagination, if the image be represented to our minds by suitable expressions; though perhaps this may be more properly called the pleasure of the understanding than of the fancy, because we are not so much delighted with the image that is contained in the description, as with the aptness of the description to excite the image." Addison, Spectator, 418.


15.10, εφ' ὑπνόγοιν ὑπ. λ.] Cf. II 4.32. Suspensa et quo ducerentur inclinatura respondet, Tac. xi Ann. 34.


BOOK II.

B 1.1, αὐτῷ διακαλεσμένων πῶς] = οἶς κραν, sive ἐκληροστάλ sive diakastai.

2.5, ὁ ὑβριζω—[ἡ θή] I 13.10, οὗ γὰρ εἰ ἐπαύγει πάνω ὄμοιεν ἀλλ' εἰ ἔναι τοῦ, οἷν τοῦ πήμάσαι ἐκεῖνοι εἰ αὐτός ἔσθενα.

3.10, διάνυσαν ἀμα φαβέσθαι καὶ ὑγίεσθαι] "My affright at his baleful aspect begins to abate, and my hatred to arise," Scott, Kenilworth ch. xix. "Under this iron domination scarce a complaint was heard;
for hatred was effectively kept down by terror," Macaulay, *Hist. Eng.* 1 p. 628.

3. 13, πάντε... ὁμήρωσις τιμωρία πρόσφερεν] 'I have little doubt of procuring a remission for you provided we can keep you out of the claus of justice till she has selected and gorged upon her victims; for in this, as in other cases, it will be according to the vulgar proverb, "First come, first served."

Scott, *Waverley* ch. LXII. "After the first storm there is naturally some compassion attends men like to be in misery." Clarendon, *Rebellion*, Book I p. 3 b. οἷς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ αἱ τελευταῖα κρυμμέναι σώζονται πεπαυμένοι γάρ τις ὁμήρης αὐτῶν ἀκροβάθε, καὶ τοὺς ἀλήχων ἤδη ἠθέλουσις ἀποδέχεσθε, Lysias xix § 5 p. 152 St=166 R.

3. 17, αὐτοὺς...παρασκευάζοσι τιμῶσι] αὐτοὺς ι. e. τοὺς κριτᾶς. Cf. 9. 16. Quid sibi velit Bekkerianum αὐτῶν, me quidem latet.

4. 18, ἐδότας (τὰ τῶν πλησίον κακᾶ) 'Who make themselves acquainted with.' Thus Plutarch II 73 C, o δ' ἐγκείμενος οὖς καὶ πανταχύν τιμῶς καὶ ἀπερίφης, καὶ πάντα γινόσκοι καὶ πολοπραγμῶνα [from Shilteo's copy].


4. 32, ἤγειν] I 15. 10.

5. 17, ἢ πλείους...ἡ κρείττους...ἡ ἀμφό] vid. ad 12. 6.

6. 10, πάντα: vid. ad q. 3.

6. 20, τοὺς πρῶτον δεθέντας τι αλαχύνοντα] Plato Sophist. 217 C, μή τούσιν, ο ζείνει, ἢμῶν τὴν γε πρῶτην αληθητάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθέως γένη. Hinc explicandus locus Aristoph. in Nub. 1215, ἀλλὰ κριίττον ἢν εὐθὺς τότε ἀπεφθάνας i.e. μὴ αλαχύνεσθαι τοῦ δεθέντα.


8. 6, οὐ γὰρ ἔλεοσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι] Shakesp. K. *Leatr* v 3. 231.


9. 3, ἄπαιτοι] all who possess these two feelings (νέμισις and φόνοις).


SHILLETO'S ADVERSARIA.

Xen. Anab. ii 1. 5, § 159, Anm. 4." Transcribed from adv. on Aristoph. l.c."

9. 5. φθονούσι.] Plat. Phileb. 48 B, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονόν γ' ἐπὶ κακῶς τοῖς τῶν πείλαις ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

10. 11, ἀκόιομενοι [for whom a claim is put in.] Vid. nos ad Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 293.

12. 6, ἄμφω ταύτα] i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνικοι. Vid. ad Plat. Phil. p. 37 C. ["Plat. Theaet. p. 154 B, ἐλ δὲ τὰ παραμετροῦμεν ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἐκατον ἢ τοῦτων, i.e. μέγα ἢ λευκὰ ἢ θερμάν. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1 9 = 8, 13, καθ' αὐτᾶς δὲ ἐνεὼ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἠδέια, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθοῖς γε καὶ καλαῖς, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτων ἐκατον, i.e. ἐδο, ἀγαθῶν, καλῶν. Rhetor. II 12. 6, καὶ ἄμφω ταύτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι, i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνικοι. 5 17, ἤ τὰ πλεῖον οὖν οἷς ταύτα συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω." From Shilleto's copy of Badham's Philædis, l.c.]


21. 14, ἀγαν...ἀγαν] 'in excess,' ut servetur ο παραλογισμός.


23. 7, τοῦτο τις ἢ εἴπερ] tis eipher Bekk. ἢ εἴπερ A. An ἢ ἐπιτείμεν; 23. 20, οὐχ ἢν κτάωσι κάρωσι Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 391, "καὶ τυφλῶν δήλων legendum esse κάρων, ne senarius in prima sede habeatcreticum." Quiní mi num * * * ἢ κατάωσι κ.τ.λ.

25. 10, ἢν οὔτως ἀνθρώποι ἢν οὔτωσι λυθώ ἢ. Cf. infra ἢν λυθή.

BOOK III.


2. 3, ἢ περὶ [λαύν] μικρῶν] 'or if one speak about very trivial matters.'
2. 13, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον κατάτατρος] Quintil. X i. 6, cum sint aliiis alia aut magis propria.
5. 4, ποτέ] Dem. de fals. leg. § 260.
9. 8, ἐλθόντες δὲ υἱὲς] eis eis Lob. Var. Lect. p. 368. Si aeque ἐν υἱῶν (i.e. τοῖς δικαιαῖοι Aphob. i. 813 § 1) et παρ’ υἱῶν § 2, et i contr. Stephan. 1101 § 1, alibi, dicitur; quidnisi aeque dicatur ei υἱῶν et δε υἱὲς? Vide etiam ne elthontes possit defendi Aphob. i. c. eis δ’ υἱῶν τούτων αὐθεντών ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένος εἴλθεθεν.
11. 13, μύστα] luscitiosum (Gell. iv 2). Arist. xxxi Probl. 8, διὰ τί oί μύστεις μικρὰ γράμματα γράφοντες; ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ μὴ δεῖ ὁρῶντας ποικίν ἐργον δὲ ὁρῶντας πότερον ὅτι μεγάλα φαινότα τὰ μικρὰ ἢ ἡ ἡγίας’ oὶ δὲ προσάγοντες γράφοντες; ἢ δὲ τὸ συναγωνία τὰ βλέφαρα γράφειν; cf. 15 et 16... [From Shilleto’s older copy].
11. 14, ὁ Καρπάθων...τῶν γλαγά] “In Iceland, the reindeer were introduced by the Danish Government about the middle of the last century; but they are understood to have proved a nuisance instead of a benefit. They have not the wolf to check the tendency of their population to exceed the means of subsistence, and they have multiplied so as to devour the summer pastures on which the inhabitants depend for their cattle; and having been allowed to run wild they are of no use.” Laing, Norway p. 418.
14. 6, καὶ μὴ εἴθος ὁσσερ Ἐφραίμης, ἄλλα ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέν’ που] An ὁσσερ Ἐφραίμης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ προϊστρί γέν’ που?
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- β 7.41 indicates the notes in small print at the foot of the page.
- αφ. for apud denotes words and phrases quoted by Aristotle.

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ιεναι εις το κατα φυσιν
α 11. 3

ιεναι εις το κατα φυσιν
α 11. 3

ιεναι εις το κατα φυσιν
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όνομάτων ἔδη

όνομάτων...ονήματων

ἡ τῶν ὀνόματων (λήθη)

διπλοίς ὀνόμασι

ὁδεῖα (φωνή)

ὁδύναμοι

ὁδύναμος

ὁποτερονοῦν

ὁράσαθαι ἀτιχοῦντες

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περὶ ὀργῆς

ὁργὴν ἀναλύσωσιν

δι’ ὀργὴν ποιήσωσιν

eἰς ὀργὴν προάγωντας

πανεὶ ὀργήν ὁ χρόνος

τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ ὅδοι

ὁργίσαι

tῶν ὀργύλων καὶ τῶν μαυμάκων ἀπλῶν α 9.29

ὁργλοῦ

ὁργλαὶ ἡχουσιν

ὁργέσσαθαί, α 8.7; ὁργέμενοι,

ὁρεῖς

δεῖσαι αἱ ὀρέθεις

Ὀρίστη τῷ Θεοδόκτον

τόπος ἐξ ὁρίσμοι

ὄρκον δῖδωσι...ὄρκων λαμβάνει

περὶ ὀρκῶν τετραχός

ὁμή τοῦ ποιήματι

ὁμῆ [ἐνοὐδίας]

δ’ τι καὶ άξιον

ὁτι

τότος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἢν εἰθ

οὐ and μη

οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον

οὐδὲν ἠλθότερον τεχνοποίαι

ὄψει παρῆλθεν

παγίων

παγκρατιακὸς

διὰ πάθος

eἰς πάθος προαχθῶσιν

πάθος (various senses of)

πάθος ποιεῖν

πρὸς τῷ οἴκειῳ πάθει

πάθῃ τῆς ψυχῆς

πάθη τῆς ἀρετῆς

πάθῃ

δ’ ἢ νῦ τὰ πάθη ἐγγίζωται

παθῶν

περὶ τῶν παθῶν

παθημάτων

παθητική λέξες

παιάν

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παιδεία

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πεπαιδευμένοι

παιδιὰ τῶν ἠδίων

ἐν παιδίᾳ

παιδιαλ

τὰ παιδιὰ ηδείας

ἐπουσιασμέναι παιδίας

παιδία καὶ θηρία

παιδίστικος

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